

Air Force Institute of Technology

**AFIT Scholar**

---

Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

---

3-6-2007

## Implementation and Optimization of the Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm on an 8-Bit Field Programmable Gate Array Hardware Platform

Ryan J. Silva

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholar.afit.edu/etd>



Part of the [Computer Engineering Commons](#), and the [Information Security Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

Silva, Ryan J., "Implementation and Optimization of the Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm on an 8-Bit Field Programmable Gate Array Hardware Platform" (2007). *Theses and Dissertations*. 3142.  
<https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3142>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact [AFIT.ENWL.Repository@us.af.mil](mailto:AFIT.ENWL.Repository@us.af.mil).



**IMPLEMENTATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF THE ADVANCED  
ENCRYPTION STANDARD ALGORITHM ON AN 8-BIT FIELD  
PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAY HARDWARE PLATFORM**

THESIS

Ryan J. Silva, 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant, USAF

AFIT/GE/ENG/07-21

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
AIR UNIVERSITY**

**AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY**

---

---

**Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio**

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

AFIT/GE/ENG/07-21

**IMPLEMENTATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF THE ADVANCED  
ENCRYPTION STANDARD ALGORITHM ON AN 8-BIT FIELD  
PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAY HARDWARE PLATFORM**

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Graduate School of Engineering and Management

Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

Air Education and Training Command

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Master of Science in Electrical Engineering

Ryan J. Silva, BSEE

2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant, USAF

March 2007

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

**IMPLEMENTATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF THE ADVANCED  
ENCRYPTION STANDARD ALGORITHM ON AN 8-BIT FIELD  
PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAY HARDWARE PLATFORM**

Ryan J. Silva, BSEE


2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant, USAF

Approved:




Dr. Rusty O. Baldwin, (Chairman)

6 Mar 07  
Date



Dr. Yong C. Kim, (Member)

6 MAR '07  
Date



Dr. Barry E. Mullins (Member)

6 Mar 07  
Date

### **Abstract**

The contribution of this research is three-fold. The first is a method of converting the area occupied by a circuit implemented on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to an equivalent (memory included) as a measure of total gate count. This allows direct comparison between two FPGA implementations independent of the manufacturer or chip family. The second contribution improves the performance of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) on an 8-bit computing platform. This research develops an AES design that occupies less than three quarters of the area reported by the smallest design in current literature as well as significantly increases area efficiency. The third contribution of this research is an examination of how various designs for the critical AES SubBytes and MixColumns transformations interact and affect the overall performance of AES. The transformations responsible for the largest variance in performance are identified and the effect is measured in terms of throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied.

AFIT/GE/ENG/07-21

*Shout out to Jesus*

## Table of Contents

	Page
Abstract.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	vi
List of Figures.....	ix
List of Tables.....	xi
I. Introduction.....	1
1.1 Background.....	1
1.2 Research Goals and Hypothesis.....	2
1.3 Document Overview.....	3
II. Literature Review.....	4
2.1 Chapter Overview.....	4
2.2 Description.....	4
2.3 Necessary Mathematical Background.....	5
2.3.1 Finite Fields.....	5
2.3.2 Finite Field Arithmetic.....	8
2.4 Description of the AES Algorithm.....	14
2.5 Current Research into AES Implementations on FPGAs.....	22
2.5.1 Optimization Techniques.....	22
2.6 Typical Design Parameter Values.....	29
2.6.1 AES Throughput.....	29
2.6.2 AES Area Efficiency.....	29
2.6.3 AES Area Optimization.....	31
2.7 Overview of research into the validation of encryption circuits.....	32
2.8 Summary.....	34
III. Methodology.....	35
3.1 Chapter Overview.....	35
3.2 Problem Definition.....	35
3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis.....	35
3.2.2 Approach.....	36
3.3 System Boundaries.....	37
3.4 System Services.....	38
3.5 Workload.....	39
3.6 Performance Metrics.....	39
3.7 Parameters.....	40
3.7.1 System.....	40



3.7.2 Workload.....	42
3.8 Factors .....	42
3.9 Experimental Factor Designs .....	44
3.9.1 SubBytes .....	44
3.9.1.1 Modular Inversion in an Extended Field .....	44
3.9.1.2 Modular Inversion in a Composite Field .....	49
3.9.2 MixColumns .....	58
3.9.2.1 Half LUT.....	58
3.9.2.2 Arithmetic .....	60
3.10 Evaluation Technique.....	63
3.11 Experimental Design .....	64
3.12 Methodology Summary .....	65
IV. Analysis and Results.....	67
4.1 Chapter Overview.....	67
4.2 Results of Experimental Scenarios and Literature Comparison.....	67
4.3 Analysis of the Data .....	73
4.3.1 Visual Analysis of Means .....	74
4.4 Performance Analysis through ANOVA.....	82
4.4.1 ANOVA for Throughput.....	82
4.4.2 ANOVA for Area Occupied .....	84
4.4.3 ANOVA on Area Efficiency.....	86
4.5 Summary.....	88
V. Conclusions and Recommendations .....	89
5.1 Chapter Overview.....	89
5.2 Significance of Research .....	89
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research.....	91
5.4 Conclusions of Research .....	91
Appendix A: Data Tables.....	93
Appendix B: Complete VHDL Code for Each Design.....	96
SubBytes Full LUT.....	96
SubBytes Extended Field Inversion .....	106
SubBytes Composite Field Inversion .....	112
MixColumns Full LUT .....	116
MixColumns Half LUT .....	122
MixColumns Arithmetic.....	126
Appendix C: Statistical Data Tables .....	128
Bibliography .....	130

Vita.....	133
-----------	-----

## List of Figures

Figure	Page
1. Basic Operation of a Symmetric Key Cipher .....	15
2. High Level Encryption Procedure for AES Algorithm [DaR98].....	16
3. AddRoundKey [Wik07a].....	17
4. ShiftRows [Wik07a].....	18
5. MixColumns [Wik07a] .....	19
6. FPGA Design Methodology [ZCN04].....	23
7. Loop Unrolling an AES Architecture [QIS05].....	26
8. Parallelization of MixColumns [CaA03].....	27
9. System Under Test.....	37
10. VHDL Code Implementing the Affine Transform .....	46
11. VHDL Code Implementing the Inverse Affine Transform.....	47
12. SubBytes design flow for Modular Inversion in an Extended Field.....	48
13. Inverse SubBytes design flow for Modular Inversion in an Extended Field.....	48
14. SubBytes Design Flow for Composite Field Inversion .....	49
15. Inverse SubBytes Design Flow for Composite Field Inversion.....	49
16. Schematic of Modular Inversion in a Composite Field .....	50
17. VHDL Code Implementing the Transform Matrix.....	53
18. VHDL Code Implementing the Inverse Transform Matrix .....	54
19. VHDL Implementation of Multiplication in $GF(2^4)$ .....	56
20. VHDL Implementation of Squaring in $GF(2^4)$ .....	57

21. VHDL Implementation of the Highlighted Portion of Table 10.....	60
22. VHDL Implementation of xtime in Combinational Logic .....	62
23. VHDL Implementation of the Column Transform Routine .....	63
24. Block Diagram of Testing Environment.....	65
25. Individual Values Plot for Throughput.....	70
27. Individual Values Plot for Area Efficiency .....	72
28. Main Effects Plot for SubBytes on Area Occupied .....	74
29. Main Effects Plot for SubBytes on Throughput .....	75
30. Main Effects Plot for SubBytes on Area Efficiency.....	76
31. Main Effects Plot for MixColumns on Area Occupied .....	77
32. Main Effects Plot for MixColumns on Throughput.....	78
33. Main Effects Plot for MixColumns on Area Efficiency .....	79
34. Main Effects Plot for Synthesis Goal on Throughput.....	80
35. Main Effects Plot for Synthesis Goal on Area Occupied .....	81
36. Main Effects Plot for Synthesis Goal on Area Efficiency .....	81

## List of Tables

Table	Page
1. Truth Table for Addition in GF(2).....	6
2. Truth Table for Multiplication in GF(2).....	6
3. Examples of Representing Polynomials in GF(2)  <sub>8</sub> .....	8
4. Throughput Comparison of Previous AES Designs.....	29
5. Area Efficiency Comparison of Previous AES Designs.....	31
6. Performance Comparison: Area, Area Efficiency, and Throughput.....	32
7. Variable Key Known Answer Test Values for Keysize = 128.....	34
8. AES FPGA Performance in Current Literature.....	35
9. Factor Levels.....	43
10. Xtime Table: Elements Not Requiring Modulus Reduction Highlighted.....	59
11. Summary of Experimental Data.....	68
12. Analysis of Variance Table for Throughput.....	83
13. Quantification of Effects for Throughput.....	83
14. Percentage of Variance Explained for Throughput.....	84
15. Order of Importance for Throughput's Factors and Interactions.....	84
16. Percentage of Variance Explained for Area Occupied.....	85
17. Order of Importance for Area Occupied's Factors and Interactions.....	86
18. Percentage of Variance Explained for Area Efficiency.....	87
19. Order of Importance for Area Efficiency's Factors and Interactions.....	88
20. Modular Inverses in the Rijndael Field [Odr01].....	93

21. S-Box Look-Up Table [Odr01].....	93
22. Inverse S-Box Look-Up Table [Odr01].....	94
23. Modular Inverses in GF(2 <sup>4</sup> ).....	94
24. Tabular Representation of xtime.....	95
25. Analysis of Variance Table for Area Occupied.....	128
26. Quantification of Effects for Area Occupied.....	128
27. Analysis of Variance Table for Area Efficiency.....	129
28. Quantification of Effects for Area Efficiency.....	129

# **IMPLEMENTATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD ALGORITHM ON AN 8-BIT FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAY HARDWARE PLATFORM**

## **I. Introduction**

### **1.1 Background**

This research implements the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm on an FPGA device and develops three designs for each of the AES transformations SubBytes and MixColumns. The results of this research can be used in areas such as onboard encryption of satellite communication. Most satellites being launched into orbit today are equipped with FPGAs. This allows controllers on the ground to change the configuration of electronic hardware on the satellite without having physical contact with the satellite. The amount of hardware a satellite can carry is limited but the need for high throughput remains the same. Achieving high area efficiency balances the amount of hardware the satellite must carry, while maintaining a reasonably high throughput.

Nine AES designs account for the various combinations of SubBytes and MixColumns designs. These designs use the Daemen and Rijmen's Rijndael algorithm targeting an 8-bit platform as a baseline [DaR98]. Each change to the baseline is an attempt to increase the throughput of the AES algorithm while decreasing the total area occupied, which results in increased area efficiency.

## 1.2 Research Goals and Hypothesis

This research has two primary goals. The first is to improve the speed of the AES algorithm on an 8-bit platform while reducing the chip area of the implementation. This goal is met when a design is produced that has a better performance than the baseline implementation. The second goal of this research is to determine the effect of factor interaction on the speed and space required to implement AES. This goal directly supports the hypothesis to be tested. By using modular inversion in an extended field and composite modular inversion in a subfield during the transformation of SubBytes in lieu of a full look up table; and by utilizing a bitwise shift and combinational logic in the transformation of MixColumns, the performance of AES and can be improved to a level that surpasses AES performance relative to a baseline level.

The approach used to satisfy the two goals uses various SubBytes and MixColumns designs to analyze the performance based on the three metrics and compares the results to the baseline algorithm as well as other optimized designs including Caltagirone's fully pipelined architecture and Good's compact Xilinx Spartan implementation [CaA03][GoB05].

The performance of AES on 8-bit processing platforms is an important issue in the AES design because most smart cards have such processors and many cryptographic applications run on smart cards [DaR98]. Tailoring a compact AES design specifically for an 8-bit platform would increase the overall usefulness of the algorithm. This compact AES design could then be used more efficiently on smart cards and for other processor-limited applications.



### **1.3 Document Overview**

Chapter II presents an overview of the mathematical foundation of AES and introduces the original design of the algorithm targeted to an 8-bit processing platform. This chapter also reviews current research into AES implementations on FPGAs. Chapter III defines the experiment conducted in this research. Chapter IV presents and interprets the data collected from the experiment. The goal of Chapter IV is to answer the investigative research questions posed in Chapter III: (1) how do experimental factors interact and affect the overall performance metrics, and (2) how does each SubBytes and MixColumns design affect performance? Chapter V summarizes the conclusions drawn from the analysis of experimental data in Chapter IV. This chapter also highlights the significance of this work and its impact on current research methods involving the implementation of AES on FPGAs. Recommendations for future research are also included.

## **II. Literature Review**

### **2.1 Chapter Overview**

This chapter provides an overview of the mathematics behind AES and presents the design specified by the creators of the algorithm targeted to an 8-bit processing platform. This chapter also provides a review of current research into AES implementations on FPGAs.

### **2.2 Description**

Implementing encryption algorithms on an FPGA brings many advantages such as flexibility of re-design, run-time reconfiguration, and a vast amount of logic on a single chip. The major drawback of an FPGA implementation is reduced throughput compared to an equivalent ASIC implementation. Through the use of a Xilinx Virtex II Pro FPGA and Xilinx ISE software, nine different designs of the AES algorithm are created with the ultimate goal of reducing the total equivalent gate count while increasing area efficiency.

On 2 October, 2000, the National Institute of Standards and Technology announced that the Rijndael algorithm would be adopted as the Advanced Encryption Standard [ZCN04]. Rijndael is a block cipher with a variable block and key length. The block length and key length can be independently specified to be any integer multiple of 32 bits, with a minimum of 128 bits and a maximum of 256 bits. The AES algorithm adopted by NIST is the unmodified Rijndael cipher except that AES has a fixed block length of 128 bits and only supports key lengths of 128, 192 or 256 bits [DaR98]. This research considers AES designs with a key length of 128 bits.

## 2.3 Necessary Mathematical Background

A grasp of the mathematics behind the Advanced Encryption Standard is necessary to understand the algorithm's design [DaR98]. AES utilizes the nonlinear properties of abstract algebra to encrypt input data; consequently, a condensed discussion in finite fields and how they are represented is presented before discussing design options that optimize the AES algorithm.

### 2.3.1 Finite Fields

In abstract algebra, a field is an algebraic structure where the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division (except by zero) may be defined, and the same rules from the arithmetic of ordinary numbers hold [Wik07b]. A finite field, or Galois field, is a field that contains a finite number of elements. The number of elements in a set defined as a finite field is termed the order of that field. A field with order  $m$  exists iff  $m$  is a prime power. A prime power is any integer  $m$  for which  $m=p^n$  for some integer  $n$  and some prime integer  $p$ . The characteristic of a finite field is defined as  $p$ . All finite fields used in AES have a characteristic of 2 [DaR98]. Finite fields with the same order are isomorphic. Since only prime powers are considered for the AES algorithm, for each prime power there is only one finite field denoted by  $GF(p^n)$ . Rijmen and Daemen provide intuitive examples of finite fields of prime order  $p$ . The elements of a prime order finite field  $GF(p)$  can be represented by the integers 0, 1, ...,  $p-1$ . The two operations of the field are integer addition modulo  $p$  and integer multiplication modulo  $p$  [DaR98]. Example 1 illustrates these properties.

**Example 1.** In the field GF(2) The elements of the field are 0 and 1; therefore the two operations of the field are defined as integer addition modulo 2 and integer multiplication modulo 2. The following truth tables define the operations of addition and multiplication in the field GF(2)

Table 1. Truth Table for Addition in GF(2)

A	B	A + B
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	0

Table 2. Truth Table for Multiplication in GF(2)

A	B	A · B
0	0	0
0	1	0
1	0	0
1	1	1

Finite fields with an order that is not prime excludes the premise that addition and multiplication can occur by simple addition and multiplication of integers modulo a number [DaR98]. This results in a more complex representation of elements. AES chose to represent finite fields GF( $p^n$ ), with  $n > 1$ , by means of polynomials over GF( $p$ ) because it provides an easy method of converting complex polynomials into binary strings, which make implementations of the algorithm much more manageable.

The transformation of a polynomial residing in a finite field  $F$  into a binary string begins with the following expression for a polynomial of the form

$$b(x) = b_{n-1} x^{n-1} + b_{n-2} x^{n-2} + \dots + b_2 x^2 + b_1 x + b_0 \quad (1)$$

where  $x$  is the indeterminate of the polynomial and  $b_i$  in the field  $F$  are the coefficients [DaR98]. Since all finite fields used in AES have a characteristic of 2, the coefficients,  $b_i$ , can only be represented by 2 numbers; in the case of AES those numbers are 0 and 1.

It is helpful to work out definitions of important terms and symbols the designers of AES use throughout the algorithm. First, the degree of a polynomial equals  $l$  if  $b_j = 0$ ,  $\forall j > l$ , and  $l$  is the smallest number with that property [DaR98]. In other words, the degree of a polynomial is equal to the largest power of  $x$ . The set of polynomials over a field  $F$  is denoted by  $F[x]$ . Finally, The set of polynomials over a field  $F$ , which have a degree below  $l$ , is denoted by  $F[x]_l$  [DaR98].

It is important to note that these polynomials are abstract entities in that they are never evaluated. The elements of a finite field are represented as polynomials to simplify storing the coefficients in computer memory as well as to increase the mathematical complexity of the algorithm (it is much more difficult to find the modulus of a polynomial than it is to find the modulus of an integer). For the purposes of AES, the coefficients of the polynomials are stored in computer memory as a string. Examples 2 and 3 demonstrate how polynomials are converted to strings of bits and vice versa.

**Example 2** Let the field  $F$  be  $GF(2)$ , and let  $l = 8$ . The polynomials can be stored as 8-bit values, or bytes [DaR98]

$$b(x) \rightarrow b_7b_6b_5b_4b_3b_2b_1b_0. \quad (2)$$

The reverse holds true as well. A byte can be considered as a polynomial with coefficients in  $GF(2)$

$$b_7b_6b_5b_4b_3b_2b_1b_0 \rightarrow b(x), \text{ or} \quad (3)$$

$$b(x) \rightarrow b_7x^7 + b_6x^6 + b_5x^5 + b_4x^4 + b_3x^3 + b_2x^2 + b_1x + b_0. \quad (4)$$

**Example 3.** The following table shows polynomials in  $\text{GF}(2)|_8$ , their corresponding bit string, and that bit string's hexadecimal value.

Table 3. Examples of Representing Polynomials in  $\text{GF}(2)|_8$

Polynomial	Bit string	Hexadecimal value
$x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1$	01010111	57
$x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$	11111111	FF
$x^2 + 1$	00000101	05
$x^7 + x^5 + x^3 + x$	10101010	AA

### 2.3.2 Finite Field Arithmetic

AES uses only two operations on polynomials in a finite field: addition and multiplication. The addition of polynomials consists of summing the coefficients with equal powers of  $x$ , where the summing of the coefficients occurs in the underlying field  $F$  [DaR98]. Since AES operates in a finite field with a characteristic of 2, the summing of coefficients in the underlying field is equal to summing the coefficients modulo 2, which is also the equivalent of using an XOR.

**Example 4.** Evaluate the following expression in  $\text{GF}(2^n)$  (the notation  $\text{GF}(2^n)$  indicates that the problem is to be solved in a finite field with an order that is not prime and has a characteristic of 2)

Polynomial representation:

$$(x^6 + x^5 + x^2 + x + 1) + (x^7 + x^5 + x^3 + x)$$

Binary representation:

$$\{01100111\} + \{10101010\}$$

Hexadecimal representation:

$$\{67\} + \{AA\}$$

### **Solution**

According to the definition of the addition of polynomials in a finite field above, the solution can be found by simply applying an XOR (denoted as  $\oplus$ ) to the coefficients with equal powers of  $x$ :

Polynomial:

$$\begin{aligned} x^7 + x^6 + (1 \oplus 1)x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + (1 \oplus 1)x + 1 \\ = \underline{x^7} + \underline{x^6} + \underline{x^3} + \underline{x^2} + \underline{1} \end{aligned}$$

Binary:

$$\begin{array}{r} 01100111 \\ \oplus \underline{10101010} \\ \hline \underline{11001101} \end{array}$$

Hexadecimal:

$$\{67\} + \{AA\} = \underline{\{CD\}}$$

The operation of addition in a finite field with a characteristic of 2 can be implemented using an XOR operator; multiplication in a finite field will prove much more complex. Multiplication of polynomials in a finite field has much of the same properties of ordinary polynomial multiplication. These properties are the associative,

commutative, and distributive property with respect to addition of polynomials [DaR98]. Since the underlying property of a finite field is that it is a closed set (finite number of elements), the multiplication of two elements in a finite field must yield another element of that field. This property is not intuitive because usually the magnitude of the product of two numbers is not less than the magnitude of the two numbers originally multiplied (i.e.,  $6 \times 7 = 1$  ?!). To make the multiplication closed over  $F[x]$ , a polynomial of degree  $l$  called the reduction polynomial [DaR98]. The reduction polynomial for all byte multiplications will be designated throughout this document as  $m(x)$ . The designers of AES selected the following polynomial as the reduction polynomial for all 8-bit multiplications throughout AES [DaR98].

$$m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \quad (5)$$

This polynomial's corresponding bit string is 100011011. Therefore all multiplications in the Rijndael field are defined as

$$c(x) = a(x) \cdot b(x) \leftrightarrow c(x) \equiv (a(x) \times b(x)) \bmod m(x) \quad [\text{DaR98}]. \quad (6)$$

This reducing polynomial is not an arbitrary choice for it displays a characteristic known as irreducibility. According the Daemen and Rijmen, a polynomial  $d(x)$  is considered irreducible over the field  $\text{GF}(p)$  iff there are no two polynomials  $a(x)$  and  $b(x)$  with coefficients in  $\text{GF}(p)$  such that  $d(x) = a(x) \cdot b(x)$ . Since the reduction polynomial is itself irreducible, it effectively constructs a representation for the field  $\text{GF}(2^8)$ , which is known as the Rijndael field. In AES, all bytes are considered elements of  $\text{GF}(2^8)$ . All subsequent operations on bytes are defined as operations in  $\text{GF}(2^8)$  [DaR98]. The following example



illustrates how the reduction polynomial is used during polynomial multiplication in a finite field.

**Example 5.** Evaluate the following expression for byte multiplication in the Rijndael finite field:

$$\{11110011\} \cdot \{00110100\}$$

$$\text{or in hexadecimal, } \{F9\} \cdot \{34\}$$

**Solution**

The bytes above correspond to the following polynomials in Rijndael’s finite field

$$\{x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x + 1\} \cdot \{x^5 + x^4 + x^2\}.$$

Ordinary polynomial multiplication (FOIL method) yields the following product:

$$x^{12} + \mathbf{x^{11}} + \mathbf{x^{11}} + \mathbf{x^{10}} + \mathbf{x^{10}} + \mathbf{x^9} + \mathbf{x^9} + \mathbf{x^9} + \mathbf{x^8} + \mathbf{x^8} + x^7 + \mathbf{x^6} + \mathbf{x^6} + \mathbf{x^5} + \mathbf{x^5} + x^4 + x^3 + x^2$$

The addition of polynomials utilizes the XOR operation resulting in the removal of all pairs of x with equal degree (shown in **bold**). This yields

$$x^{12} + x^9 + x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2.$$

The final procedure takes the modulus of the above result with the reducing polynomial  $m(x)$ :

$$x^{12} + x^9 + x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 \text{ modulo } x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$$

$$\text{or in binary } \{1001010011100\} \text{ modulo } \{100011011\}$$

This operation can be performed using the “long division” method below (note XOR is used in lieu of subtraction in ordinary long division). The result of the modulo operation is highlighted.



Daemen and Rijmen outline a matrix method for multiplying with a fixed polynomial using  $l(x)$  as the reduction polynomial [DaR98]. A summary of this method is outlined below.

Let  $c(x)$  be the fixed polynomial with degree three or

$$c(x) = c_3 x^3 + c_2 x^2 + c_1 x + c_0. \quad (9)$$

Further, let  $a(x)$  and  $b(x)$  be two variable polynomials with coefficients  $a_i$  and  $b_i$  respectively with  $i$  being less than 4 such that  $b(x) = c(x) \cdot a(x)$ . The matrix representation of the transformation takes the coefficients of polynomial  $a$  as input and produces as output the coefficients of the polynomial  $b$  or

$$\begin{aligned} b(x) &= c(x) \cdot a(x) \\ &\equiv (c_3 x^3 + c_2 x^2 + c_1 x + c_0) \cdot (a_3 x^3 + a_2 x^2 + a_1 x + a_0) \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

$$\equiv (b_3 x^3 + b_2 x^2 + b_1 x + b_0) \text{ mod } (x^4 + 1) \quad (12)$$

After working out the product through ordinary polynomial multiplication, separating the conditions for different powers of  $x$ , and accounting for the modulus operation, Daemen and Rijmen give the following matrix representation of (12) [DaR98]

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} c_0 & c_3 & c_2 & c_1 \\ c_1 & c_0 & c_3 & c_2 \\ c_2 & c_1 & c_0 & c_3 \\ c_3 & c_2 & c_1 & c_0 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} a_0 \\ a_1 \\ a_2 \\ a_3 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (13)$$

This representation is only used for multiplication with a fixed polynomial during the MixColumns transformation.

One significant property of a finite field is that each element of a finite field  $F$  has an inverse under multiplication. This property is used throughout the algorithm because it

allows a number to refer back to itself through a complex operation (i.e., multiplication). This characteristic is what allows ciphertext to be decrypted back into the original message. The method for determining the inverse element for a multiplication operation in a finite field is via the extended Euclidean Algorithm. The Euclidean Algorithm takes an element of the finite field,  $a(x)$ , and finds the inverse element,  $b(x)$ , while satisfying the following identity,

$$a(x) \times b(x) = 1 \pmod{m(x)} \quad (14)$$

where  $m(x)$  is the reducing polynomial. If the above equation holds, then  $b(x)$  is the inverse element of  $a(x)$  in a finite field  $F$  under multiplication ‘ $\cdot$ ’ [DaR98]. Recall the solution to Example 5 was  $\{F9\} \cdot \{34\} = \{01\}$  in the Rijndael finite field. According to the above property then F9 is the multiplicative inverse of 34 and vice versa. The extended Euclidean algorithm is applied to each element of the Rijndael finite field and the multiplicative inverses of all elements are recorded in Table 20 in Appendix A.

A key element of the algorithm is the Rijndael finite field. From  $F$  in the field  $GF(2)$ , a suitable reduction polynomial  $m(x)$  is found. This defines multiplication and addition over a set of polynomials less than degree = 8, or  $F[x]_8$  as a field with  $2^8$  elements denoted  $GF(2^8)$ , and otherwise known as the Rijndael finite field.

## 2.4 Description of the AES Algorithm

The Data Encryption Standard expired in 1998 and the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced an open international competition for cipher designs to replace DES as the federal information processing standard [ZCN04]. Rijndael won the competition based on security, simplicity, and suitability for both

hardware and software implementations, and was designated the Advanced Encryption Standard. AES, like DES, is a symmetric key block cipher encryption algorithm. The basic operation of a symmetric key block cipher with 128 bit blocks and a 128 bit key is shown in Figure 1. A block cipher operates on fixed-length blocks of data, while symmetric key algorithms use the same key for encryption and decryption.




Figure 1. Basic Operation of a Symmetric Key Cipher

The standard AES algorithm operates on 128 bit blocks of data at a time, which is twice the block size of DES. AES supports keys of 128, 192, or 256 bit keys. The first stage of the algorithm is the KeyExpansion function which uses the Rijndael key schedule to produce separate 4x4 matrix of keys for each of the 10 encryption rounds used. Each round of encryption operates on a 4x4 matrix of bytes called the state and each encryption round has four stages or transformations: SubBytes, MixColumns, ShiftRows, and AddRoundKey [Wik07a]. The transformations targeted in this research are SubBytes and MixColumns for reasons to be discussed in Chapter III. A very basic discussion of the KeyExpansion, ShiftRows, and AddRoundKey follows while a more in depth description of SubBytes and MixColumns is presented.

The algorithm shown in Figure 2 is a modified version of the original AES algorithm and shows a high-level procedure for encryption.

```

AES(State, CipherKey)
{
KeyExpansion(CipherKey, ExpandedKey);
AddRoundKey(State, ExpandedKey[0]);
for( i = 1; i < 10; i++) Round(State, ExpandedKey[i]);
Final Round(State, ExpandedKey[10]);
}

```

```

Round(State, ExpandedKey[i])
{
SubBytes(State);
ShiftRows(State);
MixColumns(State);
AddRoundKey(State,ExpandedKey[i]);
}

```

```

Final Round(State, ExpandedKey[10])
{
SubBytes(State);
ShiftRows(State);
AddRoundKey(State, ExpandedKey[10]);
}

```

Figure 2. High Level Encryption Procedure for AES Algorithm [DaR98]

The following descriptions of the particular stages of the AES algorithm follow Daemen and Rijmen's design for AES targeting an 8-bit processor [DaR98]. This constraint excludes designs that operate on word lengths of 32 or greater for reasons of efficiency.

The first operation to occur in AES is the KeyExpansion step. The input to this step is a 32-bit word, but the only time the entire word is operated on is during an 8-bit left rotate immediately after the data is input, which can be handled by an 8-bit processor. After the 8-bit shift, the SubBytes step is performed on all four individual bytes of the rotated word. The leftmost byte of the resulting word is XORed with the output of a procedure called Rcon. Rcon is defined as [Wik06b]

$$\text{Rcon}(i) = x^{(254+i)} \bmod m(x) \quad (15)$$

where,  $i$  is the iteration number. The most important aspect of the KeyExpansion step, as far as this research is concerned, is that KeyExpansion uses the SubBytes operation; thus the performance of KeyExpansion is directly related to that of SubBytes.

The simplest AES transformation is the AddRoundKey step, shown in Figure 3, and it consists of XORing each byte of the particular state with the 4x4 key matrix created in the KeyExpansion stage for that specific encryption round.




Figure 3. AddRoundKey [Wik07a]

Figure 4 shows the ShiftRows transformation. This step cyclically shifts each byte in each row of the state to the left by a predetermined amount. The standard AES algorithm does not shift any bytes in the first row, shifts each byte in the second row left by one byte, shifts each byte in the third row left by two bytes, and shifts each byte in the fourth row left by three bytes. This ensures that each column of the output will have elements of each column of the input.




Figure 4. ShiftRows [Wik07a]

Outside of the Rcon operation during KeyExpansion, the transformations presented thus far have not reached beyond the computational complexity of bitwise XORing two bytes of data or shifting bytes left by a predetermined amount. The computational complexity of the KeyExpansion step directly relates to the computation complexity of SubBytes. The SubBytes and MixColumns transformations are the most complicated and hardware intensive steps in the AES process, therefore they are the transformations most attractive for optimization. What follows is a description of the specific designs for the AES transformations MixColumns and SubBytes for an 8-bit processor from *The Design of Rijndael* [DaR98].

In SubBytes, each byte in the state is replaced with its specific entry,  $S$ , in a fixed 256 byte look-up table (LUT), which can be found in Table 21 in Appendix A. This look-up table, known as an S-box, is generated using inverse functions of a finite field and provides an element of non-linearity to the system. During decryption, a separate 256 byte look-up table containing the values of the inverse SubBytes transformation is used. This look-up table can be found in Table 22 in Appendix A. More detail in the generation of these tables is provided in the SubBytes designs outlined in Chapter III. This SubBytes implementation is the standard design for the SubBytes transformation for use on an 8-Bit processor [DaR98]. This design is called a LUT design for obvious reasons.



The MixColumns step combines all four bytes of each of the four columns of the state using an invertible linear transformation polynomial. The four bytes of each column are inputs and each input affects all four bytes of the output. Since the dimensions of the columns consist of 4 bytes, this is optimal for 32-bit architectures using look-up table implementations [DaR98]. This fact makes the implementation of MixColumns in an 8-bit architecture without using LUTs an extremely difficult and hardware intensive process. Daemen and Rijmen point out that good MixColumn performance on 8-bit processors is not trivial to obtain because its design is best suited for a 32-bit processor. The MixColumns transformation takes the columns of the state in polynomial form over the Rijndael finite field and multiplies them modulo  $l(x)$  (cf. (7) ) with a fixed polynomial  $c(x)$ . Figure 5 shows how each column is multiplied by a fixed polynomial  $c(x)$ .




Figure 5. MixColumns [Wik07a]

The polynomial  $c(x)$  is

$$c(x) = 03 \cdot x^3 + 01 \cdot x^2 + 01 \cdot x + 02. \quad (16)$$

This polynomial is coprime to  $l(x)$  and is therefore invertible [DaR98]. The inverse of  $c(x)$  is  $d(x)$  and is used for the inverse MixColumns routine during the process of decryption. The polynomial  $d(x)$  is

$$d(x) = 0B \cdot x^3 + 0D \cdot x^2 + 09 \cdot x + 0E. \quad (17)$$

By substituting  $c(x)$  into (13), the matrix representation for multiplication in the Rijndael specified MixColumns stage of AES is obtained below (i.e.,  $b(x) = c(x) \cdot a(x) \bmod l(x)$ ) or

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} a_0 \\ a_1 \\ a_2 \\ a_3 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (18)$$

Recall that the input to MixColumns is a 32 bit string representing the four columns in the state. Thus, each coefficient of  $a$  is comprised of four bits in  $F[x]_4$ . To implement this on an 8-bit processor, (18) must be executed in hardware. Multiplication with the coefficient 01 requires no processing power because the input equals the output. Daemen and Rijmen outline a process for multiplication with 02 and 03 on an 8-bit platform. This process takes advantage of the fact that all elements of the Rijndael finite field can be written as a sum of powers of 02 since the characteristic of the Rijndael finite field is 2. This fact coupled with the idea that the value 02 is associated with the polynomial  $x$  makes it possible to construct a 256 byte table of all possible 8-bit input values and their subsequent values after being multiplied by 02 in the Rijndael field. The multiplication by 02 is denoted  $xtime(y)$  where  $y$  is the value to be multiplied. Example 6 illustrates how  $xtime$  is used to multiply an input  $b$  by the constant value 05.

**Example 6.** Use  $xtime$  to multiply the input value  $b$  by the constant value 05.

**Solution**

$$b \cdot 05 = b \cdot (01 \oplus 04) = b \cdot (01 \oplus 02^2)$$

Now,  $xtime$  is used to multiply a value by 02. To multiply a value by  $02^2$ ,  $xtime$  is

used twice or

$$= \mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{xtime}(\mathbf{xtime}(\mathbf{b})).$$

The look-up table for the  $\mathbf{xtime}$  process can be found in Table 24 in Appendix A.

This table is used to determine the product of any two 8-bit input values. The most complex multiplication during MixColumns is a multiplication by 03, as shown in (13). Since the coefficients of  $d(x)$  (c.f., (17)) are much higher than  $c(x)$  (c.f., (16)), the Rijndael design for an 8-bit platform uses a simple property of matrix multiplication to develop a preprocessing step used during the inverse MixColumns routine. The following relationship holds between the MixColumns polynomial  $c(x)$  and the inverse MixColumns polynomial  $d(x)$  [DaR98]

$$d(x) = (04 x^2 + 05) c(x) \text{ mod } l(x). \quad (19)$$

This follows from the matrix notation

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0E & 0B & 0D & 09 \\ 09 & 0E & 0B & 0D \\ 0D & 09 & 0E & 0B \\ 0B & 0D & 09 & 0E \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} 05 & 00 & 04 & 00 \\ 00 & 05 & 00 & 04 \\ 04 & 00 & 05 & 00 \\ 00 & 04 & 00 & 05 \end{bmatrix} \quad (20)$$

which is the inverse MixColumns matrix as defined in (17) and (13) obtained by multiplying the original MixColumns matrix in (18) by a preprocessing matrix [DaR98]. This preprocessing step reduces the number of 256 byte look-up tables needed to one and can be used for both MixColumns and inverse Mixcolumns as opposed to SubBytes, which requires two tables (one for SubBytes and one for inverse SubBytes). This design for MixColumns is designated the Full LUT design.

The specification of the above designs for MixColumns and SubBytes effectively outlines the baseline AES design used during the experiment outlined in Chapter III.

## 2.5 Current Research into AES Implementations on FPGAs

### 2.5.1 Optimization Techniques

Most research uses three metrics to evaluate AES system performance. These three metrics are: throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied. Throughput is defined as

$$Throughput = \frac{128 * f_{clk}}{cycles\_per\_block} \quad (21)$$

where *cycles\_per\_block* is how many clock cycles is required for the input block to be fully encrypted and  $f_{clk}$  is the MAXIMUM clock frequency [ZCN04]. The constant 128 is the number of bits in an input block.

Area Occupied is a contentious issue. “It is difficult to make direct comparisons between FPGA implementations of any algorithm since the specific hardware target is often different” [ZCN04]. Some authors, such as Zambreno and Saqib, define Area Occupied as the number of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) used by a particular design [ZCN04] [SDR]. Other authors, such as Good, properly include the amount of block RAM (measured in equivalent CLBs) a design requires into area efficiency [GoB05].




Figure 6. FPGA Design Methodology [ZCN04]

Area Occupied should be measured in total equivalent gates required to implement the design. This goes against the current research standard but it allows an objective comparison of the size of a design between chip families. Design areas reported in CLB slices and equivalent CLB slices can only be independently compared to designs which are implemented on the same chip or, to some lesser degree, the same chip family. When design areas are reported in CLB slices between two chips that are not of the same chip family or even the same manufacturer, it cannot be an accurate comparison because of variations in CLB slice capacity across chip families/manufacturers; for example, a Xilinx Spartan CLB capacity is not as large as a Xilinx Virtex 5 CLB.

Rudra contends that only total equivalent gate count (memory included) can accurately measure and provide an objective comparison of design area between designs implemented on various chips [Rud01]. His research metrics are summarized in Table 4. Since most operational systems requiring AES implement the algorithm on ASICs rather

than FPGAs, it makes sense to report area occupied as a measure of gates, which can be compared to both ASIC and FPGA designs, rather than CLBs, which can only be accurately compared to designs implemented on the same FPGA chip. Research that presents designs measured in some estimate of theoretical gate counts are considered unreliable. Therefore gate counts only obtained by HDL synthesizers or by ASIC design fabrication methods are used herein. Theoretical gate counts are unreliable since they cannot be directly implemented in hardware nor do they account for buffers required to achieve correct timing as well as other factors which may increase the gate count at the place and route stage of synthesis.

Since most of the current literature reviewed reports area occupied in CLBs or slices, a method for estimating gate counts must be devised. For each FPGA chip it manufactures, Xilinx provides a maximum gate capability (logic and RAM) as well as a total number of CLBs. From these two measures it is possible to devise a conversion factor which translates an area in CLBs to an estimate of area given in total equivalent gate count as shown below. This conversion factor is unique for each Xilinx chip model used and is

$$\frac{gates}{CLB} = \frac{maximum\_gate\_capability}{total\_CLBs} \quad (22)$$


where the conversion factor is  $\frac{gates}{CLB}$ .  $maximum\_gate\_capability$  is the maximum number of gates an FPGA has the potential of implementing and  $total\_CLBs$  is the total number of CLBs the FPGA contains. Both  $maximum\_gate\_capability$  and  $total\_CLBs$  are reported by the chip manufacturer.

Much research has focused on increasing the performance of the various stages of AES (MixColumns, SubBytes, KeyExpansion, AddRoundKey, and ShiftRows) but this same research does not account for how the different transformations interact with each other to affect the design of AES as a whole. The only recent research on AES designs targeting an 8-bit processor found that “a good FPGA based 8-bit datapath for comparison could not be found”[GoB05].


Zambreno attempts to balance throughput, latency, and area efficiency by searching for an optimal point in the pyramid in Figure 6. As the figure illustrates, simple methods of increasing throughput have a negative effect on area efficiency. One such method is loop unrolling. A loop will normally execute an operation in the same area of hardware numerous times. When loop unrolling is used, that area of hardware is replicated as many times as the loop needs to execute so the loop can execute in parallel. It is easy to see how this method has a dramatically negative effect on area efficiency. Loop unrolling is a common method of optimizing encryption algorithms since encryption performs multiple operations on blocks of input data numerous times.

Figure 7a shows the Rijndael algorithm without modification. The algorithm runs a loop using rotating inputs from the key expansion block and the 128-bit state register to hold all plaintext input states. As shown in Figure 7b, This function can be optimized by unrolling this loop and executing each encryption round using its own dedicated hardware circuit for each of 10 rounds and storing the results of each round in 10 different 128 bit registers [QIS05]. The pyramid in Figure 6 would show a significant

increase in throughput, although since the hardware already used large area, increasing throughput in this fashion will result in a dramatic decrease in area efficiency.



(a) Rolling architecture of AES Encryption with 128-bit key.



(b) Unrolling architecture of AES Encryption with 128-bit key.

Figure 7. Loop Unrolling an AES Architecture [QIS05]

Another method of increasing throughput is pipelining. Pipelining maximizes hardware utilization by executing multiple instructions simultaneously with each instruction being in a different stage of execution at any one moment. Pipelining does not require the addition of any new functional hardware, in fact pipelining is a simple method of making the most of the hardware already available. For this reason, except for the overhead associated with starting a pipeline, it is possible to increase throughput and decrease latency with a small effect on area efficiency.



Another technique increases the throughput of AES by parallelizing stages of Rijndael's algorithm [CaA03]. Figure 8 reduces the entire MixColumns stage of AES into simple combinational logic.




Figure 8. Parallelization of MixColumns [CaA03]

Although it may be the dominant catalyst for optimization, throughput is not the only important measure of an implementation. Area efficiency is a design consideration when implementing AES since an increase in area efficiency means an AES chip can operate using less hardware as well as requiring less power. Many portable electronic devices such as cell phones or mobile WLAN terminals could benefit from AES, but since they require batteries, power consumption is an issue. For these hardware platforms, an efficient design should deliver an acceptable throughput while maintaining high area efficiency to reduce power consumption. A quick analysis of Figure 6 shows how difficult this is to reach. In fact, most methods designed to increase area efficiency have a detrimental impact on the system's overall throughput.

There are minor variations in the definition of area efficiency; for example, Zambreno and Saqib define area efficiency as

$$\text{Area Efficiency} = \frac{\text{Throughput}(kbps)}{\text{Area\_Occupied}(CLBs)} \quad (23)$$

which measures the throughput per CLB or slice [ZCN04][SDR]. Therefore, a high Area Efficiency implies a more efficient design. In contrast Pionteck defines area efficiency as the inverse of (23) or

$$\text{Area Efficiency} = \frac{\text{Area\_Occupied}(CLBs)}{\text{Throughput}(kbps)} \quad (24)$$

which measures the area in CLBs needed per one kbps [Pio04]. Therefore, a low number signifies a more efficient design. This research reports area in terms of total equivalent gates rather than CLBs or slices,

$$\text{Area Efficiency} = \frac{\text{Throughput}(kbps)}{\text{Area\_Occupied}(gates)} \quad (25)$$

Recently the AES algorithm was selected for the upcoming WLAN standard IEEE 802.11i [Pio04]. This means portable electronic devices using this new WLAN standard such as network cards for laptops and mobile WLAN terminals will benefit from a design with optimized power consumption through a highly efficient area design.

Area efficiency is a significant design goal when dealing with devices that require a small amount of hardware as well as relatively high throughput. Some designs have modest throughput requirements but require the hardware to be as small as possible. For these systems, reducing hardware area will come at a dramatic cost in throughput.

## 2.6 Typical Design Parameter Values

### 2.6.1 AES Throughput

The fastest FPGA implementation of the AES algorithm transmits at 23.65 Gbps [GoB05]. Since this implementation had maximizing throughput as the primary objective, area occupied and area efficiency suffer. It is because of this trade-off that this design is the largest of those reported in Table 4. The data for gates per slice is from the documentation for the Xilinx Virtex-II family of FPGAs [Xil07]. Similar results were produced by Zambreno although the maximum optimized throughput was only 23.57 Gbps [ZCN04]. Another high-speed implementation of the AES algorithm achieved a throughput of 16.5 Gbps [JST03].

Table 4. Throughput Comparison of Previous AES Designs

<b>Design</b>	<b>FPGA</b>	<b>Area (Slices)</b>	<b>Gates Slice</b>	<b>Area (Gates)</b>	<b>Freq. MHz</b>	<b>Throughput (Gbps)</b>
Zambreno [ZCN04]	Virtex-II XC2V4000	16938	173	2,930,274	184.1	23.57
Järvinen [JST03]	Virtex- E XCV1000c-8	11719	195	2,285,205	129.2	16.50
Good [GoB05]	Virtex-E XCV2000E-8	16693	186	3,104,898	184.8	23.65
Rudra [Rud01]	ASIC	-	-	256,000	32.0	7.50

### 2.6.2 AES Area Efficiency

AES operates on 128 bit blocks of data for each encryption round. Current literature has numerous examples of partitioning the blocks of 128 bits into smaller sub-blocks called datapaths to maximize area efficiency [GoB05]. However, by breaking one 128 bit block of data into smaller, more manageable sub-blocks, a number of additional cycles are required to complete each encryption round. As the 128 bit block of data is

divided into datapaths, the number of cycles required to complete an encryption round increases and consequently has a detrimental effect on throughput. The most common datapath size is 32 bits and can only be implemented on a platform with 32-bit processing capability [GoB05]. The Good design achieves a balance between area efficiency and throughput is achieved at this datapath size.

When calculating total area occupied by a particular design, the size of a particular FPGA's block memory should be included [GoB05]. Different FPGAs have different sizes of block memories. For example, the block memory size on a Xilinx Spartan-II is only 4 kbits whereas the block memory sizes on a Xilinx Spartan-III or Vertex-II are 18 kbits [GoB05]. Translating this into the equivalent number of slices those bits will occupy gives a common basis for comparison [GoB05]. Another method of determining area is in the number of Configurable Logic Block (CLB) slices used by the design [SDR]. Many studies do not include the block RAM used by a design, but only report the number of CLBs or slices and thereby underestimate the actual hardware required.

As shown in Table 5, the highest area efficiency, as calculated by (25) while ignoring block RAM was 15.72 [Rou04]. However, when block RAM is included, this number drops to 1.89. Chodowiec and Gaj have the most area efficient AES design including block RAM with 2.30; when block RAM is not considered efficiency rises to 5.42 [ChG01]. Table 5 summarizes area efficiency results of other designs.

Table 5. Area Efficiency Comparison of Previous AES Designs

	<b>Chodowiec &amp; Gaj [ChG01]</b>	<b>Rouvroy and others [Rou04]</b>	<b>Rouvroy and others [Rou04]</b>
<b>Device</b>	XC2S30-6	XC3S50-4	XC2V40-6
<b>Slices</b>	222	163	146
<b>Gates / Slice</b>	138	130	156
<b>Gates (Ignoring RAM)</b>	30,636	21,190	22,776
<b>Throughput (kbps)</b>	166,000	208,000	358,000
<b>Area Efficiency (ignoring block RAM)</b>	5.42	9.82	15.72
<b>Bits of block RAM used</b>	9600	34176	34176
<b>Equiv slices for block RAM</b>	300	1068	1068
<b>Total equiv slices</b>	522	1231	1214
<b>Total equivalent gate count</b>	72,036	160,030	189,384
<b>Area Efficiency (accounting for block RAM)</b>	2.30	1.30	1.89

### 2.6.3 AES Area Optimization

The smallest AES design, in equivalent gates required to implement the design used only 41,184 gates on a Xilinx XC2S15-6 using an 8-bit platform [GoB05]. Table 6 illustrates how the optimization of area usage affects throughput and area efficiency.

The highlighted values in Table 6 correspond to the largest values in the most important measures of merit: area, throughput, and area efficiency. Good's design is the lowest in both gates used as well as total equivalent gates when accounting for the amount of FPGA block RAM being used. Chodowiec and Gaj boast the highest area efficiency while accounting for block RAM [ChG01]. Rouvroy achieves the best area efficiency when block RAM is ignored [Rou04].

Table 6. Performance Comparison: Area, Area Efficiency, and Throughput

	<b>Good [GoB05]</b>	<b>Chodowiec &amp; Gaj [ChG01]</b>	<b>Rouvroy and others [Rou04]</b>
<b>Device</b>	XC2S15-6	XC2S30-6	XC2V40-6
<b>Datapath Length (bits)</b>	8	32	32
<b>CLB Slices</b>	124	222	146
<b>Gates / Slice</b>	156	138	156
<b>Gates (Ignoring Block Ram)</b>	19,344	30,636	22,776
<b>Throughput (kbps)</b>	2200	166,000	358,000
<b>Area Efficiency (ignoring block RAM)</b>	0.018	0.75	15.72
<b>Bits of Block RAM used</b>	4480	9600	34176
<b>Equiv Slices for Block RAM</b>	140	300	1068
<b>Total Equiv Slices</b>	264	522	1214
<b>Total Equiv Gates</b>	41,184	72,036	189,384
<b>Area Efficiency (accounting for block RAM)</b>	0.0534	2.30	0.529

## 2.7 Overview of research into the validation of encryption circuits

When NIST selected one of the many candidates to replace DES as the new encryption standard AES, three evaluation criteria were used to determine which algorithm was best: security, cost, and algorithm and implementation characteristics [Nis01]. The most important factor in NIST's decision was the overall security of the algorithm using two different criteria: a quantitative analysis of the general security of the algorithm and the algorithm's ability to withstand attack. For AES optimization research

however, the most important characteristic is the correctness of the implementation (i.e., whether or not the implemented algorithm EXACTLY matches the specification of AES).

NIST released the Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm Validation Suite (AESAVS) in November 2002. The suite provides three different tests which validate the functionality of the AES algorithm: the Monte Carlo algorithm test, the Multi-Block Message test, and the Known Answer Test. AES is a substitution cipher. That is, if the same block of data is run through the algorithm multiple times with the same key, the output ciphertext will be exactly the same each time. The Known Answer Tests take advantage of this and are an easy method of determining the functionality of a particular AES implementation through the use of look up tables containing the expected answers. There are four different types of known answer tests: GFSbox, KeySbox, Variable Key, and Variable Text. GFSbox and KeySbox each test the functionality of the Substitution Box (S-Box) elements of the AES and DES ciphers.

Variable Key and Variable Text Known Answer Tests are the most easily realizable methods of testing the functionality of an AES implementation. The Variable Key test simply keeps the plain text input block constant at all zeros and varies the value of the key. The AES validation suite provides look up tables containing the known ciphertext output for zeroed out plain text and different key values. Table 7 is an example of a Variable Key Known Answer Test value look up table. The Variable Text works the same way as the Variable Key test but Variable Text operates on a zeroed out key and varies the value of the plaintext.

Table 7. Variable Key Known Answer Test Values for KeySize = 128  
 PLAINTEXT and/or IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000

KEY	CIPHERTEXT
80000000000000000000000000000000	0edd33d3c621e546455bd8ba1418bec8
c0000000000000000000000000000000	4bc3f883450c113c64ca42e1112a9e87
e0000000000000000000000000000000	72a1da770f5d7ac4c9ef94d822affd97
f0000000000000000000000000000000	970014d634e2b7650777e8e84d03ccd8
f8000000000000000000000000000000	f17e79aed0db7e279e955b5f493875a7
fc000000000000000000000000000000	9ed5a75136a940d0963da379db4af26a
fe000000000000000000000000000000	c4295f83465c7755e8fa364bac6a7ea5
ff000000000000000000000000000000	b1d758256b28fd850ad4944208cf1155
ff800000000000000000000000000000	42ffb34c743de4d88ca38011c990890b
ffc00000000000000000000000000000	9958f0ecea8b2172c0c1995f9182c0f3
ffe00000000000000000000000000000	956d7798fac20f82a8823f984d06f7f5
fff00000000000000000000000000000	a01bf44f2d16be928ca44aaf7b9b106b
fff80000000000000000000000000000	b5f1a33e50d40d103764c76bd4c6b6f8
fffc0000000000000000000000000000	2637050c9fc0d4817e2d69de878aee8d
fffe0000000000000000000000000000	113ecbe4a453269a0dd26069467fb5b5
ffff0000000000000000000000000000	97d0754fe68f11b9e375d070a608c884
ffff8000000000000000000000000000	c6a0b3e998d05068a5399778405200b4
ffffc000000000000000000000000000	df556a33438db87bc41b1752c55e5e49
ffffe000000000000000000000000000	90fb128d3a1af6e548521bb962bf1f05
fffff000000000000000000000000000	26298e9c1db517c215fadfb7d2a8d691
fffff800000000000000000000000000	a6cb761d61f8292d0df393a279ad0380
fffffc00000000000000000000000000	12acd89b13cd5f8726e34d44fd486108
fffffe00000000000000000000000000	95b1703fc57ba09fe0c3580febdd7ed4
ffffff00000000000000000000000000	de11722d893e9f9121c381becc1da59a
ffffff80000000000000000000000000	6d114ccb27bf391012e8974c546d9bf2
ffffffc0000000000000000000000000	5ce37e17eb4646ecfac29b9cc38d9340

## 2.8 Summary

This chapter describes the baseline AES design. The design is specified by the creators of AES and is composed of a full LUT design for both the SubBytes and MixColumns transformations. This chapter also presents current research topics on the implementation of AES on FPGAs and provides tables of common values associated with each performance metric to be tested. The designs that perform best for each metric are highlighted. These designs allow a comparison to be made between the performance of AES designs in current literature and the new AES designs specified in Chapter III.



### III. Methodology

#### 3.1 Chapter Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to define the experiment conducted in this research.

#### 3.2 Problem Definition

##### 3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis

This research has two primary goals. The first is to improve the performance of the baseline design of AES targeting an 8-bit platform based on throughput, area occupied, and area efficiency. This goal is met when a design is produced has a better performance than the baseline design. Designs developed herein are compared to designs from literature that specifically target each metric. Table 8 lists the best values for each AES metric as reported in current literature. These designs target each specific metric individually (i.e., throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied) and use hardware optimization techniques not considered in this effort for reasons of area efficiency.

Table 8. AES FPGA Performance in Current Literature

<b>Metric</b>	<b>Design</b>	<b>FPGA</b>	<b>Value</b>
Throughput	Good [GoB05]	Virtex-II XC2V2000E-8	23.65 Gbps
Area Efficiency (ignoring block RAM)	Rouvroy [Rou04]	XC2V40-6	15.72
Area Efficiency (accounting for block RAM)	Chodowiec & Gaj [ChG01]	XC2S30-6	2.30
Area Occupied	Good [GoB05]	XC2S15-6	41,184 Total Equivalent Gates

The second goal of this research is to answer the following question: how does each factor interact and affect each metric and do the changes to the baseline design increase performance? This goal directly supports the hypothesis to be tested. By using modular inversion in an extended field and composite modular inversion in a subfield during the transformation of SubBytes in lieu of a full look up table as defined in the baseline design; and by utilizing a bitwise shift and combinational logic in the transformation of MixColumns, it is expected that the performance of AES can be improved to a level that surpasses the baseline AES performance.

### **3.2.2 Approach**

The approach to achieving the first goal uses four techniques to reduce hardware requirements in the transformations for MixColumns and SubBytes. The amount of hardware needed can be reduced by computing values rather than using LUTs. SubBytes requires a table of 256 bytes to store the SubBytes step and another table of 256 bytes to perform the inverse of SubBytes. MixColumns uses one 256 byte table and together with SubBytes these two transformations use a total of 768 bytes of memory (these values are the uncompressed storage requirement). Table 8 illustrates the significant impact memory usage has on area efficiency. When total memory usage is not accounted for, the best area efficiency attained by current research is 15.72, but when memory is taken into account the area efficiency drops to 2.30. MixColumns and SubBytes are targeted because they are the only transformations to use any operations outside of combinational logic and use LUTs as their primary means of execution. The second goal is realized by evaluating each technique's impact on performance separately. The experiment compares these

results with the results obtained from each possible combination of optimization techniques.

### 3.3 System Boundaries

The system under test is called the Data Encryption System. The Data Encryption System consists of four components illustrated in Figure 9. The first component of the Data Encryption System is the hardware description language used to create the component under test, the AES algorithm.




Figure 9. System Under Test

The AES algorithm component always contains the verified inverse cipher (decryption). It is assumed that the design used for encrypting data will also be used for decrypting data (i.e., a MixColumns Full LUT design for encryption will not be

combined with a MixColumns combinational logic design for decryption). While combining different designs for encryption and decryption will still properly encrypt and decrypt data, this method is avoided in order to maintain symmetry in the experiment. The third component is the FPGA being used as well as the development board. This device is the Xilinx Virtex-II PRO XC2VP30. The final component is the various design techniques used to improve the algorithm's performance. The scope of this study is limited to controlling the three factors and observing the three metrics. The input (workload) to the system under test is the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite.

### **3.4 System Services**

The Data Encryption System encrypts the input data stream using the AES algorithm. The first, and most desirable, outcome is for the Data Encryption System to correctly encrypt the input data stream. The verification of proper encryption is done using the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite. The second possible outcome of the system is for the Data Encryption System to improperly encrypt the input data stream. The result of this outcome is that the system will be unable to recover the entire, correct input data stream. The third possible outcome of the data encryption system is that no encryption occurs. The result of this outcome is that the input data stream is exactly the same as the output of the system. The final possibility is that nothing occurs. The result of this outcome is that no signal is observed at the output. This indicates a complete malfunction of the system.

### 3.5 Workload

The workload for the Data Encryption System is the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite. When applied to an implementation, the suite verifies the correctness of the implementation. This is a suitable workload for the Data Encryption System because it is provided by the institute responsible for the creation of the Advanced Encryption Standard. Another added benefit of using the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite is that it not only provides a suitable input data stream for the system, but also verifies that the system is providing the correct service (i.e., properly encrypting the input data stream).

### 3.6 Performance Metrics

Three performance metrics are used to evaluate system performance: throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied. Throughput is defined as

$$Throughput(kbps) = \frac{128 * f_{clk}}{cycles\_per\_block} \quad (25)$$

where  $cycles\_per\_block$  is the number of clock cycles required for the input block to be fully encrypted and  $f_{clk}$  is the MAXIMUM clock frequency as identified by the hardware description language (HDL) synthesizer. The HDL synthesizer is the Xilinx XST synthesizer, which identifies a design's critical path and subsequently determines the theoretical maximum combinational delay measured in seconds. This measurement is the minimum clock period and since frequency is the inverse of period, the maximum clock frequency can easily be determined. The constant 128 is the number of bits in an input block. Maximum clock frequency does not solely determine throughput as

throughput is also inversely related to the number of clock cycles required to operate on a block of data.

Area efficiency is defined as

$$\text{Area Efficiency} = \frac{\text{Throughput}(k\text{bps})}{\text{Area}(\text{gates})} \quad (26)$$

where *throughput* is from (25) and *Area* is measured in gates. The total equivalent gate count is measured by the HDL synthesizer.

### 3.7 Parameters

#### 3.7.1 System

- FPGA Type – Different FPGA's have inherent differences in performance; for example, a Xilinx Spartan CLB slice is different from a Xilinx Virtex CLB slice.
- HDL Synthesis Tool – It is unlikely that two different synthesis tools will implement the same HDL code the same way. The synthesis tool used in this experiment is the Xilinx XST tool packaged with the full version of the Xilinx ISE 8.2i software.
- Synthesis Goal – The Xilinx XST synthesis tool requires a user defined input as to the desired overall goal of the design synthesis. The two options are synthesize to reduce area or synthesize to increase speed. The option to increase speed does so by reducing the number of logic levels required by the design. This means that synthesizing for speed does not necessarily indicate

an increase in area occupied nor is it certain that synthesizing for area will result in a decrease in speed.

- ShiftRows Design – There are many designs that properly implement the ShiftRows transformation. The ShiftRows design used in this research is defined by *The Design of Rijndael* for an 8-bit platform as described in Chapter II [DaR98].
- AddRoundKey Design – The AddRoundKey design used in this research is implemented as a bitwise XOR of the round key and the state as defined by *The Design of Rijndael* for an 8-bit platform as described in Chapter II.
- KeyExpansion Design – The KeyExpansion step requires using the SubBytes transformation. SubBytes is considered an experimental factor yet KeyExpansion is not. This is possible by using a function call for SubBytes within the KeyExpansion HDL design. This allows for hardware executing the KeyExpansion transformation to remain the same but permits the hardware implementing SubBytes to change. Thus the SubBytes design can be considered an experimental factor while the KeyExpansion design remains a constant system parameter.
- MixColumns Design – The baseline design for MixColumns is explained in detail in Chapter II. The MixColumns transformation is the most difficult to achieve good performance on an 8-bit processor due to 4 byte column blocks of data [DaR98].

- SubBytes Design – The baseline specification for the SubBytes transformation on an 8-bit platform consumes the most memory in AES. The baseline design uses two independent 256 byte LUTs; one for the encryption cipher (SubBytes) and one for the decryption cipher (inverse SubBytes).

### **3.7.2 Workload**

- Validation Suite – The NIST Algorithm Verification Suite validates the AES algorithm through a number of tests. One such test is the Known Answer Test. This test takes advantage of the fact that AES is a substitution cipher and if the same input is used with the same key, the cipher text will always be the same. The entire battery of Known Answer Tests is run on each design of AES to ensure correctness, but only one Known Answer Test is used as the workload in this experiment. This test is the rotating plaintext test, which maintains an all zero key and varies the input plaintext.
- Key Length –AES has the option of using a 128, 192, or 256 bit key. Increasing key length increases the amount of computation required to encrypt and therefore decreases throughput. For this experiment, the key length is set at 128 bits.

## **3.8 Factors**

The factors for this experiment are: MixColumns design, SubBytes design, and Synthesis Goal. The specific levels of the transformation factors (MixColumns and SubBytes) are determined by which design is utilized during an experiment. The levels



for the factor of synthesis goal are area or speed. These factors and their levels are summarized in Table 9. SubBytes was chosen as an experimental factor because it consumes the most memory in AES. There are a number of alternative designs for implementing a more compact version of the AES S-box, but most of these designs use multiplication or access memory in a way that cannot be easily supplied by an 8-bit processor. The three designs chosen for SubBytes in this experiment can be executed on an 8-bit platform. The first of these designs is the LUT design outlined in Chapter II (cf. Description of the AES Algorithm) and is the Rijndael specified baseline design for AES on an 8-bit platform. The other two designs focus on modular inversion in a finite field. These designs are called Modular Inversion in an Extended Field and Modular Inversion in a Composite Field.

Table 9. Factor Levels

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Level</b>
SubBytes Design	Full LUT, Modular Inversion in an Extended Field, Modular Inversion in a Composite Field
MixColumns Design	Full LUT, Half LUT, Combinational Logic
Synthesis Direction	Area, Speed

The size of the input and output blocks for the MixColumns routine makes the transform ideal for implementation on a 32-bit platform. For this reason, the task of implementing the MixColumns stage of AES on an 8-bit platform with good performance (i.e., low area and high throughput) is not a trivial task [DaR98]. MixColumns is chosen as a factor for this reason. Past research on MixColumns has introduced a number of alternative designs. These designs encompass a range of implementation options for

MixColumns. The first is the Rijndael specified Full LUT design, as described in Chapter II. The second design was developed during this research and is the baseline design modified such that it requires half of the original LUT to operate. This design is titled the Half LUT design. The final design was developed by Satyanarayana and follows an algorithm created by Trenholme, which implements MixColumns using combinational logic alone [Sat04]. These three design levels were chosen because they represent the entire spectrum of MixColumns designs from a full look up table design to an entirely combinational logic design. These designs are described in detail in the following section labeled “Experimental Factor Designs”.

### **3.9 Experimental Factor Designs**

#### **3.9.1 SubBytes**

##### **3.9.1.1 Modular Inversion in an Extended Field**

There are two fundamental steps performed in the SubBytes transformation. The first step is the most mathematically complex and the most difficult to implement in hardware: the modular inversion of a polynomial in the Rijndael finite field. The second step is an invertible operation known as an affine transformation. A critical aspect of this design is the fact that the inverse SubBytes transform is simply the two steps reversed. Thus, during decryption the inverse SubBytes step executes the inverse affine transform and then determines the modular inverse, as shown in Figure 13. This is important because it allows the entire SubBytes operation (both encryption and decryption) to use one 256 byte look-up table containing all modular inverses in a Rijndael Field. The

generation of this table is explained in the Chapter II and the table itself can be found in Table 20 in Appendix A.

Both the affine transform and its inverse are specified in *The Design of Rijndael*.

The affine transform used during SubBytes is

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_7 \\ b_6 \\ b_5 \\ b_4 \\ b_3 \\ b_2 \\ b_1 \\ b_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} a_7 \\ a_6 \\ a_5 \\ a_4 \\ a_3 \\ a_2 \\ a_1 \\ a_0 \end{bmatrix} \oplus \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (27)$$

where  $b$  is the affine transform of  $a$  [DaR98]. The coefficients of the polynomial to be transformed in (27),  $a$ , is multiplied with a binary matrix; the result of which is XORed with a constant bit pattern {01100011}. Implementing (27) in VHDL using only 8-bit operations would be a complex operation if the elements of the matrix were anything but binary. Since, however, the matrix is binary, the product of the matrix multiplication will only yield either the identity of coefficient  $a_i$  (multiply by 1) or 0 (multiply by 0). If each coefficient of  $b$  is treated as a separate entity rather than as elements of a column vector, it is possible to map a unique equation for each coefficient of  $b$ . This can be achieved via ordinary matrix multiplication on the 8x8 binary matrix and the vector of  $a$  coefficients. This result is XORed with the corresponding bit from the constant bit pattern, which results in the following equations for each coefficient of  $b$

$$\begin{aligned}
b_7 &= a_7 \oplus a_6 \oplus a_5 \oplus a_4 \oplus a_3 \oplus 0, \\
b_6 &= a_6 \oplus a_5 \oplus a_4 \oplus a_3 \oplus a_2 \oplus 1, \\
b_5 &= a_5 \oplus a_4 \oplus a_3 \oplus a_2 \oplus a_1 \oplus 1, \\
b_4 &= a_4 \oplus a_3 \oplus a_2 \oplus a_1 \oplus a_0 \oplus 0, \\
b_3 &= a_7 \oplus a_3 \oplus a_2 \oplus a_1 \oplus a_0 \oplus 0, \\
b_2 &= a_7 \oplus a_6 \oplus a_2 \oplus a_1 \oplus a_0 \oplus 0, \\
b_1 &= a_7 \oplus a_6 \oplus a_5 \oplus a_1 \oplus a_0 \oplus 1, \\
b_0 &= a_7 \oplus a_6 \oplus a_5 \oplus a_4 \oplus a_0 \oplus 1.
\end{aligned} \tag{28}$$

The equations in (28) are equivalent to (27) except that (28) replaces matrix arithmetic, which is difficult to implement in hardware, with simple combinational logic using only XOR gates. (28) can be implemented on an 8-bit platform using the VHDL code in Figure 10. Notice that as the number of '1's in the binary matrix increases, so too does the number of XOR gates required to implement the necessary matrix multiplication.

```

variable a: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable b: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
    b(7) := a(7) xor a(6) xor a(5) xor a(4) xor a(3) xor '0';
    b(6) := a(6) xor a(5) xor a(4) xor a(3) xor a(2) xor '1';
    b(5) := a(5) xor a(4) xor a(3) xor a(2) xor a(1) xor '1';
    b(4) := a(4) xor a(3) xor a(2) xor a(1) xor a(0) xor '0';
    b(3) := a(7) xor a(3) xor a(2) xor a(1) xor a(0) xor '0';
    b(2) := a(7) xor a(6) xor a(2) xor a(1) xor a(0) xor '0';
    b(1) := a(7) xor a(6) xor a(5) xor a(1) xor a(0) xor '1';
    b(0) := a(7) xor a(6) xor a(5) xor a(4) xor a(0) xor '1';

```

Figure 10. VHDL Code Implementing the Affine Transform

The inverse affine transform used during decryption precedes the modular inversion step. Daemen and Rijmen determine that the inverse operation of (27) is

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_7 \\ a_6 \\ a_5 \\ a_4 \\ a_3 \\ a_2 \\ a_1 \\ a_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} b_7 \\ b_6 \\ b_5 \\ b_4 \\ b_3 \\ b_2 \\ b_1 \\ b_0 \end{bmatrix} \oplus \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (29)$$

where  $b$  is the input polynomial [DaR98]. Applying the same technique used above to derive (28) from (27), (29) is reduced into individual equations for each coefficient of  $b$ .

This yields

$$\begin{aligned}
a_7 &= b_6 \oplus b_4 \oplus b_1 \oplus 0, \\
a_6 &= b_5 \oplus b_3 \oplus b_0 \oplus 0, \\
a_5 &= b_7 \oplus b_4 \oplus b_2 \oplus 0, \\
a_4 &= b_6 \oplus b_3 \oplus b_1 \oplus 0, \\
a_3 &= b_5 \oplus b_2 \oplus b_0 \oplus 0, \\
a_2 &= b_7 \oplus b_4 \oplus b_1 \oplus 1, \\
a_1 &= b_6 \oplus b_3 \oplus b_0 \oplus 0, \\
a_0 &= b_7 \oplus b_5 \oplus b_2 \oplus 1.
\end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

which can be implemented on an 8-bit platform using the VHDL code in Figure 11.

```

variable a: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable b: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);

a(7) := b(6) xor b(4) xor b(1) xor '0';
a(6) := b(5) xor b(3) xor b(0) xor '0';
a(5) := b(7) xor b(4) xor b(2) xor '0';
a(4) := b(6) xor b(3) xor b(1) xor '0';
a(3) := b(5) xor b(2) xor b(0) xor '0';
a(2) := b(7) xor b(4) xor b(1) xor '1';
a(1) := b(6) xor b(3) xor b(0) xor '0';
a(0) := b(7) xor b(5) xor b(2) xor '1';

```

Figure 11. VHDL Code Implementing the Inverse Affine Transform

The design Modular Inversion in an Extended Field consists of the three parts outlined above: 256 byte modular inversion LUT, affine transform, and inverse affine transform. The affine transform is only used during encryption and is executed after modular inversion. The inverse affine transform is only used during decryption and is executed before modular inversion. The entire VHDL code used for implementing the SubBytes design Modular Inversion in an Extended Field can be found in Appendix B. The objective of this design is to reduce the memory required to perform SubBytes by replacing the two 256 byte LUTs (one for encryption and one for decryption) with one 256 byte LUT that can be used for both encryption and decryption. The cost of this replacement is an increase in combinational logic used to perform the affine transforms. Figure 12 illustrates a block diagram of this design during encryption and Figure 13 illustrates the design for decryption. In both figures  $y$  represents the input to the transformation while  $z$  is the output.




Figure 12. SubBytes design flow for Modular Inversion in an Extended Field




Figure 13. Inverse SubBytes design flow for Modular Inversion in an Extended Field

### 3.9.1.2 Modular Inversion in a Composite Field

The most mathematically complex operation of the AES cipher is modular inversion in a finite field. A more compact implementation of the cipher's S-box can be obtained by performing modular inversion in the field  $GF(2^4)^2$  rather than in  $GF(2^8)$  [Rij94]. The field over  $GF(2^8)$  called an extended field while the more compact representation  $GF(2^4)^2$  is called a composite field. The field  $GF(2^4)$  is referred to as a subfield. To perform modular inversion in the extended field requires a 256 byte LUT. An equivalent representation of the extended Rijndael field into a more compressed subfield over  $GF(2^4)^2$  reduces the size of the LUT to just 8 bytes. Figure 14 illustrates the design flow of SubBytes for Rijmen's efficient S-box implementation for encryption and Figure 15 shows the process for decryption.




Figure 14. SubBytes Design Flow for Composite Field Inversion




Figure 15. Inverse SubBytes Design Flow for Composite Field Inversion

Every element of  $GF(2^8)$  can be written as a polynomial of the first degree with coefficients from  $GF(2^4)$ . This polynomial has the form  $bx + c$ , where  $b$  and  $c$  are coefficients from  $GF(2^4)$  [Rij94]. The reducing polynomial for multiplication in this field

is an irreducible second degree polynomial of the form  $x^2 + Ax + B$  where the  $A$  and  $B$  coefficients are constants from  $GF(2^4)$  [Rij94]. The values for the  $A$  and  $B$  coefficients are unspecified. However, the inverse of an element of  $GF(2^8)$  represented in  $GF(2^4)^2$  as  $bx + c$  is [Rij94]

$$(bx + c)^{-1} = b(b^2 B + bcA + c^2)^{-1} x + (c + bA)(b^2 B + bcA + c^2)^{-1}. \quad (31)$$




Figure 16. Schematic of Modular Inversion in a Composite Field

Figure 16 illustrates a schematic representation of (31) where  $p$  represents the  $b(b^2 B + bcA + c^2)^{-1}$  term and  $q$  represents the  $(c + bA)(b^2 B + bcA + c^2)^{-1}$  term. The schematic shown in Figure 16 corresponds to the “Modular Inversion in  $GF(2^4)^2$ ” blocks in Figures 4 and 5. Before Figure 16 can be implemented, an invertible method for mapping elements of  $GF(2^8)$  into polynomials with coefficients in  $GF(2^4)$  must be defined.



Paar and Rosner map a finite field over  $GF(2^8)$  into an equivalent representation over  $GF(2^4)^2$  using a transformation matrix. However, this method is only valid for fields that use primitive reducing polynomials [PaR97]. The Rijndael field reducing polynomial  $m(x)$  is irreducible but not primitive [Rud01]. Therefore, the Paar and Rosner method cannot be used directly. However, Rudra used the Paar and Rosner method to develop an algorithm for determining transformation matrices specifically for the Rijndael field. This algorithm is composed of three steps that ensure the matrix has the required mathematical properties [Rud01]. These steps are iterated until a matrix has all of the properties specified in the algorithm. Rudra uses his algorithm to determine a transformation matrix which correctly splits a polynomial in  $GF(2^8)$  into a first degree polynomial with coefficients in  $GF(2^4)$ . The mapping equation with Rudra's transformation matrix is

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_3 \\ b_2 \\ b_1 \\ b_0 \\ c_3 \\ c_2 \\ c_1 \\ c_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} y_7 \\ y_6 \\ y_5 \\ y_4 \\ y_3 \\ y_2 \\ y_1 \\ y_0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (32)$$

where  $b$  and  $c$  are the coefficients of the polynomial  $bx + c$  and  $y$  is a polynomial in  $GF(2^8)$  [Rud01]. The matrix which maps from  $GF(2^4)^2$  back to  $GF(2^8)$  is the mathematical inverse of the original transformation matrix shown in (32). Therefore, the inverse mapping equation is [Rud01]

$$\begin{bmatrix} y_7 \\ y_6 \\ y_5 \\ y_4 \\ y_3 \\ y_2 \\ y_1 \\ y_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} b_3 \\ b_2 \\ b_1 \\ b_0 \\ c_3 \\ c_2 \\ c_1 \\ c_0 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (33)$$

As the number of ‘1’s a matrix contains increases, so does the number of XOR operations required to perform the matrix multiplication. The transformation matrix in (32) contains 28 ‘1’s and its inverse in (33) contains 29 ‘1’s for a total of 57 ‘1’s in both matrices. O’Driscoll’s research uses the Paar algorithm determining a transform matrix to find a more efficient (i.e., less ‘1’s) version of the transform matrix. He was able to find a transform matrix containing 27 ‘1’s and whose corresponding inverse matrix contains 24 ‘1’s for a total of 51 ‘1’s between the two matrices. Therefore the mapping equations in this research will use O’Driscoll’s more efficient transform matrix. The mapping equation used herein is [Odr01]

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_3 \\ b_2 \\ b_1 \\ b_0 \\ c_3 \\ c_2 \\ c_1 \\ c_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} y_7 \\ y_6 \\ y_5 \\ y_4 \\ y_3 \\ y_2 \\ y_1 \\ y_0 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (34)$$

The inverse mapping equation is [Odr01]

$$\begin{bmatrix} y_7 \\ y_6 \\ y_5 \\ y_4 \\ y_3 \\ y_2 \\ y_1 \\ y_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} b_3 \\ b_2 \\ b_1 \\ b_0 \\ c_3 \\ c_2 \\ c_1 \\ c_0 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (35)$$

O’Driscoll uses the European standard “little-endian” ordering of bit strings; therefore the bits are switched and the inverse of the transform matrix is recalculated to match the “big-endian” convention used in this research. The mapping equation in (34) is implemented in hardware using the VHDL code in Figure 17.

```

variable y: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable b: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable c: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
    b(3) := y(7) xor y(5) xor y(1);
    b(2) := y(3) xor y(2);
    b(1) := y(7) xor y(6) xor y(4) xor y(1);
    b(0) := y(7) xor y(5);
    c(3) := y(7) xor y(6) xor y(4) xor y(3) xor y(0);
    c(2) := y(6) xor y(2);
    c(1) := y(7) xor y(5) xor y(2) xor y(1);
    c(0) := y(7) xor y(5) xor y(4) xor y(2) xor y(1);

```

Figure 17. VHDL Code Implementing the Transform Matrix

The inverse mapping equation in (35) is implemented using the the VHDL code in Figure 18.

Using the mapping blocks in Figures 14 and 15 as defined in VHDL in Figures 17 and 18, the complicated process of modular inversion in  $GF(2^4)^2$  must be implemented. Modular inversion is accomplished using VHDL circuits for each block shown in Rijmen’s schematic as illustrated in Figure 16.

```

variable y: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable b: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable c: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
    y(7) := b(1) xor b(0) xor c(2) xor c(0);
    y(6) := b(3) xor c(2) xor c(1);
    y(5) := b(1) xor c(2) xor c(0);
    y(4) := c(1) xor c(0);
    y(3) := b(3) xor b(2) xor c(1);
    y(2) := b(3) xor c(1);
    y(1) := b(3) xor b(0);
    y(0) := b(2) xor b(1) xor b(0) xor c(3) xor c(1);

```

Figure 18. VHDL Code Implementing the Inverse Transform Matrix

Figure 16 shows four primary operations: addition, multiplication, squaring, and inversion. All of these operations are performed in the subfield  $GF(2^4)$ . Since the subfield still has a characteristic of 2, addition will remain the same (addition modulo 2). The remaining operations require a new reducing polynomial to account for the shift in finite fields. Rijmen does not specify a reducing polynomial for the subfield, nor does he specify the values of the constants A and B in (31). The reducing polynomial for the subfield is denoted as  $q(x)$  and the reducing polynomial for the extended field is  $p(x)$  [Odr01]. Choosing the suitable value for the subfield reducing polynomial was investigated extensively by O’Driscoll. Through a method which computes all possible cyclotomic cosets over 2 of degree 4 in  $GF(2^8)$  he concluded that there were only three choices for a reducing polynomial in the subfield  $GF(2^4)$  [Odr01]. Further, he calculates the number of XOR and AND operations required by multiplication in the subfield using each of the three possible polynomials and determined the most efficient choice for the reducing polynomial  $q(x)$  is

$$q(x) = x^4 + x + 1. \quad (36)$$

Now that the subfield reducing polynomial has been established, the extended field irreducible,  $p(x)$ , of the form  $x^2 + Ax + B$  can be determined. However,  $p(x)$  is specified only when values for the constants A and B have been chosen. These constants represent polynomials in the subfield  $GF(2^4)$ . An exhaustive search of the 120 possible  $p(x)$  polynomials determined that the least number of XOR and AND operations to perform multiplication is

$$p(x) = x^2 + x + \beta^{14} \quad (37)$$

where  $\beta^{14}$  is an element of the subfield and is defined by the polynomial  $x^4 + 1$  [Odr01]. This constant polynomial's corresponding bit string is {1001}. Therefore the value chosen for the constant A in (31) is 1 and the bit string representing the constant B is {1001}[Odr01].

Given  $p(x)$  and  $q(x)$ , Figure 16 can be implemented in hardware. The multiplication operation in the subfield, designated by the  $\otimes$  operator, can be implemented using (36) to perform a multiplication operation of the form  $c = (a \cdot b) \bmod q(x)$  where  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$  are polynomials. Paar uses this technique to create a so-called Z matrix [PaR97]. Multiplication in a subfield using the Z matrix method takes two polynomials in  $GF(2^4)$  and applies the Z matrix to either input (the result of the multiplication is the same when the Z matrix is applied to either). This multiplication in matrix form is

$$\begin{bmatrix} c_3 \\ c_2 \\ c_1 \\ c_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} a_3 & a_0 & a_1 & a_2 \\ a_2 & a_3 + a_0 & a_1 + a_0 & a_2 + a_1 \\ a_1 & a_2 & a_3 + a_0 & a_1 + a_0 \\ a_0 & a_1 & a_2 & a_3 + a_0 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} b_3 \\ b_2 \\ b_1 \\ b_0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (38)$$

where  $c = (a \cdot b) \bmod q(x)$  [PaR97]. Paar's  $Z$  matrix uses a "little-endian" ordering, therefore the entire matrix is recalculated to match the "big-endian" convention used in this research. Since the elements of the matrix in (38) are not constant, the implementation in hardware is not solely XOR operations but must include ANDs as well. Multiplying the vector through the matrix in (38) yields the following equations for each element of the  $c$  vector

$$\begin{aligned}
 c_3 &= b_3 a_3 \oplus b_2 a_0 \oplus b_1 a_1 \oplus b_0 a_2, \\
 c_2 &= b_3 a_2 \oplus b_2 (a_3 \oplus a_0) \oplus b_1 (a_1 \oplus a_0) \oplus b_0 (a_2 \oplus a_1), \\
 c_1 &= b_3 a_1 \oplus b_2 a_2 \oplus b_1 (a_3 \oplus a_0) \oplus b_0 (a_1 \oplus a_0), \\
 c_0 &= b_3 a_0 \oplus b_2 a_1 \oplus b_1 a_2 \oplus b_0 (a_3 \oplus a_0)
 \end{aligned} \tag{39}$$

which can be reduced to combinational logic consisting of 2-input AND and XOR gates.

Equation (39) contains redundant logic in the  $(a_3 \oplus a_0)$ ,  $(a_1 \oplus a_0)$ , and  $(a_2 \oplus a_1)$  terms.

These can be evaluated once and reused. The VHDL implementations of these are designated  $q$ ,  $r$ , and  $s$ . The VHDL code in Figure 19 implements multiplication in the subfield  $\text{GF}(2^4)$ .

```

variable a: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable b: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable c: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable q: std_logic;
variable r: std_logic;
variable s: std_logic;

q := a(3) xor a(0);
r := a(1) xor a(0);
s := a(2) xor a(1);

c(3) := (b(3) and a(3)) xor (b(2) and a(0)) xor (b(1) and a(1)) xor (b(0) and a(2));
c(2) := (b(3) and a(2)) xor (b(2) and q) xor (b(1) and r) xor (b(0) and s);
c(1) := (b(3) and a(1)) xor (b(2) and a(2)) xor (b(1) and q) xor (b(0) and r);
c(0) := (b(3) and a(0)) xor (b(2) and a(1)) xor (b(1) and a(2)) xor (b(0) and q);

```

Figure 19. VHDL Implementation of Multiplication in  $\text{GF}(2^4)$

The remaining operations in the subfield are squaring and inversion. Squaring in the subfield could be implemented using the same polynomial as both inputs in the

multiplication function shown above. However, O’Driscoll develops a much more computationally efficient method of squaring a polynomial in the subfield. O’Driscoll found a constant binary matrix that will, when multiplied with a polynomial’s bit string, produce the square of that polynomial in the subfield. This operation is

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_3 \\ b_2 \\ b_1 \\ b_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} a_3 \\ a_2 \\ a_1 \\ a_0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (40)$$

where  $b = a^2$  [Odr01]. Multiplying the  $a$  vector with the constant bit matrix yields the following set of equations for the elements of  $b$

$$\begin{aligned} b_3 &= a_3 \oplus a_1, \\ b_2 &= a_1, \\ b_1 &= a_2 \oplus a_0, \\ b_0 &= a_0. \end{aligned} \quad (41)$$

Thus, squaring a polynomial in the subfield can be implemented using only two XOR gates. The VHDL code implementing squaring in a subfield is in Figure 20.

```
variable b: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable a: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);

b(3) := a(3) xor a(1);
b(2) := a(1);
b(1) := a(2) xor a(0);
b(0) := a(0);
```

Figure 20. VHDL Implementation of Squaring in  $GF(2^4)$

The final operation in the schematic in Figure 16 is modular inversion. The Extended Euclidean algorithm method for modular inversion used to generate the table of

inverses in  $GF(2^8)$  in Appendix A is the same process as that of determining a table of inverses in  $GF(2^4)$ , but uses  $q(x)$  as the reducing polynomial. If

$$a(x) \times b(x) = 1 \pmod{q(x)} \quad (42)$$

holds, then  $a(x)$  is the inverse of  $b(x)$  in  $GF(2^4)$  and vice versa. The extended Euclidean Algorithm is used to find polynomials that satisfy (42). The subsequent polynomials and their inverses are recorded in an 8 byte look up table that can be found in Table 23 in Appendix A.

With all blocks of the schematic in Figure 16 implemented a VHDL circuit that performs the operation of SubBytes in a composite field can be realized. The design flows of Figures 14 and 15 summarize the circuit. The complete VHDL code for the implementation of SubBytes and inverse SubBytes in a composite field is in Appendix B.

### **3.9.2 MixColumns**

#### **3.9.2.1 Half LUT**

Chapter II outlines the baseline MixColumns design Daemen and Rijmen specified for an 8-bit platform. The design described below for the MixColumns transformation uses a 256 byte look up table containing the values of the xtime operation. Xtime takes an 8-bit polynomial and produces the product multiplied by 02 in the Rijndael field using  $l(x)$  as the reducing polynomial. This table has a property which can be exploited to halve the amount of memory required to perform MixColumns. The xtime table's purpose was to avoid performing complex polynomial multiplication modulo the



reducing polynomial  $l(x)$ . Consider, however, an important property of modular arithmetic

$$x \text{ modulo } y = x, 0 < x < y. \quad (43)$$

This means when every element of  $GF(2^8)$  is multiplied by 02, half of the elements would create a product less than the modulus and (43) could be applied. Careful examination of the xtime table shows that half of the table consists of simple multiplication by 02 with no modulus operation as indicated by the highlighted portion of Table 10.

Table 10. Xtime Table: Elements Not Requiring Modulus Reduction Highlighted

		y															
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
x	0	00	02	04	06	08	0A	0C	0E	10	12	14	16	18	1A	1C	1E
	1	02	22	24	26	28	2A	2C	2E	30	32	34	36	38	3A	3C	3E
	2	40	42	44	46	48	4A	4C	4E	50	52	54	56	58	5A	5C	5E
	3	60	62	64	66	68	6A	6C	6E	70	72	74	76	78	7A	7C	7E
	4	80	82	84	86	88	8A	8C	8E	90	92	94	96	98	9A	9C	9E
	5	AO	A2	A4	A6	A8	AA	AC	AE	BO	B2	B4	B6	B8	BA	BC	BE
	6	00	C2	C4	C6	C8	CA	CC	CE	DD	D2	D4	D6	D8	DA	DC	DE
	7	E0	E2	E4	E6	E8	EA	EC	EE	FO	F2	F4	F6	F8	FA	FC	FE
	8	1B	19	1F	1D	13	11	17	15	0B	09	0F	0D	03	01	07	05
	9	3B	39	3F	3D	33	31	37	35	2B	29	2F	2D	23	21	27	25
	A	5B	59	5F	5D	53	51	57	55	4B	49	4F	4D	43	41	47	45
	B	7B	79	7F	7D	73	71	77	75	6B	69	6F	6D	63	61	67	65
	C	9B	99	9F	9D	93	91	97	95	8B	89	8F	8D	83	81	87	85
	D	BB	B9	BF	BD	B3	B1	B7	B5	AB	A9	AF	AD	A3	A1	A7	A5
	E	DB	D9	DF	DD	D3	D1	D7	D5	CB	C9	CF	CD	C3	C1	C7	C5
	F	FB	F9	FF	FD	F3	F1	F7	F5	EB	E9	EF	ED	E3	E1	E7	E5

Another important property of multiplication by 02 in the Rijndael field is its equivalence to multiplying a polynomial by  $x$ . This is because the hexadecimal number 02 is equal to the bit string {00000010} which represents the polynomial  $x$ . Any polynomial multiplied by  $x$  will result in increasing the power of each indeterminate by one. The corresponding bit string of the product of any polynomial multiplied by  $x$  would be the original bit string shifted left by one. Example 7 illustrates this property.

**Example 7.** Evaluate the following expression:

$$(x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1) \cdot x$$

## Solution

Polynomial Representation	Bit String Representation
$(x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1) \cdot x$	01010111 • 00000010
$= x^7 + x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x$	= <b>10101110</b>
	= <b>Bitwise shift to the left!</b>

A bitwise shift to the left is implemented in VHDL below in Figure 21 and simply changing the wiring utilizes no hardware resources.

```
variable input: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable output: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);

if input < X"80" then
    output := (input(6 downto 0) & '0');
end if
```

Figure 21. VHDL Implementation of the Highlighted Portion of Table 10

The above VHDL circuit effectively implements all highlighted elements of Table 10, thereby eliminating the need to store these values in memory. This results in a 128 byte decrease in memory at absolutely no cost (assuming the HDL synthesizer chooses not to register the 8 bit value of output). The complete VHDL circuit for this MixColumns labeled “Half LUT” can be found in Appendix B.

### 3.9.2.2 Arithmetic

The final design is due to Satyanarayana following an algorithm created by Trenholme [Sat04][Wik06a]. Satyanarayana’s implementation is open source VHDL code. This design implements MixColumns using no look up tables by implementing the xtime function in combinational logic rather than through a LUT. Recall that xtime

multiplies an 8-bit polynomial by 02 in the Rijndael field. Thus, a way to multiply two polynomials in the Rijndael finite field using only combinational logic is needed and Trenholme's algorithm provides a method for implementing exactly that. Trenholme's algorithm for multiplying two polynomials in the Rijndael finite field is concisely described and has the following steps [Wik06a]

- Take two eight-bit numbers, **a** and **b**, and an eight-bit product **p**.
- Set the product to zero.
- Make a copy of **a** and **b**, which will be called **a** and **b** for the rest of this algorithm
- Run the following loop eight times:

1. If the low bit of **b** is set, XOR the product **p** by the value of **a**

2. Keep track of whether the high (leftmost) bit of **a** is set to one

3. Rotate **a** one bit to the left, discarding the high bit, and making the low bit have a value of zero

4. If **a**'s high bit had a value of one prior to this rotation, XOR **a** with the hexadecimal number 0x1b (27 in decimal). 0x1b corresponds to the irreducible polynomial  $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$ .

5. Rotate **b** one bit to the right, discarding the low bit, and making the high (leftmost) bit have a value of zero.

- The product **p** now has the product of **a** and **b**

Trenholme's algorithm is designed for two 8-bit numbers to be multiplied in the Rijndael field, which means the algorithm's loop must be run eight times. If one of the input polynomials were to be held at a constant level of 02 then the loop would only have

to be run once and steps 1 and 5 of the loop (highlighted above) could be eliminated. The VHDL code in Figure 22 was written by Satyanarayana and effectively implements the `xtime` function in combinational logic.

```
-- Copyright (C) 2004 Author (Satyanarayana)
variable input: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable output: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);

    if(p(0)(7) = '1') then
        m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
    else
        m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0');
    end if;
```

Figure 22. VHDL Implementation of `xtime` in Combinational Logic

This `xtime` process was created to take advantage of the fact that all elements of the Rijndael finite field can be written as a sum of powers of 02 since the characteristic of the Rijndael finite field is 2 (cf., Example 6, Chapter II). The VHDL function in Figure 23 by Satyanarayana, with comments added, implements the column transform routine on an input array `p` consisting of four 8-bit elements (i.e., a column of the 4x4 state matrix).

The procedure in Figure 23 is extended for the inverse MixColumns transform (cf., Chapter II). The complete VHDL code for the MixColumns Arithmetic design can be found in Appendix B.

```
-- Copyright (C) 2004 Author (Satyanarayana)
function col_transform(p: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector is
variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable m,n: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin

--Multiply by 02 in Rijndael field
    if(p(0)(7) = '1') then
        m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
    else
        m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0');
    end if;

--Multiply by 03 by performing xtime and then XORing with p(1)
```

```

if(p(1)(7) = '1') then
  n := (p(1)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011" xor p(1);
else
  n := (p(1)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor p(1);
end if;

--Bytes p(2) and p(3) require no processing since they are multiplied
-- by 01 as specified in Chapter II equation (18)
result := m xor n xor p(2) xor p(3);
return result;
end function col_transform;

```

Figure 23. VHDL Implementation of the Column Transform Routine

### 3.10 Evaluation Technique

The NIST Algorithm Validation Suite is the result of the findings of an analytical evaluation of AES by NIST. The evaluation of a candidate implementation is verified using the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite's Known Answer Test. AES is a substitution cipher; so, if the same block of data is run through the algorithm multiple times with the same key, the output ciphertext will be exactly the same each time. The Known Answer Test takes advantage of this and provides an easy method of determining the functionality of a particular AES implementation. This method uses look up tables containing known answer values given an input key and plaintext (i.e., validation against analytic analysis).

The experiment testing environment consists of an HDL module which contains the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite. This module provides the workload and key entry for the data encryption system. The internal signals of the data encryption system is monitored using the Xilinx software package ChipScope. A separate HDL module implements the actual data encryption system which is monitored via ChipScope. Most of the testing environment is localized to the FPGA chip. The FPGA sends the input/output data to two separate pins on the Xilinx board such that they can be viewed on a computer

running the ChipScope software. ChipScope verifies the maximum clock frequency dictated by the critical path found by the HDL synthesizer using an iterative process by which the frequency of the system clock is increased by 0.01 MHz until the output of the data encryption system does not pass the known answer test as defined by the validation suite. Area Occupied is measured by the Xilinx XST HDL synthesis software. After the software finishes synthesizing the VHDL code and routes all logic blocks, the total number of gates (including memory) required to implement the design is given in the synthesis report. Figure 24 is a block diagram outlining the testing environment.

### **3.11 Experimental Design**

There are three factors in each experiment (SubBytes design, MixColumns Design, and Synthesis goal). The two transformation factors (SubBytes and MixColumns design) each have three different levels (cf., Table 9). The Synthesis goal factor has two levels (area and speed). The total number of factors and their levels require  $3^2 \cdot 2^1$  or 18 different experiments for each algorithm in order to account for every possible combination of factors and levels. After each experiment is run, values for all three metrics are recorded. For example, the first experiment implements the baseline AES design on the FPGA and runs the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite. Values for all metrics (throughput, area efficiency, area occupied) are recorded after the suite has been completed. Each subsequent experiment is a permutation of experimental factor levels. The expected variance of the data is minimal, meaning it is assumed that the performance of the system given the same design, workload, and HDL compilation will have similar results. Data is analyzed using ANOVA and other statistical tests as appropriate.




Figure 24. Block Diagram of Testing Environment

### 3.12 Methodology Summary

This research has two primary goals; to optimize the AES algorithm's performance based on the chosen metrics and to answer the following questions: How does each factor of optimization interact and affect the overall values of each optimization metric, and how does each SubBytes and MixColumns design affect performance with respect to the full factorial design? The metrics are throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied. These questions are investigated by controlling the level of the following three factors: SubBytes design, MixColumns design, and Synthesis Goal. The approach used to satisfy the two goals of the research uses a variety of SubBytes and MixColumns designs to analyze the performance based on the three metrics with respect to the baseline AES design for an 8-bit processor.

The system under test is called the data encryption system and consists of HDL modules, the AES algorithm, and an FPGA board. A functional implementation of this system provides a properly encrypted data stream of a defined workload, which in this experiment is the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite. This system is evaluated by performing multiple experiments on multiple system designs and measuring values for the performance metrics. These measurements are validated by comparing them to the findings of the analysis provided by the validation suite.



## **IV. Analysis and Results**

### **4.1 Chapter Overview**

This chapter presents and interprets the data collected from executing the experiment outlined in Chapter III. The goal of this chapter is to answer the investigative research questions posed in Chapter III: (1) how do experimental factors interact and affect the overall performance metrics, and (2) how does each SubBytes and MixColumns design affect performance? A tabular summary and graphs are used to give a quick overview of the raw data. The data is then examined through an analysis of means. Finally the percentage of variation explained by each factor and their interactions is determined through an analysis of variance (ANOVA). This analysis allows the effects to be sorted and the most important effects and interactions identified.

### **4.2 Results of Experimental Scenarios and Literature Comparison**

Total equivalent gate count and maximum clock frequency data from all experimental scenarios are summarized in Table 11. This data is represented graphically in Figures 25, 26 and 27. The theoretical maximum clock frequency matched the measured clock frequency to 1 kHz. Using this data, throughput, area occupied, and subsequently area efficiency are calculated. The number of clock cycles required to encrypt a block of data for all designs is 12. The highlighted values are the maximum (minimum) values obtained by this research. Table 11 reflects only one replication of each experiment. Pilot studies using two different methods were used to generate multiple replications of the experiment and neither method resulted in any significant

variance in the data. The first method cleared the FPGA and then reprogrammed it using the already synthesized design and recorded values for the metrics. It was expected that data for the exact same design re-implemented on the FPGA (using the same workload) had little variation. The second method for generating replications re-synthesized the VHDL circuit and programmed the FPGA using the re-synthesized design. The size of the .BIT files of the re-synthesized designs vary by no more than  $\pm 87$  bits compared to the original. So, there was some difference but no variation in the data resulted. This was expected because the synthesizer is creating a design based on the same VHDL definition. The reason the .BIT files are different is due to the synthesizer, but did not affect the circuit produced.

Table 11. Summary of Experimental Data

SUBBYTES	MIXCOLUMNS	SPEED			
		Max Freq (MHz)	Eq Gate Ct	Throughput (kbps)	Area Efficiency
Full LUT	Full LUT	53.714	156616.000	572949.333	3.658
Full LUT	Half LUT	82.747	113742.000	882634.667	7.760
Full LUT	Arithmetic	87.524	109456.000	933589.333	8.529
Extended Field Inversion	Full LUT	56.459	121384.000	602229.333	4.961
Extended Field Inversion	Half LUT	82.912	51500.000	884394.667	17.173
Extended Field Inversion	Arithmetic	81.880	50289.000	873386.667	17.367
Composite Field Inversion	Full LUT	52.151	108382.000	556277.333	5.133
Composite Field Inversion	Half LUT	70.057	33916.000	747274.667	22.033
Composite Field Inversion	Arithmetic	69.955	33973.000	746186.667	21.964
SUBBYTES	MIXCOLUMNS	AREA			
		Max Freq (MHz)	Eq Gate Ct	Throughput (bps)	Area Efficiency
Full LUT	Full LUT	36.688	154176.000	391338.667	2.538
Full LUT	Half LUT	52.260	89799.000	557440.000	6.208
Full LUT	Arithmetic	48.483	90516.000	517152.000	5.713
Extended Field Inversion	Full LUT	49.584	106617.000	528896.000	4.961
Extended Field Inversion	Half LUT	69.737	43722.000	743861.333	17.013
Extended Field Inversion	Arithmetic	64.748	44850.000	690645.333	15.399
Composite Field Inversion	Full LUT	36.945	91353.000	394080.000	4.314
Composite Field Inversion	Half LUT	47.039	29049.000	501749.333	17.273
Composite Field Inversion	Arithmetic	44.593	29628.000	475658.667	16.054

The smallest area occupied uses 29,049 total equivalent gates using the Composite Field Inversion SubBytes design, Half LUT MixColumns design, and a Synthesis Goal of area. Since the Composite Field Inversion design for SubBytes is the design that uses the least amount of memory, the fact that the overall AES design achieves the smallest area occupied is expected. The Half LUT MixColumns design uses 128 bytes of memory, whereas the Arithmetic design uses no look-up table. The reason the Half LUT MixColumns design results in the AES design achieving the lowest total area occupied is because the sheer amount of combinational logic required to perform the complex finite field arithmetic for the MixColumns transform. The logic required for the combinational logic design outweighs the memory required for the Half LUT design. It is also expected that the smallest design would be achieved by synthesizing for area. The smallest area found in current research occupies an estimated 41,184 total equivalent gates [GoB05]. Thus, the design developed in this research occupies 29.5% less space.

The largest area efficiency (including memory) achieved by this research is 22.033 for the Composite Field Inversion SubBytes design, Half LUT MixColumns design, and Synthesis Goal of speed. Since the area efficiency metric is obtained by dividing throughput by area, a sound strategy is to keep the area occupied figure low. It is no surprise that the SubBytes and MixColumns designs used to generate the lowest total area occupied for the overall AES algorithm (Composite Field Inversion and Half LUT) are responsible for achieving the lowest area efficiency. The only difference in the factor levels used to produce the lowest total area and the highest area efficiency is that the HDL synthesizer's goal for high area efficiency is speed rather than area. This is a vast

improvement over the 2.30 obtained by Chodowiec & Gaj. These results are estimates because the total area occupied as reported in current research is specified in CLBs or slices. Converting CLBs or slices to total equivalent gate count used the conversion factor described in Chapter II (22). This transformation is based on logic capabilities published by the manufacturer of the device and does not account for the specific design or implementation considerations such as routing. Furthermore, this estimate also assumes that all slices or CLBs are completely occupied by relevant logic, which may or may not be the case for some designs.




Figure 25. Individual Values Plot for Throughput

The maximum throughput achieved is about 934 Mbps for the Full LUT SubBytes design, Arithmetic MixColumns design, and Speed Synthesis Goal. The Full LUT SubBytes design results in highest throughput since in the Full LUT design the entire SubBytes transform is reduced to a single table look-up. Arithmetic MixColumns design

is faster than the LUT table MixColumns design is because the LUT design, unlike the SubBytes Full LUT design, requires combinational logic as well as a table look-up. The gate delay involved with performing the MixColumns transformation entirely through combinational logic (i.e., Arithmetic design) is not as large as the latency required to access memory for a table look-up on top of a combinational logic delay (i.e., LUT design).




Figure 26. Individual Values Plot for Area Occupied

Although the maximum throughput achieved by this research is not close to the maximum throughput obtained by Good of 23.5 Gbps, the objective of this research was to maximize area efficiency, not speed. Thus, this research used methods that reduced the memory required to complete the transformations. This limits design goals solely to the correct operation of AES and not to the hardware responsible for implementing it. For example, pipelining was not used even though the fastest current implementation is

pipelined because pipelining has no impact on the correct functioning of AES. Another powerful method for increasing throughput at the hardware level is loop unrolling. Loop unrolling was not implemented for the same reason.




Figure 27. Individual Values Plot for Area Efficiency

The individual values plots shown in Figures 25, 26 and 27 show the highest and lowest values obtained for each metric. Figure 25 shows that the design with the slowest throughput is the baseline AES design for an 8-bit processor (Full LUT designs for both SubBytes and MixColumns) synthesized for area. Since the HDL synthesizer has a goal of area, it does not route the design to reduce the latency required for a table look-up. The baseline AES design uses table look-ups as its primary means of operation, and this coupled with the high latency attributed to LUT designs synthesized for area explains the slow throughput value for this particular design.

Figure 26 shows the largest (highest area occupied) overall AES design is the baseline AES design for an 8-bit platform synthesized for speed. One of the goals of this research is to improve the performance of the baseline AES design. This goal was achieved by reducing the design's dependence on look-up tables and memory. The design's large area can be attributed to its three 256 byte look-up tables coupled with synthesizing for speed.

### **4.3 Analysis of the Data**

The individual values plots shown in Figures 25, 26 and 27 illustrate the performance of individual AES designs, but they do not reveal how individual experimental factors and their associated levels affect the performance metrics. Through the analysis of the baseline experimental design outlined in Chapter III it is possible to associate individual factor levels and assess their impact on performance. A visual analysis of the data is accomplished using main effects plots. This provides insight into the first research goal that is to determine how each factor level affects the performance of the design as a whole. It does not, however, address the second goal, which is to quantify the interactions of the factors and explain how these interactions affect the system as a whole. An analysis of an ANOVA table will aid in quantifying the main effects of each factor and, more importantly, their interactions. The interactions are quantified as percentages of variation explained by each factor. The final product of this analysis is an enumeration the significance of each factor and interaction.

### 4.3.1 Visual Analysis of Means

The first step in evaluating the data is to visually determine how each factor level impacts the performance of the system using the chosen metrics. The first factor to be analyzed is SubBytes design. The main effects plot in Figure 28 shows the Full LUT design drastically increases the total area occupied. The graph in Figure 28 shows the mean of the gate count attributed to the Extended Field Inversion design is roughly half of the gates required to implement the Full LUT design. This makes intuitive sense because Extended Field Inversion is intended to halve the amount of memory required by the Full LUT design by reducing the required amount of look-up tables from two 256 byte LUTs to one 256 byte LUT.




Figure 28. Main Effects Plot for SubBytes on Area Occupied



Figure 29 indicates that the Composite Field Inversion design has the lowest mean throughput of the three designs tested. This is because of the complexity of the combinational logic required to implement the entire SubBytes transform using a single 64 bit LUT. What is surprising is that the mean throughput of Extended Field Inversion is higher than simply using the Full LUT design. This is linked to the percentage of variation explained by each design. This will become clearer once the ANOVA results are presented. Figure 29 also shows that the Extended Field Inversion design, which blends combinational logic and one 256 byte LUT, has a higher mean throughput than the designs at either end of the combinational logic / LUT spectrum.




Figure 29. Main Effects Plot for SubBytes on Throughput

The mean area efficiency of the Full LUT design for SubBytes is by far the lowest shown in Figure 30. Thus, the additional throughput value of a Full LUT SubBytes

design does not come close to justifying its large memory consumption (512 bytes). The SubBytes design which makes the best use of the area it occupies is Composite Field Inversion. This design boasts such a small total equivalent gate count that its subsequent reduction in throughput does not significantly impact its efficiency. It must also be noted that the area efficiency of the Extended Field Inversion design is similar to Composite Field Inversion, yet Extended Field Inversion achieves the highest throughput of the three designs tested.




Figure 30. Main Effects Plot for SubBytes on Area Efficiency

The additional computational complexity of the Arithmetic MixColumns design is what makes the design's area occupied almost equivalent to that of the Half LUT design, as shown in Figure 31. Figure 31 also shows the Half LUT design, which was to halve the amount of memory required by the full factorial design, does indeed do so. What is

interesting is that, on average, the Half LUT and the Arithmetic designs require about the same amount of equivalent gates even though the Arithmetic design uses only combinational logic while the Half LUT design uses one 128 byte LUT as well as combinational logic. This is because the hardware required to implement the LUT entirely in combinational logic, as is the intention of the Arithmetic design, approaches the resources required to simply use the table look-up.




Figure 31. Main Effects Plot for MixColumns on Area Occupied

The results obtained in Figure 32 for the MixColumns design's impact on throughput are similar to those observed for SubBytes' effect on throughput in Figure 29. The average throughput for the MixColumns LUT design is the lowest of the three, while the Half LUT design obtained the highest throughput with the Arithmetic design achieving a throughput comparable to the Half LUT design. Just as with the SubBytes

designs, the designs tested for MixColumns encompass the entire spectrum of design options ranging from a full LUT design to an entirely combinational logic design.




Figure 32. Main Effects Plot for MixColumns on Throughput

Memory latency again proves to be a weakness of the LUT design. The Half LUT design requires a table look-up on half of the values operated on. This halves the amount of memory latency associated with table look-ups and thus increases the overall average throughput of the design. The throughput obtained by the Arithmetic design is comparable to the Half LUT because the combinational logic delay associated with the complex mathematical operations the Arithmetic design must execute is similar to the memory latency associated with a table look-up on half of the values operated on.

The average effects of MixColumns design on area efficiency are summarized in Figure 33. This figure shows how inefficient the full factorial MixColumns LUT design

is compared to the other two options. The average area efficiency performance of both the Arithmetic and Half LUT designs are above 14, whereas the baseline design specified by Daemen and Rijmen for an 8-bit processor is below one third of that. The full factorial LUT design for MixColumns occupies the most area and achieves the slowest throughput, and therefore it has an extremely low average area efficiency.




Figure 33. Main Effects Plot for MixColumns on Area Efficiency

The best average area efficiency is obtained through the Half LUT design. This design is successful because it allows half of the full factorial LUT to be reduced to a simple bitwise shift. This shift is accomplished through the changes in wiring and halves the memory required from the full factorial design at the cost of a mere 8-bit register.

The main effects plot in Figure 34 illustrates the positive impact synthesizing a VHDL design for speed has on throughput. This is expected. It is assumed that

synthesizing for speed comes at a cost, namely an increase in area. This raises an interesting question as to whether the increase in throughput as a result of synthesizing for speed justifies an increase in area.




Figure 34. Main Effects Plot for Synthesis Goal on Throughput

Figure 35 shows that synthesizing for speed does, in fact, increase the average area occupied by a design, thus proving the above supposition. But the answer to the question as to whether the increase in throughput as a result of synthesis for speed is worth the cost of an increase in average area occupied is given in Figure 36. Figure 36 shows that synthesis for speed increases the average area efficiency, which means that the synthesis goal of speed will, on average, increase a design's ability to efficiently use its available hardware resources. Thus, the increase in throughput resulting from synthesis for speed justifies the cost of a subsequent increase in area occupied.




Figure 35. Main Effects Plot for Synthesis Goal on Area Occupied




Figure 36. Main Effects Plot for Synthesis Goal on Area Efficiency

#### 4.4 Performance Analysis through ANOVA

The analysis of the data in Table 11 through visual analysis of means, as presented above, indicates how each factor individually affects the average performance of the entire AES system, but it does not reveal how the factors interact to affect the performance metrics. Through an ANOVA it is possible to determine which factor is responsible for the most variance in each performance metric and consequently which factor level is most suitable when optimizing AES for a particular performance metric.

##### 4.4.1 ANOVA for Throughput

The data in Table 11 is analyzed by MINITAB's Analyze Factorial Design feature for a three factor General Factorial Design. MINITAB's output for the Balanced ANOVA for throughput is reproduced in Table 12.

Table 12. Analysis of Variance Table for Throughput

Source	DF	Seq SS	Adj SS	Adj MS
SubBytes Design	2	67861330654	67861330654	33930665327
MixColumns Design	2	1.68976E+11	1.68976E+11	84487864855
Synthesis Goal	1	2.21800E+11	2.21800E+11	2.21800E+11
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design	4	8597865719	8597865719	2149466430
SubBytes Design*Synthesis Goal	2	23149318959	23149318959	11574659480
MixColumns Design*Synthesis Goal	2	17579150621	17579150621	8789575310
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design* Synthesis Goal	4	2696989634	2696989634	674247408
Error	0	*	*	*
Total	17	5.10661E+11		

Table 12 displays the Sum of Squares values, the Adjusted Sum of Squares, and the Mean Square Values. Most notably the values of Error for all three columns is zero since the experiment has only one replication, therefore no error can be calculated. The output of MINITAB's Factorial Design Analysis also includes a quantification of the main effects as shown in Table 13. Note the difference in terminology, what this research calls an effect, MINITAB calls a coefficient (Coef).



The quantification of the effects, as shown in Table 13 are raw values, the magnitudes of which can be used to determine which factors have the most overall impact on throughput. An easier method of determining the impact of factors on throughput is through a simple calculation using the ANOVA Table in Table 12. This method divides the each Sum of Squares (SS) value in Table 12 by the total SS value, thus providing a percent of variation explained by each factor and interaction. The results of this are summarized in Table 14.

Table 13. Quantification of Effects for Throughput

Term	Coef	SE	T	P
Constant	644430		*	*
SubBytes Des				
Composite Field Inversion	-74225.8		*	*
Extended Field Inversion	76138.7		*	*
MixColumns D				
Arithmetic	61672.9		*	*
Half LUT	75128.9		*	*
Synthesis Go				
Area	-111006		*	*
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D				
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic	-20954.7		*	*
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT	-20821.3		*	*
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic	-225.778		*	*
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT	18430.2		*	*
SubBytes Des*Synthesis Go				
Composite Field Inversion Area	-2036.15		*	*
Extended Field Inversion Area	44904.3		*	*
MixColumns D*Synthesis Go				
Arithmetic Area	-33945.5		*	*
Half LUT Area	-7536.59		*	*
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D*Synthesis Go				
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic Area	11723.3		*	*
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT Area	-2184.30		*	*
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic Area	8676.15		*	*
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT Area	3371.26		*	*

Table 14 shows that Synthesis Goal is responsible for 43.43% of the variance in throughput data. This indicates that the factor that influences throughput the most is Synthesis Goal. The next most important factor is MixColumns design, which is responsible for 33.09% of throughput variation. Table 14 concludes that the interaction of

factors does not account for as much percentage of variance for throughput as the individual factors themselves, for the highest interaction percentage is 4.53% (interaction of SubBytes Design and Synthesis Goal) and the lowest individual factor percentage is 13.29% (SubBytes Design).

Table 14. Percentage of Variance Explained for Throughput

	Sum of Squares	% Variance Explained
SubBytes Design	67861330654	13.29
MixColumns Design	1.68976E+11	33.09
Synthesis Goal	2.218E+11	43.43
SubBytes * MixColumns	8597865719	1.68
SubBytes * Synthesis Goal	23149318959	4.53
MixColumns * Synthesis Goal	17579150621	3.44
SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal	2696989634	0.53
<b>Total</b>	5.10661E+11	

Table 15 ranks each factor and interaction in descending order of importance as defined by percentage of variation explained.

Table 15. Order of Importance for Throughput's Factors and Interactions

Importance	Factor
1	Synthesis Goal
2	MixColumns Design
3	SubBytes Design
4	SubBytes * Synthesis Goal
5	MixColumns * Synthesis Goal
6	SubBytes * MixColumns
7	SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal

#### 4.4.2 ANOVA for Area Occupied

Doing a similar analysis on area occupied yields Table 16. The MINITAB output for the balanced ANOVA for area occupied is reproduced in Table 25 in Appendix C and the quantification of the main effects table is summarized in Table 26 in Appendix C.

Table 16 summarizes the percentages of variance explained by each factor and interaction for area occupied.

Table 16. Percentage of Variance Explained for Area Occupied

	Sum of Squares	% Variance Explained
SubBytes Design	13700255055	44.86
MixColumns Design	15902640562	52.07
Synthesis Goal	550544684	1.80
SubBytes * MixColumns	150371320	0.49
SubBytes * Synthesis Goal	37100094	0.12
MixColumns * Synthesis Goal	5430919	0.02
SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal	196245452	0.64
<b>Total</b>	<b>30542588085</b>	

Table 16 shows that MixColumns Design is responsible for 52.07% of the variance in total equivalent gate count. This indicates that the factor which influences area occupied the most is MixColumns Design. The next most important factor is SubBytes Design and is responsible for 44.86% of total equivalent gate count variation. The full ordering of each factor and interaction is shown in Table 17. It is surprising that MixColumns Design is responsible for more variation in area occupied than SubBytes since alternative SubBytes designs eliminated the need for more memory than alternative MixColumns Designs.

The full factorial SubBytes design requires 512 bytes of memory while the least memory consuming SubBytes design requires 64 bits of memory, thus reducing the original design's memory usage by 508 bytes. The full factorial MixColumns requires 256 bytes of memory while the Arithmetic design requires no memory to execute, thus saving a total of 256 bytes of memory. The reason MixColumns still accounts for more variance in total equivalent gate count is because the combinational logic needed for

reducing the memory requirements of the baseline SubBytes design is much more complicated than reducing the full factorial MixColumns design. This large requirement for logic across all designs of SubBytes is why the variance in area for MixColumns due to this factor is so small. Table 16 reveals that the interaction of factors accounts for little variance in total equivalent gate count, for the highest interaction percentage is only 0.64 (interaction of SubBytes, MixColumns, and Synthesis Goal).

Table 17. Order of Importance for Area Occupied’s Factors and Interactions

<b>Importance</b>	<b>Factor</b>
1	MixColumns Design
2	SubBytes Design
3	Synthesis Goal
4	SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal
5	SubBytes * MixColumns
6	SubBytes * Synthesis Goal
7	MixColumns * Synthesis Goal

#### 4.4.3 ANOVA on Area Efficiency

Performing a similar analysis on area efficiency yields Table 18. The MINITAB output for the Balanced ANOVA for area occupied is reproduced in Table 27 in Appendix C and the quantification of the main effects table is summarized in Table 28 in Appendix C. Table 18 summarizes the percentages of variance explained by each factor and interaction for area efficiency.

The hypothesis that MixColumns will produce a large percentage of variation explained due to the large magnitudes of MixColumns effects is confirmed by Table 18. The percentage of variation explained by the factor MixColumns Design is 52.11% and is larger than any other factor or interaction. This makes intuitive sense because MixColumns Design is responsible for the most variation in area occupied and the second

most variation in throughput. Since area efficiency is related to both throughput and area occupied, it would make sense that MixColumns should be responsible for a large amount of variation in area efficiency.

Table 18. Percentage of Variance Explained for Area Efficiency

	Sum of Squares	% Variance Explained
SubBytes Design	257.976	32.82
MixColumns Design	409.585	52.11
Synthesis Goal	20.278	2.58
SubBytes * MixColumns	81.639	10.39
SubBytes * Synthesis Goal	7.496	0.95
MixColumns * Synthesis Goal	6.39	0.81
SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal	2.71	0.34
<b>Total</b>	<b>786.074</b>	

Table 18 shows the first instance of an interaction being more significant to variation than an individual factor. The interaction of SubBytes Design and MixColumns Design is responsible for 10.39% of variance in area efficiency which is much greater than the percentage explained by the individual factor of Synthesis Goal (2.58%). This can be attributed to the observations evident in Figures 34 and 35. That is, synthesizing for area decreases average throughput while synthesizing for speed increases average area. Since area efficiency relates both throughput and area occupied, these observations offset each other and results in a small percentage of variance attributed to Synthesis Goal. Therefore since individually, MixColumns Design and SubBytes Design share a large percentage of variation explained and the interaction of these two factors should have a large impact on variation for area efficiency as well. The ordering of importance for each factor and interaction is shown in Table 19.

Table 19. Order of Importance for Area Efficiency's Factors and Interactions

Importance	Factor
1	MixColumns Design
2	SubBytes Design
3	SubBytes * MixColumns
4	Sythesis Goal
5	SubBytes * Synthesis Goal
6	MixColumns * Synthesis Goal
7	SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal

#### 4.5 Summary

This chapter shows that the baseline SubBytes and MixColumns designs (i.e., Full LUT designs) always perform poorly in area efficiency and area occupied. The only design to produce a lower performance than the baseline Full LUT design for any metric is the SubBytes design Composite Field Inversion, which produced a lower throughput than the baseline design. Composite Field Inversion has the highest area efficiency of the three SubBytes design, thus justifying the reduction in throughput for more efficient area usage. MixColumns Design and Synthesis Goal are responsible for the largest variance in performance of the AES algorithm in terms of throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied.

## **V. Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **5.1 Chapter Overview**

This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the analysis of experimental data. This chapter also highlights the significance of this work and its impact on current research methods involving the implementation of AES on FPGAs, as well as provides recommendations for future research in this area.

### **5.2 Significance of Research**

The significance of this research is three-fold. This research establishes a method of comparing AES FPGA implementations across FPGAs independent of chip family or manufacturer by normalizing measures of area. This research also provides an in depth analysis of design considerations for AES implementations on 8-bit processing platforms. Finally, this research compares the performance of each AES transformation design implementation as a part of the AES system as a whole, rather than as its own separate entity.

The trend in current research for specific AES transformations (i.e., designs for SubBytes, MixColumns, KeyExpansion, AddRoundKey, or ShiftRows) is to implement a design independent of the AES algorithm and compare the result to some baseline transformation. This method, essentially, takes an incremental step in a process and treats the individual transformation as its own system. The problem with this approach is that it ignores the impact the new design may have on the algorithm as a whole. This research addresses this issue by assessing the impact of each new transformation as a part of the

overall AES system, which allows a more comprehensive perspective on how the new transformation affects the algorithm as a whole.

The state of current research to minimize area occupied is summed up best by Zambreno: “It is difficult to make direct comparisons between FPGA implementations of any algorithm since the specific hardware target is often different” [ZCN04]. This research addresses this concern by proposing a way to estimate the area occupied by an implementation independent of manufacturer or chip family using a conversion factor (cf., Chapter II (22) ). Area occupied is measured in terms of total equivalent gate count rather than CLBs or slices. Comparing gate count rather than CLB or slice count eliminates the specific hardware target’s architecture from consideration because the number of gates required to implement a design on any hardware platform is measured using the same units, whereas the number of CLB or slices required to implement a design is a function of the specific hardware target.

Research that has examined throughput, area, or efficiency of AES implementations often does so with no consideration to the usefulness of the design in practice, especially if they assume the availability of a 32-bit processor. Most implementations of AES requiring a small area also have a correspondingly small processing capability (e.g., smart card). This research realistically assumes an 8-bit processing capability. The importance of this constraint is so significant that the designers of AES incorporated into their specification of the algorithm a separate design intended to perform well on an 8-bit platform. This research succeeds in its goal of



increasing the performance of this constrained AES design based on the metrics of throughput, area occupied, and area efficiency.

### **5.3 Recommendations for Future Research**

Future AES transformation designs are possible. Some examples include a SubBytes design that uses no table look-ups, which can be accomplished by reducing the 64 bit LUT associated with Composite Field Inversion to combinational logic by reducing the composite field  $GF(2^4)^2$  to the field  $GF((2^2)^2)^2$ . Since this experiment concentrated on design considerations at the algorithmic level, future research could also carry out a similar performance analysis on designs targeting the hardware level using optimization techniques such as loop unrolling, pipelining, and speculation.

The process of mapping  $GF(2^8)$  to the composite field  $GF(2^4)^2$  could be expanded to research work being done in  $GF(2^{16})$ . Through further research, operations in  $GF(2^{16})$  could be reduced to the composite field  $GF(2^8)^2$ , which could be reduced again to the composite field  $GF((2^4)^2)^2$ .

### **5.4 Conclusions of Research**

This research has two primary goals, the first of which is to improve the performance of the baseline design of AES targeting an 8-bit platform based on the chosen metrics. The second goal of this research is to quantify how each factor interacts and affects the overall values of each metric and to identify which factors are responsible for the largest variance in performance of the AES algorithm measured in throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied.

The first goal is accomplished through the visual analysis of means plots shown in Chapter IV (cf., Figures 28-36). These plots show that the baseline SubBytes and MixColumns designs (i.e., Full LUT designs) are always the poorest performers in area efficiency and area occupied. The only design to produce a lower performance than the baseline Full LUT design for any metric is the SubBytes design Composite Field Inversion, which produced a lower throughput than the baseline design. Figure 30 shows Composite Field Inversion has the highest area efficiency of the three SubBytes design, thus justifying the reduction in throughput for more efficient area usage. Thus, the first goal of improving the performance of the baseline design of AES targeting an 8-bit platform is achieved.

The second research goal is to determine how each factor interacts and affects the overall values of each metric. This is accomplished through the identification of which factors are responsible for the largest variance in performance of the AES algorithm measured in throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied by quantifying the percentage of variance attributed to each factor. Table 15 identifies the factor most responsible for affecting throughput is Synthesis Goal. Tables 17 and 19 identify that the factor most responsible for variance in both area efficiency and area occupied is MixColumns design.

This research also contributes a method of estimating area as a measure of total equivalent gate count. This method allows a direct comparison to be made between two FPGA implementations independent of manufacturer or chip family. Thus, this research meets both research goals and answers both investigative questions posed through a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the data collected through experimentation.

## Appendix A: Data Tables

Table 20. Modular Inverses in the Rijndael Field [Odr01]

		y															
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
x	0	00	01	8D	F6	CB	52	7B	D1	E8	4F	29	C0	B0	E1	E5	C7
	1	74	B4	AA	4B	99	2B	60	5F	58	3F	FD	CC	FF	40	EE	B2
	2	3A	6E	5A	F1	55	4D	A8	C9	C1	0A	98	15	30	44	A2	C2
	3	2C	45	92	6C	F3	39	66	42	F2	35	20	6F	77	BB	59	19
	4	1D	FE	37	67	2D	31	F5	69	A7	64	AB	13	54	25	E9	09
	5	ED	5C	05	CA	4C	24	87	BF	18	3E	22	F0	51	EC	61	17
	6	16	5E	AF	D3	49	A6	36	43	F4	47	91	DF	33	93	21	3B
	7	79	B7	97	85	10	B5	BA	3C	B6	70	D0	06	A1	FA	81	82
	8	83	7E	7F	80	96	73	BE	56	9B	9E	95	D9	F7	02	B9	A4
	9	DE	6A	32	6D	D8	8A	84	72	2A	14	9F	88	F9	DC	89	9A
	A	FB	7C	2E	C3	8F	B8	65	48	26	C8	12	4A	CE	E7	D2	62
	B	0C	E0	1F	EF	11	75	78	71	A5	8E	76	3D	BD	BC	86	57
	C	0B	28	2F	A3	DA	D4	E4	0F	A9	27	53	04	1B	FC	AC	E6
	D	7A	07	AE	63	C5	DB	E2	EA	94	8B	C4	D5	9D	F8	90	6B
	E	B1	0D	D6	EB	C6	0E	CF	AD	08	4E	D7	E3	5D	50	1E	B3
	F	5B	23	38	34	68	46	03	8C	DD	9C	7D	A0	CD	1A	41	1C

Table 21. S-Box Look-Up Table [Odr01]

		y															
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
x	0	63	7C	77	7B	F2	6B	6F	C5	30	01	67	2B	FE	D7	AB	76
	1	CA	82	C9	7D	FA	59	47	F0	AD	D4	A2	AF	9C	A4	72	C0
	2	B7	FD	93	26	36	3F	F7	CC	34	A5	E5	F1	71	D8	31	15
	3	04	C7	23	C3	18	96	05	9A	07	12	80	E2	EB	27	B2	75
	4	09	83	2C	1A	1B	6E	5A	A0	52	3B	D6	B3	29	E3	2F	84
	5	53	D1	00	ED	20	FC	B1	5B	6A	CB	BE	39	4A	4C	58	CF
	6	D0	EF	AA	FB	43	4D	33	85	45	F9	02	7F	50	3C	9F	A8
	7	51	A3	40	8F	92	9D	38	F5	BC	B6	DA	21	10	FF	F3	D2
	8	CD	0C	13	EC	5F	97	44	17	C4	A7	7E	3D	64	5D	19	73
	9	60	81	4F	DC	22	2A	90	88	46	EE	B8	14	DE	5E	0B	DB
	A	E0	32	3A	0A	49	06	24	5C	C2	D3	AC	62	91	95	E4	79
	B	E7	C8	37	6D	8D	D5	4E	A9	6C	56	F4	EA	65	7A	AE	08
	C	BA	78	25	2E	1C	A6	B4	C6	E8	DD	74	1F	4B	BD	8B	8A
	D	70	3E	B5	66	48	03	F6	0E	61	35	57	B9	86	C1	1D	9E
	E	E1	F8	98	11	69	D9	8E	94	9B	1E	87	E9	CE	55	28	DF
	F	8C	A1	89	0D	BF	E6	42	68	41	99	2D	0F	B0	54	BB	16

Table 22. Inverse S-Box Look-Up Table [Odr01]

		y															
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
x	0	52	09	6A	D5	30	36	A5	38	BF	40	A3	9E	81	F3	D7	FB
	1	7C	E3	39	82	9B	2F	FF	87	34	8E	43	44	C4	DE	E9	CB
	2	54	7B	94	32	A6	C2	23	3D	EE	4C	95	0B	42	FA	C3	4E
	3	08	2E	A1	66	28	D9	24	B2	76	5B	A2	49	6D	8B	D1	25
	4	72	F8	F6	64	86	68	98	16	D4	A4	5C	CC	5D	65	B6	92
	5	6C	70	48	50	FD	ED	B9	DA	5E	15	46	57	A7	8D	9D	84
	6	90	D8	AB	00	8C	BC	D3	0A	F7	E4	58	05	B8	B3	45	06
	7	D0	2C	1E	8F	CA	3F	0F	02	C1	AF	BD	03	01	13	8A	6B
	8	3A	91	11	41	4F	67	DC	EA	97	F2	CF	CE	F0	B4	E6	73
	9	96	AC	74	22	E7	AD	35	85	E2	F9	37	E8	1C	75	DF	6E
	A	47	F1	1A	71	1D	29	C5	89	6F	B7	62	0E	AA	18	BE	1B
	B	FC	56	3E	4B	C6	D2	79	20	9A	DB	C0	FE	78	CD	5A	F4
	C	1F	DD	A8	33	88	07	C7	31	B1	12	10	59	27	80	EC	5F
	D	60	51	7F	A9	19	B5	4A	0D	2D	E5	7A	9F	93	C9	9C	EF
	E	A0	E0	3B	4D	AE	2A	F5	B0	C8	EB	BB	3C	83	53	99	61
	F	17	2B	04	7E	BA	77	D6	26	E1	69	14	63	55	21	0C	7D

Table 23. Modular Inverses in  $GF(2^4)$

X	$x^{-1}$
0	0
1	1
2	9
3	E
4	D
5	B
6	7
7	6
8	F
9	2
A	C
B	5
C	A
D	4
E	3
F	8

Table 24. Tabular Representation of xtime

		y															
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
x	0	00	02	04	06	08	0A	0C	0E	10	12	14	16	18	1A	1C	1E
	1	02	22	24	26	28	2A	2C	2E	30	32	34	36	38	3A	3C	3E
	2	40	42	44	46	48	4A	4C	4E	50	52	54	56	58	5A	5C	5E
	3	60	62	64	66	68	6A	6C	6E	70	72	74	76	78	7A	7C	7E
	4	80	82	84	86	88	8A	8C	8E	90	92	94	96	98	9A	9C	9E
	5	A0	A2	A4	A6	A8	AA	AC	AE	B0	B2	B4	B6	B8	BA	BC	BE
	6	C0	C2	C4	C6	C8	CA	CC	CE	D0	D2	D4	D6	D8	DA	DC	DE
	7	E0	E2	E4	E6	E8	EA	EC	EE	F0	F2	F4	F6	F8	FA	FC	FE
	8	1B	19	1F	1D	13	11	17	15	0B	09	0F	0D	03	01	07	05
	9	3B	39	3F	3D	33	31	37	35	2B	29	2F	2D	23	21	27	25
	A	5B	59	5F	5D	53	51	57	55	4B	49	4F	4D	43	41	47	45
	B	7B	79	7F	7D	73	71	77	75	6B	69	6F	6D	63	61	67	65
	C	9B	99	9F	9D	93	91	97	95	8B	89	8F	8D	83	81	87	85
	D	BB	B9	BF	BD	B3	B1	B7	B5	AB	A9	AF	AD	A3	A1	A7	A5
	E	DB	D9	DF	DD	D3	D1	D7	D5	CB	C9	CF	CD	C3	C1	C7	C5
	F	FB	F9	FF	FD	F3	F1	F7	F5	EB	E9	EF	ED	E3	E1	E7	E5

## Appendix B: Complete VHDL Code for Each Design

### SubBytes Full LUT

```
--Copyright (C) 2004 Hemanth Satyanarayana

--This function implements the S-Box LUT
function sbox_val(address: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return
std_logic_vector is
variable data: bit_vector(7 downto 0);
variable data_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin
case address is

    when "00000000" => data := X"63";
    when "00000001" => data := X"7C";
    when "00000010" => data := X"77";
    when "00000011" => data := X"7B";
    when "00000100" => data := X"F2";
    when "00000101" => data := X"6B";
    when "00000110" => data := X"6F";
    when "00000111" => data := X"C5";
    when "00001000" => data := X"30";
    when "00001001" => data := X"01";
    when "00001010" => data := X"67";
    when "00001011" => data := X"2B";
    when "00001100" => data := X"FE";
    when "00001101" => data := X"D7";
    when "00001110" => data := X"AB";
    when "00001111" => data := X"76";
    when "00010000" => data := X"CA";
    when "00010001" => data := X"82";
    when "00010010" => data := X"C9";
    when "00010011" => data := X"7D";
    when "00010100" => data := X"FA";
    when "00010101" => data := X"59";
    when "00010110" => data := X"47";
    when "00010111" => data := X"F0";
    when "00011000" => data := X"AD";
    when "00011001" => data := X"D4";
    when "00011010" => data := X"A2";
    when "00011011" => data := X"AF";
    when "00011100" => data := X"9C";
    when "00011101" => data := X"A4";
    when "00011110" => data := X"72";
    when "00011111" => data := X"C0";
    when "00100000" => data := X"B7";
    when "00100001" => data := X"FD";
    when "00100010" => data := X"93";
    when "00100011" => data := X"26";
    when "00100100" => data := X"36";
    when "00100101" => data := X"3F";
    when "00100110" => data := X"F7";
```

```
when "00100111" => data := X"CC";
when "00101000" => data := X"34";
when "00101001" => data := X"A5";
when "00101010" => data := X"E5";
when "00101011" => data := X"F1";
when "00101100" => data := X"71";
when "00101101" => data := X"D8";
when "00101110" => data := X"31";
when "00101111" => data := X"15";
when "00110000" => data := X"04";
when "00110001" => data := X"C7";
when "00110010" => data := X"23";
when "00110011" => data := X"C3";
when "00110100" => data := X"18";
when "00110101" => data := X"96";
when "00110110" => data := X"05";
when "00110111" => data := X"9A";
when "00111000" => data := X"07";
when "00111001" => data := X"12";
when "00111010" => data := X"80";
when "00111011" => data := X"E2";
when "00111100" => data := X"EB";
when "00111101" => data := X"27";
when "00111110" => data := X"B2";
when "00111111" => data := X"75";
when "01000000" => data := X"09";
when "01000001" => data := X"83";
when "01000010" => data := X"2C";
when "01000011" => data := X"1A";
when "01000100" => data := X"1B";
when "01000101" => data := X"6E";
when "01000110" => data := X"5A";
when "01000111" => data := X"A0";
when "01001000" => data := X"52";
when "01001001" => data := X"3B";
when "01001010" => data := X"D6";
when "01001011" => data := X"B3";
when "01001100" => data := X"29";
when "01001101" => data := X"E3";
when "01001110" => data := X"2F";
when "01001111" => data := X"84";
when "01010000" => data := X"53";
when "01010001" => data := X"D1";
when "01010010" => data := X"00";
when "01010011" => data := X"ED";
when "01010100" => data := X"20";
when "01010101" => data := X"FC";
when "01010110" => data := X"B1";
when "01010111" => data := X"5B";
when "01011000" => data := X"6A";
when "01011001" => data := X"CB";
when "01011010" => data := X"BE";
when "01011011" => data := X"39";
when "01011100" => data := X"4A";
when "01011101" => data := X"4C";
```

```
when "01011110" => data := X"58";
when "01011111" => data := X"CF";
when "01100000" => data := X"D0";
when "01100001" => data := X"EF";
when "01100010" => data := X"AA";
when "01100011" => data := X"FB";
when "01100100" => data := X"43";
when "01100101" => data := X"4D";
when "01100110" => data := X"33";
when "01100111" => data := X"85";
when "01101000" => data := X"45";
when "01101001" => data := X"F9";
when "01101010" => data := X"02";
when "01101011" => data := X"7F";
when "01101100" => data := X"50";
when "01101101" => data := X"3C";
when "01101110" => data := X"9F";
when "01101111" => data := X"A8";
when "01110000" => data := X"51";
when "01110001" => data := X"A3";
when "01110010" => data := X"40";
when "01110011" => data := X"8F";
when "01110100" => data := X"92";
when "01110101" => data := X"9D";
when "01110110" => data := X"38";
when "01110111" => data := X"F5";
when "01111000" => data := X"BC";
when "01111001" => data := X"B6";
when "01111010" => data := X"DA";
when "01111011" => data := X"21";
when "01111100" => data := X"10";
when "01111101" => data := X"FF";
when "01111110" => data := X"F3";
when "01111111" => data := X"D2";
when "10000000" => data := X"CD";
when "10000001" => data := X"0C";
when "10000010" => data := X"13";
when "10000011" => data := X"EC";
when "10000100" => data := X"5F";
when "10000101" => data := X"97";
when "10000110" => data := X"44";
when "10000111" => data := X"17";
when "10001000" => data := X"C4";
when "10001001" => data := X"A7";
when "10001010" => data := X"7E";
when "10001011" => data := X"3D";
when "10001100" => data := X"64";
when "10001101" => data := X"5D";
when "10001110" => data := X"19";
when "10001111" => data := X"73";
when "10010000" => data := X"60";
when "10010001" => data := X"81";
when "10010010" => data := X"4F";
when "10010011" => data := X"DC";
when "10010100" => data := X"22";
```



```
when "10010101" => data := X"2A";
when "10010110" => data := X"90";
when "10010111" => data := X"88";
when "10011000" => data := X"46";
when "10011001" => data := X"EE";
when "10011010" => data := X"B8";
when "10011011" => data := X"14";
when "10011100" => data := X"DE";
when "10011101" => data := X"5E";
when "10011110" => data := X"0B";
when "10011111" => data := X"DB";
when "10100000" => data := X"E0";
when "10100001" => data := X"32";
when "10100010" => data := X"3A";
when "10100011" => data := X"0A";
when "10100100" => data := X"49";
when "10100101" => data := X"06";
when "10100110" => data := X"24";
when "10100111" => data := X"5C";
when "10101000" => data := X"C2";
when "10101001" => data := X"D3";
when "10101010" => data := X"AC";
when "10101011" => data := X"62";
when "10101100" => data := X"91";
when "10101101" => data := X"95";
when "10101110" => data := X"E4";
when "10101111" => data := X"79";
when "10110000" => data := X"E7";
when "10110001" => data := X"C8";
when "10110010" => data := X"37";
when "10110011" => data := X"6D";
when "10110100" => data := X"8D";
when "10110101" => data := X"D5";
when "10110110" => data := X"4E";
when "10110111" => data := X"A9";
when "10111000" => data := X"6C";
when "10111001" => data := X"56";
when "10111010" => data := X"F4";
when "10111011" => data := X"EA";
when "10111100" => data := X"65";
when "10111101" => data := X"7A";
when "10111110" => data := X"AE";
when "10111111" => data := X"08";
when "11000000" => data := X"BA";
when "11000001" => data := X"78";
when "11000010" => data := X"25";
when "11000011" => data := X"2E";
when "11000100" => data := X"1C";
when "11000101" => data := X"A6";
when "11000110" => data := X"B4";
when "11000111" => data := X"C6";
when "11001000" => data := X"E8";
when "11001001" => data := X"DD";
when "11001010" => data := X"74";
when "11001011" => data := X"1F";
```

```

when "11001100" => data := X"4B";
when "11001101" => data := X"BD";
when "11001110" => data := X"8B";
when "11001111" => data := X"8A";
when "11010000" => data := X"70";
when "11010001" => data := X"3E";
when "11010010" => data := X"B5";
when "11010011" => data := X"66";
when "11010100" => data := X"48";
when "11010101" => data := X"03";
when "11010110" => data := X"F6";
when "11010111" => data := X"0E";
when "11011000" => data := X"61";
when "11011001" => data := X"35";
when "11011010" => data := X"57";
when "11011011" => data := X"B9";
when "11011100" => data := X"86";
when "11011101" => data := X"C1";
when "11011110" => data := X"1D";
when "11011111" => data := X"9E";
when "11100000" => data := X"E1";
when "11100001" => data := X"F8";
when "11100010" => data := X"98";
when "11100011" => data := X"11";
when "11100100" => data := X"69";
when "11100101" => data := X"D9";
when "11100110" => data := X"8E";
when "11100111" => data := X"94";
when "11101000" => data := X"9B";
when "11101001" => data := X"1E";
when "11101010" => data := X"87";
when "11101011" => data := X"E9";
when "11101100" => data := X"CE";
when "11101101" => data := X"55";
when "11101110" => data := X"28";
when "11101111" => data := X"DF";
when "11110000" => data := X"8C";
when "11110001" => data := X"A1";
when "11110010" => data := X"89";
when "11110011" => data := X"0D";
when "11110100" => data := X"BF";
when "11110101" => data := X"E6";
when "11110110" => data := X"42";
when "11110111" => data := X"68";
when "11111000" => data := X"41";
when "11111001" => data := X"99";
when "11111010" => data := X"2D";
when "11111011" => data := X"0F";
when "11111100" => data := X"B0";
when "11111101" => data := X"54";
when "11111110" => data := X"BB";
when "11111111" => data := X"16";
when others => null;
end case;
data_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(data);

```

```

return data_stdlogic;
end function sbox_val;

--This function implements the inverse S-Box LUT
function inv_sbox_val(address: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return
std_logic_vector is
variable inv_data: bit_vector(7 downto 0);
variable inv_data_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin
case address is

    when "00000000" => inv_data := X"52";
    when "00000001" => inv_data := X"09";
    when "00000010" => inv_data := X"6a";
    when "00000011" => inv_data := X"d5";
    when "00000100" => inv_data := X"30";
    when "00000101" => inv_data := X"36";
    when "00000110" => inv_data := X"a5";
    when "00000111" => inv_data := X"38";
    when "00001000" => inv_data := X"bf";
    when "00001001" => inv_data := X"40";
    when "00001010" => inv_data := X"a3";
    when "00001011" => inv_data := X"9e";
    when "00001100" => inv_data := X"81";
    when "00001101" => inv_data := X"f3";
    when "00001110" => inv_data := X"d7";
    when "00001111" => inv_data := X"fb";
    when "00010000" => inv_data := X"7c";
    when "00010001" => inv_data := X"e3";
    when "00010010" => inv_data := X"39";
    when "00010011" => inv_data := X"82";
    when "00010100" => inv_data := X"9b";
    when "00010101" => inv_data := X"2f";
    when "00010110" => inv_data := X"ff";
    when "00010111" => inv_data := X"87";
    when "00011000" => inv_data := X"34";
    when "00011001" => inv_data := X"8e";
    when "00011010" => inv_data := X"43";
    when "00011011" => inv_data := X"44";
    when "00011100" => inv_data := X"c4";
    when "00011101" => inv_data := X"de";
    when "00011110" => inv_data := X"e9";
    when "00011111" => inv_data := X"cb";
    when "00100000" => inv_data := X"54";
    when "00100001" => inv_data := X"7b";
    when "00100010" => inv_data := X"94";
    when "00100011" => inv_data := X"32";
    when "00100100" => inv_data := X"a6";
    when "00100101" => inv_data := X"c2";
    when "00100110" => inv_data := X"23";
    when "00100111" => inv_data := X"3d";
    when "00101000" => inv_data := X"ee";
    when "00101001" => inv_data := X"4c";
    when "00101010" => inv_data := X"95";
    when "00101011" => inv_data := X"0b";

```

```
when "00101100" => inv_data := X"42";
when "00101101" => inv_data := X"fa";
when "00101110" => inv_data := X"c3";
when "00101111" => inv_data := X"4e";
when "00110000" => inv_data := X"08";
when "00110001" => inv_data := X"2e";
when "00110010" => inv_data := X"a1";
when "00110011" => inv_data := X"66";
when "00110100" => inv_data := X"28";
when "00110101" => inv_data := X"d9";
when "00110110" => inv_data := X"24";
when "00110111" => inv_data := X"b2";
when "00111000" => inv_data := X"76";
when "00111001" => inv_data := X"5b";
when "00111010" => inv_data := X"a2";
when "00111011" => inv_data := X"49";
when "00111100" => inv_data := X"6d";
when "00111101" => inv_data := X"8b";
when "00111110" => inv_data := X"d1";
when "00111111" => inv_data := X"25";
when "01000000" => inv_data := X"72";
when "01000001" => inv_data := X"f8";
when "01000010" => inv_data := X"f6";
when "01000011" => inv_data := X"64";
when "01000100" => inv_data := X"86";
when "01000101" => inv_data := X"68";
when "01000110" => inv_data := X"98";
when "01000111" => inv_data := X"16";
when "01001000" => inv_data := X"d4";
when "01001001" => inv_data := X"a4";
when "01001010" => inv_data := X"5c";
when "01001011" => inv_data := X"cc";
when "01001100" => inv_data := X"5d";
when "01001101" => inv_data := X"65";
when "01001110" => inv_data := X"b6";
when "01001111" => inv_data := X"92";
when "01010000" => inv_data := X"6c";
when "01010001" => inv_data := X"70";
when "01010010" => inv_data := X"48";
when "01010011" => inv_data := X"50";
when "01010100" => inv_data := X"fd";
when "01010101" => inv_data := X"ed";
when "01010110" => inv_data := X"b9";
when "01010111" => inv_data := X"da";
when "01011000" => inv_data := X"5e";
when "01011001" => inv_data := X"15";
when "01011010" => inv_data := X"46";
when "01011011" => inv_data := X"57";
when "01011100" => inv_data := X"a7";
when "01011101" => inv_data := X"8d";
when "01011110" => inv_data := X"9d";
when "01011111" => inv_data := X"84";
when "01100000" => inv_data := X"90";
when "01100001" => inv_data := X"d8";
when "01100010" => inv_data := X"ab";
```

```

when "01100011" => inv_data := X"00";
when "01100100" => inv_data := X"8c";
when "01100101" => inv_data := X"bc";
when "01100110" => inv_data := X"d3";
when "01100111" => inv_data := X"0a";
when "01101000" => inv_data := X"f7";
when "01101001" => inv_data := X"e4";
when "01101010" => inv_data := X"58";
when "01101011" => inv_data := X"05";
when "01101100" => inv_data := X"b8";
when "01101101" => inv_data := X"b3";
when "01101110" => inv_data := X"45";
when "01101111" => inv_data := X"06";
when "01110000" => inv_data := X"d0";
when "01110001" => inv_data := X"2c";
when "01110010" => inv_data := X"1e";
when "01110011" => inv_data := X"8f";
when "01110100" => inv_data := X"ca";
when "01110101" => inv_data := X"3f";
when "01110110" => inv_data := X"0f";
when "01110111" => inv_data := X"02";
when "01111000" => inv_data := X"c1";
when "01111001" => inv_data := X"af";
when "01111010" => inv_data := X"bd";
when "01111011" => inv_data := X"03";
when "01111100" => inv_data := X"01";
when "01111101" => inv_data := X"13";
when "01111110" => inv_data := X"8a";
when "01111111" => inv_data := X"6b";
when "10000000" => inv_data := X"3a";
when "10000001" => inv_data := X"91";
when "10000010" => inv_data := X"11";
when "10000011" => inv_data := X"41";
when "10000100" => inv_data := X"4f";
when "10000101" => inv_data := X"67";
when "10000110" => inv_data := X"dc";
when "10000111" => inv_data := X"ea";
when "10001000" => inv_data := X"97";
when "10001001" => inv_data := X"f2";
when "10001010" => inv_data := X"cf";
when "10001011" => inv_data := X"ce";
when "10001100" => inv_data := X"f0";
when "10001101" => inv_data := X"b4";
when "10001110" => inv_data := X"e6";
when "10001111" => inv_data := X"73";
when "10010000" => inv_data := X"96";
when "10010001" => inv_data := X"ac";
when "10010010" => inv_data := X"74";
when "10010011" => inv_data := X"22";
when "10010100" => inv_data := X"e7";
when "10010101" => inv_data := X"ad";
when "10010110" => inv_data := X"35";
when "10010111" => inv_data := X"85";
when "10011000" => inv_data := X"e2";
when "10011001" => inv_data := X"f9";

```

```
when "10011010" => inv_data := X"37";
when "10011011" => inv_data := X"e8";
when "10011100" => inv_data := X"1c";
when "10011101" => inv_data := X"75";
when "10011110" => inv_data := X"df";
when "10011111" => inv_data := X"6e";
when "10100000" => inv_data := X"47";
when "10100001" => inv_data := X"f1";
when "10100010" => inv_data := X"1a";
when "10100011" => inv_data := X"71";
when "10100100" => inv_data := X"1d";
when "10100101" => inv_data := X"29";
when "10100110" => inv_data := X"c5";
when "10100111" => inv_data := X"89";
when "10101000" => inv_data := X"6f";
when "10101001" => inv_data := X"b7";
when "10101010" => inv_data := X"62";
when "10101011" => inv_data := X"0e";
when "10101100" => inv_data := X"aa";
when "10101101" => inv_data := X"18";
when "10101110" => inv_data := X"be";
when "10101111" => inv_data := X"1b";
when "10110000" => inv_data := X"fc";
when "10110001" => inv_data := X"56";
when "10110010" => inv_data := X"3e";
when "10110011" => inv_data := X"4b";
when "10110100" => inv_data := X"c6";
when "10110101" => inv_data := X"d2";
when "10110110" => inv_data := X"79";
when "10110111" => inv_data := X"20";
when "10111000" => inv_data := X"9a";
when "10111001" => inv_data := X"db";
when "10111010" => inv_data := X"c0";
when "10111011" => inv_data := X"fe";
when "10111100" => inv_data := X"78";
when "10111101" => inv_data := X"cd";
when "10111110" => inv_data := X"5a";
when "10111111" => inv_data := X"f4";
when "11000000" => inv_data := X"1f";
when "11000001" => inv_data := X"dd";
when "11000010" => inv_data := X"a8";
when "11000011" => inv_data := X"33";
when "11000100" => inv_data := X"88";
when "11000101" => inv_data := X"07";
when "11000110" => inv_data := X"c7";
when "11000111" => inv_data := X"31";
when "11001000" => inv_data := X"b1";
when "11001001" => inv_data := X"12";
when "11001010" => inv_data := X"10";
when "11001011" => inv_data := X"59";
when "11001100" => inv_data := X"27";
when "11001101" => inv_data := X"80";
when "11001110" => inv_data := X"ec";
when "11001111" => inv_data := X"5f";
when "11010000" => inv_data := X"60";
```

```

when "11010001" => inv_data := X"51";
when "11010010" => inv_data := X"7f";
when "11010011" => inv_data := X"a9";
when "11010100" => inv_data := X"19";
when "11010101" => inv_data := X"b5";
when "11010110" => inv_data := X"4a";
when "11010111" => inv_data := X"0d";
when "11011000" => inv_data := X"2d";
when "11011001" => inv_data := X"e5";
when "11011010" => inv_data := X"7a";
when "11011011" => inv_data := X"9f";
when "11011100" => inv_data := X"93";
when "11011101" => inv_data := X"c9";
when "11011110" => inv_data := X"9c";
when "11011111" => inv_data := X"ef";
when "11100000" => inv_data := X"a0";
when "11100001" => inv_data := X"e0";
when "11100010" => inv_data := X"3b";
when "11100011" => inv_data := X"4d";
when "11100100" => inv_data := X"ae";
when "11100101" => inv_data := X"2a";
when "11100110" => inv_data := X"f5";
when "11100111" => inv_data := X"b0";
when "11101000" => inv_data := X"c8";
when "11101001" => inv_data := X"eb";
when "11101010" => inv_data := X"bb";
when "11101011" => inv_data := X"3c";
when "11101100" => inv_data := X"83";
when "11101101" => inv_data := X"53";
when "11101110" => inv_data := X"99";
when "11101111" => inv_data := X"61";
when "11110000" => inv_data := X"17";
when "11110001" => inv_data := X"2b";
when "11110010" => inv_data := X"04";
when "11110011" => inv_data := X"7e";
when "11110100" => inv_data := X"ba";
when "11110101" => inv_data := X"77";
when "11110110" => inv_data := X"d6";
when "11110111" => inv_data := X"26";
when "11111000" => inv_data := X"e1";
when "11111001" => inv_data := X"69";
when "11111010" => inv_data := X"14";
when "11111011" => inv_data := X"63";
when "11111100" => inv_data := X"55";
when "11111101" => inv_data := X"21";
when "11111110" => inv_data := X"0c";
when "11111111" => inv_data := X"7d";
when others => null;
end case;
inv_data_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(inv_data);
return inv_data_stdlogic;
end function inv_sbox_val;

```

## SubBytes Extended Field Inversion

```
function sbox_val(inp: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); mode: std_logic)
return std_logic_vector is
variable address: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable data: bit_vector(7 downto 0);
variable data_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable outdata: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin

--Performs affine transform first if in Decrypt mode
if mode='0' then
    address(7) := inp(6) xor inp(4) xor inp(1) xor '0';
    address(6) := inp(5) xor inp(3) xor inp(0) xor '0';
    address(5) := inp(7) xor inp(4) xor inp(2) xor '0';
    address(4) := inp(6) xor inp(3) xor inp(1) xor '0';
    address(3) := inp(5) xor inp(2) xor inp(0) xor '0';
    address(2) := inp(7) xor inp(4) xor inp(1) xor '1';
    address(1) := inp(6) xor inp(3) xor inp(0) xor '0';
    address(0) := inp(7) xor inp(5) xor inp(2) xor '1';
else
    address := inp;
end if;

--Modular inversion in the extended field LUT
case address is

    when "00000000" => data := "00000000";
    when "00000001" => data := "00000001";
    when "00000010" => data := "10001101";
    when "00000011" => data := "11110110";
    when "00000100" => data := "11001011";
    when "00000101" => data := "01010010";
    when "00000110" => data := "01111011";
    when "00000111" => data := "11010001";
    when "00001000" => data := "11101000";
    when "00001001" => data := "01001111";
    when "00001010" => data := "00101001";
    when "00001011" => data := "11000000";
    when "00001100" => data := "10110000";
    when "00001101" => data := "11100001";
    when "00001110" => data := "11100101";
    when "00001111" => data := "11000111";
    when "00010000" => data := "01110100";
    when "00010001" => data := "10110100";
    when "00010010" => data := "10101010";
    when "00010011" => data := "01001011";
    when "00010100" => data := "10011001";
    when "00010101" => data := "00101011";
    when "00010110" => data := "01100000";
    when "00010111" => data := "01011111";
    when "00011000" => data := "01011000";
    when "00011001" => data := "00111111";
    when "00011010" => data := "11111101";
    when "00011011" => data := "11001100";
```



```

when "00011100" => data := "11111111";
when "00011101" => data := "01000000";
when "00011110" => data := "11101110";
when "00011111" => data := "10110010";
when "00100000" => data := "00111010";
when "00100001" => data := "01101110";
when "00100010" => data := "01011010";
when "00100011" => data := "11110001";
when "00100100" => data := "01010101";
when "00100101" => data := "01001101";
when "00100110" => data := "10101000";
when "00100111" => data := "11001001";
when "00101000" => data := "11000001";
when "00101001" => data := "00001010";
when "00101010" => data := "10011000";
when "00101011" => data := "00010101";
when "00101100" => data := "00110000";
when "00101101" => data := "01000100";
when "00101110" => data := "10100010";
when "00101111" => data := "11000010";
when "00110000" => data := "00101100";
when "00110001" => data := "01000101";
when "00110010" => data := "10010010";
when "00110011" => data := "01101100";
when "00110100" => data := "11110011";
when "00110101" => data := "00111001";
when "00110110" => data := "01100110";
when "00110111" => data := "01000010";
when "00111000" => data := "11110010";
when "00111001" => data := "00110101";
when "00111010" => data := "00100000";
when "00111011" => data := "01101111";
when "00111100" => data := "01110111";
when "00111101" => data := "10111011";
when "00111110" => data := "01011001";
when "00111111" => data := "00011001";
when "01000000" => data := "00011101";
when "01000001" => data := "11111110";
when "01000010" => data := "00110111";
when "01000011" => data := "01100111";
when "01000100" => data := "00101101";
when "01000101" => data := "00110001";
when "01000110" => data := "11110101";
when "01000111" => data := "01101001";
when "01001000" => data := "10100111";
when "01001001" => data := "01100100";
when "01001010" => data := "10101011";
when "01001011" => data := "00010011";
when "01001100" => data := "01010100";
when "01001101" => data := "00100101";
when "01001110" => data := "11101001";
when "01001111" => data := "00001001";
when "01010000" => data := "11101101";
when "01010001" => data := "01011100";
when "01010010" => data := "00000101";

```

```

when "01010011" => data := "11001010";
when "01010100" => data := "01001100";
when "01010101" => data := "00100100";
when "01010110" => data := "10000111";
when "01010111" => data := "10111111";
when "01011000" => data := "00011000";
when "01011001" => data := "00111110";
when "01011010" => data := "00100010";
when "01011011" => data := "11110000";
when "01011100" => data := "01010001";
when "01011101" => data := "11101100";
when "01011110" => data := "01100001";
when "01011111" => data := "00010111";
when "01100000" => data := "00010110";
when "01100001" => data := "01011110";
when "01100010" => data := "10101111";
when "01100011" => data := "11010011";
when "01100100" => data := "01001001";
when "01100101" => data := "10100110";
when "01100110" => data := "00110110";
when "01100111" => data := "01000011";
when "01101000" => data := "11110100";
when "01101001" => data := "01000111";
when "01101010" => data := "10010001";
when "01101011" => data := "11011111";
when "01101100" => data := "00110011";
when "01101101" => data := "10010011";
when "01101110" => data := "00100001";
when "01101111" => data := "00111011";
when "01110000" => data := "01111001";
when "01110001" => data := "10110111";
when "01110010" => data := "10010111";
when "01110011" => data := "10000101";
when "01110100" => data := "00010000";
when "01110101" => data := "10110101";
when "01110110" => data := "10111010";
when "01110111" => data := "00111100";
when "01111000" => data := "10110110";
when "01111001" => data := "01110000";
when "01111010" => data := "11010000";
when "01111011" => data := "00000110";
when "01111100" => data := "10100001";
when "01111101" => data := "11111010";
when "01111110" => data := "10000001";
when "01111111" => data := "10000010";
when "10000000" => data := "10000011";
when "10000001" => data := "01111110";
when "10000010" => data := "01111111";
when "10000011" => data := "10000000";
when "10000100" => data := "10010110";
when "10000101" => data := "01110011";
when "10000110" => data := "10111110";
when "10000111" => data := "01010110";
when "10001000" => data := "10011011";
when "10001001" => data := "10011110";

```

```

when "10001010" => data := "10010101";
when "10001011" => data := "11011001";
when "10001100" => data := "11110111";
when "10001101" => data := "00000010";
when "10001110" => data := "10111001";
when "10001111" => data := "10100100";
when "10010000" => data := "11011110";
when "10010001" => data := "01101010";
when "10010010" => data := "00110010";
when "10010011" => data := "01101101";
when "10010100" => data := "11011000";
when "10010101" => data := "10001010";
when "10010110" => data := "10000100";
when "10010111" => data := "01110010";
when "10011000" => data := "00101010";
when "10011001" => data := "00010100";
when "10011010" => data := "10011111";
when "10011011" => data := "10001000";
when "10011100" => data := "11111001";
when "10011101" => data := "11011100";
when "10011110" => data := "10001001";
when "10011111" => data := "10011010";
when "10100000" => data := "11111011";
when "10100001" => data := "01111100";
when "10100010" => data := "00101110";
when "10100011" => data := "11000011";
when "10100100" => data := "10001111";
when "10100101" => data := "10111000";
when "10100110" => data := "01100101";
when "10100111" => data := "01001000";
when "10101000" => data := "00100110";
when "10101001" => data := "11001000";
when "10101010" => data := "00010010";
when "10101011" => data := "01001010";
when "10101100" => data := "11001110";
when "10101101" => data := "11100111";
when "10101110" => data := "11010010";
when "10101111" => data := "01100010";
when "10110000" => data := "00001100";
when "10110001" => data := "11100000";
when "10110010" => data := "00011111";
when "10110011" => data := "11101111";
when "10110100" => data := "00010001";
when "10110101" => data := "01110101";
when "10110110" => data := "01111000";
when "10110111" => data := "01110001";
when "10111000" => data := "10100101";
when "10111001" => data := "10001110";
when "10111010" => data := "01110110";
when "10111011" => data := "00111101";
when "10111100" => data := "10111101";
when "10111101" => data := "10111100";
when "10111110" => data := "10000110";
when "10111111" => data := "01010111";
when "11000000" => data := "00001011";

```

```
when "11000001" => data := "00101000";
when "11000010" => data := "00101111";
when "11000011" => data := "10100011";
when "11000100" => data := "11011010";
when "11000101" => data := "11010100";
when "11000110" => data := "11100100";
when "11000111" => data := "00001111";
when "11001000" => data := "10101001";
when "11001001" => data := "00100111";
when "11001010" => data := "01010011";
when "11001011" => data := "00000100";
when "11001100" => data := "00011011";
when "11001101" => data := "11111100";
when "11001110" => data := "10101100";
when "11001111" => data := "11100110";
when "11010000" => data := "01111010";
when "11010001" => data := "00000111";
when "11010010" => data := "10101110";
when "11010011" => data := "01100011";
when "11010100" => data := "11000101";
when "11010101" => data := "11011011";
when "11010110" => data := "11100010";
when "11010111" => data := "11101010";
when "11011000" => data := "10010100";
when "11011001" => data := "10001011";
when "11011010" => data := "11000100";
when "11011011" => data := "11010101";
when "11011100" => data := "10011101";
when "11011101" => data := "11111000";
when "11011110" => data := "10010000";
when "11011111" => data := "01101011";
when "11100000" => data := "10110001";
when "11100001" => data := "00001101";
when "11100010" => data := "11010110";
when "11100011" => data := "11101011";
when "11100100" => data := "11000110";
when "11100101" => data := "00001110";
when "11100110" => data := "11001111";
when "11100111" => data := "10101101";
when "11101000" => data := "00001000";
when "11101001" => data := "01001110";
when "11101010" => data := "11010111";
when "11101011" => data := "11100011";
when "11101100" => data := "01011101";
when "11101101" => data := "01010000";
when "11101110" => data := "00011110";
when "11101111" => data := "10110011";
when "11110000" => data := "01011011";
when "11110001" => data := "00100011";
when "11110010" => data := "00111000";
when "11110011" => data := "00110100";
when "11110100" => data := "01101000";
when "11110101" => data := "01000110";
when "11110110" => data := "00000011";
when "11110111" => data := "10001100";
```

```

when "11111000" => data := "11011101";
when "11111001" => data := "10011100";
when "11111010" => data := "01111101";
when "11111011" => data := "10100000";
when "11111100" => data := "11001101";
when "11111101" => data := "00011010";
when "11111110" => data := "01000001";
when "11111111" => data := "00011100";
when others => null;
end case;
data_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(data);

--Performs the affine transform after inversion if in Encrypt mode
if mode='1' then
    outdata(7) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor '0';
    outdata(6) := data_stdlogic(6) xor data_stdlogic(5) xor
data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor data_stdlogic(2) xor '1';
    outdata(5) := data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor
data_stdlogic(3) xor data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor '1';
    outdata(4) := data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';
    outdata(3) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';
    outdata(2) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';
    outdata(1) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '1';
    outdata(0) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '1';
else
    outdata := data_stdlogic;
end if;
return outdata;
end function sbox_val;

```

## SubBytes Composite Field Inversion

```
--Function performs multiplication in the subfield
function mult(
    inmult1: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
    inmult2: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0)
)
return std_logic_vector is

variable outmult: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable a: std_logic;
variable b: std_logic;
variable c: std_logic;
begin

a := inmult1(3) xor inmult1(0);
b := inmult1(1) xor inmult1(0);
c := inmult1(2) xor inmult1(1);

outmult(3) := (inmult2(3) and inmult1(3)) xor (inmult2(2) and
inmult1(0)) xor (inmult2(1) and inmult1(1)) xor (inmult2(0) and
inmult1(2));
outmult(2) := (inmult2(3) and inmult1(2)) xor (inmult2(2) and a) xor
(inmult2(1) and b) xor (inmult2(0) and c);
outmult(1) := (inmult2(3) and inmult1(1)) xor (inmult2(2) and
inmult1(2)) xor (inmult2(1) and a) xor (inmult2(0) and b);
outmult(0) := (inmult2(3) and inmult1(0)) xor (inmult2(2) and
inmult1(1)) xor (inmult2(1) and inmult1(2)) xor (inmult2(0) and a);

return outmult;
end function mult;

--Function squares in the subfield
function squarer(in_sq: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0)) return
std_logic_vector is
variable out_sq: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
begin

out_sq(3) := in_sq(3) xor in_sq(1);
out_sq(2) := in_sq(1);
out_sq(1) := in_sq(2) xor in_sq(0);
out_sq(0) := in_sq(0);

return out_sq;
end function squarer;

--Function inverts polynomials in the subfield
function inv_val(input: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return
std_logic_vector is
variable z1: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable input2: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable z0: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable z1_squared: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable z0_squared: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
```

```

variable z1z0: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable bz1 : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable F: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable Finv: bit_vector(3 downto 0);
variable Finv_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable D1: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable D0: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable z1xorz0: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable final : std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);

constant b14: std_logic_vector := "1001";

begin

--Converts to "big endian" notation
input2(7) := input(0);
input2(6) := input(1);
input2(5) := input(2);
input2(4) := input(3);
input2(3) := input(4);
input2(2) := input(5);
input2(1) := input(6);
input2(0) := input(7);

--Computes Z values
z1(3) := input2(6) xor input2(2) xor input2(0);
z1(2) := input2(5) xor input2(4);
z1(1) := input2(6) xor input2(3) xor input2(1) xor input2(0);
z1(0) := input2(2) xor input2(0);
z0(3) := input2(7) xor input2(4) xor input2(3) xor input2(1) xor
input2(0);
z0(2) := input2(5) xor input2(1);
z0(1) := input2(6) xor input2(5) xor input2(2) xor input2(0);
z0(0) := input2(6) xor input2(5) xor input2(3) xor input2(2) xor
input2(0);

z1_squared := squarer(z1);
z0_squared := squarer(z0);
z1z0 := mult(z1,z0);
bz1 := mult(b14,z1_squared);

F(3) := z0_squared(3) xor z1z0(3) xor bz1(3);
F(2) := z0_squared(2) xor z1z0(2) xor bz1(2);
F(1) := z0_squared(1) xor z1z0(1) xor bz1(1);
F(0) := z0_squared(0) xor z1z0(0) xor bz1(0);

--Composite field inversion LUT
case F is

    when "0000" => Finv := "0000";
    when "0001" => Finv := "1111";
    when "0010" => Finv := "1011";
    when "0011" => Finv := "0101";
    when "0100" => Finv := "1001";
    when "0101" => Finv := "0011";

```

```

    when "0110" => Finv := "1110";
    when "0111" => Finv := "1100";
    when "1000" => Finv := "1000";
    when "1001" => Finv := "0100";
    when "1010" => Finv := "1101";
    when "1011" => Finv := "0010";
    when "1100" => Finv := "0111";
    when "1101" => Finv := "1010";
    when "1110" => Finv := "0110";
    when "1111" => Finv := "0001";
    when others => null;
end case;
Finv_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(Finv);

D1 := mult(z1, Finv_stdlogic);

z1xor0(3) := z1(3) xor z0(3);
z1xor0(2) := z1(2) xor z0(2);
z1xor0(1) := z1(1) xor z0(1);
z1xor0(0) := z1(0) xor z0(0);

D0 := mult(z1xor0, Finv_stdlogic);

--[D1(3) D1(2) D1(1) D1(0) D0(3) D0(2) D0(1) D0(0)

final(0) := D1(2) xor D1(1) xor D1(0) xor D0(3) xor D0(1);
final(1) := D1(3) xor D1(0);
final(2) := D1(3) xor D0(1);
final(3) := D1(3) xor D1(2) xor D0(1);
final(4) := D0(1) xor D0(0);
final(5) := D1(1) xor D0(2) xor D0(0);
final(6) := D1(3) xor D0(2) xor D0(1);
final(7) := D1(1) xor D1(0) xor D0(2) xor D0(0);

return final;
end function inv_val;

--Function performs affine transforms depending on Encrypt/Decrypt mode
function sbox_val(inp: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); mode: std_logic)
return std_logic_vector is
variable address: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable data_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable outdata: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin

if mode='0' then
    address(7) := inp(6) xor inp(4) xor inp(1) xor '0';
    address(6) := inp(5) xor inp(3) xor inp(0) xor '0';
    address(5) := inp(7) xor inp(4) xor inp(2) xor '0';
    address(4) := inp(6) xor inp(3) xor inp(1) xor '0';
    address(3) := inp(5) xor inp(2) xor inp(0) xor '0';
    address(2) := inp(7) xor inp(4) xor inp(1) xor '1';
    address(1) := inp(6) xor inp(3) xor inp(0) xor '0';
    address(0) := inp(7) xor inp(5) xor inp(2) xor '1';
else

```



```

        address := inp;
end if;

data_stdlogic := inv_val(address);

if mode='1' then
    outdata(7) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor '0';
    outdata(6) := data_stdlogic(6) xor data_stdlogic(5) xor
data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor data_stdlogic(2) xor '1';
    outdata(5) := data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor
data_stdlogic(3) xor data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor '1';
    outdata(4) := data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';
    outdata(3) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';
    outdata(2) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';
    outdata(1) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '1';
    outdata(0) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '1';
else
    outdata := data_stdlogic;
end if;
return outdata;
end function sbox_val;

```

## MixColumns Full LUT

```
--xtime LUT
function xtimes(inp: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return
std_logic_vector is
variable table: bit_vector(7 downto 0);
variable table_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin
case inp is

    when X"00" => table := X"00";
    when X"01" => table := X"02";
    when X"02" => table := X"04";
    when X"03" => table := X"06";
    when X"04" => table := X"08";
    when X"05" => table := X"0a";
    when X"06" => table := X"0c";
    when X"07" => table := X"0e";
    when X"08" => table := X"10";
    when X"09" => table := X"12";
    when X"0a" => table := X"14";
    when X"0b" => table := X"16";
    when X"0c" => table := X"18";
    when X"0d" => table := X"1a";
    when X"0e" => table := X"1c";
    when X"0f" => table := X"1e";
    when X"10" => table := X"20";
    when X"11" => table := X"22";
    when X"12" => table := X"24";
    when X"13" => table := X"26";
    when X"14" => table := X"28";
    when X"15" => table := X"2a";
    when X"16" => table := X"2c";
    when X"17" => table := X"2e";
    when X"18" => table := X"30";
    when X"19" => table := X"32";
    when X"1a" => table := X"34";
    when X"1b" => table := X"36";
    when X"1c" => table := X"38";
    when X"1d" => table := X"3a";
    when X"1e" => table := X"3c";
    when X"1f" => table := X"3e";
    when X"20" => table := X"40";
    when X"21" => table := X"42";
    when X"22" => table := X"44";
    when X"23" => table := X"46";
    when X"24" => table := X"48";
    when X"25" => table := X"4a";
    when X"26" => table := X"4c";
    when X"27" => table := X"4e";
    when X"28" => table := X"50";
    when X"29" => table := X"52";
    when X"2a" => table := X"54";
    when X"2b" => table := X"56";
    when X"2c" => table := X"58";
```

```
when X"2d" => table := X"5a";
when X"2e" => table := X"5c";
when X"2f" => table := X"5e";
when X"30" => table := X"60";
when X"31" => table := X"62";
when X"32" => table := X"64";
when X"33" => table := X"66";
when X"34" => table := X"68";
when X"35" => table := X"6a";
when X"36" => table := X"6c";
when X"37" => table := X"6e";
when X"38" => table := X"70";
when X"39" => table := X"72";
when X"3a" => table := X"74";
when X"3b" => table := X"76";
when X"3c" => table := X"78";
when X"3d" => table := X"7a";
when X"3e" => table := X"7c";
when X"3f" => table := X"7e";
when X"40" => table := X"80";
when X"41" => table := X"82";
when X"42" => table := X"84";
when X"43" => table := X"86";
when X"44" => table := X"88";
when X"45" => table := X"8a";
when X"46" => table := X"8c";
when X"47" => table := X"8e";
when X"48" => table := X"90";
when X"49" => table := X"92";
when X"4a" => table := X"94";
when X"4b" => table := X"96";
when X"4c" => table := X"98";
when X"4d" => table := X"9a";
when X"4e" => table := X"9c";
when X"4f" => table := X"9e";
when X"50" => table := X"a0";
when X"51" => table := X"a2";
when X"52" => table := X"a4";
when X"53" => table := X"a6";
when X"54" => table := X"a8";
when X"55" => table := X"aa";
when X"56" => table := X"ac";
when X"57" => table := X"ae";
when X"58" => table := X"b0";
when X"59" => table := X"b2";
when X"5a" => table := X"b4";
when X"5b" => table := X"b6";
when X"5c" => table := X"b8";
when X"5d" => table := X"ba";
when X"5e" => table := X"bc";
when X"5f" => table := X"be";
when X"60" => table := X"c0";
when X"61" => table := X"c2";
when X"62" => table := X"c4";
when X"63" => table := X"c6";
```

```
when X"64" => table := X"c8";
when X"65" => table := X"ca";
when X"66" => table := X"cc";
when X"67" => table := X"ce";
when X"68" => table := X"d0";
when X"69" => table := X"d2";
when X"6a" => table := X"d4";
when X"6b" => table := X"d6";
when X"6c" => table := X"d8";
when X"6d" => table := X"da";
when X"6e" => table := X"dc";
when X"6f" => table := X"de";
when X"70" => table := X"e0";
when X"71" => table := X"e2";
when X"72" => table := X"e4";
when X"73" => table := X"e6";
when X"74" => table := X"e8";
when X"75" => table := X"ea";
when X"76" => table := X"ec";
when X"77" => table := X"ee";
when X"78" => table := X"f0";
when X"79" => table := X"f2";
when X"7a" => table := X"f4";
when X"7b" => table := X"f6";
when X"7c" => table := X"f8";
when X"7d" => table := X"fa";
when X"7e" => table := X"fc";
when X"7f" => table := X"fe";
when X"80" => table := X"1b";
when X"81" => table := X"19";
when X"82" => table := X"1f";
when X"83" => table := X"1d";
when X"84" => table := X"13";
when X"85" => table := X"11";
when X"86" => table := X"17";
when X"87" => table := X"15";
when X"88" => table := X"0b";
when X"89" => table := X"09";
when X"8a" => table := X"0f";
when X"8b" => table := X"0d";
when X"8c" => table := X"03";
when X"8d" => table := X"01";
when X"8e" => table := X"07";
when X"8f" => table := X"05";
when X"90" => table := X"3b";
when X"91" => table := X"39";
when X"92" => table := X"3f";
when X"93" => table := X"3d";
when X"94" => table := X"33";
when X"95" => table := X"31";
when X"96" => table := X"37";
when X"97" => table := X"35";
when X"98" => table := X"2b";
when X"99" => table := X"29";
when X"9a" => table := X"2f";
```

```
when X"9b" => table := X"2d";
when X"9c" => table := X"23";
when X"9d" => table := X"21";
when X"9e" => table := X"27";
when X"9f" => table := X"25";
when X"a0" => table := X"5b";
when X"a1" => table := X"59";
when X"a2" => table := X"5f";
when X"a3" => table := X"5d";
when X"a4" => table := X"53";
when X"a5" => table := X"51";
when X"a6" => table := X"57";
when X"a7" => table := X"55";
when X"a8" => table := X"4b";
when X"a9" => table := X"49";
when X"aa" => table := X"4f";
when X"ab" => table := X"4d";
when X"ac" => table := X"43";
when X"ad" => table := X"41";
when X"ae" => table := X"47";
when X"af" => table := X"45";
when X"b0" => table := X"7b";
when X"b1" => table := X"79";
when X"b2" => table := X"7f";
when X"b3" => table := X"7d";
when X"b4" => table := X"73";
when X"b5" => table := X"71";
when X"b6" => table := X"77";
when X"b7" => table := X"75";
when X"b8" => table := X"6b";
when X"b9" => table := X"69";
when X"ba" => table := X"6f";
when X"bb" => table := X"6d";
when X"bc" => table := X"63";
when X"bd" => table := X"61";
when X"be" => table := X"67";
when X"bf" => table := X"65";
when X"c0" => table := X"9b";
when X"c1" => table := X"99";
when X"c2" => table := X"9f";
when X"c3" => table := X"9d";
when X"c4" => table := X"93";
when X"c5" => table := X"91";
when X"c6" => table := X"97";
when X"c7" => table := X"95";
when X"c8" => table := X"8b";
when X"c9" => table := X"89";
when X"ca" => table := X"8f";
when X"cb" => table := X"8d";
when X"cc" => table := X"83";
when X"cd" => table := X"81";
when X"ce" => table := X"87";
when X"cf" => table := X"85";
when X"d0" => table := X"bb";
when X"d1" => table := X"b9";
```

```

when X"d2" => table := X"bf";
when X"d3" => table := X"bd";
when X"d4" => table := X"b3";
when X"d5" => table := X"b1";
when X"d6" => table := X"b7";
when X"d7" => table := X"b5";
when X"d8" => table := X"ab";
when X"d9" => table := X"a9";
when X"da" => table := X"af";
when X"db" => table := X"ad";
when X"dc" => table := X"a3";
when X"dd" => table := X"a1";
when X"de" => table := X"a7";
when X"df" => table := X"a5";
when X"e0" => table := X"db";
when X"e1" => table := X"d9";
when X"e2" => table := X"df";
when X"e3" => table := X"dd";
when X"e4" => table := X"d3";
when X"e5" => table := X"d1";
when X"e6" => table := X"d7";
when X"e7" => table := X"d5";
when X"e8" => table := X"cb";
when X"e9" => table := X"c9";
when X"ea" => table := X"cf";
when X"eb" => table := X"cd";
when X"ec" => table := X"c3";
when X"ed" => table := X"c1";
when X"ee" => table := X"c7";
when X"ef" => table := X"c5";
when X"f0" => table := X"fb";
when X"f1" => table := X"f9";
when X"f2" => table := X"ff";
when X"f3" => table := X"fd";
when X"f4" => table := X"f3";
when X"f5" => table := X"f1";
when X"f6" => table := X"f7";
when X"f7" => table := X"f5";
when X"f8" => table := X"eb";
when X"f9" => table := X"e9";
when X"fa" => table := X"ef";
when X"fb" => table := X"ed";
when X"fc" => table := X"e3";
when X"fd" => table := X"e1";
when X"fe" => table := X"e7";
when X"ff" => table := X"e5";
when others => null;
end case;
table_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(table);
return table_stdlogic;
end function xtimes;

--Processing step for encryption
function col_transform(p: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector is
    variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);

```

```

variable m,n: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin
    m := xtimes(p(0));
    n := xtimes(p(1)) xor p(1);
    result := m xor n xor p(2) xor p(3);
    return result;
end function col_transform;

--Preprocessing step for decryption
function col_inv_transform(s: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector
is
variable u: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable v: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable prep: state_array_type;
begin

    u := xtimes(xtimes(s(0) xor s(2)));
    v := xtimes(xtimes(s(1) xor s(3)));
    prep(0) := s(0) xor u;
    prep(1) := s(1) xor v;
    prep(2) := s(2) xor u;
    prep(3) := s(3) xor v;
    result := col_transform(prep);
    return result;
end function col_inv_transform;

```

## MixColumns Half LUT

```
function xtimes(inp: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return
std_logic_vector is
variable table: bit_vector(7 downto 0);
variable table_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin

--replaces half of xtime LUT with a bitwise shift
if inp < X"80" then
    table_stdlogic := (inp(6 downto 0) & '0');
else

--the other half of the LUT
case inp is
    when X"80" => table := X"1b";
    when X"81" => table := X"19";
    when X"82" => table := X"1f";
    when X"83" => table := X"1d";
    when X"84" => table := X"13";
    when X"85" => table := X"11";
    when X"86" => table := X"17";
    when X"87" => table := X"15";
    when X"88" => table := X"0b";
    when X"89" => table := X"09";
    when X"8a" => table := X"0f";
    when X"8b" => table := X"0d";
    when X"8c" => table := X"03";
    when X"8d" => table := X"01";
    when X"8e" => table := X"07";
    when X"8f" => table := X"05";
    when X"90" => table := X"3b";
    when X"91" => table := X"39";
    when X"92" => table := X"3f";
    when X"93" => table := X"3d";
    when X"94" => table := X"33";
    when X"95" => table := X"31";
    when X"96" => table := X"37";
    when X"97" => table := X"35";
    when X"98" => table := X"2b";
    when X"99" => table := X"29";
    when X"9a" => table := X"2f";
    when X"9b" => table := X"2d";
    when X"9c" => table := X"23";
    when X"9d" => table := X"21";
    when X"9e" => table := X"27";
    when X"9f" => table := X"25";
    when X"a0" => table := X"5b";
    when X"a1" => table := X"59";
    when X"a2" => table := X"5f";
    when X"a3" => table := X"5d";
    when X"a4" => table := X"53";
    when X"a5" => table := X"51";
    when X"a6" => table := X"57";
    when X"a7" => table := X"55";
```



```
when X"a8" => table := X"4b";
when X"a9" => table := X"49";
when X"aa" => table := X"4f";
when X"ab" => table := X"4d";
when X"ac" => table := X"43";
when X"ad" => table := X"41";
when X"ae" => table := X"47";
when X"af" => table := X"45";
when X"b0" => table := X"7b";
when X"b1" => table := X"79";
when X"b2" => table := X"7f";
when X"b3" => table := X"7d";
when X"b4" => table := X"73";
when X"b5" => table := X"71";
when X"b6" => table := X"77";
when X"b7" => table := X"75";
when X"b8" => table := X"6b";
when X"b9" => table := X"69";
when X"ba" => table := X"6f";
when X"bb" => table := X"6d";
when X"bc" => table := X"63";
when X"bd" => table := X"61";
when X"be" => table := X"67";
when X"bf" => table := X"65";
when X"c0" => table := X"9b";
when X"c1" => table := X"99";
when X"c2" => table := X"9f";
when X"c3" => table := X"9d";
when X"c4" => table := X"93";
when X"c5" => table := X"91";
when X"c6" => table := X"97";
when X"c7" => table := X"95";
when X"c8" => table := X"8b";
when X"c9" => table := X"89";
when X"ca" => table := X"8f";
when X"cb" => table := X"8d";
when X"cc" => table := X"83";
when X"cd" => table := X"81";
when X"ce" => table := X"87";
when X"cf" => table := X"85";
when X"d0" => table := X"bb";
when X"d1" => table := X"b9";
when X"d2" => table := X"bf";
when X"d3" => table := X"bd";
when X"d4" => table := X"b3";
when X"d5" => table := X"b1";
when X"d6" => table := X"b7";
when X"d7" => table := X"b5";
when X"d8" => table := X"ab";
when X"d9" => table := X"a9";
when X"da" => table := X"af";
when X"db" => table := X"ad";
when X"dc" => table := X"a3";
when X"dd" => table := X"a1";
when X"de" => table := X"a7";
```

```

when X"df" => table := X"a5";
when X"e0" => table := X"db";
when X"e1" => table := X"d9";
when X"e2" => table := X"df";
when X"e3" => table := X"dd";
when X"e4" => table := X"d3";
when X"e5" => table := X"d1";
when X"e6" => table := X"d7";
when X"e7" => table := X"d5";
when X"e8" => table := X"cb";
when X"e9" => table := X"c9";
when X"ea" => table := X"cf";
when X"eb" => table := X"cd";
when X"ec" => table := X"c3";
when X"ed" => table := X"c1";
when X"ee" => table := X"c7";
when X"ef" => table := X"c5";
when X"f0" => table := X"fb";
when X"f1" => table := X"f9";
when X"f2" => table := X"ff";
when X"f3" => table := X"fd";
when X"f4" => table := X"f3";
when X"f5" => table := X"f1";
when X"f6" => table := X"f7";
when X"f7" => table := X"f5";
when X"f8" => table := X"eb";
when X"f9" => table := X"e9";
when X"fa" => table := X"ef";
when X"fb" => table := X"ed";
when X"fc" => table := X"e3";
when X"fd" => table := X"e1";
when X"fe" => table := X"e7";
when X"ff" => table := X"e5";
when others => null;
end case;
table_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(table);
end if;
return table_stdlogic;
end function xtimes;

--Processing step for encryption
function col_transform(p: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector is
variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable m,n: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin
m := xtimes(p(0));
n := xtimes(p(1)) xor p(1);
result := m xor n xor p(2) xor p(3);
return result;
end function col_transform;

--Preprocessing step for decryption
function col_inv_transform(s: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector
is
variable u: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);

```

```
variable v: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable prep: state_array_type;
begin

    u := xtimes(xtimes(s(0) xor s(2)));
    v := xtimes(xtimes(s(1) xor s(3)));
    prep(0) := s(0) xor u;
    prep(1) := s(1) xor v;
    prep(2) := s(2) xor u;
    prep(3) := s(3) xor v;
    result := col_transform(prep);
    return result;
end function col_inv_transform;
```

## MixColumns Arithmetic

```
--Copyright (C) 2004 Hemanth Satyanarayana

--Uses Trenholme's Algorithm to compute modulus for encryption
function col_transform(p: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector is
variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable m,n: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin
  if(p(0)(7) = '1') then
    m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
  else
    m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0');
  end if;
  if(p(1)(7) = '1') then
    n := (p(1)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011" xor p(1);
  else
    n := (p(1)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor p(1);
  end if;
  result := m xor n xor p(2) xor p(3);
  return result;
end function col_transform;

--Uses Trenholme's Algorithm to compute modulus values for decryption
function col_inv_transform(s: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector
is
variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable sub0,sub1,sub2,sub3: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable x0,y0,z0: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable x1,y1,z1: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable x2,y2,z2: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
variable x3,y3,z3: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
begin
  if(s(0)(7) = '1') then
    x0 := (s(0)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
  else
    x0 := (s(0)(6 downto 0) & '0');
  end if;
  if(x0(7) = '1') then
    y0 := (x0(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
  else
    y0 := (x0(6 downto 0) & '0');
  end if;
  if(y0(7) = '1') then
    z0 := (y0(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
  else
    z0 := (y0(6 downto 0) & '0');
  end if;
  sub0 := (x0 xor y0 xor z0);-----

  if(s(1)(7) = '1') then
    x1 := (s(1)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
  else
    x1 := (s(1)(6 downto 0) & '0');
  end if;
```

```

if(x1(7) = '1') then
  y1 := (x1(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
else
  y1 := (x1(6 downto 0) & '0');
end if;
if(y1(7) = '1') then
  z1 := (y1(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
else
  z1 := (y1(6 downto 0) & '0');
end if;
sub1 := (x1 xor z1 xor s(1));-----

if(s(2)(7) = '1') then
  x2 := (s(2)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
else
  x2 := (s(2)(6 downto 0) & '0');
end if;
if(x2(7) = '1') then
  y2 := (x2(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
else
  y2 := (x2(6 downto 0) & '0');
end if;
if(y2(7) = '1') then
  z2 := (y2(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
else
  z2 := (y2(6 downto 0) & '0');
end if;
sub2 := (y2 xor z2 xor s(2));-----

if(s(3)(7) = '1') then
  x3 := (s(3)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
else
  x3 := (s(3)(6 downto 0) & '0');
end if;
if(x3(7) = '1') then
  y3 := (x3(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
else
  y3 := (x3(6 downto 0) & '0');
end if;
if(y3(7) = '1') then
  z3 := (y3(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011";
else
  z3 := (y3(6 downto 0) & '0');
end if;
sub3 := (z3 xor s(3));-----

result := sub0 xor sub1 xor sub2 xor sub3;
return result;
end function col_inv_transform;

```

## Appendix C: Statistical Data Tables

Table 25. Analysis of Variance Table for Area Occupied

Source	DF	Seq SS	Adj SS	Adj MS
SubBytes Design	2	13700255055	13700255055	6850127527
MixColumns Design	2	15902640562	15902640562	7951320281
Synthesis Goal	1	550544684	550544684	550544684
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design	4	150371320	150371320	37592830
SubBytes Design*Synthesis Goal	2	37100094	37100094	18550047
MixColumns Design*Synthesis Goal	2	5430919	5430919	2715460
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design* Synthesis Goal	4	196245452	196245452	49061363
Error	0	*	*	*
Total	17	30542588085		

S = \*

Table 26. Quantification of Effects for Area Occupied

Term	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	81053.8	*	*	*
SubBytes Des				
Composite Field Inversion	-26670.3	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion	-11326.8	*	*	*
MixColumns D				
Arithmetic	-21268.4	*	*	*
Half LUT	-20765.8	*	*	*
Synthesis Go				
Area	-5530.44	*	*	*
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D				
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic	-1314.56	*	*	*
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT	-2135.22	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic	-889.056	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT	-1350.22	*	*	*
SubBytes Des*Synthesis Go				
Composite Field Inversion Area	1156.94	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion Area	866.444	*	*	*
MixColumns D*Synthesis Go				
Arithmetic Area	743.111	*	*	*
Half LUT Area	-567.556	*	*	*
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D*Synthesis Go				
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic Area	1457.89	*	*	*
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT Area	2507.56	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic Area	1201.39	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT Area	1342.56	*	*	*

Table 27. Analysis of Variance Table for Area Efficiency

Source	DF	Seq SS	Adj SS	Adj MS	F	P
SubBytes Design	2	257.976	257.976	128.988	**	
MixColumns Design	2	409.585	409.585	204.792	**	
Synthesis Goal	1	20.278	20.278	20.278	**	
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design	4	81.639	81.639	20.410	**	
SubBytes Design*Synthesis Goal	2	7.496	7.496	3.748	**	
MixColumns Design*Synthesis Goal	2	6.390	6.390	3.195	**	
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design* Synthesis Goal	4	2.710	2.710	0.677	**	
Error	0	*	*	*		
Total	17	786.074				

S = \*

Table 28. Quantification of Effects for Area Efficiency

Term	SE Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	11.0028	*	*	*
SubBytes Des				
Composite Field Inversion	3.45900	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion	1.80950	*	*	*
MixColumns D				
Arithmetic	3.16817	*	*	*
Half LUT	3.57383	*	*	*
Synthesis Go				
Area	-1.06139	*	*	*
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D				
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic	1.37900	*	*	*
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT	1.61733	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic	0.402500	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT	0.706833	*	*	*
SubBytes Des*Synthesis Go				
Composite Field Inversion Area	-0.853444	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion Area	0.706722	*	*	*
MixColumns D*Synthesis Go				
Arithmetic Area	-0.720944	*	*	*
Half LUT Area	-0.017278	*	*	*
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D*Synthesis Go				
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic Area	-0.319222	*	*	*
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT Area	-0.447889	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic Area	0.091611	*	*	*
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT Area	0.291944	*	*	*

## Bibliography

- [CaA03] C. Caltagirone and K. Anantha. High Throughput, Parallelized 128-bit AES Encryption in a Resource-Limited FPGA. In *Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures*, pages 240-241, San Diego, CA, 2003.
- [ChG01] P. Chodowicz and K. Gaj. *Comparison of the Hardware Performance of the AES Candidates using Reconfigurable Hardware*. George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 2001.
- [DaR98] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen. *The Design of Rijndael. AES—The Advanced Encryption Standard*. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1998.
- [GoB05] T. Good and M. Benaissa. AES on FPGA from the Fastest to the Smallest. In *Proceedings of the Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Conference, Lecture Notes in Computer Science* vol 3659, pages 427-440, 29 August 2005.
- [JST03] K. Järvinen, J.O. Skyttä, and M.T. Tommiska. A Fully Pipelined Memoryless 17.8 Gbps AES-128 Encryptor. In *Proceedings of the 2003 ACM/SIGDA Eleventh International Symposium on FPGAs*, pages 207-215, Monterey, CA, 2003.
- [Nis01] National Institute of Standards and Technology. *Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)*. Federal Information Standards Publication, 2001.
- [Odr01] C. O’Driscoll. *Hardware Implementation Aspects of the Rijndael Block Cipher*. Masters thesis. National University of Ireland, Cork, Ireland 2001.
- [PaR97] C. Paar and M. Rosner. Comparison of arithmetic architectures for Reed-Solomon decoders in reconfigurable hardware. In *Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE Symposium on FPGA-Based Custom Computing Machines*, pages 219-225, 1997.
- [Pio04] T. Pionteck, T. Staake, T. Stiefmeier, L.D. Kabulepa, and M. Glesner. Design of a reconfigurable AES encryption/decryption engine for mobile terminals. In *Proceedings of the 2004 International Symposium on Circuits and Systems* vol 2, pages 545-548, May 2004.
- [QIS05] H. Qin, Y. Iguchi, and T. Sasao. An FPGA design of AES encryption circuit with 128-bit keys. In *Proceedings of the 15<sup>th</sup> ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI*, pages 147-151, 2005.



- [Rij94] V. Rijmen. *Efficient Implementation of the Rijndael S-Box*. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Heverlee, Belgium, 1994.
- [Rou04] G. Rouvroy, F.X. Standaert, J.J. Quisquater, and J.D. Legat. Compact and Efficient Encryption/Decryption Module for FPGA Implementation of the AES Rijndael Very Well Suited for Small Embedded Applications. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing* vol 2, page 583, 2004.
- [Rud01] A. Rudra, P.K. Dubey, C.S. Jutla, V. Kumar, J.R. Rao, and P. Rohatgi. Efficient Implementation of Rijndael Encryption with Composite Field Arithmetic. In *Proceedings of the Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Conference, Lecture Notes in Computer Science* vol 2162, pages 171-185, Paris, France, May 2001.
- [Sat04] H. Satyanarayana. aes\_crypto\_core. open source VHDL  
[http://www.opencores.org/projects.cgi/web/aes\\_crypto\\_core/overview](http://www.opencores.org/projects.cgi/web/aes_crypto_core/overview)  
28 December 2004.
- [SDR] N.A. Saqib, A. Díaz-Pérez, and F. Rodríguez-Henriquez. *A Compact and Efficient FPGA Implementation of the DES Algorithm*. Computer Science Section, Electrical Engineering Department, Centro de Investigación y de Estudios Avanzados del IPN (Not Dated).
- [Sti06] D.R. Stinson. *Cryptography Theory and Practice* (3rd Edition). Boca Raton: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2006.
- [Wik06a] Wikipedia Contributors. “Finite Field Arithmetic”, *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*. n. pag.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Finite\\_field\\_arithmetic&oldid=95285693](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Finite_field_arithmetic&oldid=95285693), 19 December 2006.
- [Wik06b] Wikipedia Contributors. “Rijndael key schedule”, *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*. n. pag.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Rijndael\\_key\\_schedule&oldid=95563942](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Rijndael_key_schedule&oldid=95563942), 20 December 2006.
- [Wik07a] Wikipedia Contributors. “Advanced Encryption Standard”, *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*. n. pag.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Advanced\\_Encryption\\_Standard&oldid=102110762](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Advanced_Encryption_Standard&oldid=102110762), 21 January 2007.

- [Wik07b] Wikipedia Contributors. "Finite Field", *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*. n. pag.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Finite\\_field&oldid=99871161](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Finite_field&oldid=99871161),  
10 January 2007.
- [Xil07] Xilinx. Xilinx Virtex-II Series FPGAs. page 2, 2007.  
<http://www.xilinx.com/publications/matrix/virtexmatrix.pdf>.
- [ZCN04] J. Zambreno, A. Choudhary, and D. Nguyen. Exploring Area/Delay Tradeoffs in an AES FPGA Implementation. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and its Applications*, pages 575-585, August 2004.

## **Vita**

Second Lieutenant Ryan Jay Silva graduated from Regis Jesuit High School in Aurora, Colorado. He entered undergraduate studies at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado where he graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering in June 2005. His first assignment was to complete this thesis at the Air Force Institute of Technology. Upon graduation he will be assigned to the 84 Radar Evaluation Squadron at Hill, AFB in Ogden, Utah. He looks forward to leaving the dreary Midwestern landscape for the sunny mountains of Utah.

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>				<i>Form Approved OMB No. 074-0188</i>	
<p>The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.</p> <p><b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b></p>					
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 22-03-2007		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master's Thesis		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> August 2005 - March 2007	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>  Implementation and Optimization of the Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm on an 8-Bit Field Programmable Gate Array Hardware Platform				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b>  Silva, Ryan J., 2LT, USAF				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)</b> Air Force Institute of Technology Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 WPAFB OH 45433-8865				<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>  AFIT/GE/ENG/07-21	
<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Christopher E Reuter, Civ, AFRL/SNTA (937) 320-9068 x163, Christopher.Reuter2@wpafb.af.mil 2241 Avionics Circle WPAFB, OH 4433-7320				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b>  APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> The contribution of this research is three-fold. The first is a method of converting the area occupied by a circuit implemented on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to an equivalent as a measure of total gate count. This allows direct comparison between two FPGA implementations independent of the manufacturer or chip family. The second contribution improves the performance of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) on an 8-bit computing platform. This research develops an AES design that occupies less than three quarters of the area reported by the smallest design in current literature as well as significantly increases area efficiency. The third contribution of this research is an examination of how various designs for the critical AES SubBytes and MixColumns transformations interact and affect the overall performance of AES. The transformations responsible for the largest variance in performance are identified and the effect is measured in terms of throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Advanced Encryption Standard, Cryptology, Field Programmable Gate Array, Number Theory					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			Dr. Rusty O. Baldwin
U	U	U	UU	133	<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)</b> 937-785-6565 rbaldwin@afit.edu

