Evaluating Information Assurance Control Effectiveness on an Air Force Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System
Date of Award
Master of Science
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Jeffrey M. Hemmes, PhD.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are increasingly being connected to corporate networks which has dramatically expanded their attack surface to remote cyber attack. Adversaries are targeting these systems with increasing frequency and sophistication. This thesis seeks to answer the research question addressing which Information Assurance (IA) controls are most significant for network defenders and SCADA system managers/operators to focus on in order to increase the security of critical infrastructure systems against a Stuxnet-like cyber attack. This research applies the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) IA controls to an attack tree modeled on a remote Stuxnet-like cyber attack against the WPAFB fuels operation. The probability of adversary success of specific attack scenarios is developed via the attack tree. Then an impact assessment is obtained via a survey of WPAFB fuels operation subject matter experts (SMEs). The probabilities of adversary success and impact analysis are used to create a Risk Level matrix, which is analyzed to identify recommended IA controls. The culmination of this research identified 14 IA controls associated with mitigating an adversary from gaining remote access and deploying an exploit as the most influential for SCADA managers, operators and network defenders to focus on in order to maximize system security against a Stuxnet-like remote cyber attack.
DTIC Accession Number
Nielsen, Jason R., "Evaluating Information Assurance Control Effectiveness on an Air Force Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System" (2011). Theses and Dissertations. 1418.
Digital Communications and Networking Commons, Information Security Commons, Systems and Communications Commons