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James A. MacKenna

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REQUIREMENTS-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING AGE INVENTORY LEVELS

THESIS

James A. MacKenna, Captain, USAF

AFIT/GLM/ENS/01M-15

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

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REQUIREMENTS-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING AGE INVENTORY LEVELS

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty

Department of Operational Sciences

Graduate School of Engineering and Management

Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

Air Education and Training Command

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Science in Logistics Management

James A. MacKenna, B.A.

Captain, USAF

March 2001

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REQUIREMENTS-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING AGE INVENTORY LEVELS

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Acknowledgments

There were many who contributed to this effort and it would not be complete without them. Their support, patience, and consideration helped make this a worthy project.

This endeavor was truly taxing and only the guidance and strength of God helped me balance a family with a brutal education.

^I am deeply indebted to my wife, who has worked far more during this time than ^I ever did, with four exuberant children to manage. Her patience and spirit are what made this effort possible.

^I express my sincere appreciation to my faculty advisor, Lt. Col. Raymond Hill, for his guidance and support throughout the course of this thesis effort. My reader, Dr. William Cunningham, was an excellent sounding board. Their insight, experience, and feedback was greatly appreciated. Thanks to my sponsors, Chief David Caldwell and SMSgt Sam Desai, from the Air Mobility Command for the support provided me in this endeavor. Lastly, thanks to Al Wallace and especially Mark Goldschmidt from the AFMC LCOM technical office, for their active interest and enduring patience with my endless queries.

James A. MacKenna

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Abstract

The purpose of this research was to illuminate crucial areas in analyzing AGE needs on an operational flightline and assist in determination of AGE inventory levels. Further refinements could result in more objective and accurate assessments of actual flightline AGE needs and associated risks involved with reduction of AGE inventory levels.

The research in this thesis consists of a discrete event simulation to determine desired AGE inventory level through an analysis of aircraft launches and wait time for AGE support by varying AGE (mean time between failure) MTBF and AGE inventory. Stochastic inputs for aircraft failures, AGE delivery times, and AGE MTBF were used. The scope of this effort was primarily concerned with an appropriate methodology to determine actual AGE requirements through analysis of consumption patterns and risk to reach a desired service level. The result of this effort was a defined methodological approach in determination of AGE levels that could be applied across aircraft and AGE type.

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REQUIREMENTS-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING AGE INVENTORY LEVELS

I. Introduction

Problem

Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) is used to service aircraft while the aircraft is on the ground. It is the aircraft maintainer's job to ensure aircraft are serviced and repaired expediently thereby maintaining high percentages of their aircraft fleet in mission ready status. The desire to have these high aircraft mission capable rates has resulted in keeping high inventory levels of everything imaginable necessary to sustain the aircraft. No maintainer wants to see aircraft mission losses due to a lack of functional AGE. Thus, to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable AGE, excess AGE inventory is the norm. This excess inventory phenomena is not limited to AGE but includes tools, parts, and supplies. In other words, over the years, the Air Force fielded increasing amounts of AGE, "just in case." Since some AGE serviced by the AGE maintenance shop have very little actual operating time between service intervals some question whether the amount of AGE in the field is excessive.

The level of AGE (or any support equipment) at a given location is determined by that location's table of allowance authorization. Currently, Air Mobility Command (AMC), queries subject matter experts (SME's) to determine the table of allowance authorizations for AGE. This is done base-by-base, with

Unit Type Codes (UTC's) and mission requirements of each base determining the final total allowance authorization. As the Air Force enters the 21st century, the Air Force must reduce instances of excess assets in the most effective manner possible.

With AGE, this is most effectively addressed on two dependent issues: the number of AGE units required and the reliability of the AGE units. By closely examining what is actually required to support aircraft, the Air Force can identify excesses and shortfalls to provide maximum utility from limited resources. Considering the reliability of the AGE units is a major input into the number of units required due to potential reliability problems with either newly deployed or aging systems. Effective utilization of limited resources supports the Joint Vision 2020 concept of seamless integration of support requirements through, "focused logistics." (Joint Vision 2020, 2000)

AMC Interest

AMC reviewed the paper by O'Fearna, Hill, and Miller (2000) based on the thesis entitled, Reduction of the Aircraft Ground Equipment Footprint of an Air Expeditionary Force, by Captain Frank C. O'Fearna, and found the force sizing methodology attractive. O'Fearna sought to define the amount of AGE needed by a deploying fighter expeditionary force reducing AGE levels without impacting the mission. His approach was AGE-utilization based. Using a model to track utilization of particular AGE units as dictated by a squadron flying schedule coupled with aircraft component failure and repair data. Under-utilized

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equipment became candidates for inventory reduction, deployment delay or even elimination from the deployment plan.

AMC would like to use a similar approach and apply an analysis of need to AMC AGE levels, with the possibility of long-term AGE leveling strategies. AMC is purchasing a new nitrogen system, the Self Generating Nitrogen Servicing Cart (SGNSC), and would like to do a demonstration project in AGE leveling, assessing utilization of SGNSC as the first potential application of a methodology. The current method AMC uses to determine AGE levels appear to overstate need, and the purchase of a new nitrogen system for use throughout the Air Force, with AMC as the lead command, is an excellent opportunity to compare current practice with a more analytical approach to determining AGE levels. The intent of course is to reduce AGE levels without impacting aircraft mission capable rates.

Proposal

A stochastic discrete-event queuing simulation used to determine the Basis Of Issue (BOI) may provide a more accurate starting point for determining AGE authorizations. A quantitative methodology, initially applied to SGNSC, and eventually extended to other AGE inventory, may allow AMC to more effectively assess the need and utilization of AGE. This assessment should provide opportunities for cost savings through AGE reduction along with a risk assessment associated with the proposed reduction.

Scope of Research

The primary purpose of this research is to refine and demonstrate a methodology for assessing AGE utilization in a given scenario while noting any impacts on mission capability. The goal is to use this quantitative methodology to size an AGE fleet to meet aircraft demand at a base of study, and perform sensitivity analysis on any maintenance delay if the aircraft must wait for AGE assets.

In an effort to analyze the impact of SGNSC, and limit confounding effects of possibly redundant variables, variables such as maintenance, fuel, etc, will be modeled as unconstrained resources. AGE will be delayed for 10 minutes after it is identified to allow for delivery. Statistics will be gathered on AGE utilization to show usage, percentage of cancelled missions (PCM) to show the net effect of different AGE levels, and the actual number of cancelled missions. It is anticipated that AGE utilization will be very low due to high service levels. Carrico and Clark found this to be true in their research although their results were based on using levels of AGE as assigned by the table of allowances, and sensitivity analysis of the effect of different AGE levels was only conducted for the Modular Aircraft Support System (MASS). (Carrico and Clark, 1996:15, 18- 20) The focus of the current study is to determine the actual amount of AGE necessary to meet requirements, regardless of the table of allowance values, such as those used in Carrico and Clark's study. They also used PCM in their study as a measure of mission effectiveness. They used a static measure. A delay of over 30 minutes would result in a cancelled mission. (Carrico, 1996:16)

This is not an unreasonable assumption, since current AMC guidance is to cancel a mission if the aircraft exceeds the launch window by 15 minutes. An attempt will be made to use actual cancelled missions in the current study.

Issues/Needs/Limitations

SGNCS reliability/(Mean Time Between Failure) MTBF rates are unknown. Engineering data from the contractor and any reliability testing will be used as a baseline for failure rates. According to Carrico and Clark, sensitivity analysis of reliability figures did not have an influence of practical significance on AGE's impact to Flight Sortie Effectiveness. (Carrico and Clark, 1996: 23-25) Similar results are expected for this study.

Constraints imposed by the airfield, such as the maximum number of serviced aircraft on the ground at one time limit the potential aircraft population pool that require SGNSC support. Historical throughput data for Travis AFB will be used to determine the population of aircraft requesting SGNSC support.

G081 is the aircraft maintenance database for heavy aircraft which are the focus of this study. G081 has limitations thus using its data for this study will impact the accuracy of our analytical model. Where G081 data is unavailable, SME interviews will be used to obtain the necessary data. The primary data required is that data suggesting any maintenance-based nitrogen needs.

One of two issues not addressed in this research is the dynamic redistribution of CONUS SGNCS. AMC aircraft could bring their own Nitrogen support to a deployment base. Since AMC aircraft would likely fly empty to the base, they could carry a SGNSC with them for the deployment activity, and then

take it home when they are done. This would require coordination on the return trip, but has potential for savings in acquisition and life cycle costs. However, the command, control, and funding issues are far outside the scope of this effort, and this will not be explored. However, AGE is not such small change anymore. The initial SGNSC contract is a \$20 million effort with an estimated 570 units at \$35k each, not including operations and maintenance costs. (DefenseLINK News, 1998) While it does not compare with the B-2 program, it does carry potential for cost reductions, and is worth examining. Further, these are only procurement costs, and do not include other costs such as reliability, maintainability, and mobility/deployment.

This thesis also does not examine the impact of other AGE on aircraft availability at this point. This thesis only addresses the impact of SGNSC through comparison of distributions of different variables against each other through a queuing simulation to determine range of utilization and size SGNCS inventory to accommodate mission requirements.

II. Literature Review

Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE)

AGE is used for the servicing and maintenance of aircraft while the aircraft are on the ground. AGE is a relatively inexpensive way to maintain aircraft compared to using systems onboard the aircraft. AGE may be readily replaced without impacting the aircraft mission capability. Systems onboard the aircraft would need servicing which would impact aircraft availability. AGE is a necessary part of the flightline environment and some form of AGE is almost always used whenever performing aircraft maintenance.

AGE delivery is also an issue. The delivery of AGE, if it is available, is dependent on the AGE driver and the delivery vehicle. For purposes of the current research, AGE drivers are assumed to be on duty when demanded and that an AGE delivery vehicle is available when required. Delays may be modeled to account for driving time around the flightline.

Self Generating Nitrogen Servicing Cart (SGNSC)

SGNSC is a self-contained powered AGE unit that uses outside air to refill storage cylinders filled with nitrogen. The cart takes outside air, builds pressure and filters nitrogen through a membrane into the storage cylinder. The nitrogen is retained in the cylinder until discharged. The system is entirely self-contained and does not require refilling from outside sources, saving time and money, while increasing safety.

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Previous AGE Research

Carrico and Clark- IMDE

Carrico and Clark studied the Multi-function Aerospace Support System (MASS) using the Integrated Model Development Environment (IMDE). Carrico created a model to study the effects of varying levels of AGE, AGE travel time, and flying schedules on the utilization and effectiveness of MASS, and MASS'S impact on aircraft availability. Carrico and Clark measured the impact of AGE by examining changes to the percentage of cancelled missions. (Carrico and Clark, 1996:16)

The results from Carrico and Clark's study supported the position that combined AGE units could supplant current AGE without affecting unit mission effectiveness. However, he made the observation that a compressed flying schedule, with several missions and small intervals between launch times, could dramatically increase abort rates. (Carrico and Clark, 1996:35) By varying numbers of MASS units, Carrico and Clark observed that the sharp increase in the abort rate under the compressed schedule was primarily due to the defined aircraft repair times, not the availability or non-availability of support equipment. (Carrico and Clark, 1996:35)

Carrico and Clark also found that the time needed to physically move AGE from one position to another had a significant impact on mission effectiveness. (Carrico and Clark, 1996:35) However, AGE can be called for by the maintenance supervisor in advance of maintenance and thus negate the effect of travel time. This significantly reduces the effects of travel time predicted by the

Simulation with the potential exception of maintenance work that occurs with discovery of a discrepancy during a pre-flight check, commonly called a, "red streak." Red streaks are a minor part of overall maintenance tasks accomplished in an organization. Carrico and Clark did not address "red streaks" in his study. His interviews with maintenance personnel indicated that waits of $15 - 20$ minutes were not uncommon. He thus delayed all AGE for all maintenance actions, effectively yielding a worst case scenario. (Carrico and Clark, 1996:15)

Interviews with personnel at Travis revealed that delivery times were tracked, and AGE was delivered in less than 10 minutes 80 percent of the time and in less than 20 minutes 99% of the time. (Labadie, 2000) This delivery distribution was the AGE delivery delay modeled in LCOM.

Havlicek

Lieutenant Jeffrey Havlicek modified Carrico and Clark's model to examine the effect of consolidating AGE in response to the development of the MASS and compare the MASS unit to the Combined Generator Air Conditioner (CGAC), legacy AGE, and a combination of MASS and CGAC. He modeled a single F-16 squadron over a 30 day deployment and manipulated MTBF/mean time to repair (MTTR) of the AGE units and travel time. He measured the percentage of cancelled missions and the number of requests in the queue, but did not measure the time spent in the queue.

Havlicek performed cost analysis on his results and concluded that CGAC was the least expensive option up to 27 deployments, at which point the MASS option became less expensive. (Havlicek, 1997:85) The legacy AGE option did

not compete effectively at any point. The reason the CGAC was less expensive for the first 27 missions was the acquisition cost of the unit. After 27 deployments the MASS unit made up for the initial higher acquisition costs in Havlicek's model. Havlicek used fixed quantities of AGE for his study due to his manipulation of other variables. The study was primarily a cost analysis of the different AGE configurations available based on a set requirement. He does not question the requirement itself, but that was not the focus of the study.

O'Fearna

Captain Frank O'Fearna created a queuing simulation in Awesim to address AGE utilization in a deployment of fighter aircraft. He created enormous databases of information on AGE-supported maintenance performed on F-15 aircraft based on extensive interviewing with field experts. This is an extremely time-intensive task and is not suitable to the desired extensibility of this thesis. However, the basic approach and model used by O'Fearna in his thesis was a template for the current thesis. O'Fearna used Work Unit Codes (WUCs) to drive maintenance actions. WUCs identify systems in an aircraft at various system/subsystem levels. Actual failure data in maintenance databases are theoretically keyed to WUCs. This means a stochastic model may model failures at a given subsystem level and the WUC will indicate the failure and the maintenance actions required to rectify the failure. O'Fearna's databases were based on WUCs. His model captured failures at a subsystem level and a matrix of maintenance actions and AGE requirements was employed to model the resulting maintenance process.

O'Fearna tried to determine the actual amounts of AGE required to support a deployment of an F-15 fighter squadron using a simulation model of an Air Expeditionary Force. Previous analysis of AGE levels consisted of justification of current allowance tables vice leveling AGE for maximum utilization while still meeting mission requirements. O'Fearna's goal was to reduce the logistics "tail," the support equipment required to keep aircraft mission ready. This is what initially lured AMC into pursuing a study on requirements based AGE inventory levels. While O'Fearna's study presented preliminary results, it aptly illustrated the potential gains of a more analytical approach to AGE inventory level determination.

Festejo

Festejo extended O'Fearna's model to specifically address MASS substitutability of legacy AGE and MASS reliability. By modeling failures in the MASS cart, Festego examined the impact and sensitivity of MASS reliability on the FSE of an AEF. Festejo found that the future MASS would have to be extremely unreliable, or require an inordinate amount of repair time, before FSE would be effected. Even then, just-in-time delivery of replacement MASS units could compensate to maintain mission effectiveness levels. (Festejo, 2000)

Logistics Composite Model (LCOM)

The Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) is a discrete event queuing simulation. It was developed by Air Force Logistics Command in the 1960's with the Rand Corporation to analyze maintenance processes. (L-COM Final Report,

1973) In 1970, Tactical Air Command used LCOM to determine maintenance manpower requirements for a squadron of F-4E aircraft. The end result, according to the final report, was that LCOM gave, "proof positive" through the actual operational units flying a schedule developed through LCOM, that LCOM was a valid model for determination of manpower requirements. (L-COM Final Report, 1973, 1-6) As LCOM has matured, systematic changes have been made to the model so that LCOM remains a valid, adaptable, well-written program. In 1992, ASC conducted a study for the F-15E Eagle Century plus Radar Program. They combined this study with a validation effort for LCOM. The study compared LCOM predictions with actual results. As can be readily seen from Table 1, the LCOM model conformed very closely to actual sortie rates and APG-70 actions, with a close to or less than 1% difference between the model and the real world.

LCOM results were also compared to Luke AFB F-15E operations for a 56 day period with the results presented in Table 2. LCOM results were again very close to the real world.

	Actual	Model
Sorties Flown	1040-1120	1111.2
Flying Hours	1640	1633.2
APG-70 LRU Pulls	105	105.1

Table 2: Luke AFB vs. Modeled Statistics (JSF JIRD III Accreditation Report, 4-17)

LCOM has been selected by numerous System Program Offices (SPOs), including but not limited to the B-2, F-22, JSF, and C-17 SPOs for use in determining supportability requirements. (Wallace, 18 Dec 2000) LCOM was formally accredited by the JSF SPO as a satisfactory supportability model to analyze Sortie Generation Rate, Manpower, Support Equipment/Facilities, Spares, Prognostics/Health Management, Cannibalization, and Resource Constraints. (Draft JSF JIRD III Accreditation Report, 4-7, 4-8)

The verification of LCOM by the JSF IRD and the use of LCOM by numerous current and next generation aircraft SPOs, as well as the studies comparing LCOM output to real world results, speaks to the acceptability of LCOM as a model for the study of AGE and the support it provides to the flightline.

Current AGE BOI and Utilization

Interviews with HQ AMC AGE personnel stated AGE BOI is currently determined by SME's with field experience. The SPO for the weapon system meets with the command headquarters AGE representatives and the AGE management agency from Robins AFB (WRALC/LE). They review AGE usage

at the bases where the weapon system is maintained. They then negotiate the AGE table of allowances based on estimated future usage.

Currently, AGE utilization is very low. Metered hours per cart point to an overabundance of AGE, possibly even an overabundance for surge situations which is a worst-case scenario for flightline operations and aircraft maintenance.

To measure the impact of AGE on the mission, O'Fearna used Flight Sortie Effectiveness (FSE) as the measure for sensitivity analysis of AGE availability. The issue with FSE, as it is commonly used, is it is post-mission, and includes factors such as weather, pilots, navigation, and other variables hiding the impact of AGE. O'Fearna did not use FSE in the traditional sense, as he excluded other variables such as weather to prevent confounding effects on his analysis. However, FSE lends confusion when discussing the issue with those in the field, as they interpret FSE to include all variables, not just AGE support.

III. Methodology

General Approach

LCOM, a simulation model, with stochastic inputs from several sources, will drive demand for SGNSC and determine capacity and utilization. Standard flight schedules will determine the potential population of aircraft that may require SGNSC support. Work Unit Codes for each aircraft type will be used to address variance in demand characteristics and differences in SGNSC utilization by airframe.

AGE Reliability

Carrico and Clark used MTBF and MTTR of AGE in their study. They found that MTBF and MTTR, "made very little difference in the number of aborted sorties." (Carrico and Clark, 1996:35) While Carrico and Clark's conclusion leads one to think MTBF and MTTR are unimportant, issues in fielding the new SGNSC have arisen. Of the initial carts delivered to Travis AFB, three of eight broke prior to delivery to the flightline. In addition, repairing these carts was difficult because the supply chain was not yet in place to support the SGNSC system. In actuality, the three broken carts were not repaired because the AGE shop could not get the parts. It was approximately two weeks since the AGE shop had requested parts and they had still not arrived when the site visit occurred. It is hypothesized that these issues are merely due to the fielding of a new system and that eventually these issues will be overcome as the system matures and processes

are put in place to support the SGNSC system. However, sensitivity analysis will be performed on this aspect of the SGNSC system. MTBF figures are unavailable from engineering and testing data, as this requirement was not part of the acquisition contract. Between telephone interviews and correspondence with the the San Antonio Air Logistics Center (SA/ALC) engineer, MTBF for SGNSC, as a new system, is estimated to be approximately 500 hours. MTTR is estimated to be 2 hours. Again, this is based on expert opinion but serves as a starting point for sensitivity analysis.

LCOM does not model individual pieces of support equipment, so SGNSC failures will be modeled using an exponential distribution with a MTBF of 50, 100, and 500 hours. LCOM repair times will be modeled using a lognormal distribution with a standard deviation of 29% of the mean. AGE MTTR times will use a mean of 2 hours and a lognormal distribution.

In reality the supply system will likely catch up and support the SGNSC as far as repairing the carts. Pertinent data has recently become available as part of the ongoing MASS research. Legacy AGE reliability is not tracked by the Air Force, however, legacy AGE reliability data was calculated by Arthur D. Little (ADL), the contractor building the MASS concept demonstrator for AFRL/HE, using the 1995 NonElectronic Parts Reliability Data Guide (NEPRD). The 1995 guide was unavailable, however the 1991 version was readily available, and was used for reference. Discussion with the Reliability Analysis Center revealed the changes to the 1995 edition included a much larger database although the same basic assumptions held. Data for the NEPRD was collected from field data, from

several different sources, applications, and environments. (NEPRD, 1991:1-3) While non-electronic parts may display wearout characteristics, for complex devices where parts are replaced upon failure, the failure rate, "may appear to be exponentially distributed if a long enough time has elapsed." (NEPRD, 1991:1-7) Later, the NEPRD goes further, stating, "for complex nonelectronic devices, the exponential distribution is a reasonable assumption." (NEPRD, 1991:1-9) ADL used data from the NEPRD to calculate MTBF times for AGE carts to be replaced by the MASS unit. The availability of reliability data, while the failures may not significantly impact the results, seem to provide a more accurate analysis of the effect of AGE reliability.

This effort will use the exponential distribution with the MTBF times as calculated by ADL using the NEPRD. It is interesting to note that, based on expert opinion, the estimated mature system reliability is 500 hours for SGNSC, however the reliability for the liquid nitrogen cart was calculated to be 1,320 hours. This does not include the additional mission flexibility of the SGNSC, but Travis does not have the mission requirements necessary to effectively assess SGNSC performance under multiple missions. One of the caveats to multifunction AGE is the inability to be at more than one place at a time, unlike the single-function AGE it replaces. Multi-function AGE carries the potential to reduce requirements by consolidating functions into a single unit, but the drawback is the inability to be in more than one place at a time. The lack of mission requirements necessary to effectively assess SGNSC performance under these conditions prevents an analysis of this aspect of performance.

Table 3: MTBF times for AGE carts

Travel Time

Havlicek stated that AGE travel time could have both a statistically and practically significant effect on mission effectiveness.(Havlicek, 1997:83) He used two constant travel times of 15 and 45 minutes.(Havlicek, 1997:52) Havlicek raised the importance of addressing travel time in an AGE study, and that the variability of travel times could have a significant effect.

The intent of the current thesis is to apply a needs based methodology to determine AGE requirements. To incorporate travel times, a delivery delay was incorporated into the LCOM model. Travis tracks AGE delivery times and according to the latest information available, 80% of AGE deliveries are within 10 minutes, and 99% of AGE deliveries are within 20 minutes. A minimum delivery time was unavailable as was the exact distribution. An assumption was made that 100% of the time maintenance would call for SGNSC support ten minutes prior to actually needing the SGNSC. The travel time was modeled in LCOM with a notional minimum travel time of 5 minutes and another point at 10 minutes. 80% of the delivery times will be linearly interpolated between 5 and 10 minutes. The remaining 20% of the delivery times linearly interpolated between 10 and 20 minutes, with the upper bound set at 20 minutes. Figure ¹ visually illustrates the delivery delay distribution modeled in LCOM for this effort.

Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution Function for AGE delivery times

Resource Substitution

Flexibility of AGE is an important consideration when comparing legacy, single-function AGE to multi-function units such as SGNSC. Ideally one would model AGE as discrete elements to allow for this differentiation and allow for an analysis of the cost of combining AGE. The SME analysis of SGNSC requirements estimated a 1:1 exchange requirement to liquid nitrogen (LN₂) carts, a 1:3 exchange requirement for six/eight bottle Nitrogen carts, and the potential for also replacing MC-1A (hi-pac) units. Unfortunately, the base of study, Travis AFB, does not use Nitrogen bottle carts or MC-1A units. While they do have MC-1A units, the AGE shop and flightline crew chiefs stated they do not use them. This conforms to policy against using air vice nitrogen in corrosion prone systems. Therefore, while LCOM retains the ability to substitute resources and collect results, it was not used in this effort because AGE consolidation is not an issue at Travis. This could be incorporated into future efforts relatively easily

to address questions of AGE flexibility, particularly in the case of the Modular Aircraft Support System (MASS), a program that proposes to combine functions of power generation, hydraulics, and air conditioning into one unit.

SGNSC Users

In terms of modeling users of the SGNSC resource, aircraft will be the SGNSC users, or calling population. The size of the population is determined by historical data on arrivals and departures from Travis AFB. Aircraft throughput for Travis was provided by SMSgt Jorgenson from the AMC HQ analysis shop. Data from ¹ Sep 98 through 30 Jul 00 (100 weeks) was collected and analyzed. The aircraft assigned to Travis are C-5's and KC-10's. However, the base serves many different types of aircraft on a daily basis, approximately 500 departures per month. The heaviest users of Travis are KC-10 and C-5 aircraft, with an average 68% of all departures. There are also C-17, C-141, C-9, C-21, C-130, KC-135, and Commercial aircraft that use Travis. These are only the aircraft that visit the base, not necessarily the calling population.

Upon further investigation, SMSgt Imlay, the AGE Flight Chief at Travis, stated that transient aircraft use very little nitrogen and that they could be adequately served with one primary SGNSC and one spare, for a total of two SGNSC. This makes sense, as transient aircraft typically will temporarily fix something until they can get to home station where they can perform a permanent fix. Assuming transient aircraft can be adequately serviced with two SGNSC, one primary and one spare, this study excludes transient aircraft and

concentrates on the demands of Travis's C-5 and KC-10 aircraft. This simplifies the model and facilitates extensibility of the methodology to other bases, aircraft, and AGE. This methodology extensibility was a primary consideration for this research effort.

The historical throughput data was analyzed to create a flying schedule for LCOM. After this extensive review, it was determined that aircraft flying schedules from the standard template that Travis currently uses would be more suitable in this study. The desire to allow extensibility to other bases and aircraft made using the flying template much more desirable. It is easier to use and is adequate for planning purposes. The use of historical throughput data, while initially desirable and thought to provide a good insight, requires extensive data manipulation and formatting to use effectively. Using the standard flying template minimizes the amount of time spent building aircraft flying schedules, and has a big impact when modeling multiple aircraft and locations. It also allowed higher customization in the form of aircraft launch windows to model potential clustering of AGE requirements.

Aircraft that are in preflight status were given a higher priority for nitrogen than all other tasks requiring nitrogen. This allows the preflight aircraft to preempt other tasks that require nitrogen, similar to what would happen during a "red streak," or short notice, high-priority maintenance on a flightline if there were not enough resources to go around. If this happens on an actual flightline, the lower priority task would be preempted to service the flyer. The LCOM model accurately reflects this situation. (Cronk, 58)

Failure Data

G081 (Gee-oh-eighty-one) is the maintenance data collection database for heavy aircraft and is key to the success of this effort. A page-by-page review of all applicable Technical Orders (T.O.'s) for each airframe is beyond the scope of this effort. SME's from the career field familiar with the airframe were interviewed to determine the WUCs requiring SGNSC support. If the WUC requires SGNSC support, WUCs will be used and matched against SGNSC requirements. Distributions are constructed based on the demand for SGNSC derived by G081 data and field interviews. Data from G081 is gathered by aircraft type. One issue with G081 is the time necessary to complete the maintenance task. This includes all maintenance, not just the time necessary for nitrogen servicing. Only the total time is collected in the maintenance data system. For those work unit codes, Field interviews were used to determine appropriate nitrogen service times.

The WUC is the initial data flag. Each job includes the WUC and time taken for the repair job. The time taken to complete the job will determine the mean time for the job length. An assumption of unconstrained maintenance availability is necessary to focus on analysis of effects of changes to the SGNSC quantities. Data collected from G081 was the actual number of occasions that systems requiring nitrogen were serviced. Distributions are based on these maintenance intervals. It is assumed that maintenance will be available according to the same priority schedule and that nitrogen will be required in a

similar manner. This assumption may or may not hold in a wartime environment, however, it is necessary as data for wartime consumption is not available. Data will be aggregated to the fleet for an overall distribution.

Failure data was extracted from G081 by WUC and aggregated to include the number of failures, MTTR, and the mean time to service, as nitrogen consumption is not necessarily required for the entire task time. This is an acceptable assumption, as it reflects reality on the flightline; technicians will not call for the nitrogen cart until they require it. A majority of the components that require nitrogen servicing are part of the aircraft landing gear system, and failures are more accurately reflected if defined by number of landings as opposed to the standard number of flying hours. Modifications to the database will accommodate this failure pattern. Historical aircraft arrivals to Travis were compared to the number of failures recorded in G081 for the same period to arrive at the number of failures per number of landings. An exponential distribution was used to model the failure rates of these nitrogen systems. The failure rates as determined by system with task and service times are given in Tables 4 and 5. Basic postflight (BPO) and preflight service intervals are interpreted through interviews with flightline personnel, as nitrogen servicing is often undocumented.

WUC	KC-10 System	Task Time-Hrs.	Service Time	Landings/ Action
13DAB	MLG	2.75	0.35	8.82
13DBB	NLG	2.75	0.35	16.17
03200	BPO	4.67	0.88	0.5
03100	PRE	0.77		0.5
45ABH	Accumulator	0.87		200
13AAO	MLG strut	1.12		12.13
13BAO	NLG strut	1.12		12.13
13AEO	Centerline landing gear	1.12		19.4
46GJO	Boom pneumatic disconnect 1.25			7.46

Table 4: KC-10 Task/N² Service Times and Number of Landings per Action

Table 5: C-5 Task/N² Service Times and Number of Landings per Action

WUC	$C-5$ System	Task Time-Hrs. Time-Hrs Action	Service	Landings/
3100	Preflight	0.77		0.5
3200	Throughflight	0.5		0.5
3210	BPO	$\mathbf{2}$		0.5
13AAA	Shock Strut Assembly	2.8	0.75	16.44
13FCN	Ldg Gr Strg Actuator	2.7	0.75	411
$13LA*$	MLG Tire	2	0.35	.83
$13LC*$	NLG Tire	$\overline{2}$	0.35	6.42
24ALP	APU Accumulator	3.95	0.88	206
91AAF	Slide bottles	1.35		206
11LCH	Crew Entry door accumulator	2.8	0.88	206
	11LCK Crew Entry door accumulator	2.8	0.88	250

Output

The percentage and number of cancelled missions is a more immediate, readily identifiable reflection of AGE availability on mission effectiveness than FSE. If an aircraft mission is cancelled, then there is a very real penalty for not

having AGE available. All other resources are assumed to be unconstrained to isolate SGNSC and allow analysis of SGNSC effectiveness. Flight Sortie Effectiveness or Mission Capability are not as closely related to AGE availability, and it is the author's opinion that mission capability can suffer some, but the cost of AGE is not comparable to the cost of a lost mission. The number/percentage of cancelled missions is examined for statistical and practical significance.

Utilization of AGE is collected to give the users an expectation of usage. The proposition of an overabundance of AGE is addressed examining utilization and AGE wait time. At issue is not necessarily utilization, although this will give the decision makers an idea of usage, but the ability of AGE to meet mission requirements. The focus on utilization does not consider the impact of multiple requests. The capacity to handle periods of high demand is expected to be the main driver of AGE and a natural means for sizing an AGE force such as SGNSC.
IV. Results

A variety of scenarios were defined to examine two factors of interest: SGNSC inventory levels and SGNSC reliability. AMC has projected 18 SGNSC units for Travis, the base of study. The transient aircraft mission of Travis requires SGNSC. However, this mission is neither a focus of this study nor a significant user of local SGNSC. Two SGNSC were detailed to support the transient mission to account for this real concern. Three SGNSC inventory levels were examined: 5, 10, and 15. For each inventory level, a SGNSC MTBF of 50, 100 and 500 hours was modeled.

Travis AFB operations were modeled for a 5-year period. As aircraft complete missions failures occur. Those failures requiring SGNSC were modeled. SGNSC failures reduce the pool of SGNSC available to perform modeled aircraft maintenance. Inadequate inventory or depleted inventory due to SGNSC failures may impact mission effectiveness. Peacetime and surge flying scheudles were modeled.

Data collected from this 5-year simulation represent steady-state data. As with most steady-state simulations, the initial period of the simulation, called the transient or warm-up period, is not indicative of steady-state conditions. Including transient data in steady-state calculations introduces bias. The transient period, conservatively determined to be the first 6-months of the simulated time frame was removed (Law and Kelton, 2000:499-501).

Final statistics are based on 30 replications, each with the initial transient removed. Scenarios are compared based on 95% confidence intervals. As noted in the results below, various confirmatory simulations were conducted as dictated by the initial analysis of the simulation data. The primary data examined are SGNSC utilization, mission effectiveness, and time spent waiting for SGNSC assets to become available.

Peacetime Results

Initial results were impressive and insightful. At an inventory of 5 SGNSC with a 50 hour MTBF, aircraft sorties did not suffer at all. A subsequent confirmatory run reducing the inventory to 3 still did not affect the flying schedule. SGNSC utilization was only 29%, which included travel time. LCOM limitations necessitated including travel time in utilization rate. However, wait time increased dramatically. Wait time increased from an acceptable average 4.4 hours per month with 5 SGNSC, to a likely unacceptable 69.2 hours per month with 3 SGNSC. This confirmed nitrogen utilization is not very high.

People are the most valuable resource on the flightline, and if your people are waiting for equipment, they can't work. Greater coordination between AGE and maintenance holds promise in leveling out demand by forecasting nitrogen requirements, but the demands on maintenance are legion. The ability to plan AGE consumption is merely held out as an opportunity for future improvement, especially regarding deployments. The current command structure and demands for attention on maintenance force this study to focus on the most efficient and

effective utilization of AGE within existing command structures and maintenance concepts.

Therefore, the focus changed from one of ability of aircraft to meet the schedule to one of reducing wait time to an acceptable level of pain. General goals in the service sector are an 80% utilization rate for resources. Some sectors cannot and probably should not try to attain this kind of utilization. A more appropriate comparison would be with emergency services. An emergency ambulance has a utilization of approximately 30%. (Fitzimmons, 1997: 517) However, if someone must wait for an ambulance, his or her family may not be comforted knowing an ambulance fleet was reduced to increase overall utilization. The flightline presents a somewhat similar scenario; we do not want to wait on support equipment when trying to restore aircraft to a mission capable status. The consequences of waiting for AGE on the flightline outweigh the advantages gained by higher utilization of AGE.

The failure rates of SGNSC were manipulated to determine the sensitivity of demand. MTBF times of 50, 100 and 500 hrs were used. The differences were very small as illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Comparison of Quantity and MTBF on Wait Time

SGNSC was not very sensitive to changes in reliability as Figure 2 aptly shows. It is much more sensitive to the quantity of SGNSC. An additional run with an inventory of four was included in Figure 2. Wait times do not begin until an inventory drops and a quantity of five SGNSC is reached. Wait time increases very quickly after that, as Table 6 shows.

SGNSC	Average wait (hrs/month)	Utilization
	59.6	28.9%
	14.4	21.6%
	4.4	17.9%
		11.2%
1∩		9%
15		6%

Table 6: Effect of SGNSC Quantity on Wait Time and Utilization (Peacetime)

A comparison of confidence intervals by SGNSC MTBF in Table 7 shows that an inventory of 5 SGNSC or higher results in no statistical difference in wait time with 95% confidence. Even when there is a statistical difference, the practical differences are minor until SGNSC is constrained to 3 units.

Table 7: Difference in wait time at 50 and 500 hr MTBF (Peacetime)

Upper 69.89 60.23 15.84 14.59 4.66 4.61 0.10 0.09

Surge Results

While the peacetime results are illuminating, they do not address the ability to meet maximum demand. The military, by nature, requires excess capacity. The ability to respond quickly and with force during wartime is necessary. The unfortunate side effect of this capability is the apparent lack of utilization of capacity during a peacetime posture. Using an LCOM surge template, the model was shifted into a fly-when-ready mode. SGNSC quantities of 5, 10, and 15 were again initially used to examine sensitivities. Additional confirmatory runs with quantities of 11 and 12 SGNSC were added to further clarify wait times and utilization. MTBF times were initially 500 hours, but additional runs with 50 hour MTBF times were conducted to verify SGNSC availability under maximum usage scenarios at quantities of 11 and 12. The results of the comparison between 50 and 500 hour MTBF times under a surge scenario are very similar to the peacetime results. While Table 8 shows statistical differences at 95% confidence, the practical differences are again minor at these inventory levels.

		95% CI 11/50 11/500 12/50 12/500		
	lower 8.80	7.88 2.96		2.73
upper $\sqrt{9.25}$		8.20	I 3.18	2.90

Table 8: Difference in wait time at 50 and 500 hour MTBF (Surge)

Figure 3: Comparison of MTBF times and Quantity on Wait Times (Surge)

The effect of varying reliability of the SGNSC carts is minor compared to varying the quantity of SGNSC. The wait time "knee in the curve: occurs when SGNSC inventory falls to 12 carts. Reduced further, to 11 and then 10 units, wait times increase dramatically. An inventory of 5 SGNSC gives an impressive 94% utilization! However, just as we do not want to wait for an ambulance, we cannot accept the waiting time associated with this tremendous utilization. Utilization and wait times for the various quantities of SGNSC are listed in Table 9.

	SGNSC Average wait (hrs/month)	Utilization
	2,860	94%
	22	51%
		46%
12	2.8	42%
15		34%

Table 9: Effect of SGNSC Quantity on Wait Time and Utilization (Surge)

The effect of changing to a fly-when-ready mode of operations exposes SGNSC to a much higher demand rate. What is apparently a vastly underutilized fleet of 10 units with **a** dismal peacetime utilization of 9% explodes during surge to 51%, with an unacceptably low overall average wait time of 22 hours per month.

Implications

SGNSC is currently being fielded. Unit reliability is uncertain but historical AGE data and MASS research yield reasonable bounds for MTBF data. This study fails to judge MTBF as a prime driver for SGNSC BOI.

Utilization and wait time are inversely related. High utilization should not become a factor for SGNSC BOI as it comes with too high a cost to the maintainer.

The BOI driver appears to be the unit surge mission While still yielding excess peacetime capacity, the resulting inventory levels appear a fairly nice reduction in planned inventory levels (25% in this case).

V. Recommendations

AGE utilization is very low, and demands for AGE resources overstated. The current overabundance of AGE on the flightline is unaffordable in today's Air Force. The methodology yields a useful, quantitative basis in determining AGE levels for new and existing programs and should be used in conjunction with current methods for more insight into AGE inventory levels.

The model promotes a reduction of AGE to at least an inventory of 12 plus ¹ for transient aircraft. MTBF effects are minimal and it is postulated that a spare for the transient support is unnecessary provided transient support may borrow a SGNSC from the home station AGE shop. This would mean an inventory of 13 SGNSC vice the current 18 programmed for Travis by AMC. The current contract for SGNSC, at \$20 million for 570 carts, is approximately \$35,000 per cart. A reduction of 5 SGNSC would mean approximately \$175,000 reduction in acquisition costs, not including maintenance costs. If the model could be extended the possibility of a 28% reduction in SGNSC acquisition costs would amount to approximately \$5.6 million over the life of the contract. These reductions in levels of AGE Air Force wide would also have the benefit of cost avoidance in operations and maintenance costs.

While the results are positive, this study only attempts to estimate actual requirements. These results do not incorporate War Reserve Material, deployment, other potential demands or outside limiting factors, only demands anticipated at Travis AFB, CA. It must be remembered that these are estimates

only, and should be taken into consideration with other factors and experience before applying any results to the field. However, the results give a reasonable estimation of the potential cost savings in reduced procurement costs.

One of the issues in optimizing a certain part (SGNSC) of an interrelated system are the effects on other parts of the system, or flightline. Reducing SGNSC may increase utilization, but AGE drivers may not be enough; waiving reliability requirements may not have a serious effect on wait time, but AGE shop manpower may need to be increased. This study examines the effects of reducing AGE levels to meet expected mission requirements. When a resource pool is reduced, other issues may arise.

Redeployment/Redistribution

One opportunity, if command and control issues could be addressed, would be the option of redeploying AGE assets from other bases. In the case of SGNSC, acceptable peacetime waits resulted in a SGNSC inventory of 5 units. A minimal wait during wartime resulted in a SGNSC inventory of 12 to meet mission requirements. What if there were 8 SGNSC at Travis and 8 units at another base, say Altus? If Travis surges, Altus aircraft could bring 4 SGNSC with them to meet the increase in demand. Again, this assumes a second, similar base and does not address SGNSC needs at the other base and a deployed location. However, this concept may provide an opportunity to reduce AGE levels significantly.

Simulation Software and LCOM

LCOM was initially thought to be an excellent model for modeling a flightline environment. Flying schedules were readily translated into LCOM protocols, numerous WUCs were already in the model, and it is a queuing simulation with numerous resources and extensive data analysis. However, after using LCOM, while it is an effective model and has numerous advantages, there were great difficulties in tweaking the model to examine the particular parameters desired. While LCOM can model resources, it does not identify resources as individual entities, the resource is a pool. This can be an issue when higher resolution is desired, such as monitoring the MTBF of a particular piece of AGE. The ability to add in special code when necessary is highly desired. LCOM is very powerful, but does not have the flexibility of some of the general purpose simulation software commercially available, such as modeling multiple locations. LCOM is already built, and has excellent interaction with existing maintenance data collection systems. This gives it a great advantage, especially when doing a major study, but lacks the resolution desired when asking detailed questions. It is complicated, and the user documentation is poor. Without the expert assistance of the LCOM shop at ASC/ENMS ^I would still be trying to figure out LCOM. Once a model is built, LCOM is a dream to run and operate. The user interface is excellent. However building the model is an exercise in patience.

Further Research

To preserve flexibility of the model, allow easier programming of the model, and arrive at a more accurate answer, it is recommended that in the future a commercially available general purpose simulation software package such as Awesim or Arena be used. Given the difficulties anticipated in multi-base coordination of AGE assets, the model could be confined to single base applications while preserving a multi-base option in the future if desired. More definitive research into surge operations and their effects on the flying schedule is needed, as is actual nitrogen consumption during preflights and postflights. These are a main drivers of SGNSC utilization, and may also have an effect on other flightline AGE utilization. The effect of interactions between AGE units and the impact of multi-function AGE was not addressed in this research but could be incorporated in future models.

Summary

This thesis was an attempt to define and demonstrate a usable methodology for assessing AGE utilization, need, and the impact of AGE on mission effectiveness. The research met this objective. An important issue discovered in the analysis of AGE inventory sizing was the wait time for AGE. A queuing simulation is ideally suited to the fluid environment of the flightline and WUCs are the most accurate indicator available to derive AGE consumption. Adjusting AGE inventory to minimize wait time or keep it down to an acceptable level is the prime measure of AGE mission effectiveness.

This study is not a mathematical formula to quantify the number of SGNSC carts needed on the flightline. This research is a more objectively oriented approach to identify those aspects of actual AGE needs on flightline operations that have the greatest impact and the relative consequences of adjusting AGE inventory levels. This thesis has illuminated the issues and areas that are worth a more detailed exploration. A side benefit has been the discovery that there really is too much AGE in the field.

Appendix A

Legacy AGE reliability data was compiled by Arthur D. Little during MASS

research. All data is from the 1995 Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data Guide.

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Appendix B: LCOM Database file

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 UNSCH555 GN2-SE D 30 UNSCH555 CART 30 UNSCH55 UART C
30 UNSCH5 UNSCH56 FF13LC05 UNSCH56 M13LC05 E .10 UNSCH56 S13LC05 UNSCH562 E .90 UNSCH562 QN2-SE UNSCH563 D UNSCH563 DELAY-UNSCH- 10 UNSCH564 D UNSCH564 USE-N2-13LC05 UNSCH565 D ÜNSCH565 GN2-SE D UNSCH565 CART C UNSCH5 UNSCH57 FF24ALP5 UNSCH57 M24ALP5 E .10 UNSCH57 S24ALP5 UNSCH572 E .90 30 UNSCH572 QN2-SE UNSCH573 D 30 UNSCH573 DELAY-UNSCH-10 UNSCH574 D UNSCH574 USE-N2-24ALP5 UNSCH575 D UNSCH575 GN2-SE D UNSCH575 CART C UNSCH5 UNSCH58 FF91AAF5 UNSCH58 M91AAF5 E .10 UNSCH58 S91AAF5 UNSCH582 E .90 UNSCH582 QN2-SE UNSCH583 D 30 UNSCH583 DELAY-UNSCH-10 UNSCH584 D UNSCH584 USE-N2-91AAF5 UNSCH585 D UNSCH585 GN2-SE D UNSCH585 CART C UNSCH5 UNSCH59 FF010005 UNSCH59 M010005 E .10 UNSCH59 S010005 UNSCH592 E .90 ÜNSCH592 QN2-SE UNSCH593 D 30 UNSCH593 DELAY-UNSCH-10 UNSCH594 D UNSCH594 USE-N2-010005 UNSCH595 D UNSCH595 GN2-SE D UNSCH595 CART C UNSCHI UNSCH11 FF13AA01 UNSCH11 M13AA01 E .10 UNSCH11 S13AA01 UNSCH112 E .90 UNSCHI12 QN2-SE UNSCH113 D 30 UNSCH113 DELAY-UNSCH-10 UNSCH114 D UNSCH114 USE-N2-13AA01 UNSCH115 D UNSCH115 GN2-SE D UNSCH115 CART C 30 UNSCH1 UNSCH12 FF13AE01 UNSCH12 M13AE01 E .10 UNSCH12 S13AE01 UNSCH122 E .90 UNSCH122 QN2-SE UNSCH123 D 30 UNSCH123 DELAY-UNSCH-10 UNSCH124 D UNSCH124 USE-N2-13AE01 UNSCH125 D UNSCH125 GN2-SE D UNSCH125 CART C 30 UNSCH1 UNSCH13 FF13BA01 UNSCH13 M13BA01 E .10 UNSCH13 S13BA01 UNSCH132 E .90 30 UNSCH132 QN2-SE UNSCH133 D 30 UNSCH133 DELAY-UNSCH-10 UNSCH134 D UNSCH134 USE-N2-13BA01 UNSCH135 D UNSCH135 GN2-SE D

 UNSCH135 CART C ÜNSCH1 UNSCH14 FF13DAB1 UNSCH14 Ml3DAB1 E .10 UNSCH14 S13DAB1 UNSCH142 E .90 UNSCH142 QN2-SE UNSCH143 D UNSCH143 DELAY-UNSCH- 10 UNSCH144 D UNSCH144 USE-N2-13DAB1 UNSCH145 D UNSCH145 GN2-SE D ÜNSCH145 CART C 30 UNSCH1 UNSCH15 FF13DBB1 UNSCH15 M13DBB1 E .10 UNSCH15 S13DBB1 UNSCH152 E .90 30 UNSCH152 QN2-SE UNSCH153 D 30 UNSCH153 DELAY-UNSCH-10 UNSCH154 D UNSCH154 USE-N2-13DBB1 UNSCH155 D UNSCH155 GN2-SE D UNSCH155 CART C 30 UNSCH1 UNSCH16 FF45ABH1 30 UNSCH16 M45ABH1 E .10 30 UNSCH16 S45ABH1 UNSCH162 E.90 UNSCHI62 QN2-SE UNSCH163 D 30 UNSCH163 DELAY-UNSCH-10 UNSCH164 D UNSCH164 USE-N2-45ABH1 UNSCH165 D UNSCH165 GN2-SE D UNSCH165 CART C UNSCHI UNSCH17 FF4 6GJ01 UNSCH17 M4 6GJ01 E .10 UNSCH17 S46GJ01 UNSCH172 E .90 30 UNSCH172 QN2-SE UNSCH173 D 30 UNSCH173 DELAY-UNSCH-10 UNSCH174 D UNSCH174 USE-N2-46GJ01 UNSCH175 D UNSCH175 GN2-SE D UNSCH175 CART C UNSCHI UNSCH18 FF010001 UNSCH18 M010001 E .50 UNSCH18 S010001 UNSCH182 E .50 30 UNSCH182 QN2-SE UNSCH183 D 30 UNSCH183 DELAY-UNSCH-10 UNSCH184 D UNSCH184 USE-N2-010001 UNSCH185 D UNSCH185 GN2-SE D UNSCHI85 CART C 30 CART CART CART2 FFN2 30 CART2 FIX-N2 D PREFLT1 E .50 PREFLT1 PREFLT-1 PREFLT12 E .50 30 PREFLT12 QN2-SE PREFLT13 D 30 PREFLT13 DELAY-SCHED-10 PREFLT14 D 30 PREFLT14 USE-N2-PRF1 PREFLT15 D 30 PREFLT15 GN2-SE
30 PREFLT15 CART C PREFLT15 CART C PREFLT5 E .50 PREFLT5 PREFLT-5 PREFLT52 E .50 30 PREFLT52 QN2-SE PREFLT53 D 30 PREFLT53 DELAY-SCHED-10 PREFLT54 D PREFLT54 USE-N2-PRF5 PREFLT55 D PREFLT55 GN2-SE D PREFLT55 CART C

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Appendix C: LCOM Form 75s (Peacetime)

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Aooendix D: LCOM Form 75s (Surqe)

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Appendix E: LCOM Change Card File

PERIOD,182,1825,WARMUP LV1RPT,182,1825 LV2RPT,YES,YES PSRRPT,YES,YES RPT_STATS,KEY SUPPRESS,ALL AUTH,C5,32 AUTH, KC10, 24 AUTH, N2-SE, 12 AUTH,N2-SE-T,65000 FLY_WINDOW,ALL,0,2400 ,FAILURE AND FIX CLOCKS FOR SGNSC CKCNG,FN2,50.0H,0.0H TKCNG,FIX-N2,2.OH,0.58H TMULT, UNSC, 1.00 CMULT,EXP,1.00 ,FAILURE CLOCK IN SORTIES CKCNG,F11LCH5,206.0D,0.0D CKCNG,F11LCK5,206.0D,0.0D CKCNG,F13AAA5,16.44D,0.0D CKCNG,F13FCN5,411.0D,0.0D CKCNG,F13LA05,0.83D,0.0D CKCNG,F13LC05,6.42D,0.0D CKCNG,F24ALP5,206.0D,0.0D CKCNG,F91AAF5,206.0D,0.OD CKCNG,F010005,20.0D,0.0D CKCNG,F13AA01,12.13D,0.OD CKCNG,F13AE01,19.4D,0.OD CKCNG,F13BA01,12.13D,0.OD CKCNG,F13DAB1,8.82D,0.OD CKCNG,F13DBB1,16.17D,0.OD CKCNG,F45ABH1,206.0D,0.0D CKCNG,F4 6GJ01,7.4 6D,0.OD CKCNG,F010001,20.0D,0.0D STOP
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