Date of Award

9-2024

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Science

Department

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

First Advisor

Kenneth M. Hopkinson, PhD

Abstract

Side-channel attacks (SCAs) represent a sophisticated method by which attackers exploit indirect pathways, such as power leakage and electromagnetic emissions to glean sensitive information from microprocessors. These attacks analyze variation in power consumption during operations like data encryption to infer protected data, potentially compromising the security of the device. For example, observing the power draw differences when a device encrypts known data can also serve defensive purposes. Attacks often overlook emissions and power patterns, while focusing on avoiding network and host-based detection systems. This oversight presents an opportunity for security professionals to use SCAs to enhance system defenses by monitoring these side channels for anomalies that indicate unauthorized access or operations. The dual nature of SCAs necessitates a deeper understanding and strategic implementation of countermeasures in microprocessor architecture to safeguard against vulnerabilities while potentially harnessing these channels for defensive insights.

AFIT Designator

AFIT-ENG-MS-24-S-133

DTIC Accession Number

AD1308514

Comments

A 12-month embargo was observed for posting this work on AFIT Scholar.

Distribution Statement A, Approved for Public Release. PA case number on file.

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