Date of Award
3-11-2011
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Science
Department
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
First Advisor
Yong C. Kim, PhD.
Abstract
Today's society has become more dependent on the integrity and protection of digital information used in daily transactions resulting in an ever increasing need for information security. Additionally, the need for faster and more secure cryptographic algorithms to provide this information security has become paramount. Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms provide the necessary increase in throughput, but at a cost of leaking critical information. Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks allow an attacker to exploit the regular and predictable power signatures leaked by cryptographic functions used in algorithms such as RSA. In this research the focus on a means to counteract this vulnerability by creating a Critically Low Observable Anti-Tamper Keeping Circuit (CLOAK) capable of continuously changing the way it functions in both power and timing. This research has determined that a polymorphic circuit design capable of varying circuit power consumption and timing can protect a cryptographic device from an Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA) attacks. In essence, we are effectively CLOAKing the circuit functions from an attacker.
AFIT Designator
AFIT-GCE-ENG-11-03
DTIC Accession Number
ADA540103
Recommended Citation
Falkinburg, Jeffrey L., "Dynamic Polymorphic Reconfiguration to Effectively “CLOAK” a Circuit’s Function" (2011). Theses and Dissertations. 1384.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1384
Included in
Computer and Systems Architecture Commons, Hardware Systems Commons, VLSI and Circuits, Embedded and Hardware Systems Commons