Date of Award
4-3-2007
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Science in Cost Analysis
Department
Department of Systems Engineering and Management
First Advisor
Jeffrey S. Smith, PhD
Abstract
The monetary incentives used to motivate DoD contractors’ schedule performance on Acquisition Category One programs afford them the opportunity as a whole to earn billions of dollars in addition to their contract award. These incentives are paid 85-90% of the time regardless of schedule performance. While these contractors are paid to avoid delays, there is an indication the delay increases the contractor’s stock value. This research tested the theory that contract delays significantly impact the company’s stock returns. The results found both positive and negative reactions to a firm’s value. Delays caused by budget cuts tend to have a negative impact on a company’s wealth, while delays for other reasons such as a restructure or redesign tend to have a positive impact. The findings illustrate that shareholders are aware the impact delays could have on a program and react accordingly and quickly to the market. Undeniably contractors cannot control the program’s funding however; there is no incentive for a contractor to avoid other types of delays because of the wealth it generates for the company.
AFIT Designator
AFIT-GCA-ENV-07-M7
DTIC Accession Number
ADA500236
Recommended Citation
Leskowich, Jacqueline M., "Contract Delays: The Impact of Department of Defense (DoD) Contractors' Wealth" (2007). Theses and Dissertations. 3013.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3013