Leakage mapping: A systematic methodology for assessing the side-channel information leakage of cryptographic implementations
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-2013
Abstract
We propose a generalized framework to evaluate the side-channel information leakage of symmetric block ciphers. The leakage mapping methodology enables the systematic and efficient identification and mitigation of problematic information leakages by exhaustively considering relevant leakage models. The evaluation procedure bounds the anticipated resistance of an implementation to the general class of univariate differential side-channel analysis techniques. Typical applications are demonstrated using the well-known Hamming weight and Hamming distance leakage models, with recommendations for the incorporation of more accurate models. The evaluation results are empirically validated against correlation-based differential side-channel analysis attacks on two typical unprotected implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard.
Source Publication
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (ISSN 1094-9224)
Recommended Citation
Cobb, W. E., Baldwin, R. O., & Laspe, E. D. (2013). Leakage mapping: A systematic methodology for assessing the side-channel information leakage of cryptographic implementations. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 16(1), Art. No. 2. https://doi.org/10.1145/2487222.2487224
Comments
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