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Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

AFIT/GCM/LAC/98S-6

THE INTERACTION OF FEMA WITH AIR
FORCE STATESIDE
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OPERATIONS

THESIS

Jeffrey A. Merchant, 1st Lt, USAF

AFIT/GCM/LAC/98S-6

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AFIT/GCM/LAC/98S-6

THE INTERACTION OF FEMA WITH
AIR FORCE
STATESIDE CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OPERATIONS

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Logistics and Acquisition

Management of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

Air Education and Training Command

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Science in Contracting Management

Jeffrey A. Merchant

1st Lieutenant, USAF

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Abstract

Natural disasters can strike the U.S. at any time without warning. When an Air Force base is struck with disaster, the base as well as the surrounding area must interact with FEMA to initiate and sustain emergency relief operations. Policies and procedures must be in effect to ensure that affected personnel know what agencies to coordinate with to conduct relief efforts.

This research explores how the Air Force interacts with FEMA in a natural disaster situation that affects an Air Force base. A case study investigates how FEMA interacted with Grand Forks AFB during the 1997 flooding to determine the policies and procedures used by FEMA to coordinate the relief efforts.

This thesis analyzes the process of how the Air Force interacted with FEMA during an emergency response operation. It details the actual procedures of emergency relief operations between the Air Force and FEMA and analyzes differences between the stated procedures and the actual processes used in the emergency operations.

THE INTERACTION OF FEMA WITH AIR FORCE STATESIDE CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OPERATIONS

I. Introduction

Chapter Overview

Throughout history, the need for domestic contingency contracting performed within the United States has been seen repeatedly. Recent instances include hurricane relief at Homestead AFB, FL in 1992 and flood relief at Grand Forks AFB, ND in 1997. In such cases, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had an active role in coordinating with the Air Force to support relief efforts. Although FEMA's emergency response plans are designed to initiate support in both money and manpower, there exists no clear procedure detailing how FEMA coordinates with the Air Force in such catastrophes. In such circumstances, contingency contracting officers (CCOs) find themselves attempting to contract for needed services and supplies without knowledge of how to obtain proper funding from FEMA. According to past after action reports, there was no established policy dictating how the two agencies should interact. Furthermore, due to the many complicated steps and procedures involved with the activation of the Federal Response Plan, the procedures can be difficult to understand.

Background

In dealing with FEMA in a natural disaster condition, military services have noted one common problem: relatively little knowledge of how FEMA is supposed to work. During the flooding of Paducah, KY in 1993, an officer stated in an after action report that there was an "obvious lack of interagency coordination and there was no lead agency identified" (AAR, JULLS 11953-59519). According to the same report, there was no coordination point for the different agencies involved with the flood relief activities. Additionally, no Disaster Field Offices were established to coordinate the local, county, state, and federal response agencies.

Another report, stated that "little is known about FEMA" (AAR, JULLS 91552-76780). These reports indicate a need to establish how FEMA should effectively interact with Air Force contracting in times of a natural disaster. Because the mission of FEMA is to coordinate emergency response within the federal agencies, it is imperative that the Air Force establish a clear FEMA coordination process.

Problem Statement

The purpose of this thesis is to explore how Air Force CCOs could interact with FEMA personnel in the time of a stateside contingency on an Air Force Base. To determine the procedures involved between Air Force CCOs

and FEMA, the research seeks to define the process of how FEMA interacts with the military services, and to determine any discrepancies within the process.

Scope and Limitations

Many organizations take part in the Federal Response Plan to aid FEMA in reacting to a natural disaster. However, the focus of this study is to determine how the Air Force should effectively deal with FEMA in situations where an Air Force base is directly involved with the disaster relief efforts. Additionally, the other forces of the Armed Services should operate similarly with FEMA. Due to time constraints, only interaction between the Air Force and FEMA is considered. However, information derived from other services is considered if it is relevant to Air Force procedures for interaction with FEMA.

Many other aspects of emergency response could also be analyzed. Such problems include law enforcement in natural disasters as well as in civil riots. However, Air Force action officers need to know the process of how to respond to natural emergencies to have the correct appropriations and manpower available to get the job done as quickly as possible to ensure that losses in a natural disaster are minimized.

Additionally, many other primary and support agencies are also involved in the disaster relief efforts. However, this study focuses primarily on the process of how the Air Force interacts with FEMA where an Air Force base is directly involved with the disaster relief efforts.

According to the Federal Response Plan, the Air Force is considered an "Other Federal Agency," falling under the Department of Defense (DOD) (Federal Response Plan, 1998: 32).

Research Objectives

To explore whether a discrepancy exists between the actual process implemented between the Air Force and FEMA emergencies on base and the procedures outlined in the Federal Response Plan, four questions are investigated:

1. What is the Federal Emergency Management Agency?
2. What is FEMA's financial responsibility in stateside contingencies?
3. How do overseas and stateside contracting policies differ?
4. How has the process of FEMA emergency relief differed from procedures set forth in the Federal Response Plan?

Operational Definitions

Air Force contingency contracting can be divided into two categories: stateside and overseas. Contingency contracting is defined as

a situation involving the deployment of military forces in response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and order, political instability, or military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (Contingency Contracting Reference Book, 1-1)

A contingency is defined as

a situation involving the deployment of military forces in response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and order, political instability, or military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations and equipment. (Contingency Contracting Reference Book, pg. 1-1)

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines contracting as

purchasing, renting, leasing or otherwise obtaining supplies or services from non-federal sources. Contracting functions include preparation of descriptions (but not determinations) of supplies and services required, selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contracts, and all phases of contract administration. (FAR 2.101)

FEMA is the governmental unit responsible for the United States emergency management system. Emergency management is the process through which America prepares for emergencies and disasters, responds to them, recovers from them, rebuilds, and mitigates their future effects (Federal Response Plan, 1998: 1).

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) provides a policy that addresses the consequences of any disaster or emergency situation where there is a need for Federal response as outlined in the Stafford Act (Public Law 100-707), which is the law that establishes procedures for natural disasters. The FRP applies to all natural disasters including earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, tornadoes, and floods. The FRP describes the processes involved when the Federal

Government mobilizes and allocates resources to augment state and local areas in emergency response efforts (Federal Response Plan, 1998: 1).

Thesis Overview

Chapter II reviews the current information available as to how the Air Force and FEMA interact together in national emergencies. In this chapter, FEMA operations and overseas and stateside contingency contracting are defined. Additionally, information gathered as to how FEMA interacted with Homestead AFB is reviewed and analyzed to see how FEMA operated in 1992 as a base comparison to its contemporary operation. Chapter III describes the methodology for incorporating a proper process for Air Force interaction with FEMA. Chapter IV is a case study of how FEMA interacted with Grand Forks AFB during the flooding of 1997. In this chapter I will examine the procedures of interaction between the Air Force and FEMA personnel. Finally, chapter V offers recommendations for improved interaction between FEMA, the Air Force, and Air Force contracting.

II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview

This literature review summarizes information from several sources. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section combines information found in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Federal Response Plan and the FEMA Strategic Plan to describe FEMA and its functions in a stateside emergency situation. The second section concentrates on Air Force stateside contingency contracting. Finally, the third section evaluates information from the Air Force interaction with FEMA during the Hurricane Andrew destruction of Homestead AFB. To date, little information has been published linking the two agencies in any capacity greater than that of FEMA as a principal agency and the Air Force as an "Other Federal Agency" (Federal Response Plan, 32).

History of FEMA

In September of 1979, President Carter approved the Federal Emergency Management Agency. He established FEMA through the passage of Executive Order 12148, which "transferred functions and responsibilities associated with Federal emergency management to the Director, FEMA" (Federal Response Plan, C-7). Executive Order 12148 also established that the Director of FEMA has the responsibility of establishing Federal policies "for and to coordinate all

defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of Executive Agencies" (Federal Response Plan, C-7).

FEMA originally had four functions: (1) to anticipate, prepare for and respond to major civil emergencies with an official responsible to the President; (2) to broaden the scope of the civil defense system to be organized, resourced, and prepared to cope with any threatening disaster; (3) to coordinate and plan for the emergency deployment of routine federal resources in support of catastrophic events; and (4) to closely link federal hazard mitigation with emergency preparedness (Bradshaw, 1993: 2). However, FEMA's authority was not commensurate with its responsibilities. FEMA was plagued by high turnover in its top management during its first two years. Also, several other agencies retained operational control of their emergency response responsibilities. To make matters more difficult, FEMA lacked a mission statement. Therefore, it relied on existing laws and executive orders to establish its authority and responsibility (Bradshaw, 1993: 3-4).

In 1982 FEMA developed and approved a mission statement that established its responsibilities. Then, in 1988, President Reagan passed Executive Order Number 12656, which assigned emergency preparedness responsibilities to Federal departments and agencies. FEMA was then finally able to begin to consolidate all federal planning and responsibilities for emergency management activities (Bradshaw, 1993: 4).

FEMA Today

Today FEMA has a strategic plan consisting of both a vision and a mission statement. Its vision includes generating support for a nationwide commitment to the protection of U.S. citizens from natural and man-made hazards (FEMA Strategic Plan, 1997; 7). Its mission is to

provide the leadership and support to reduce the loss of life and property and protect our institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based, all hazards emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. (FEMA Strategic Plan, 1997; 5)

FEMA relies on local and state programs to respond to the majority of natural disasters. However, when a natural disaster overwhelms local and state government agencies, these governing bodies turn to the Federal Government for help. Once the President of the United States has declared a major disaster, "FEMA coordinates not only its own response activities but also those of as many as 28 other Federal agencies that may participate" (FEMA Strategic Plan, 1998:1). The many Federal agencies then help the states and areas affected by the disaster by providing services, resources, and personnel to perform the necessary functions. Such functions may be supplying food and/or transportation, providing potable water, providing temporary housing, providing generators, and providing medical supplies.

Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act

Known as the Stafford Act, the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act (Public Law 100-707), provides

an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which results from disasters. The President, in response to a State Governor's request, may declare an emergency or major disaster, in order to provide Federal assistance under the Act. The President, in Executive Order 12148, delegated all functions, except those in section 301,401, and 409, to the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Act provides for the appointment of a Federal Coordinating Officer for the purpose of coordinating state and local disaster assistance efforts with those of the Federal Government. (Federal Response Plan, 1998: C-2)

Federal Response Plan

The Federal Response Plan is a consortium of 28 Federal agencies, led by FEMA. It calls for 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), which are headed by a primary agency. Each of these agencies is responsible for a particular response effort. The ESFs are Transportation, Communications, Public Works and Engineering, Firefighting, Information and Planning, Mass Care, Resource Support, Health and Medical Services, Urban Search and Rescue, Hazardous Materials, Food, and Energy. FEMA works with all 28 agencies to help coordinate assistance in each situation.

Funds

After a disaster occurs, but before presidential declaration, FEMA will reimburse "Other Federal Agencies" (OFAs) for personnel, travel, and logistical assistance as part of the preliminary damage assessment or support to FEMA. Reimbursement is provided under the authority provided in section 304 of the Stafford Act. To ensure that agencies will be reimbursed for their actions, three actions must first take place. First, the Governor of the affected state must request that the President declare the state a major disaster. Second, the President must declare the state a major disaster or emergency area. Finally, FEMA activates an Emergency Support Function or Functions.

The FEMA Resource Director then activates an ESF by telephone call, followed by written communication. This written communication is traditionally called a "mission assignment letter." The letter states the initial funding limitation and any requirements to be followed. The letter is an obligating document for FEMA and the funding limitation becomes a credit to the agency's reimbursable account. The agency later seeks reimbursement from FEMA against that mission number, which acts as the account number (Federal Response Plan 1998: 32-35).

Procedure

The procedure for allocating funds is complex. Many checks and balances exist to ensure that needed funding is approved. Following is a list of

the procedures for allocating funds in a crisis situation after the presidential declaration of an emergency.

-The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress approves FEMA a supplemental budget request to sustain operations for approximately three weeks.

-After two weeks, additional estimates are made and a second emergency supplemental appropriation will be made.

-A FEMA financial management unit is established in each Disaster Field Office (DFO) to support the Federal Coordinating Officer and senior FEMA official responsible for FEMA funds, which usually is the FEMA Regional Director.

-The FEMA Chief Financial Officer is usually the senior Federal financial official. He is responsible for the requests for supplemental relief funds under the Stafford Act, and he advises the Chairman of the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG) on financial matters in this situation.

-The CDRG is the "headquarters-level coordinating group which addresses policy issues and support requirements from the FCO and ESF response elements in the field (FRP, pg. 16).

-The Chief Financial Officer provides a Senior Financial Services Officer (SFSO) at each Disaster Field Office area to respond to financial problems and coordinate with the FEMA Chief Financial Officer on financial issues in the field.

-Each department and agency identifies a single point of contact for financial matters and informs the Senior Financial Services Officer of that information.

-Each department and agency identifies a headquarters level point of contact for financial matters and informs the FEMA Chief Financial Officer.

-If the ESF primary agency needs a support agency, the primary agency informs FEMA and recommends its funding needs. FEMA then confirms the mission assignment to the support agency in writing and provides a fund limitation.

Funding from FEMA. Each primary agency is responsible for notifying FEMA of the funds in needs to support a mission. Agencies must keep in constant contact with the support agencies in this regard. Funding is requested through the identification of the mission assignment number. Reimbursable actions are limited only to those authorized under the Stafford Act. Additionally, funding costs should not be exceeded without prior approval from FEMA. Documentation of expenditures is not sent to FEMA. Rather, it is used to substantiate claims in time of audits by FEMA upon closeout of the emergency phase.

Agencies may request reimbursements of amounts greater than \$25,000 at any time. Such requests are submitted directly to FEMA. Reimbursement is accomplished in several ways. The first method is submission of Standard Form

1080, "Voucher for Transfers Between Appropriations and/or Funds." The second method is submission of Standard Form 1081, "Voucher and Schedule of Withdrawals and Credits." The other two methods are the On-Line Payments and Collection process (OPAC) and cash disbursement by electronic transfer or check. No one process is more appropriate than another method. However, the OPAC process is the most expeditious and preferred method by FEMA, for reimbursement of funding.

Many times agencies need reimbursement for contracts in an emergency situation. Such needs include potable water, drinking water, sanitary disposal, and food. In these situations, the agency should provide a listing of each contract and its associated costs.

Contingency Contracting

Both overseas and domestic contingency operations involve the same fundamental procedures. When an area is declared a contingency operation, the same policies and procedures are established for both types of contracting efforts.

Overseas contingency operations involve deploying to a foreign country in support of an established operation. Such operations have included Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Desert Storm and Desert Watch in Saudi Arabia, and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. In each of these operations, contracting officers have been responsible for establishing contracts for potable and non-

potable water, sanitation, housing, base sanitation, mortuary services and the like. The contracting officers on the base must purchase all services, supplies, and construction.

In a domestic emergency, the President declares the situation a crisis. Contracting officers are deployed to the emergency when dealing with an emergency affecting a military base. Examples include the relief efforts associated with Hurricane Andrew at Homestead AFB and the flooding at Grand Folks AFB. Contingency Contracting Officers purchase much the same commodities, services, and construction in this case as in overseas contracting. The major difference would be that stateside contracting has the advantage of easier transportable supplies and personnel. Additionally, CCOs do not have to overcome a language barrier in specifying their needs.

Homestead AFB Introduction

The research conducted on Homestead AFB consisted mainly of newspaper article accounts and After Action Reports (AARs) of the emergency efforts. To obtain additional information, two interviews were also conducted by phone with Air Force personnel stationed at Homestead AFB at the time that Hurricane Andrew struck the base.

Background. The destruction of Homestead Air Force Base occurred between the days of 23-25 August 1992. This disaster was the most damaging

storm in Florida's history (Williams, 1992: A4). The damage exceeded 30 billion dollars in damage and over 90% of the buildings in the area were destroyed (Clary, 1992: A1). During the restoration operation, a total of over 19,400 troops were dispatched to the city of Homestead, including 5,700 National Guardsmen (Clary and Harrison, 1992: A1).

FEMA, the only authorized agency to coordinate all other agencies, did not provide adequate notification of procedures to governmental agencies. Military agencies cited a lack of familiarity with the FEMA structure, rules, capabilities, and mission as hampering rapid deployment of forces (JULLS 91552-76780, 1992; 1). This lack of familiarity caused confusion within the various military agencies as to who was responsible for which relief operation. Another after action report suggested that FEMA should provide some kind of field agency training for command level individuals to quickly familiarize them in the event of an emergency (JULLS 331102-56798, 1993; 2).

Emergency Response. During the emergency process, FEMA was criticized for taking four days to respond to the emergency after waiting for the Florida governor, Lawton Chiles, to request federal aid from the President of the United States (Ingwerson, 1993: 6). Initially, Governor Chiles activated over 5,700 National Guardsmen to restore the community of Homestead. However, according to Kathleen Hale, an emergency-management director in Dade County, FL, "with Andrew, we couldn't provide the immediate responses we

should have been able to, and FEMA didn't come in until four or five days after the storm" (Nolan, 1993: 3). Therefore, evidence suggests that FEMA did not react quickly and efficiently. Furthermore, FEMA inspectors were more than a week overdue in arriving at the city of Homestead. Consequently, local citizens had to wait in their devastated homes for the inspectors to declare them homeless to provide the area residents with rent money for other means of housing (Williams: 1992, 4).

Reactions to Hurricane Andrew. After evaluating FEMA's response to Hurricane Andrew, Robert Kupperman, senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, called for the dissolving of FEMA. He believed that it should be replaced with a smaller team managing emergency response within the White House, which could deploy the resources of the federal government with White House authority and overview (Ingwerson, 1993: 6). Kupperman added that

The Government really screwed up on this one. Here you had people out of their homes and jobs, farmers with their entire crops destroyed, and they took days and weeks on end to respond. I think we are kidding ourselves if we think FEMA is capable of dealing with any kind of big sustained emergency on the order of Hurricane Andrew.
(Boulard, 1993: 7)

According to Richard Krimm, associate director of FEMA at the time, "FEMA made a mistake with Hurricane Andrew by waiting for the states to tell us what they needed first" (Nolan, 1993: 3). Additionally, after the destruction of

Hurricane Andrew, a blue-ribbon team established to evaluate FEMA's emergency capability recommended that FEMA's top-secret national security functions be handed over to the military. Furthermore, the team recommended that a new domestic crisis unit be created in the White House to handle emergency response within the United States (Freda, 1993: A4). Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.), stated: "The nation needs a well-organized, effective emergency management system; the panel found it does not have one," [finding based on the nine-member committee created to research FEMA after Hurricane Andrew struck Homestead] (Freda, 1993: A4). Mikulski also stated in a hearing for the appropriations subcommittee for independent agencies, such as FEMA, that "the government's disaster response, run through FEMA, was widely seen by many of Hurricane Andrew's victims in Florida as a disaster itself" (Lipman, 1993: A5). Finally, Lou Bosner, a longtime FEMA employee and critic, stated that FEMA's response to Hurricane Andrew should result in the revamping of FEMA. According to Bosner,

These people in charge have been planning all these years for a massive Soviet Union attack. But when one county in Florida gets hit, they're saying they couldn't respond until they receive a request from the state. That's like a police officer saying that he can't respond to someone shot in the street because the guy didn't fill out a complaint form.
(Tuller, 1992: A3)

Results of Hurricane Andrew. President Clinton appointed James Lee Witt as the director of FEMA. Witt is the first director of FEMA with emergency-management experience, and he has focused on many large-scale reform

projects within FEMA. Most notably, he has converted FEMA from a reactive to a proactive agency, seeking to prepare for mobilization and giving state governors the information they need to properly seek emergency response as quickly as possible (Nolan, 1993: 3).

As a result of Hurricane Andrew, FEMA has become more involved with preparing for a disaster. It must still wait for the President of the United States to declare a disaster in a state to dispatch Federal aid. However, it now coordinates with states when an imminent disaster is known to possibly occur by use of weather forecasts. It now informs the Governor of appropriate actions, such as drafting a letter to the President of the United States requesting that the President declare the state a disaster. Furthermore, FEMA now informs the Governor to have the letter prepared and ready to fax as soon as relief is needed (Kilborn, 1993: A12).

After Action Reports. According to several After Action Reports, no clear understanding existed as to how agencies should interact with FEMA during the emergency response to Homestead Air Force during the Hurricane Andrew disaster. According to Major Schoch, U.S. Army, "There was a lack of understanding of how the civil relief agencies operated. This caused confusion on how to interface with FEMA, the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and the local governments" (AAR, 1994: Jull's Number 62233-39134). Colonel Biamon, U.S. Army, commented of FEMA's response to Hurricane Andrew, that "the ad hoc

nature of the relief effort provided conflicting guidance in tracking and directing supplies pushed in theater.” He also stated, “the lack of a joint logistics integration agency precluded the command and control of logistics in theater during the early stages of the relief effort” (AAR, 1992: Jull Number 91509-16618). Additionally, according to Colonel Barefield, U.S. Army, the “lack of familiarity with FEMA structure, rules, capabilities, and mission hampered rapid deployment forces and caused confusion about responsibilities during Hurricane Andrew relief operations” (AAR, 1992: Jull Number 91552-76780). Finally, Major Aitken, U.S. Army, stated that problems existed in billing/funding for materials purchased for the disaster relief. FEMA provided no funding data at the onset of the operation. Furthermore, since project code assignments to joint operations distinguishes the precedence between requirements with the same priority, such a code is necessary to determine what requirement is satisfied first. By not providing such codes, dummy codes (made-up codes) had to be used to order requirements, which resulted in a high dollar amount of unfunded requisitions (AAR, 1992:Jull Number 00227-92285).

Interviews with Individuals at Homestead AFB. According to interviews with individuals stationed at Homestead AFB at the time the Hurricane Andrew struck, the Air Force relied on its own efforts to recover from Hurricane Andrew's destruction. Most of the contracts on the base were terminated at that time, and

Air Force personnel were transferred off the base within one month. There was no interaction with FEMA on base (Mashburn).

According to another interviewee, FEMA personnel set themselves up in trailers in the community. At the time, FEMA received criticism for not responding quickly. However, this emergency was the first test of the Federal Response Plan and that it was "a growing experience for FEMA" (D'Angelo).

Analysis of Hurricane Andrew. Clearly, FEMA did not meet the expectations of anyone as the coordinating agency in its response to Hurricane Andrew at Homestead, FL. FEMA waited four days to send emergency relief to the area, and did not provide the proper coordination necessary between local, city, and military agencies. Furthermore, FEMA did not provide the training and awareness necessary before the disaster for any agency to properly work with FEMA. No agency seemed to have any kind of an idea as to how to properly coordinate with FEMA, and FEMA was working in an ad hoc manner. It created procedures as it deemed necessary, as evidenced in its lack of a funding system and sending housing inspectors to Homestead a week after the disaster to inspect families' homes. However, as mentioned in one interview, this was the first real test of the Federal Response Plan, which showed the many problems with the system. Finally, the magnitude of this disaster and the location of the destruction severely impacted the federal response (Hurricane's Lesson, 1992: B7).

Lorri Jean, a FEMA deputy regional director based in San Francisco felt that the destruction was inevitable regardless of FEMA's efficiency (Tuller, 1992: A3). She had this to say about the disaster relief efforts:

People have unrealistic expectations about what disaster experts can do in a tremendously catastrophic event, even when government operates at its best. And we've been screaming at Congress for three years for more resources. We have twenty people doing disaster work in this region, and that's just not enough. (Tuller, 1992: A3)

Need for Research

No one knows when a natural disaster will strike the United States. When a hurricane destroys a city, a flood wipes out a state, or a tornado ravages a town, one realizes the need for an emergency response plan. Currently, FEMA is dedicated to helping out with disaster relief during these times. However, when an Air Force base is associated with that disaster, no clear policy has been developed to dictate how the two agencies should join forces both in funds and in manpower. Due to the fact that natural disasters have directly affected the Air Force in the past, a need exists to explore this relationship to ensure that proper procedures are followed to shorten the response time and aid in the emergency efforts. As has been shown in the flooding situations and Hurricane Andrew, the coordination process has not been clearly developed. In many instances, the initial response time is critical to reducing the number of deaths and injuries suffered in a time of natural disaster. Only through evaluating the Air Force's current procedure of interacting with FEMA can an improvement to this process

be made. The intent of this study is to determine the process of how FEMA and CCOs should properly integrate both funding and manpower during a stateside contingency to effectively deal with a stateside natural disaster.

Summary

Little has been documented as to how the Air Force and FEMA actually interact. Only through after action reports of CCOs and other military members from various agencies can one determine how exactly these two agencies have worked together in past natural disaster relief efforts. FEMA does have its own response plan, which lists how it is supposed to coordinate with the various federal agencies. However, it is vague in its description of its operations with the Air Force. It is the intent of this thesis to determine how exactly the Air Force currently interacts with FEMA in a natural disaster to contract for services in disaster relief efforts. With this information, one could possibly improve the process of FEMA allocating funds and manpower to such Air Force efforts to aid in natural disaster relief efforts. Chapter III discusses the methodology used in this research, the population examined, the research instrument used, and the data analysis procedure.

III. Methodology

Introduction

This chapter examines the process of how the data was collected to address the research objectives. The case study approach was used to obtain information on how FEMA interacted with the Air Force during the flooding of Grand Forks AFB in 1997. The chapter concludes by discussing the population, research instruments used, and data analysis process.

Case Study Background

The intention of this research is to determine how FEMA has interacted with the Air Force in the past by studying the flooding at Grand Forks AFB. By examining federal regulations, which dictate FEMA's responsibilities in the time of a natural disaster (when declared by the President of the U.S.), one may discern whether a disconnect exists between procedure and practice in such a state of emergency. The method of research chosen is the case study. According to Robert K. Yin, three conditions can aid in determining the appropriate research strategy to use:

- the type of research question posed;
- the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral events;
- and the degree of focus on contemporary events as opposed to historical events. (Yin, 1989:16)

In examining whether a disconnect exists between FEMA policy and practice in a natural contingency operation, the researcher is examining both how the Air Force should interact with FEMA and why the procedure may or may not have operated as intended by the Federal Response Plan. These two elements of the research “are likely to favor the use of case studies” (Yin, 1989:19). The research seeks to determine how FEMA actually operates in an emergency situation, and then it examines possibly why it operates effectively or ineffectively. Case studies often concentrate on the examination of one or only a small number of cases, and the object of analysis is often the organization, departments in organizations, or inter-organizational networks (Bryman, 1989:30). Additionally, Yin states that the case study is used in many settings, including:

- 1) policy, political science, and public administration research;
- 2) community psychology and sociology;
- 3) organizational and management studies;
- 4) city and regional planning research, such as studies of plans, neighborhoods, or public agencies. (Yin, 1989:13)

Given the nature of this research, all four settings apply. Therefore, the case research methodology is the most appropriate means for this research.

“Exploration is particularly useful when researchers lack a clear idea of the problems they will meet during the study” (Cooper and Emory, 1995:117).

Therefore, according to Cooper and Emory, this research is clearly exploratory in

nature. Since no research has been performed in how FEMA interacts with the military, "the area of investigation may be so new or so vague that a researcher needs to do an exploration just to learn something about the problem. Important variables may not be known or thoroughly defined" (Cooper and Emory, 1995:118). Since no previous studies have been conducted in this area of research, this study necessitates the use of exploratory research.

The use of the case study has one definite problem, generalization. In this study, the sample size consists of only one case. Because the sample size is so small, case studies do not provide a statistical basis to generalize the research results of a single case as representative of a wider population (Bryman, 1989:172). However, case studies can be useful in the "understanding of areas to achieve new insights that are useful for building theory" (Bryman, 1989:173-174). Additionally, due to the exploratory nature of the research, personnel located in this study who were involved with the interactions between FEMA and Grand Forks AFB were questioned as to their involvement with the emergency situations. Therefore, information is limited to interviews of personnel involved with the Grand Forks flooding who could be located and to the details that those personnel remember of the disasters.

Population

The population consists of those personnel involved with the flooding at Grand Forks. Grand Forks AFB is located in North Dakota. Several Air Force

personnel involved with the emergency operations at Grand Forks AFB were questioned about their interaction with FEMA in this situation.

Grand Forks AFB, ND was chosen because the area sustained great damage in an emergency disaster. Additionally, it is an Air Force base, which demonstrates how the Air Force interacted with FEMA in an emergency situation. Finally, this case provides a current perspective of how FEMA has changed in its emergency response posture compared to its past relief endeavors.

Research Instrument

The data were collected through the use of federal publications, archival data, after action reports (AARS) and personal interviews. The personal interview allowed for the gathering of more detailed information, which could not have been gathered through archival data. The interviewer used unstructured questions, which are those that "do not have a limited set of responses but do provide a frame of references for respondents' answers" (Cooper and Emory, 1995:299). Questions were developed based on the needs of the Contingency Contracting School at Lackland Air Force Base. However, respondents were allowed to divert from the questions and provide other information pertinent to the interview. Using this type of interview, the interviewer was able to explore the research object and further explore those interviewed who had greater experience or involvement in the cases studied. Exploratory follow-on questions

were ad hoc. As more pertinent information to the subject was discovered in the interviews, it was used in subsequent interviews.

The interviews were conducted by phone. The interviewer contacted the individuals who had experience in both cases, and asked them if they were willing to answer questions about both case studies. All respondents agreed to participate in the interviews, and the interviewer asked them questions over the phone. Respondents included military enlisted members working as contracting officers, a commander of the support group (O-6), the Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer (civilian), and the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (O-6). All respondents interviewed were male.

Data Analysis

Data analysis was conducted by interpreting the data collected through interviews, archival data, and federal publications. By evaluating all of the data collected, the researcher was able to make general findings as to how FEMA operates in an emergency situation. The researcher evaluated any discrepancies in FEMA's operations by examining how FEMA operated in real emergency responses as opposed to its response plan. Additionally, differences were noted between the archival data/AARs and official policy to determine whether the discrepancy between what the literature indicated was the correct process and how personnel believed the process either worked or failed in various dealings with FEMA.

Summary

This chapter discussed the research methodology, population, research instrument, and data analysis procedure. Unstructured interviews and archival data were used to construct the case study. Chapter IV presents the results of the data gathering procedures.

IV. Results and Analysis

Introduction

The objective of this research is to determine how Air Force CCOs should interact with FEMA in an emergency response. To do this, the researcher has evaluated written official procedures outlined in the Federal Response Plan and performed a case study of the interaction between the Air Force and FEMA during the Grand Forks AFB flooding. This chapter presents the data collected from the interviews, after action reports, and archival data from emergency response to the flooding at Grand Forks AFB, ND.

Grand Forks Flooding

On April 18th, 1997, the Red River in Grand Forks, ND overflowed the Lincoln dike to begin "North Dakota's worst disaster ever" (WDAY; 1998). By the next day, the waters covered large areas of the city, and 60,000 of the city's residents had been forced out of their homes (Draves; 1998).

Despite the great destruction associated with the flooding, the disaster did not begin with the flooding. On April 4th, 1997, Blizzard Hannah struck the area. On the 7th of April, President Clinton declared the area a disaster due to the severe power outages resulting from the blizzard. On the 16th of April, the residents of Grand Forks were warned by government officials to evacuate the area due to the rising level of the Red River as the snow melted (Looking Back;

1998). By April 18th, the residents of Grand Forks had been preparing for the flooding, but to no avail as the Red River broke through the dikes and quickly covered over 75% of the city of Grand Forks and affected up to 95% of the population (Salter; 1997). On April 22nd, President Clinton surveyed the Grand Forks destruction with FEMA director James Lee Witt and pledged more money to the affected counties (Looking Back; 1998).

Air Force Contingency Contracting During Grand Forks Floods

The contracting officers at Grand Forks AFB overcame great obstacles in dealing with the flooding. The flooding was unprecedented in the area. Due to the destruction, almost 90% of the city of Grand Forks had to be evacuated. Since this flood directly affected the city of Grand Forks, many of the off-base Air Force personnel were also directly affected. Therefore, the base responded quickly by providing the local citizens of Grand Forks and dislocated Air Force personnel with equipment and shelter. The 319th Contracting Squadron took the lead in these efforts (Burton AAR).

Finance provided an initial funding of \$180,000 using an AF Form 616 (a funding document) to obligate funds for contracting to make initial emergency purchases. Later, contracting was given an appropriation of an additional \$500,000. Throughout this operation, CCOs contracted for many requirements in support of this disaster relief. They purchased portable toilets for the 4,000 to 5,000 people to be sheltered on the base in the 3-bay hangar. The CCOs also

purchased bottled water, water for the base water supply, pumping and cleaning service for the portable toilets, 150 tables, 400 folding chairs, bus service, plates, napkins, and cable television for the shelters (Burton AAR).

Air Force Perceptions

Colonel Michael Collings was the Support Group Commander during the time of the Grand Forks AFB flooding. He was responsible for determining what items were needed in support of the emergency operations during the flood. In performing his duties, he determined what supplies should be purchased, and he was responsible for coordinating with FEMA. According to Colonel Collings, there was a miscommunication between the FEMA Disaster Coordinating Officer and himself as to how to approach the disaster relief operation. Consequently, there was no response process activated through FEMA, and the Air Force took care of its own people.

Funding. According to Colonel Collings, FEMA was initially directly accountable for the funding given to Grand Forks AFB. During the first few days, the Air Force had to request FEMA's permission to buy anything it felt necessary to support relief operations. However, FEMA gave the Air Force the authority to determine the necessary expenses needed to support the operation. The process then changed to the Air Force notifying FEMA what it was procuring

and requesting a control number from FEMA to track the funds. FEMA then reimbursed the Air Force using that control number to track the funds (Collings Interview).

Coordination. Initially, FEMA was the control point. However, according to Colonel Collings, since there was no direct interaction with FEMA, the Air Force was in charge of the disaster operation. Collings noted that FEMA was content to allow the Air Force to continue emergency operations even though the Air Force had to continue its flying mission (Collings Interview).

Resources Provided. According to interviews, FEMA provided resources in the form of reimbursements for authorized purchases. It did not provide any additional manpower or direction (Collings Interview).

Assistance. The Air Force used forecasts and weather reports to predict the severity of the flooding. When the river flowed over the dikes of the Red River, the city of Grand Forks flooded. It was shortly after that that the Governor requested that the President declare the area a state of emergency (Collings Interview).

The largest problem for the Air Force was providing logistical support, such as the communications within the city and moving people from the city to

safe housing, i.e. hangars. The city had not planned for a great destruction of this magnitude. Therefore, the Air Force provided assistance in reestablishing the city's communication grid and relocating the citizens to safe areas on base.

Contracting Procedures. SSgt Richardson from the 319th contracting squadron was a CCO at Grand Forks AFB during the flooding at Grand Forks AFB, ND. She stated that according to her squadron's operating procedures a Blanket Justification and Approval (J&A) was designed and signed by the commander of the contracting squadron that allowed the contracting office to buy needed items without competition. According to FAR Part 2.101, competition is required for all purchases over \$2,500. Additionally, FAR 13.003 states that the simplified acquisition procedures will be used for all supply and services acquisitions exceeding \$2,500 but below \$100,000. However, the office increased the small dollar threshold to \$200,000 during this disaster to ensure that the CCOs were able to purchase needed items without having to go through the process of competition. The process becomes more involved with the amount of competition required and the regulations guiding the action.

Additionally, FAR 2.101 states that

Contracts awarded and performed, or purchases made outside the U.S. in support of military contingency, humanitarian, or peacekeeping operations, the simplified acquisition threshold is increased to \$200,000 allowing use of simplified acquisition procedures.

Using a Blanket Justification and Approval document, MSgt. Burton, Superintendent and Contracting Officer for the 319th Contracting Squadron at Grand Forks AFB, cited Unusual and Compelling Urgency, FAR 6.302-2 for using other than competitive measures. The CCOs in the office were then able to make purchases over \$2,500 without competition to ensure speedy acquisition of necessary supplies such as rental of water hauling trucks, rental of Porta-Johns, cleaning of Porta-Johns, water pumps, paperware, tables and chairs, floodlights, and drinking water (Burton Justification & Approval).

IMPAC Card. During the flooding, the 319th Contracting Squadron set up a contingency office. The office used the IMPAC card to procure items up to \$200,000. IMPAC is the abbreviation for the International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card. It is a VISA credit card issued to the government used to purchase supplies and services up to \$2,500. During the emergency relief efforts, the CCOs had to rely heavily on the use of the IMPAC card to purchase the necessary supplies. However, not all contractors were able to accept the IMPAC card because they were either not set up to accept credit cards or not able to do so due to the debilitating conditions of their companies. Therefore, the CCOs had to use the Standard Form 44 (SF44).

SF44. The Standard Form 44 is a Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher. It is used in the time of a contingency when computerized purchase orders, such as

the DD Form 1149, can not be used. It is a simplified purchase order made out by hand. Following is a description of its salient characteristics:

- a. Prior to initiating any procurement using an SF 44, ordering officers must ensure—
 - (1) Sufficient funds are available. A DA Form 3953, Purchase Request and Commitment Form, signed by a budget officer must be in place prior to the ordering officer entering into any transactions.
 - (2) The purchase amount of any one transaction does not exceed the dollar limitation specified in the appointment letter. (The requirement will not be split to avoid this dollar limitation.)
 - (3) The supplies or services are available from the local trade area.
 - (4) One delivery of over-the-counter supplies or services and one payment will be made per SF 44.
 - (5) The price is fair and reasonable.
 - (6) The purchases are rotated among sources of supply when possible.
- b. The ordering officer must—
 - (1) Prepare the Standard Form 44.
 - (2) Comply strictly with all provisions of the appointment letter.
 - (3) Maintain a register of orders issued and copies of each SF 44 with supporting documents.
 - (4) Promptly report individual transactions made during the month and at the completion of the operation. (Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Manual: Appendix G-2)

CCOs at Grand Forks AFB used the Standard Form 44 to purchase supplies from contractors who could not accept credit cards.

Contracting Office. The office was set up in 12-hour shifts to ensure 24-hour availability. Purchases included portable bathrooms, potable water,

drinking water, toiletries, and items to sustain the people housed at Grand Forks AFB. Contracting had no interaction with FEMA. The office sent its purchases to finance, and the authorized purchases were reimbursed. However, the contracting office had no knowledge of how FEMA operated during the relief efforts.

FEMA Response

Peter Bakerski was the Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer, Operations Chief, and Mission Assignment Coordinator during the relief efforts at Grand Forks AFB. During the operation, he delegated the functions of Operations Chief and Mission Assignment Coordinator to members of the Emergency Response Team and coordinated the response as the Deputy FCO. According to his interview, the relationship between Grand Forks AFB and FEMA had been established prior to the disaster. Grand Forks AFB was identified as the Base Support Installation (BSI) to the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). Additionally, the state had already been declared a disaster area by the President in the early part of April due to a severe blizzard and power outage for the state. Therefore, by the time of the flooding, the Federal Response Plan had already been activated for the blizzard. The following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) had already been activated and were in place: ESF 1, Transportation; ESF 3, Public Works and Engineering; ESF 5, Information and Planning; ESF 6, Mass Care; ESF 7, Resource Support; ESF 8, Health and

Medical; and ESF 12, Energy. The DCO had also been deployed to Bismark, ND to support the state emergency relief efforts. According to Bakersky, “the relationship with GFAFB was maintained throughout the disaster as the base was the mobilization site for Federal assets deployed to Grand Forks.” Additionally, FEMA was in constant contact with Grand Forks Air Force Base Operations and Logistics during the flooding (Bakersky Interview).

FEMA Interaction with GFAFB. According to Bakersky, once FEMA was able to identify the various points of contacts between GFAFB and FEMA, the relationship worked well. However, there was some initial confusion as to various individuals’ roles and responsibilities (Bakersky Interview).

The response times varied as to the nature of the requests and the availability of the resources. Initially, when loss of life was potentially imminent, verbal requests were received and acted upon rather than waiting for the administrative paperwork. “Actions in this category were accomplished in as little as twenty minutes” (Bakersky Interview).

Funding. There were two methods of fund request. The first request for GFAFB support came from the state of North Dakota through FEMA. In such a case, reimbursement was made based on the mission assignment number. GFAFB would request reimbursement, and FEMA would assign a tracking number associated with the mission assignment number used to identify the

disaster relief effort. The flooding of Grand Forks was mission assignment number 1174. Therefore, FEMA would assign a tracking number that would be attached to the 1174 number to trace reimbursable purchases in support of the disaster relief efforts.

The second request for GFAFB support came from the locals under the "Immediate Response." In this case, reimbursement was funneled through the state, to the county, to GFAFB (Bakersky Interview).

FEMA Involvement. According to Bakersky, the State is always in charge of relief efforts during a Presidential Declaration of emergency. Additionally, FEMA provided the coordination of federal assets to assist the state and provided resources that the state of North Dakota needed for its relief efforts, including generators, blankets, communications capability (Bakersky Interview).

The need for FEMA assistance was evident following the blizzard and ice storm that hit the state in early April. Flooding would be inevitable due to the severe snow build-up. When the flooding began, the Governor of North Dakota requested federal assistance from the FEMA Regional Office, which passed on the request to the President. At that time, the state of North Dakota did not have the resources to handle the magnitude of the disaster.

Contracting Procedures. The normal contracting procedures enacted under emergency conditions were used. However, the major difference was that

the contracting office expedited the process of acquisition and did not put out any contracts for bid.

Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO)

The EPLO is An individual who functions in support of the Service Regional Planning Agent to facilitate planning and execution of military assistance to other Federal agencies and State and local government under an "All Hazards" domestic emergency environment. (FORSCOM Regulation 140-12)

Colonel Kapitain was the EPLO for the state of North Dakota during the flooding disaster. According to Kapitain, the EPLO is intermediary who interacts with the military during such an emergency disaster as the flooding at Grand Forks AFB. The EPLO coordinates between the military and FEMA, ensuring that the mission is accomplished. He works with FEMA and the Base Support Installation to ensure that the base has enough manpower and that needed funding and resources are distributed to the base.

FEMA Interaction with GFAFB. According to Kapitain, FEMA never actually interacted with the base. Instead, he coordinated between the two agencies. Additionally, "FEMA would not directly interact with a base unless the Governor of the state would request such action" (Kapitain Interview). As Bakersky stated in his interview, Grand Forks AFB was set up as the Base Support Installation (BSI). "The BSI is normally the closest base to a catastrophe, which can be used as the focal point to bring in equipment and

support” (Kapitain Interview). Additionally, Grand Forks AFB and the city of Grand Forks had a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in place. This MOU dictated that GFAFB and the city would share costs between them to restore costs and security. The MOU also gave the base commander the authority to take necessary action to save lives without getting prior approval.

Funding. FEMA brought in its budget people to conduct an audit of the base’s expenditures. The command personnel then justified what expenses it incurred during the emergency relief effort.

FEMA Involvement. According to Kapitain, the Adjutant General of North Dakota was in charge during the operation, since it was a state operation. Additionally, FEMA was activated within 24 hours of presidential declaration of a natural disaster. FEMA did not interact with the GFAFB directly, but it did activate the Red Cross in the area. Furthermore, FEMA already had personnel in place in the area because of the severe snowstorms.

FEMA Resources. FEMA provided mostly manpower to the operation. As the EPLO, Kapitain coordinated the amount of manpower that Grand Forks AFB would provide to the rescue operation. However, the EPLO could not mandate that a commander give more than the required amount of personnel to

maintain its minimum mission requirements. Additionally, FEMA provided fifty pumps and generators to the operation from Florida.

FEMA assistance was known to be needed when 120 inches of snow fell on Grand Forks in one week. The normal snowfall is 19-20 inches in a year, and that series of snowstorms put the area into a state of emergency. However, FEMA knew that the snow would melt and flood the area quickly. Additionally, when the flooding of Grand Forks began, 95% of the highway arteries initially flooded. Since so many of the arteries had flooded, FEMA personnel knew that the side roads would be flooded also. Therefore, FEMA personnel were aware that emergency assistance would be needed immediately.

Challenges Encountered. There was one problem during the emergency relief effort. The Disaster Coordinating Officer (DCO) was an Army Colonel who is tasked with the additional duty of DCO. In such an emergency situation FEMA notifies the DCO of the affected area to set up a Disaster Field Office in the area of the emergency. During such an operation, the DCO is supposed to coordinate with the EPLO to ensure coordination between FEMA and the military. However, in the case of the flooding of Grand Forks, the DCO did not coordinate with the EPLO. Due to the lack of coordination from the DCO, the entire operation was hindered, and the emergency relief operations fell behind schedule (Kapitain Interview).

Analysis

Grand Forks AFB was designated the Base Support Installation for Grand Forks and the surrounding area, and the state emergency response action went into action. Figure 1 indicates that the Adjutant General was in charge of the relief efforts, and he worked with FEMA through the Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer, the State Coordinating Officer and the EPLO. The EPLO, in turn, worked with Grand Forks AFB to coordinate manpower from the base and provide any needed supplies. During that sequence of events, funding was distributed to GFAFB through its conventional method of reimbursing allowable costs and auditing the expenditures after the disaster.

Alternatively, the personnel at Grand Forks AFB, such as the Contracting personnel and the Support Group Commander, were not aware of the relationship between FEMA and the EPLO. The Support Group Commander, the military member at the base responsible for directing manpower and determining supplies and requirements, did not think that FEMA was involved in the disaster relief efforts. He believed he was in charge of the emergency relief effort and determining what the people of both the city and Grand Forks AFB needed. Additionally, the Contracting personnel merely responded to the threat by procuring what they were told to buy during the flooding. The Superintendent drafted a Blanket Justification and Approval document to allow the CCOs to procure items without competition, and the Contracting office became a Contingency Contracting Office subject to the rules and guidelines of




Figure 1. Disaster Relief Process for Grand Forks AFB

contingency contracting. However, no member of the contracting squadron knew that the base was interacting with FEMA. The CCOs merely purchased supplies and services, which had money obligated from finance. However, they relied on finance to submit the requests to FEMA for reimbursement.

The personnel at GFafb lacked knowledge about how FEMA interacts with the military in an emergency relief effort. Therefore, an effort must be made to align these organizations in a manner that allows them to effectively coordinate in the future. In an emergency relief operation, all organizations must know how the process works before the disaster occurs. Many different perspectives have been presented as to how personnel viewed the relief efforts at Grand Forks Air Force Base. The only common denominator is that relief was provided to the people of Grand Forks. Given the many different view points as to what happened, there was a lack of knowledge as to how the process of interaction is supposed to work between FEMA and the military. The Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer seems to be the coordinating link between the military and FEMA in an emergency relief effort. From the standpoint of FEMA and the EPLO, the relief effort seemed to operate without any problems, with the exception of the miscommunication between the DCO and the EPLO. The Governor requested that the President declare the state of North Dakota a disaster, which he did, and the Federal Response Plan was put into action.

Summary

This chapter presented the results of the interviews, after action reports, and literature. The information addressed how the personnel participated in the relief efforts of the flooding of GFAFB, and how they viewed the actions of the FEMA interaction process. Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations for further research.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

As reviewed in this case study, a disconnect existed between how FEMA was supposed to interact with the Air Force during a contingency on an Air Force Base and its actual application of the process. During a time of uncertainty of natural disasters, FEMA is tasked to be the coordinating agency during the time of crisis. However, if the coordinating agency is not doing its job, then other agencies will have to do their best to perform the necessary disaster relief operations. This chapter presents the findings of the case study of FEMA's interaction with the Air Force during the Grand Forks flooding. It addresses the research objectives introduced in Chapter 1, and it concludes with recommendations for better interactions between FEMA and the Air Force in the future. The chapter concludes with recommendations for further research.

Conclusions

Procedures do exist that guide how the Air Force is supposed to interact with FEMA during a relief effort. However, these policies are not widely known by Air Force personnel who administer the emergency aid. Rather, the policies seem to be difficult to distinguish since they are embedded within Army regulations and FEMA response plans. However, the EPLO does seem to be

the liaison between FEMA and the military organization participating in the emergency response efforts.

Given that the EPLO position is designed to provide a coordination officer between FEMA and the military in the time of a natural disaster, the EPLO program should be highly publicized within the Disaster Preparedness offices. The Army EPLO program should coordinate some kind of training to ensure that the Support Group Commander knows that it is the EPLO who coordinates with FEMA to ensure that the base military personnel receive the proper support needed, resources and funding. Air Force emergency workers need to know what agencies to interact with during a natural disaster. If no coordinating agency directs the base commanders, the commanders will perform emergency relief efforts using the resources at their disposal and worry about consequences after the fact. However, there is no need for actions not consistent with FEMA's emergency response plans because the EPLO program is in place to direct the military in a disaster situation that involves the military and FEMA.

Recommendations

Training. According to this case study, it would appear that military agencies should be informed of the process of interaction between FEMA and themselves. Only by informing all members involved with the emergency relief effort can the military effectively coordinate with FEMA and the state. Therefore,

the EPLO position responsibilities should be briefed to the base Support Group Commander and Disaster Preparedness personnel.

Air Force personnel need to know how the funding process works before they start committing funds during a disaster. It is only after a catastrophe that personnel seek guidance as to how to get reimbursed for expenditures in support of the mission. Therefore, FEMA and the EPLO program should provide training to the Base Commander, the Support Group Commander, the Finance Commander, and their representatives as to how to get reimbursed for disaster relief expenditures and what is an allowable expenditure.

Screen Military Personnel for FEMA Positions. The emergency response process can occur quickly and require immediate reaction. The position of Disaster Coordinating Officer is an important link between the military and FEMA. The DCO directly coordinates between the EPLO, who coordinates with the military, and FEMA. The position should either be a full-time job, or it must be assigned to someone capable of the responsibility as an additional duty.

Include FEMA and EPLO in Base Exercises. Bases could conduct exercises to rehearse the emergency response procedures used in the time of a natural contingency at least once a year to ensure personnel know the correct process. By doing so, they could also ensure that FEMA and EPLO are coordinating effectively to complete the mission. Discrepancies could be

examined during an after action conference. Only by training what to do in an emergency or disaster relief effort can the military ensure that it knows the correct procedures in a disaster response. Because the military will probably be assigned the responsibility to react in an emergency effort, it should be aware of the correct procedures to ensure mission effectiveness.

Train Contracting Officers of the EPLO Position. During a contingency operation, many times the CCO merely reacts to the situation without knowing exactly what to do next. The contracting squadron must provide support by purchasing the needed supplies and services. However, CCOs do not know how these supplies and services will be funded, or if they are accurately approved for the intended purpose. Because CCOs are responsible for obligating funds, they need to be aware of how they fit into the process. Therefore, the EPLO program should provide contracting offices with the required training to ensure proper involvement in a natural disaster relief effort. CCOs should be notified of their roles and their approval authorities. They should also know where funding for a purchase originates.

Study Limitations

This study dealt specifically with personnel on one Air Force Base and their interaction with FEMA during a natural contingency operation. Therefore, it is important not to generalize how FEMA interacts with the military based solely

on one case study. Additionally, one can not view the operations of this case study as being standard for all contingency situations. In the case of the Grand Forks flooding, blizzards preceded the flooding. Therefore, the President had already declared the state of North Dakota a disaster when Grand Forks flooded. This study only examines how the Air Force and FEMA interacted during the emergency relief efforts.

Suggestions for Further Study

This study focused primarily on how the Air Force has interacted with FEMA when the base was affected by a natural disaster. However, further research should be conducted as to how FEMA interacts with the other military agencies during emergency relief efforts to ensure that specific procedures are established and conducted for each agency. Additionally, research could be conducted concerning the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer program in effect by the Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM). That research could include the origin and duties of the EPLO program to determine whether proper procedures have been established by the Army to ensure that FEMA and the other agencies properly coordinate in an emergency operation. Additionally, further research could be conducted on how contingency contracting officers deal with disasters overseas. The process could be examined and compared with actual procedures stipulated in the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

Appendix A: Interview Questions

1. What was your role in the emergency response process?
2. How long did it take FEMA to interact with the base?
3. How did the base interact with FEMA?
4. What was the FEMA response process time from time of crisis to resolution of crisis?
5. How were funds distributed from FEMA to Grand Forks AFB?
6. Who was in charge of the emergency response? (Air Force or FEMA and what position)
7. What resources did FEMA provide?
8. When was it evident FEMA assistance would be necessary?
9. How was it evident that FEMA assistance would be necessary? (Criteria for FEMA involvement?)
10. Were any special contracting procedures used?

Appendix B: Interviews

1. Personal Interview – 06 July 1998; Colonel Michael Collings
Wing Commander; 88th Air Base
Wright Patterson AFB, OH 45433
Phone: 937-257-6116

1. What was your role in the emergency response process?

Support Group Commander of Grand Forks AFB during the flooding. Responsible for determining what items needed in support of emergency operations during the flood. Determined what supplies would be purchased, coordinated with FEMA.

2. How long did it take FEMA to interact with the base?

FEMA never officially interacted with the base. The Disaster Coordinating Officer came as far as Bismark, ND. He was an O-6. He stayed there for a few days. Then he left. He lost his job because of his actions during the flooding.

3. How did the base interact with FEMA?

As discussed in question number 2, there was no formal interaction with FEMA.

4. What was the FEMA response process from time of crisis to resolution of crisis?

There was no response process. The Air Force took care of its own. There were two FEMA personnel walking around, but he didn't see them do anything.

5. How were funds distributed from FEMA to Grand Forks AFB?

Initially, FEMA was in control of the funding. The Air Force had to request FEMA's permission to buy anything it felt necessary to support relief operations. However, FEMA quickly turned over control to the Air Force to determine what it felt was necessary to support the operation. The Air Force then told FEMA what it was procuring, and then it requested a control number from FEMA. FEMA then reimbursed the Air Force using that control number.

6. Who was in charge of the emergency response?

Initially, FEMA was the control point. However, since FEMA never showed up, it put the Air Force in charge of the disaster operation. The Air Force actually complained to FEMA because FEMA was content to allow the Air Force to continue emergency operations even though the Air Force had to continue its flying mission.

7. What resources did FEMA provide?

FEMA only provided money in the form of reimbursements.

8. When was it evident that FEMA assistance would be necessary?

Using forecasts and weather reports, the Air Force already knew that a flood would strike the area. When the dikes of the Red River gave way, the city flooded. It was shortly after that that the Governor requested that the President declare the area a state of emergency.

9. How was it evident that assistance would be necessary?

FEMA never showed up. There was a flood, and the area was declared an emergency. The biggest problem was providing logistical support, such as the communications within the city and the transplantation of the people from the city to safe housing, i.e. hangars.

10. Were any special contracting procedures used?

He didn't know of any special contracting procedures used. Military construction costs did increase about 30% because contractors didn't want to bother working at Grand Forks AFB. They had plenty of work in the city of Grand Forks.

2. Telephone Interview – 15 July 1998; SSgt Jennifer Richardson
Contingency Contracting Officer, 319th Contracting Squadron
Grand Forks, ND
DSN 362-5342

Question: Were any special contracting procedures used?

According to standard operating procedures, a Blanket Justification and Approval document was designed and signed by the Commander that allowed the office to buy needed items without competition. According to the FAR, competition is required for all purchases over \$2,500. The office set up a contingency office, and the small purchase threshold was increased from \$100,000 to \$200,000. The office used the IMPAC card (defense credit card) to procure items up to \$200,000. Also, CCOs used the Standard Form 44, which is used instead of purchase orders to buy items from contractors who do not accept credit cards. The office was set up in 12-hour shifts to ensure 24-hour availability. Purchases included portable bathrooms, potable water, drinking water, toiletries, and items to sustain the people being housed at Grand Forks AFB. Contracting had no interaction with FEMA. There seemed to be a miscommunication between the Red Cross and FEMA as to the type of aid to provide.

3. Telephone Interview – 21 July 1998
Mr. Peter Bakerski; Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Phone 303-235-4845 Pager 800-200-4899

1. What was your role in the emergency response process?

During the initial response to the North Dakota disaster 1174 I was the Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer, Operations Chief, and Mission Assignment Coordinator. After the flooding incident in Grand Forks I delegated the functions of Operations Chief and Mission Assignment Coordinator to members of the expanded Emergency Response Team and coordinated the response as the Deputy FCO.

2. How long did it take FEMA to interact with the base?

The relationship with Grand Forks AFB was established prior to the Grand Forks Flooding. Grand Forks AFB was identified as the BSI (Base Support Installation) to the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). The State had been declared a major disaster area by the president in early April for severe wind, ice storm, blizzard and statewide power outage. The Federal Response Plan had been activated as were Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) 1 Transportation, 3-Public Works and Engineering, 5-Information and Planning, 6-Mass Care, 7-Resource Support, 8-Health and Medical, and 12-Energy. Also, the DCO was deployed to Bismarck ND. Finally, the Prime Power Team was activated for the power outage. The relationship with GFAFB was maintained throughout the disaster as the base was the mobilization site for Federal assets deployed to Grand Forks. During the flooding event FEMA was in constant contact with GFAFB Operations and Logistics.

3. How did the base interact with FEMA?

Once POCs were identified between GFAFB and FEMA the relationship worked well. Initially there was some confusion as to who was doing what and where.

4. What was the FEMA response process time from time of crisis to resolution?

Depending on the nature of the request and the availability of resources the process times varied. During the immediate response to prevent loss of life the normal administrative process was curtailed and requests were received verbally and acted upon immediately. The paperwork was accomplished within 24hrs of the request. Actions in this category were accomplished in as little as twenty minutes.

5. How were funds distributed from FEMA to Grand Forks AFB?

Depending upon whether the request for GFAFB support came from the State through FEMA or if the support came from the locals under "Immediate Response" determined the funding mechanism. If the support was under Mission Assignment from the State to FEMA then GFAFB was reimbursed through normal DOD mechanisms. If the support was under "Immediate Response" authority of the Base Commander then reimbursement was through the State to the County to GFAFB.

6. Who was in charge of the emergency response? (Air Force or FEMA and what position)

As with any response to a Presidential Emergency or Disaster declaration the State is in charge. FEMA provides coordination of federal assets to assist the state and provide resources that the State has either depleted or cannot bring to the response.

7. What resources did FEMA provide?

FEMA provided generators, blankets, cots and other resources from our Logistics Centers. We also provided communications capability and command post space through our MERS assets.

8. When was it evident FEMA assistance would be necessary?

The need for FEMA assistance was evident following the blizzard and ice storm that hit the state in early April.

9. How was it evident that FEMA assistance would be necessary? (Criteria for FEMA involvement?)

The request for Federal Assistance that was requested by the Governor of ND to the FEMA Regional Office then passed on to the White House. The resources of the state were incapable to handle the magnitude of the event. The whole state had basically been affected and was well beyond the capability of the state to provide adequate resources to prevent loss of life and restoration of the power infrastructure.

10. Were any special contracting procedures used?

The normal contracting procedures were used under emergency conditions, which basically expedites the process and does not require the normal bidding process.

4. Telephone Interview – 25 July 1998; Colonel James Kapitain
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer; North Dakota Air Force
Reserve
Phone 701-235-4619

1. What was your role in the emergency response process?

I was the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer for North Dakota. I worked for the FORCOM Air Force National Emergency Security Preparedness (AFNESP). I worked with the state National Guard with the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to see if the state was willing to bring in support equipment.

2. How long did it take FEMA to interact with the base?

FEMA never actually interacted with the base. Instead, the EPLO is the liaison between the military and FEMA. FEMA would not directly interact with a base unless the Governor of the state would request such action. Otherwise, there are regulations as to what active duty can and can't do in such an operation such as being used for security or police action. In the case of the Grand Forks flooding, Grand Forks AFB was set up as the Base Support Installation (BSI). The BSI is normally the closest base to a catastrophe, which can be used as the focal point to bring in equipment and support.

3. How did the base interact with FEMA?

Again, there was no actual interaction between the two. However, FEMA did fly out fifty generators and pumps using a C-5 at its own expense since no local contractors could have provided the equipment. Additionally, Grand Forks AFB and the city of Grand Forks have a Memorandum of Understanding, which states that they will share costs between the city and state to restore costs incurred or to restore security to the area. In this case, the MOU also allowed the commander of Grand Forks AFB to take necessary action to save lives.

4. What was the FEMA response process time from time of crisis to resolution?

FEMA was activated within 24 hours of the Presidential Declaration of an emergency. However, FEMA doesn't interact with Air Force Bases. FEMA activated Red Cross to the area. Additionally, FEMA was already in the area because of the snowstorms that had struck the area, which actually lead to the flooding.

5. How were funds distributed from FEMA to Grand Forks AFB?

FEMA brings in budget people, and the base brings in its command people. It is something like an IRS audit. The base individuals justify why they made certain purchases in support of the operation, and FEMA's accountants determine what is reimbursable.

6. Who was in charge of the emergency response? (Air Force or FEMA and what position)

The Adjutant General of North Dakota was in charge of the operation from both the military and civilian side.

7. What resources did FEMA provide?

FEMA provided manpower and equipment to the operation. As the EPLO, I coordinated the amount of manpower that Grand Forks AFB could actually provide to the rescue operation. Additionally, as I mentioned earlier, FEMA provided the generators and pumps.

8. When was it evident FEMA assistance would be necessary?

It was evident that assistance would be necessary when 120 inches of snow fell on Grand Forks in one week. The normal snowfall is 19-20 inches in one year. Therefore, FEMA knew that there would be substantial flooding in the area.

9. How was it evident that FEMA assistance would be necessary? (Criteria for FEMA involvement?)

95% of the highway arteries were flooded. Since the main arteries were flooded, you could assume that the minor roads were flooded also.

10. Were any special contracting procedures used?

You must go to the civilian contractors first, or you will have a protest of some sort after the fact. Since there were no contractors able to provide the generators and pumps, FEMA provided them at their own expense via C-5 transport. I think they actually broke some law by doing that.

11. Was there anything else?

There was one problem during this response. The Disaster Coordinating Officer (DCO) was an Army Colonel. DCO is an additional duty for him. When there is an emergency response, FEMA tells the DCO to direct his staff to set up a Disaster Field Office in the area of the emergency. He is supposed to coordinate with the EPLO to ensure coordination between FEMA and the military. However, the DCO never showed up due to the fact that he didn't think military should get involved. He therefore hindered operations. Consequently, he was fired from the job of DCO, and asked to retire.

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Vita

Lt. Jeff Merchant was born on [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. Growing up in both Indianapolis, IN and Amesbury, MA, he graduated from Amesbury High School in 1988. He then attended the University of Massachusetts and graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics in 1992. Two years after graduation, he entered Officers Training School at Maxwell AFB, AL and was commissioned 18 November 1994.

Jeff's first assignment was to the 55th operational contracting squadron at Offutt AFB, NE. While at Offutt, Jeff was trained in services, commodities, and construction contracting. In October 1996, he deployed to Prince Sultan AB, Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia to assist in the establishment of the base as a Contingency Contracting Officer. Upon his return in January 1997, he was appointed a contracting officer in charge of the Government Operated Civil Engineering Supply Store at Offutt AFB.

Jeff was assigned to AFIT in May of 1997. While attending AFIT, Jeff married the former Rebecca Brelsford on 26 June 1998. Jeff will be assigned to Los Angeles AFB upon graduation where he will be a buyer for the Atlas Missile Launch Program Office.

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