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EXAMINING THE INFLUENCE OF SOURCE DEPENDENCE ON SUPPLIER PERFORMANCE IN THE USAF ORGANIC SUPPLY CHAIN

THESIS

Thomas A. Counter, Technical Sergeant, USAF

AFIT-ENS-MS-21-J-040

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

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THESIS

Presented to the Faculty

Department of Operational Sciences

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Air Education and Training Command

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Science in Logistics and Supply Chain Management

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June 2021

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Abstract

Due to the diminishment of manufacturing sources needed to sustain aging weapon systems, the USAF has become highly dependent on sole sourcing to fulfill their spare part requirements. From 2017 to 2019, approximately 57% of total purchases for spare parts were sole sourced, with less than 7% of repairable parts being dual sourced. When suppliers are the sole source for a component due to high specificity of requirements or government restrictions to data rights, it generates dependency within the buyer-seller relationship. Furthermore, if the USAF's level of dependence outweighs the supplier's reliance toward the USAF, it can create undesired supplier performance during the procurement process. This research used linear regression to investigate the relationship between source dependence, supplier size, and various performance categories for 326 suppliers managed by the 448th Supply Chain Management Wing. The five supplier performance categories in the study included timeliness, cost control, quality, business relations, and regulatory compliance. The research found that the USAF's dependence on sole sourcing had a small but statistically significant influence on all five aspects of supplier performance, with timeliness having the most negatively influenced relationship. Additionally, supplier size in terms of contract volume was found to have a small but statistically significant relationship with all performance categories except for cost control. Future research should consider other potential drivers of performance scores such as supplier age, length of business relationship, and physical distance between suppliers and their buying agency.

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Thomas A. Counter, TSgt, USAF

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EXAMINING THE INFLUENCE OF SOURCE DEPENDENCE ON SUPPLIER PERFORMANCE IN THE USAF ORGANIC SUPPLY CHAIN

I. Introduction

Background

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) on average spends \$4 billion every year to purchase and repair the spare parts needed for weapon system sustainment (Mills et. al, 2018.) This high cost often constitutes for a significant proportion of total operations and support (O&S) expenditures, which have steadily increased over the years due to the decreased reliability of aging USAF weapon systems. From 1999 to 2016, the annual growth rate of O&S costs per flying hour increased between the range of three and seven percent annually. Naturally, it is expected for these O&S costs to rise as aircraft age increases, especially during the end-of-life phase, when airframes begin to degrade and require more maintenance. However, the aftermarket supply chains for spare parts are also adversely impacted by aircraft age as the availability of manufacturing and repair sources diminish over time (Trunkey, 2019.) This phenomenon is referred to as diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages (DMSMS) and it has become a significant issue when managing the suppliers of critical spare parts for aging aircraft fleets. Furthermore, if a supplier becomes the sole source for a component due to specificity of requirements or government restrictions to data rights, it creates dependency within the buyer-seller relationship. This can become problematic for the buying organization if there is a high level of dependence on the supplier that outweighs the supplier's dependence on the buyer for future business. The supplier can potentially

leverage this dependence to gain power over the buyer and may lead to undesired supplier performance during the procurement process (Kull and Ellis, 2016.)

Typically, poor performance during the fulfillment of federal contracts can result in adverse consequences for the supplier, such as the denial to obtain future contracts or termination of the relationship (Manuel, 2015.) However, if there is only one supplier that can manufacture or repair a critical component, the USAF is typically forced to continue business with them. Leaders of the USAF have long recognized negative procurement outcomes associated with sole sourcing, which led to HQ USAF/A4 addressing it in their 2019 Strategic Sustainment Framework (AF/A4, 2019.) The second line of effort (LOE) of this framework lays out the plan to improve enterprise material support by building resilient supply chain capabilities. In this LOE, they propose that the USAF should develop new sources of supply and invest in the dual sourcing of critical workloads (AF/A4, 2019.) Additionally, within the USAF's organic supply chain at the 448th Supply Chain Management (SCMW), there are several ongoing efforts to identify and mitigate the risk of dependence toward sole sources of supply. One of the focal points for this initiative is the Strategic Alternative Sourcing Program Office (SASPO) which is structured within the 448th SCMW. The SASPO is charged with developing alternative sources of supply or repair that can be leveraged to combat the negative effects of diminishing sources within USAF organic supply chain. By increasing market competition, the SASPO aims to increase spare parts availability while reducing costs and lead times (Wishon, 2020.) Ultimately, the optimization of procurement outcomes through alternative sourcing methods will be crucial for aging weapon systems that have been adversely impacted by the diminishment of manufacturing sources.

Problem Statement

Every year, more than 80% of the USAF's demand requirements for critical spare parts are fulfilled through organic and contract repair, while the rest are met through new purchases. The problem is that most of these parts only have a single source of repair or supply, leaving them highly susceptible to disruptive outcomes during the procurement process. From 2017-2019, approximately 57% of total purchases for new spare parts went toward a sole source and less than 7% of new buys for repairable parts were dualsourced (AF/A4, 2019.) When you think of supply chain disruptions, most often acts of god such as tornadoes, hurricanes, wildfires, or even the recent COVID-19 pandemic come to mind. However, disruptions can also be caused by breakdowns in supply due to DMSMS, obsolescence, or even supplier performance factors such as quality issues, delinquent deliveries, or no-bids against sole sourced items. These breakdowns in supply can result in lengthy procurement lead times which can subsequently contribute to supply related downtime of aircraft, referred to as NMCS hours in the USAF. In addition to adverse performance costs, the monetary costs of lengthy lead times can also be significant. It is estimated that one day of administrative lead time drives \$3.44M of spare parts inventory for the USAF. Ultimately, being able to reduce the USAF's dependence on sole source suppliers by increasing market competition through competitive acquisition, can reduce risk and procurement costs. (AF/A4, 2019.)

Purpose Statement

Due to the diminishment of manufacturing sources for aging weapon systems, the USAF has become highly reliant on sole sources of supply to fulfill their spare part

requirements, even if there is a history of poor procurement outcomes. The aim of this study is to examine the relationship that varying levels of dependence toward sole sources of supply has with the procurement outcomes in terms of supplier performance. Additionally, this research also strives to study the relationship of supplier size in terms of contract volume with performance outcomes.

Research Questions

Through a quantitative research framework, this study answered the following questions of interest:

RQ 1: To what extent does the USAF's dependence on sole sourcing influence the performance outcomes of suppliers within the USAF organic supply chain? RQ 2: How does supplier size in terms of contract volume relate to supplier performance outcomes?

Research Focus

First, the literature is reviewed to understand spare parts logistics as it relates to procurement, strategic sourcing decisions, and supplier performance. The literature review also covers relevant studies within the context of defense logistics and federal contracting as government processes can often vary from commercial practices. Next, the data collection process and methodological applications used in this research are outlined. Furthermore, the statistical analysis of linear regression models are presented and the relationships between the variables of interest are explained. Lastly, recommendations and research limitations related to this study are outlined for both supply chain managers and future researchers.

Methodology

A series of linear regression models were utilized to understand the relationship between source dependency, contract volume, and various aspects of supplier performance. In this case, supplier performance is captured through supplier evaluations that were derived from the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS.) The performance metrics used as dependent variables in this study include timeliness, cost control, quality, business relations, and regulatory compliance.

Assumptions/Limitations

One major limitation of this study was the ability to capture dependence and other aspects of the buyer-seller relationship from the supplier's perspective. The contract data provided by the 448th SCMW primarily included information that pertains to details of the buyer's perspective. Another limitation is that the measures of supplier performance captured through CPARS are subjective in nature, which can be subject to biases. However, the use of CPARS data has been used in other studies to investigate drivers of supplier performance, and to our knowledge is the best existing data source for supplier performance.

II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview

The intent of this chapter is to lay out the fundamental knowledge needed to understand sourcing decisions in federal acquisition, the tradeoffs associated with these decisions, and how they impact procurement outcomes in terms of supplier performance. First, the theories of transaction cost economics and resource dependence theory are investigated to determine which theoretical lens could be used to explore the research problem at hand. Then, after-sales supply chains are explored to provide context of organizational structure and critical processes used in the sustainment of the USAF's organically managed aircraft. Next spare parts logistics will be covered to understand how demand changes throughout product lifecycle and how that impacts sourcing decisions. The procurement process will also be covered as it is important to understand differences in commercial and federal procurement. Lastly, relevant studies regarding supplier performance management and strategic sourcing will be discussed to identify gaps in literature and pave the path forward for this study.

Transaction Cost Economics

A theory commonly explored within the context of SCM is transaction cost economics (TCE) which has been used to explain firm behavior in the governance of transactions between organizations (Defee et. al, 2010.) A fundamental idea behind TCE theory is that firms strive to optimize costs within the organization when making transactional agreements and exchanges with outside organizations for products or services (Williamson, 1979.) In TCE, these transactions usually take the form of a contract when a buyer makes an economic exchange with an outsourced supplier. The subsequent costs associated with these transactions can vary depending on specificity, sourcing decisions, and the buyer-seller relationship (Pint and Baldwin, 1997.) Another area of interest within the realm of TCE is the impact of supply chain integration on transaction costs. It is argued that vertical integration of the supply chain can reduce costs by centralizing command over the supply chain to minimize inefficient negotiations with outsourced entities (Williams, 1979; Gibbons, 2010). This discussion on integration relates closely to the TCE literature on source dependence. Dependence typically occurs when there is a high degree of specificity needed to produce a requirement. When dependence increases between the buyer and supplier, it can aid in maintaining governance of the relationship and encourages continuity. As dependency decreases, the buying firm must rely on competition to establish governance which can result in increased costs in the procurement process (Williamson, 2008.)

Resource Dependence Theory

Along with TCE, resource dependence theory (RDT) is also frequently used to explain relational exchanges between buyers and suppliers. TCE commonly explores the themes of specificity, uncertainty, and transactional frequency in the literature. Whereas RDT argues that transactional exchanges are impacted by social aspects of the buyerseller relationship and investigates factors such as the strength of communication, commitment, and stability of the relationship (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Fink et. al 2006). The body of literature using RDT has mainly investigated firm dependence and its influence on procurement strategies. There are varied arguments on how dependency should be defined. However, similarly to TCE, many have used specificity to measure dependence between a buyer and seller (Fink et. al, 2006.) Other researchers used criticality of requirements and the buyer's perception of importance to define dependence (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Ganesan, 1994). Ultimately, the fundamental concept of RDT is to explain how outcomes are impacted when an organization does not possess or control all conditions needed to fulfill requirements (Hanfield, 1993.)

After-sales Service Supply Chains

Before diving into the highly relevant topics such as spare parts logistics, procurement, supplier performance, and strategic sourcing. It is imperative to understand the supply chain structure in which the USAF receives its support. The aircraft fleets owned and operated by commercial or defense agencies can be described as an installed base, which is defined as a system of products that have been sold and are still in use by the consumer (Dekker et. al, 2013.) Examples of installed bases include aircraft fleets, windmills, service antennas, and a variety of other support equipment. After the sale, these products are then serviced and maintained throughout its lifecycle through service contracts. These services are usually contracted out to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), outsourced to another service organization, or maintained locally by the consumer (Dekker et. al, 2013.) The after-sales services for these installed bases have become a critical component for organizations across the globe as they can generate additional revenue for the OEM and service contractors (Cohen 2006.) For the consumers on the other hand, managing these services becomes a costly factor that drives O&S budgets as they make sourcing decisions on where to purchase and repair their spare parts (Trunkey, 2018.)

Traditional supply chains have often been defined as a network of upstream and downstream organizations that work together to create value for a customer in the form of a finished product (Christopher, 2016). Whereas service supply chains focus on the creation of value through services such as the management of information, processes, capacity, and funds (Ellram et al. 2004). After-sales service supply chains are a separate identity that create value through the repair, modification, maintenance, and technical support for products throughout the product lifecycle. Understanding these distinct differences between manufacturing and after-sales services is imperative, as each heavily influences supply chain structure and processes (Cohen et al. 2006). The foundational framework for supply chain management developed by Lambert and Cooper (1998) is organized into three vital elements: business processes, management components, and structure. They describe business processes as a group of key tasks that create valued output for a consumer, while the management components are the individual elements along the supply chain in which the processes are conducted. However, there are some differences in the processes for after-sales services. N. Saccani et. al. (2007) and Amini et al. (2005) identified the following processes as being critical in adding value for the enditem users: field technical assistance, spare parts logistics, and customer care. As the focus of this study will be on the suppliers for spare parts, the next section will give a brief overview on spare parts logistics and how they differ from manufacturing inventories.

Spare Parts Logistics

Kennedy et. al (2002) define spare parts as service or repair items that are used to maintain an installed base and keep capital equipment in a fully functioning state. The management of inventory for spare parts differ greatly from manufacturing inventories, in that they are highly dependent on the failure process and how the end-items are operated by the consumer. Whereas manufacturing inventories serve the purpose of maintaining the flow of a production line for finished goods. Manufacturing inventories are much easier to predict and govern due to the ability to control the rate in which inventory is

consumed on the production line (Kennedy et. al, 2002.) While the requirements for spare part inventories are much more difficult to manage due to intermittent or lumpy demand patterns that are difficult to forecast (Huiskonen, 2001.) Additionally, the demand for spare parts changes as the end-item progresses throughout the product lifecycle, which is represented in the figure below. During the initial phase as the installed base is growing, the demand for spare parts is typically low. However, during the mature and end-of life phases, demand reaches its peak and eventually diminishes. The end-of-life or sustainment phase for products with long life cycles can become problematic for supply chain managers as the spare parts market begins to diminish and consumers become more reliant on sole sources of supply (Dekker et. al 2013.)



Figure 1: Product Life Cycle (Dekker et. al, 2013.)

Procurement Process

Obtaining the external services and materials needed to accomplish internal objectives is vital for any supply chain. In supply chain management, this process is referred to as either procurement or purchasing. These terms are often used interchangeably within the literature; however, procurement has become an umbrella term that encompasses the purchasing process (Pereira et. al, 2014.) Effective procurement and supplier management can lead to competitive advantage and maximize value creation for both the buying and selling organizations. Novack and Simco (1991) lay out the procurement process in the order in which it should occur. The process starts with a make or buy decision once the buying agency identifies the need for a product and outlines the specifications of the requirement. If they determine the part cannot be made internally, they conduct a market analysis, identify potential suppliers, and determine whether they can these suppliers can fulfill the demanded requirement. Once all potential suppliers have been prescreened, the buyer makes a final decision based on different factors such as price, quality, and service. However, the process does not end there. Lastly, after the final product has been delivered, an evaluation of the supplier's performance must be conducted to determine whether the buyer's needs were met to satisfaction in terms of quality, schedule effectiveness, and business relationship. This final step to the process is crucial as it can aid in future procurement decisions.

Federal Acquisition

The previous section gave perspective on how the procurement process plays out for many organizations. However, it is important to mention that the federal government's procurement process operates much differently than commercial industries due to budget constraints and federal regulations. For starters, the government often refers to the process as federal contracting or acquisition opposed to procurement or purchasing. In terms of regulation, all government members involved in acquisition must abide by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR.) This body of statutory regulation is set in place to guide federal contracting officers in the acquisition process. Below are the four fundamental aspects of government procurement which are laid out in the FAR (Lamourex et. al, 2015.)

- Satisfy the End User in Terms of Cost, Quality, and Timeliness of the Delivered <u>Product or Service</u>: The top priority of federal contracting is to ensure that end users have the materials and services needed to execute their missions. In the Air Force, end users would include the warfighter support and anything in support of sustaining and operating our weapon systems. All acquisition and contracting activity should be designed to ensure that end users receive their required level of support by (1) using commercial items when possible, (2) using suppliers that have displayed competence, and (3) by seeking out competition.
- <u>Minimize Administrative Operating Cost:</u> Federal contracting officers should pursue every possible avenue before awarding contracts to ensure that they are wisely utilizing funds.
- 3. <u>Conduct Business with Integrity, Fairness, and Openness:</u> As previously mentioned, the government operates much differently than commercial organizations that are profit seeking. Federal institutions rely on taxpayers for income and because of that, there are additional regulations which ensure that there is transparency in the acquisition process.
- 4. <u>Fulfill Public Policy Objectives:</u> Lastly, those involved in the federal acquisition process must adhere to policies set forth by congress. These policies typically are meant to support commercial businesses opposed to the warfighter. This is to

ensure equal opportunities to small businesses who may be less established than large government contractors but are still able to fulfill the required level of support to the customer.

Supplier Performance Evaluations

The use of supplier performance evaluations has become vital in the procurement process due to an increased reliance on outsourcing in supply chains. These evaluations allow the buyer to measure how well the supplier was able to meet their expectations and provide feedback to the supplier (Hawkins et. al, 2020.) In accordance with the FAR, the performance of federal contractors must be evaluated to maintain quality of performance and provide information that can aid in future sourcing decisions (Manuel, 2015.) Federal contracts that exceed the simplified acquisition threshold of \$150,000 are required to be evaluated and documented in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPAR.) In this system, the buying organization rates contractor performance based on various factors that encompass the fulfillment process. Below are the factors that are evaluated. During the evaluation, each factor is given a rating in addition to a narrative in support of the ratings.

- Technical quality of product or services
- Cost Control efforts to minimize and control costs.
- Schedule/Timeliness ability to deliver products or services on time.
- Management ability to maintain a satisfactory business relationship.
- Regulatory Compliance ability to abide by environmental, safety, or other miscellaneous standards within the contract requirements.

Strategic Sourcing Strategies

There is extensive research on strategic sourcing and supplier management strategies within the supply chain body of literature. One of the most debated topics in sourcing is whether to invest into sole or multiple suppliers when procuring materials or services. This topic has recently been further investigated due to the increased interest of risk management and supply chain resilience in the literature over the past 20 years (Yu et. al, 2009.) There are three widely used approaches when determining the number of sources for an item. These include single sourcing, dual sourcing, and multiple sourcing. Single sourcing is when the purchasing entity decides to source from a single supplier even though there are multiple suppliers in the market that can accommodate the demanded requirement. Single sourcing is often confused with sole sourcing, which is when the buyer is forced to source from a single supplier because they are the only seller or manufacturer in that particular market (Newman, 1989.) Dual sourcing on the other hand refers to when the purchasing entity decides to source between two suppliers for the same item. While multiple sourcing refers to the purchase of an item from several suppliers. When setting aside the consideration of risk, there are solid arguments for both single and dual sourcing strategies to be made. Single sourcing has often been associated with improving the efficiency and productivity of firms. It also allows for the buyer and seller to develop a closer relationship and collaborate their efforts to ensure decisions are advantageous for both entities. Dual and multiple sourcing methods on the other hand, have often been used to increase competition between suppliers. This allows the buyer to leverage price within the market (Yu et. al, 2009.) All these strategies have their advantages and disadvantages.

In the literature discussing just-in-time (JIT) and lean initiatives, there is heavy favor toward single sourcing for the purpose of improving efficiency and productivity. However, as supply chains have globalized and become more complex over the years, they have become more vulnerable to disruptive events. This has cause debate of how buyers should manage sourcing decisions based on supply chain risk management. Newman (1989) warns of the long-term risks associated with single sourcing. While single sourcing may provide short-term cost savings, he argues that the supplier gains power over the buyer if they decide against rationing demand requirements among multiple suppliers. He states that dual or multiple sourcing is an effective strategy that reduces the risk of a monopolistic supply base. Ramasesh et al. (1991) agree with this assessment and further argue that multiple sourcing can also lead to higher reliability of on time deliveries and greater flexibility in management of requirements. Zsidisin et al. (2000) argues that investing in single source relationships with suppliers to reduce costs puts them at an increased state of risk. They emphasize that the risk associated with source dependence can be significantly reduced through the development of new suppliers. Lastly, they indicate that these efforts can result in improved communication and collaboration between the buyer and seller.

Source Selection Methods

Being able to understand what drives procurement outcomes such as contract price, supplier performance, and lead times is critical in the procurement process as it can be used to inform sourcing decisions that lead to improvements in cost, quality, and service levels. Source selection method has largely been considered in the literature to

leverage procurement outcomes. Ittner et al. (1999) found that that using higher levels of non-price criterion in supplier selection resulted in greater buyer-seller relationships but sacrificed lower costs and product quality. Kaufmann et al. (2014) considered non-price and price performance metrics separately. They found that a rational selection method increased cost performance while experience-based intuition in source selection resulted in increased quality, innovation, and delivery timeliness. Landale and Rendon (2017) examined a series of government contracts to assess the impact of supplier selection method on lead times and CPARS performance metrics using multiple regression. The two primary source selection methods in this study were trade-off and low-price, technically acceptable (LPTA.) They found that the trade-off method resulted in higher lead times, but increased levels of supplier performance. Lastly, they suggested that the use of CPARS data as dependent variables is limited and that it should be explored further.

Summary

This chapter covered past literature and supply chain topics related to the research topic on hand. First, transaction cost economics and resource dependence theory were explored to provide a theoretical scope in which this research could be built upon. Next, relevant topics such as spare part logistics, procurement, and sourcing decisions were laid out in detail. Lastly, studies regarding federal contracting and supplier performance were investigated for gaps in the literature. Overall, it was found that there is limited research using CPARS performance metrics as dependent variables and that it is an area that warrants further research.

III. Methodology

Chapter Overview

This chapter covers the research design, variables, and methodology used to answer the research questions of interest. First, the quantitative design of this study is covered and linked back to the research question. Then the variables of interest are explained in detail to include data sources, collection methods, and the cleansing of data. Lastly, the method of linear regression is covered as it will be used extensively in the following chapter to provide statistical analysis of the data.

Research Design

This study used a quantitative research design to answer the following research question of interests:

RQ 1: To what extent does the USAF's dependence on sole sourcing influence the performance outcomes of suppliers within the USAF organic supply chain? RQ 2: How does supplier size in terms of contract volume relate to supplier performance outcomes?

Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics

The primary interest of this study is to understand what effect source dependence has on supplier performance. To effectively capture the performance of suppliers within the USAF organic supply chain, performance data was collected from the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS.) This system is used by all federal procurement agencies to maintain and track the performance of suppliers for contracts valued above \$150,000. After the completion of contracts, suppliers are graded in a variety of areas to inform the ratee or future buyers on how well the supplier's satisfied the various aspects of their agreement. Depending on the specifications of the contracts, each contract is typically graded on the following criterion:

- Schedule/Timeliness how well the supplier managed to deliver products or services within the specified time requirements.
- Cost Control the extent to which the supplier was able to effectively forecast/control order cost and exhibit cost responsibility.
- Technical the supplier's ability to maintain quality control and deliver products within parameters of the design specifications.
- Management or Business Relations how well the supplier managed customer service and their ability to respond to problems, changes, or inquiries.
- Regulatory Compliance the supplier's ability to stay within accordance to financial, environmental, safety, or labor requirements of the contract terms.

The 448th SCMW, which is primarily responsible for organically sustained aircraft in the USAF, manage the contracts for approximately 1166 tier 1 suppliers that manufacture or repair spare parts in support of these aircraft.

In the dataset generated from CPARS, performance ratings for the five graded areas for all 1166 suppliers from April 2018 to April 2021 were collected. Upon analyzing the data for cleanliness, about 436 suppliers had missing values and were removed from the dataset: resulting in datapoints for approximately 730 suppliers. Next, the aggregated ratings for each supplier were converted into a grade point average depending on the rating they received. In CPARS, the buying agency responsible for grading each criterion provides following ratings listed from worst to best; unsatisfactory, marginal, satisfactory, very good, and exceptional. As a method used in previous studies, a Likert scale of one to five was developed to match each possible rating. A one being assigned to the worst possible score of "unsatisfactory" and a five being assigned to the best possible score of "exceptional." Once this was completed, a grade point average for each supplier and performance criterion was calculated.

Regarding the independent variables of this study, source dependence and supplier contract volume were the primary subjects of interest. Contract volume was incorporated in this study to give perspective of the supplier's size. This variable was relatively easy to generate as it is simply the total count of contracts managed by the supplier during the time period of interest. Source dependency in this case is a metric tracked by the 448th Supply Chain Management Wing (SCMW) to determine the how reliant the USAF supply chain is on sole sources of supply or repair. The SCMW utilizes this source dependency metric to understand which suppliers are at higher risk to disruption. Each supplier within their supply chain risk model is given a score based on the USAF's level dependency toward that supplier. A higher score indicates high risk, meaning that the USAF is highly dependent on that supplier and there is little to no competition in the acquisition process for the resources they provide. While lower dependency scores are associated with dual sourcing and increased competition in the acquisition process. The dependency score for each supplier is calculated based on Acquisition Method Codes (AMC) relative to the total volume of contracts managed by the supplier. Below is a description of AMCs used in the calculation.

• AMC 0 – The NSN was not assigned AMC 1 through 5 when it entered the inventory and has not yet completed the screening process.

- AMC 1 Suitable for competitive acquisition for the second time or more.
- AMC 2 Suitable for competitive acquisition for the first time.
- AMC 3 Acquired for the second or subsequent time from a sole source.
- AMC 4 Acquired for the first time from a sole source.
- AMC 5 Acquired directly from a sole source contractor.

Upon request, the 448th SCMW provided a dataset containing contract data for the tier 1 suppliers managed by their organization. In this dataset, there were 27 variables that pertained to those individual contracts. As contract volume and source dependence are the primary independent variables of interest, the dataset was narrowed down to these variables for approximately 569 suppliers. Next, the resulting datapoints were then matched with the CPARS performance scores using the VLOOKUP function in excel. Due to suppliers with missing values and suppliers that did not match on either dataset, the final matched product resulted in datapoints for approximately 329 suppliers. Below are the descriptive statistics for all variables of interest in this study.

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Schedule or Timeliness	3.35	0.52	1.00	5.00
Cost Control	3.43	0.39	2.60	5.00
Technical or Quality	3.45	0.47	2.50	5.00
Management or Business Relations	3.46	0.53	1.00	5.00
Regulatory Compliance	3.23	0.36	2.50	5.00
Source Dependence	4.38	1.67	1.00	10.00
Contract Volume	26.10	53.91	1	370

 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables

Threats to Validity

During the data collection process, limitations and potential threats to validity were discovered. The first being the inability to capture and measure dependence from the supplier's perspective. The source dependence metric provided by the 448th SCMW only captures the USAF's perspective of dependence toward suppliers. Therefore, if there was a lack of interdependence between the buyer (USAF) and a supplier, it was not captured in this study. Another limitation and potential threat to validity is the subjective nature of supplier performance reports, which are subject to biases. Being that the received CPARS dataset was aggregated, and the raters of these reports were unknown, it was impossible to detect potential biases in the dataset.

Research Method

The contract data obtained from the 448th SCMW and CPARS was utilized in a series of simple linear regression models to determine the relationship between source dependence and several supplier performance variables to include timeliness, cost control, quality, business relations, and regulatory compliance. The results of these regression models were then used to make statistical interpretations and explore the relationship between the variables of interest. The fundamental formula used for simple linear regression is:

$$y = \alpha + \beta x$$

where α is the y-intercept (constant variable) and β is the slope of the line.

Summary

This chapter reiterated the research questions of interest and covered the framework in which they could be answered. Each of the variables chosen for this study were then explained in detail in terms of data sources, data collection, and the cleansing process. Furthermore, threats to validity and limitations found during the data collection process were identified. Lastly, the methodology of linear regression was covered as it will be used in the following chapter to statistically interpret the relationship between the variables of interest.

IV. Analysis and Results

Chapter Overview

The intent of this chapter is to discuss the statistical findings for the research questions of interest. The primary focus of this study is to determine if there a significant relationship between source dependence, contract volume, and supplier performance. In this case, supplier performance is captured by the following graded categories accomplished through CPARS: timeliness, cost control, quality, business relations, and regulatory compliance. In this chapter, each of these categories were used as the dependent variables of interest. Each performance metric was modeled through linear regression to determine how they are influenced by source dependence and contract volume.

Analysis and Results

Correlation Matrix

Before the conduction of linear regression models, it is imperative to ensure that variables of interest are not too closely related. The correlation matrix below (see Figure 2) provides the correlations between all the supplier performance metrics, source dependence, and contract volume. As each of the CPARS performance metrics were being considered in separate models, it needed to be confirmed that each of these graded areas of performance were not scored similarly. While there are certainly some correlations between the performance metrics, the majority are lower than .5. However, the business relations metric did have an above average correlation with both timeliness (.6687) and quality (.6308.) The two independent variables, source dependence and contract volume, yielded much weaker correlations with all other variables of interest. Overall, it was concluded that there were not any performance variables that were too closely related and that they could be considered as dependent variables in separate regression models. In the following sections of this chapter, each performance metric will be assessed and modeled to explain their relationships with source dependence and contract volume.

	Timeliness	Cost Control	Quality	Business Relations	Regulatory Compliance	Source Dependence	Contract Volume
Timeliness	1.0000						
Cost Control	0.3513	1.0000					
Quality	0.5813	0.4001	1.0000				
Business							
Relations	0.6687	0.3915	0.6308	1.0000			
Regulatory							
Compliance	0.3913	0.4287	0.4953	0.5236	1.0000		
Source		-					
Dependence	-0.2777	0.1762	-0.2433	-0.2006	-0.1469	1.0000	
Contract							
Volume	0.1261	0.0734	0.1562	0.1649	0.1503	-0.0686	1.0000

Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Variables

Schedule/Timeliness

As previously mentioned, the schedule or timeliness metric in CPARS refers to the supplier's ability to ensure contract requirements are fulfilled in a timely manner. A simple linear regression was formulated to determine the relationship between source dependence supplier timeliness. The calculated regression formula was found to be statistically significant (p = .0001), with an R^2 of .077. Meaning that 7.7% of variance in supplier timeliness scores can be explained by the source dependence variable. While the model is statistically significant, high levels of variance around the slope suggests that source dependence alone would not generate accurate predictions of supplier timeliness. Furthermore, the scatterplot displayed in Figure 2 below indicates that source dependence has a negative influence ($\beta = -.086$) on supplier timeliness. This negative relationship differs from the transaction cost economics literature which suggest that higher levels of dependence lead to improved performance (Williamson, 2008.) This could potentially be attributed to a lack of interdependence within the buyer-seller relationship. Additionally, a separate linear regression model was calculated to measure the influence of supplier contract volume on the timeliness performance metric. This model also yielded a small but statistically significant result (p = .0234.) and an R^2 of .0159. Which indicates that only 1.6% of variance in timeliness is attributed to contract volume of suppliers.



Figure 2: Scatterplots for Timeliness

Cost Control

The cost control performance metric in CPARS refers to the supplier's ability to exhibit cost responsibility through forecasting and order cost control. First, a simple linear regression model was formulated to measure the relationship between the cost control performance of suppliers and the USAF's level of dependence toward those suppliers. The calculated regression formula was found to have a statistically small significance (p = .0015), with an R^2 of .031. Meaning that 3.1% of variance in supplier's cost control performance scores can be explained by source dependence. The scatterplot in Figure 3 below displays a negative relationship ($\beta = ..041$.) However, with high variance around the slope, it could not solely be used as a predicting variable. Additionally, a simple linear regression model was calculated to measure the influence of supplier's contract volume on the cost control performance metric. This calculation was not found to be statistically significant (p = .1884) and resulted in an R^2 of .0054. This indicates that only .54% of variance in cost control is attributed to supplier size in terms of contract volume.





Technical/Quality

The technical or quality rating in CPARS refers to the supplier's ability to deliver products or services within contract specifications. In this model, the calculated regression formula was also found to be statistically significant (p = .0001), with an R^2 of

.0592. Meaning that 5.92% of variance in the supplier's quality performance scores can be explained by source dependence. The scatterplot in Figure 4 below indicates that source dependence also has negative relationship ($\beta = -.069$) with supplier quality scores. However, with large amounts of variance around the slope, it is unlikely to yield accurate results as a predicting variable. Additionally, a simple linear regression model was calculated to measure the influence of supplier contract volume on the quality performance metric. This calculation was also deemed to have a statistically small significance (p = .0049.) However, it resulted in a much lower R^2 of .0244, indicating that only about 2.44% of variance in supplier quality ratings can be attributed to contract volume.



Figure 4: Scatterplots for Quality

Management/Business Relations

Management or business relations in CPARS measures a supplier's level of customer service and how they respond to problems or changes that may occur during the procurement process. A simple linear regression was formulated to relate the business relations of suppliers to the USAF's level of dependence toward those suppliers. The linear regression model was calculated and found to be statistically significant (p = .0003), with an R^2 of .0402. Meaning that 4.02% of variance in business relations performance scores can be explained by source dependence. Again, this performance metric was found to have a negative relationship ($\beta = .064$) with source dependence, as seen below in Figure 5. Additionally, another linear regression model was calculated to measure the influence of supplier contract volume on the business relations metric. This calculation was also deemed to be statistically significant (p = .0029.) However, it resulted in a much lower R^2 of .0272, indicating that only about 2.72% of variance in business relations can be attributed to contract volume.



Figure 5: Scatterplots for Business Relations

Regulatory Compliance

Regulatory compliance is scored in CPARS to capture the supplier's ability to abide by miscellaneous contract terms such as environment, safety, or financial regulations. A simple linear regression was formulated to predict the regulatory compliance scores of suppliers based on the USAF's level of dependence toward those suppliers. The calculated regression formula was found to be statistically significant (p = .0082), with an R^2 of .0215. Meaning that 2.15% of variance in regulatory performance scores can be explained by source dependence. As found in the previous models, source dependence was found to negatively influence ($\beta = -.031$) the regulatory compliance of suppliers. Additionally, a simple linear regression model was calculated to measure the influence of supplier contract volume on the regulatory compliance performance metric. This calculation was also found to have a small but statistically significant result (p = .0068.) However, it resulted in a much lower R^2 of .0226, indicating that only 2.26% of variance in regulatory compliance is attributed to contract volume.



Figure 6: Scatterplots for Regulatory Compliance

Summary

The intent of this chapter was to statistically explain the influence of source dependence and contract volume on various aspects of supplier performance. As indicated in table 3 below, source dependence was found to have a small but statistically significant influence all CPARS performance metrics, with timeliness being the most influenced. Furthermore, it was discovered that source dependence had a negative relationship with the performance metrics. This negative relationship differs from the transaction cost economics literature which suggest that higher levels of dependence lead to improved performance (Williamson, 2008.) This could potentially be attributed to a lack of interdependence within the buyer-seller relationship, which relates to a limitation discussed in the previous chapter. Additionally, it was found that contract volume also had a significant but small influence (see Table 4) on all aspects of supplier performance, except for cost control.

<u>k</u>	Source Dep	pendence	-		
Dependent Variables	α	β	SE(β)	R^2	р
Timeliness	3.732	-0.086	0.017	0.077	0.0001*
Cost Control	3.605	-0.041	0.013	0.031	0.0015*
Quality	3.749	-0.069	0.015	0.059	0.0001*
Business Relations	3.741	-0.064	0.017	0.0402	0.0001*
Regulatory Compliance	3.366	-0.031	0.012	0.022	0.0001*
* <i>p</i> < .05					

Table 3: Source Dependence Model Results

	<u>Contract</u>	Volume			
Dependent Variables	α	β	$SE(\beta)$	R^2	р
Timeliness	3.323	0.001	0.0005	0.016	0.0234*
Cost Control	3.413	0.001	0.0004	0.005	0.1884
Quality	3.412	0.001	0.00004	0.024	0.0049*
Business Relations	3.41	0.002	0.0001	0.027	0.0029*
Regulatory Compliance	3.202	0.001	0.0003	0.023	0.0068*
* <i>p</i> < .05					

Table 4: Contract Volume Model Results

While both source dependence and contract volume were found to have statistically measurable influences on performance, it is unlikely they would yield in accurate predictions solely as prediction variables. The next and final chapter of this study will draw conclusions from these findings and recommendations will be made to inform sourcing decisions and future research.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions of Research

As many of the USAF's aircraft fleets are now decades old, the procurement of spare parts needed to sustain and prolong their life cycles is imperative. The diminishment of manufacturing sources experienced by many of these weapon systems has led the USAF to be highly dependent on sole sources of supply to furnish these critical spare parts (AF/A4, 2019.) While there is extensive research in the literature on source dependence and how they influence procurement outcomes, there has been little research conducted within the scope of federal procurement and USAF spare part logistics. The overall goal of this study was to investigate the USAF's dependence toward sole sources of supply and its impact on supplier performance outcomes. In this case, supplier performance was captured through CPARS records and the performance scores of timeliness, quality, cost control, business relations, and regulatory compliance were examined as outcome variables.

Using a series of linear regression models, it was found that source dependence had a negative influence on all performance categories. Among these models, the analysis indicated that the timeliness performance metric was impacted more adversely than the others. This suggests that suppliers with increased levels of dependence, achieved lower performance scores in terms of their ability to avoid delinquent deliveries and satisfy their order requirements in a timely manner. This finding of a negative relationship differs from the transaction cost economics literature which suggest that higher levels of dependence can lead to improved performance. This could be attributed a lack of interdependence within the buyer-seller relationship, which was a limiting factor of this research. Additionally, supplier size in terms of contract volume was also considered as a driver of performance. While, four of the five models were deemed statistically significant, it proved to be less significant than source dependence.

Recommendations for Action

The USAF has already made the growth of manufacturing and repair sources a priority in their sustainment strategic framework. With a high proportion of contracts being awarded to sole sources, they call for future investments in new sources of supply and the dual sourcing of critical workloads (AF/AF, 2019.) Additionally, the Strategic Alternative Sourcing Program Office (SASPO) within the 448th SCMW has long been the backbone of this initiative by recruiting alternative sources of supply that aim to reduce procurement costs and lead times. While this study did not focus on the effect of source dependence on costs and lead times, there was sufficient evidence found to support potential improvements in supplier performance through the reduction of source dependence. With that, it can be recommended that the USAF should continue their efforts toward alternative sourcing programs by investing in new sources of supply and repair.

Future Research

One of the major limitations of this study was the inability to measure interdependence between the USAF and its suppliers. Meaning that the source dependence metric provided by the 448th SCMW only captures the USAF's level of dependence toward suppliers, but it fails to capture dependence from the supplier's perspective. Being able to incorporate interdependence would be a natural extension to this study. Another limitation was the use of subjective performance reports that are subject to biases. Being that the dataset was aggregated by supplier, and the performance raters were unknown, it made it difficult to detect biases in the data. Future researchers should obtain unaggregated CPARS data to aid in the detection of these biases. The unaggregated data will also allow the use of source selection method and other contract specific characteristics as independent variables of interest. Additionally, future research could investigate other potential drivers of CPARS performance scores such as supplier age, length of business relationship with USAF, or perhaps the physical distance between supplier's and their servicing Air Logistics Complex (ALC.)

Appendicies

Appendix A: Model Outputs for Timeliness

Linear Regression Model for Timeliness and Source Dependence

⊿ Lack Of	Fit						
		Sur	n of				
Source	D	F Squ	ares	Mean Sq	uare	E I	Ratio
Lack Of Fi	t 21	7 58.54	1866	0.269	9778	1	.3125
Pure Error	r 104	4 21.37	5895	0.205	5547	Pro	b > F
Total Erro	r 32'	1 79.91	3761			0.0)591
						Max	k RSq
						C	.7531
4 Summa	rv of F	it					
DCauara	.,		0.0	77107			
RSquare			0.0	7/10/			
RSquare A	40J 		0.0	14232			
Magazine	n Square	e Enfor	0.4	54000			
Observati	vesponse	t Turna Martal	5.5	24892			
Observati	ons (or a	sum vvgts)		323			
⊿ Analysi	s of Va	riance					
		Sum	of				
Source	DF	Squar	es N	Vean Squa	re	F Ra	tio
Model	1	6.67711	0	6.6771	11	26.8191	
Error	321	79.91876	51	1 0.24897		rob :	> F
C. Total	322	86.59587	71			<.000)1*
⊿ Parame	ter Est	imates					
Term		Estin	nate	Std Error	t Ra	atio	Prob
Intercept		3.731	5916	0.077876	4	7.92	<.00
	Source Dependence -(

Linear Regression Model for Timeliness and Contract Volume

4	Lack Of	Fit							
			Sum	1 of					
	Source	D	F Squa	ares	Mean	Square	e	F Rati	0
	Lack Of Fi	t 7	8 15.494	903	0.	0.198653		0.692	3
	Pure Error	r 24	3 69.723	285	0.	0.286927		rob >	F
	Total Erro	r 32	1 85.218	188				0.9712	2
							N	lax RS	q
								0.194	8
4	⊿ Summary of Fit								
	RSquare	-		0.0	15909				
	RSquare A	٩di		0.0	12844				
	Root Mea	n Squar	e Error	0.5	15245				
	Mean of F	Respons	e	3.3	54892				
	Observati	ons (or S	Sum Wgts)		323				
4	Analysi	s of Va	riance						
	-		Sum o	f					
	Source	DF	Square	s N	/lean Sq	uare	FI	Ratio	
	Model	1	1.37768	3	1.3	7768	5	1895	
	Error	321	85.21818	8	0.2	0.26548		b > F	
	C. Total	322	86.59587	1			0.0)234*	
4	Parame	ter Est	timates						
	Term		Estimate	e St	d Error	t Rat	io	Prob>	t
	Intercept		3.3232267	0	.031861	104.	30	<.000	1*
	Contract V	Volume	0.0012134	0	.000533	2.	28	0.023	4*

Appendix B: Model Outputs for Cost Control

⊿ Lack Of Fit Sum of Source DF Squares Mean Square F Ratio 217 32.807050 0.151185 1.1205 Lack Of Fit Pure Error 104 14.032896 0.134932 Prob > F Total Error 321 46.839945 0.2582 Max RSq 0.7097 ⊿ Summary of Fit RSquare 0.03104 RSquare Adj 0.028021 Root Mean Square Error 0.381993 Mean of Response 3.426811 Observations (or Sum Wgts) 323 ⊿ Analysis of Variance Sum of DF Source Squares Mean Square F Ratio 1.50047 10.2829 Model 1 1.500470 0.14592 Prob > F Error 321 46.839945 322 48.340415 C. Total 0.0015* ⊿ Parameter Estimates Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 3.6054312 0.05962 60.47 <.0001* Source Dependence -0.040788 0.01272 -3.21 0.0015*

Linear Regression Model for Cost Control and Source Dependence

Linear Regression Model for Cost Control and Contract Volume

Lack O	f Fit								
			Sum	of					
Source	D	F	F Squa		Mear	n Squar	е	F Rati	o
Lack Of F	it 7	8	12.466	713	0.15983		0	1.090)6
Pure Erro	or 24	3	35.6134	491	I 0.14655		8	Prob >	F
Total Erro	or 32	1	48.080	204				0.3067	7
								Max RS	δq
								0.263	33
Summa	ary of F	it							
DCauara	,			0.0	05202				
RSquare	RSquare				00000				
Root Mo	Auj an Sauar	~ E1	ror	0.0	02204				
Moon of	Bospons			2.4	0/010				
Obsorpt	ions (or 9	e Cun	a Matc)	5.4	20011				
Observat		Sun	n vvyts)		323				1
Analys	is of Va	aria	ance						
			Sum o	f					
Source	DF		Square	s I	Mean S	quare	F	Ratio	
Model	1		0.260212	2	0.2	60212		1.7373	
Error	321	4	8.080204	1	0.1	49783	Pr	ob > F	
C. Total	322	4	8.340415	5			0	.1884	
Param	eter Est	tim	ates						
Term		E	Istimate	St	td Erro	r tRa	tio	Prob>	t
Intercept	:	3.	4130496	0	.02393	2 142	.62	<.000)1
Contract	Volume	0.	0005273		0.000	4 1	.32	0.188	34

Appendix C: Model Outputs for Quality

Lack Of Fit Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Lack Of Fit 217 52.998504 0.244233 1.6821 Pure Error 104 15.100013 0.145192 Prob > F Total Error 321 68.098517 0.0016* Max RSq 0.7914 Summary of Fit 0.059202 0.7914 Summary of Fit 0.056272 0.056272 0.0016* Root Mean Square Error 0.460592 0.460592 0.8447523 Observations (or Sum Wgts) 323 323 4 Analysis of Variance Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001* Parameter Estimates Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.00 Source Dependence -0.06893 0.015337 -4.49 <.00									
Source DF Squares Squares Mean Square F Ratio Lack Of Fit 217 52.998504 0.244233 1.6821 Pure Error 104 15.100013 0.145192 Prob > F Total Error 321 68.098517 0.0016* Max RSq 0.7914 0.059202 0.059202 RSquare Adj 0.0556272 0.0016* RSquare Adj 0.056272 0.0056272 0.0059202 Mean of Response 3.447523 Observations (or Sum Wgts) 323 323 4 Analysis of Variance F Ratio Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001* Parameter Estimates Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> reb <.0001* Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.00 <.00	Lack Of F	it							
Source DF Squares Mean Square F Ratio Lack Of Fit 217 52.998504 0.244233 1.6821 Pure Error 104 15.100013 0.145192 Prob > F Total Error 321 68.098517 0.0016* Max RSq 0.7914 0.059202 RSquare Adj 0.0556272 0.0016* RSquare Adj 0.0556272 0.056272 Root Mean Square Error 0.460592 Mean of Response 3.447523 024.1999 323 Analysis of Variance Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001* 4 Parameter Estimates Std Error t Ratio Prob > F Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.000			Sum	ı of					
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Pure Error Total Error 104 321 15.100013 68.098517 0.145192 Prob > F Max RSq 0.7914 0.0016* Max RSq 0.7914 Summary of Fit 0.059202 0.7914 Square Adj 0.056272 0.056272 Root Mean Square Error 0.460592 323 Analysis of Variance 323 323 Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001*	Lack Of Fit	217	52.998	504		0.2442	33	1.6	821
Total Error 321 68.098517 0.0016* Max RSq 0.7914 Summary of Fit 0.059202 RSquare Adj 0.056272 Root Mean Square Error 0.460592 Mean of Response 3.447523 Observations (or Sum Wgts) 323 Analysis of Variance 5000000000000000000000000000000000000	Pure Error	104	15.100	013		0.1451	92	Prob	> F
Max RSq 0.7914 Summary of Fit RSquare Adj 0.059202 RSquare Adj 0.056272 Root Mean Square Error 0.460592 Mean of Response 3.447523 Observations (or Sum Wgts) 323 Analysis of Variance F Ratio Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001*	Total Error	321	68.098	517				0.00	16*
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RSquare 0.059202 RSquare Adj 0.056272 Root Mean Square Error 0.460592 Mean of Response 3.447523 Observations (or Sum Wgts) 323 Analysis of Variance 323 Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001*	⊿ Summary	y of Fi	it						
RSquare Adj 0.056272 Root Mean Square Error 0.460592 Mean of Response 3.447523 Observations (or Sum Wgts) 323 Analysis of Variance 323 Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001*	RSquare			0.0	59202				
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Mean of Response Observations (or Sum Wgts) 3.447523 323 Analysis of Variance Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001* Parameter Estimates Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> o.001* Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.000 Source Dependence -0.06893 0.015337 -4.49 <.000	Root Mean	Square	Error	0.4	50592				
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 323 Analysis of Variance Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001* Parameter Estimates Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.000 Source Dependence -0.06893 0.015337 -4.49 <.000	Mean of Re	sponse		3.44	47523				
Analysis of Variance Source DF Squares Mean Square F Ratio Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001* Parameter Estimates Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.000 Source Dependence -0.06893 0.015337 -4.49 <.000	Observation	s (or S	um Wgts)		323				
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001*	⊿ Analysis	of Va	riance						
Source DF Squares Mean Square F Ratio Model 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001* Parameter Estimates 74.38244 0.071887 52.16 <.000 Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.000 \$.000			Sum o	f					
Model Error 1 4.285302 4.28530 20.1999 Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001* Parameter Estimates Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.000 Source Dependence -0.06893 0.015337 -4.49 <.000	Source	DF	Square	s N	/lean S	Square	F	Rati	•
Error 321 68.098517 0.21214 Prob > F C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001*	Model	1	4.28530	2	4	.28530) 2	0.199	9
C. Total 322 72.383819 <.0001* Parameter Estimates Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.000	Error	321	68.09851	7	0.212		1214 Prob > 1		F
Parameter Estimates Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.000	C. Total	322	72.38381	9			<	.0001	*
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.000			in star						
Intercept 3.7493844 0.071887 52.16 <.000	Parameter	er Est	imates						
Source Dependence -0.06893 0.015337 -4.49 <.000	⊿ Parameto Term	er Est	Estim	ate	Std E	rror	t Ra	tio F	Prob>
	Parameter Term Intercept	er Est	Estim 3.7493	ate 844	Std E	irror 1887	t Ra 52	tio F .16	Prob> <.000

Linear Regression Model for Quality and Source Dependence

Linear Regression Model for Quality and Contract Volume

Lack Of	Fit						
Source		Sur E Sau	n of	Mean	Sauara	E Pat	in
Lack Of Fit	7	2 125 <i>//</i>	5645	0	172675	0.72	0
Duro Error	24	2 57 070	1220	0.	22/057	Proh >	
Total Error	27	5 57.070 1 70.614	5072	0.	234037	0.040	• 0
IotarEnor	52	1 70.010	575			Max R	S
						0.21	1
Summai	y of F	it					
RSquare			0.0	24409			
, RSquare A	di		0.0	02137			
Root Mear	Squar	e Error	0.4	59032			
Mean of R	espons	e	3.44	47523			
Observatio	ns (or S	Sum Wgts)		323			
Analysis	of Va	riance					1
		Sum o	of				
Source	DF	Square	es N	/lean Sq	uare	F Ratio	
Model	1	1.76684	45	1.7	6685	8.0315	
Error	321	70.61697	73	0.2	1999 F	Prob > F	
C. Total	322	72.38381	9			0.0049*	
Paramet	er Est	imates					
Term		Estimat	e St	d Error	t Rati	o Proba	>
Intercept		3.411663	8 0	.029003	117.6	3 <.00	0
Contract V	olume	0.001374	1 0	.000485	2.8	3 0.00	4

Appendix D: Model Outputs for Business Relations

Linear Regression Model for Business Relations and Source Dependence

⊿ Lack O	f Fit								
		Sur	n of						
Source	D	F Squ	ares	Mean Sq	uare	E I	Ratio		
Lack Of F	-it 21	7 59.653	3438	0.27	4901	1	.0249		
Pure Erro	or 10	4 27.896	5396	0.26	8235	Pro	ob > F		
Total Erro	or 32	1 87.549	9835			0.4502			
						Max	x RSq		
						C).6942		
⊿ Summ	ary of F	Fit							
RSquare	-		0.04	40242					
RSquare	Adi	0.0	37252						
Root Me	an Squar	0.5	22246						
Mean of	Respons	e	3.4	62105					
Observat	tions (or s	- Sum Wats)		323					
⊿ Analvs	is of Va	ariance							
		anance							
-	13 01 42	Sum	of						
Source	DF	Sum of Square	of es N	Aean Squa	re	F Ra	tio		
Source Model	DF	Sum of Square 3.67093	of es M	Mean Squa 3.670	re 93	F Ra 13.45	tio		
Source Model Error	DF 1 321	Sum o Squaro 3.67093 87.54983	of es N 34	Mean Squa 3.670 0.272	re 93 74 P	F Ra 13.45 rob :	tio 594 > F		
Source Model Error C. Total	DF 1 321 322	Sum of Square 3.67093 87.54983 91.22076	of es N 34 35 58	Mean Squa 3.670 0.272	re 93 74 P	F Ra 13.45 rob : 0.000	tio 594 > F)3*		
Source Model Error C. Total	DF 1 321 322 eter Est	Sum of Square 3.67093 87.54983 91.22076 timates	of es N 34 35 58	Mean Squa 3.670 0.272	re 93 74 P	F Ra 13.45 rob : 0.000	tio 594 > F 03*		
Source Model Error C. Total Param Term	DF 1 321 322 eter Est	Sum of Square 3.67093 87.54983 91.22076 timates Estin	of es M 34 35 58 nate	Mean Squa 3.670 0.272 Std Error	re 93 74 P	F Ra 13.45 (rob : 0.000	tio 594 > F)3* Prob>		
Source Model Error C. Total Param Term Intercept	DF 1 321 322 eter Est	Sum of Square 3.67093 87.54983 91.22076 timates Estin 3.7414	of es M 34 35 58 nate 4914	Mean Squa 3.670 0.272 Std Error 0.08151	re 93 74 P t Ra 4	F Ra 13.45 (rob : 0.000 atio 5.90	tio 594 > F 03* Prob> <.000		

Linear Regression Model for Business Relations and Contract Volume

Lack Of	f Fit							
Source	D	Sum F Squa	of res	Mean	Squar	e	F Rati	0
Lack Of F	it 7	8 15 444	984	0	19801	- 3	0.656	55
Pure Erro	r 24	3 73,293	931	0	30162	1	Prob >	F
Total Erro	or 32	1 88.738	915				0.9849	9
							Max RS	q
							0.196	55
Summa	ary of F	it						
RSquare			0.0	27207				
RSquare	Adj		0.0	24177				
Root Mea	an Squar	e Error	0.5	25781				
Mean of	Respons	e	3.4	62105				
Observati	ions (or !	Sum Wgts)		323				
Analysi	is of Va	riance						
		Sum o	f					
Source	DF	Square	s N	/lean So	uare	F	Ratio	
Model	1	2.481854	1	2.4	18185	- 1	8.9777	
Error	321	88.73891	5	0.2	27645	Pro	ob > F	
C. Total	322	91.220768	3			0	.0029*	
Parame	eter Est	timates						
Term		Estimate	St	d Error	t Rat	io	Prob>	t
Intercept		3.419605	0	.032512	105.	18	<.000)1
Contract	Volume	0.0016286	0	.000544	3.	00	0.002	29

Appendix E: Model Outputs for Regulatory Compliance

Linear Regression Model for Regulatory Compliance and Source Dependence

Lack Of	Fit					
		Sui	m of			
Source	D	F Squ	ares	Mean Squ	iare F	Ratio
Lack Of Fi	t 21	7 28.32	5806	0.130	534	1.1160
Pure Erro	r 10-	4 12.16	4127	0.116	963 Pro	ob > F
Total Erro	r 32	1 40.48	9933		0	.2658
					Ma	ix RSq
						0.7061
Summa	ry of F	it				
RSquare			0.0	21594		
RSquare /	Adj		0.0	18546		
Root Mea	n Squar	e Error	0.3	55158		
Mean of I	Response	e	3.2	27678		
Observati	ons (or S	Sum Wgts))	323		
Analysi	s of Va	riance				
		Sum	of			
Source	DF	Squar	es N	Aean Squar	e FRa	atio
Model	1	0.8936	26	0.89362	6 7.0	846
Error	321	40.4899	33	0.12613	7 Prob	> F
C. Total	322	41.3835	59		0.00	82*
4 Parame	eter Est	imates				
Term		Estir	nate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob
Intercept		3.365	5241	0.055431	60.72	<.00

Linear Regression Model for Regulatory Compliance and Contract Volume

Lack O	f Fit						
		Su	um of				
Source	D	F Sq	uares	Mear	n Squar	е	F Rati
Lack Of F	it 7	8 6.4	99192	0.08332		3 0.59	
Pure Erro	r 24	3 33.9	49409	(0.13971	0	Prob >
Total Erro	r 32	1 40.4	48600				0.9959
							Max RS
							0.179
Summa	arv of F	Fit					
RSquare	·		0.0	22502			
PSquare	٨di		0.0	10540			
Root Mar	Auj En Caucar	- Free	0.0	E 4076			
Married	ni Squai	eenor	0.5	34970			
Observation	Respons	e Suma Mart	3.2	2/0/8			
Observati	ions (or :	sum vvgi	.S)	323			
Analysi	is of Va	ariance					
		Sum	n of				
Source	DF	Squa	ires	Mean S	quare	F	Ratio
Model	1	0.934	958	0.9	34958		7.4198
Error	321	40.448	600	0.1	26008	Pre	ob > F
C. Total	322	41.383	559			0	*8000.
Parame	eter Est	timates					
Term		Estima	ate S	td Erro	r tRat	tio	Prob>
Intercept		3.20159	25 (.02195	1 145.	.85	<.000
Contract	Volume	0.00099	96 (.00036	7 2.	.72	0.006

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