Dynamic Architectural Countermeasure to Protect RSA against Side Channel Power Analysis Attacks
The modular exponentiation operation used in popular public key encryption schemes such as RSA, has been the focus of many side channel analysis (SCA) attacks in recent years. Current SCA attack countermeasures are largely static. Given sufficient signal to noise ratio and a number of power traces, static countermeasures can be defeated as they merely attempt to mask or hide the power consumption of the system under attack. This paper introduces a dynamic countermeasure which constantly varies the timing and power consumption of each operation, making correlation between traces more difficult than for static countermeasures.
Information Systems, Technology and Management: 6th International Conference, ICISTM 2012
Barron J., Andel T.R., Kim Y. (2012) Dynamic Architectural Countermeasure to Protect RSA against Side Channel Power Analysis Attacks. In: Dua S., Gangopadhyay A., Thulasiraman P., Straccia U., Shepherd M., Stein B. (eds) Information Systems, Technology and Management. ICISTM 2012. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 285. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29166-1_33
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