Quantifying DDS-Cerberus Network Control Overhead

Andrew T. Park, Air Force Institute of Technology
Nataniel Peck, Air Force Institute of Technology
Richard Dill, Air Force Institute of Technology
Douglas D. Hodson, Air Force Institute of Technology
Michael R. Grimaila, Air Force Institute of Technology
Wayne C. Henry, Air Force Institute of Technology

© 2022, This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply.

The "Link to Full Text" on this page opens the full article at SpringerNature.


Securing distributed device communication is critical because the private industry and the military depend on these resources. One area that adversaries target is the middleware, which is the medium that connects different systems. This paper evaluates a novel security layer, DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C), that protects in-transit data and improves communication efficiency on data-first distribution systems. This research contributes a distributed robotics operating system testbed and designs a multifactorial performance-based experiment to evaluate DDS-C efficiency and security by assessing total packet traffic generated in a robotics network. The performance experiment follows a 2:1 publisher to subscriber node ratio, varying the number of subscribers and publisher nodes from three to eighteen. By categorizing the network traffic from these nodes into either data message, security, or discovery+ with Quality of Service (QoS) best effort and reliable, the mean security traffic from DDS-C has minimal impact to Data Distribution Service (DDS) operations compared to other network traffic. The results reveal that applying DDS-C to a representative distributed network robotics operating system network does not impact performance.