Date of Award
Master of Science
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Barry E. Mullins, PhD
The increasing capabilities of commercial drones have led to blossoming drone usage in private sector industries ranging from agriculture to mining to cinema. Commercial drones have made amazing improvements in flight time, flight distance, and payload weight. These same features also offer a unique and unprecedented commodity for wireless hackers -- the ability to gain ‘physical’ proximity to a target without personally having to be anywhere near it. This capability is called Remote Physical Proximity (RPP). By their nature, wireless devices are largely susceptible to sniffing and injection attacks, but only if the attacker can interact with the device via physical proximity. A properly outfitted drone can increase the attack surface with RPP (adding a range of over 7 km using off-the-shelf drones), allowing full interactivity with wireless targets while the attacker can remain distant and hidden. Combined with the novel approach of using a directional antenna, these drones could also provide the means to collect targeted geolocation information of wireless devices from long distances passively, which is of significant value from an offensive cyberwarfare standpoint. This research develops skypie, a software and hardware framework designed for performing remote, directional drone-based collections. The prototype is inexpensive, lightweight, and totally independent of drone architecture, meaning it can be strapped to most medium to large commercial drones. The prototype effectively simulates the type of device that could be built by a motivated threat actor, and the development process evaluates strengths and shortcoming posed by these devices. This research also experimentally evaluates the ability of a drone-based attack system to track its targets by passively sniffing Wi-Fi signals from distances of 300 and 600 meters using a directional antenna. Additionally, it identifies collection techniques and processing algorithms for minimizing geolocation errors. Results show geolocation via 802.11 emissions (Wi-Fi) using a portable directional antenna is possible, but difficult to achieve the accuracy that GPS delivers (errors less than 5 m with 95% confidence). This research shows that geolocation predictions of a target cell phone acting as a Wi-Fi access point in a field from 300 m away is accurate within 70.1 m from 300 m away and within 76 meters from 600 m away. Three of the four main tests exceed the hypothesized geolocation error of 15% of the sensor-to-target distance, with tests 300 m away averaging 25.5% and tests 600 m away averaging at 34%. Improvements in bearing prediction are needed to reduce error to more tolerable quantities, and this thesis discusses several recommendations to do so. This research ultimately assists in developing operational drone-borne cyber-attack and reconnaissance capabilities, identifying limitations, and enlightening the public of countermeasures to mitigate the privacy threats posed by the inevitable rise of the cyber-attack drone.
DTIC Accession Number
Bramlette, Clint M., "Cyber-Attack Drone Payload Development and Geolocation via Directional Antennae" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 2247.