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The Impact of Changing Requirements

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THESIS

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Abstract

The fundamental purpose of an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) is to change the requirements of a contract. To build in flexibility, the acquisition practice is to estimate a dollar value to hold in reserve after the contract is awarded. There appears to be no empirical-based method for estimating this ECP withhold in the literature. Using the Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE) database, 533 contracts were randomly selected to build two regression models: one to predict the likelihood of a contract experiencing an ECP, and the other to determine the expected median percent increase in baseline contract cost if an ECP was likely. Results suggest that this two-step approach works well over a managed portfolio of contracts in contrast to three investigated rules-of-thumb. Significant drivers are the basic contract cost and the number of contract line items.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank everyone that spent the time to listen to my ramblings about this work. As time goes on, I am sure I will look back with a fondness and dislike at both the good times creating the work and at how much more I could have done. Most importantly, I want to thank my loving wife, not for her help on the thesis, but for her general love and support.

James C. Ellis

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I. Introduction

An Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) is a scope change to a contract, usually technical in nature. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report (2008) found that 63 percent of major defense programs had requirement changes after system development began. The major defense programs with requirement changes encountered cost growth of 72 percent, while costs grew by only 11 percent among those programs that did not change requirements (2008). With such a large amount of preparation required before the military can spend money or purchase anything, how can 63 percent of programs change their requirements? How can programs experience 72 percent cost growth? Perhaps more importantly, what factors led to 63 percent of programs incurring an 72 percent increase in cost? We need to better understand the factors that lead to changing requirements along with their respective cost and schedule impact.

Background

Once a contract is awarded to a contractor, the scope or work requested is set. It requires multiple actions to change this now established work. The action of changing the established work is called a change order or contract modification. ECPs are a specific type of change order, as they initiate an engineering or technical change rather than an administrative or contracting change. They can be initiated by the acquisition agency, the contractor, or even feedback from the users. Yet despite a large amount preparation required before awarding a contract and a large amount required to modify a contract, history suggests that, by and large, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military departments have underestimated the cost of buying new weapon systems.

Arena et al. (2006) analyzed major DoD programs and discovered these experienced nearly 46% cost growth before the end of Milestone B and another 16% growth by Milestone C. This cost growth trend continued with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. As of the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) the JSF per-unit estimate has grown 57% from its initial October 2001 estimated value. To combat this cost growth, Congress led a reform labeled The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, often called WSARA. The act created a Pentagon office - Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) - to analyze the cost of defense programs. A highlighted trend since this reform act is giving more accurate information to decision makers sooner allowing decision makers to control their domain (US Congress, 2009). In this light, this research analyzes the factors related to cost growth; specifically, we analyze the technical changes to a contract that cause an increase in price.

ECPs can occur for many reasons. The fundamental purpose of an ECP is to change the requirements of a contract (ECP, 2017). To build in flexibility, the acquisition practice is to estimate a dollar value to hold in

reserve after the contract is awarded. This amount has several names, for the purpose of this article, we call it ECP withhold since it is the amount of money the Government withholds for ECPs.

This research builds on Cordell's (2017) logistical regression model for estimating the probability a contract will experience an ECP. With this research, cost estimators can use project-specific factors to derive a unique withhold estimate for ECPs; additionally, decision makers will be aware of the likelihood of experiencing an ECP. They will be able to better support programs with analytically backed information as well as streamline reporting, program reviews, and financial what-ifs scenarios. This research provides an alternative to the analogy or phased based methods for estimating ECPs. The intent is to develop a unique probability of an ECP and the dollar value of the ECPs for every contract; allowing each program office to use informed risk management.

Problem Statement

There are three major cost estimating guides in use by the Air Force today: The Air Force Cost Analysis Handbook (AFCAH), The GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, and The U.S. Air Force - Cost Risk and Uncertainty Analysis Handbook (AFCRUH). Each provide overlapping material and views in order to best estimate cost and risk, however, none of the guides provide an empirical-based method for estimating ECP withhold. Given this lack of guidance, practitioners employ common rules-of-thumb for ECP withhold.

The current practice for estimating ECPs is to use a static factor. This fixed static factor is multiplied by the total award price of the contract and then put into a separate accounting line for further use. The Air Force standard for estimating this withhold is to follow the 10% rule-of-thumb or to base it on a similar completed contract and adjust based on the opinion of a subject matter expert (AFCAH, 2007; Valentine 2017).

For both methods, this factor does not account for project risk, contract type, location, or project complexity, nor is there any statistical foundation. Using this static factor leads to overfunding some contracts and underfunding the other contracts. This impact is perhaps impossible to quantify, but it is something nearly every acquisition member understands. Inaccurate budgets create extra work to re-balance; however, that re-balancing is surface-level disruption. Inaccuracy causes other rippling effects as well. Projects with insufficient ECP funding may experience execution delays, which in turn may affect cost, morale, and project capability loss. Inadequate funding may force managers to accept too much programmatic risk; in contrast, excess funding may allow managers to be financially wasteful.

The purpose of this research is to present empirically-based models via historical data that can be used to estimate not only the likelihood of a contract experiencing an ECP but to also determine the amount of

ECP withhold as a percentage of the total contract cost. In addition, the study compares these models to the rule-of-thumb that a straight percentage is applied to all contracts for ECP withhold, which has the tacit assumption that all contracts experience an ECP. The analysis presented in this paper is at the contract level, not a program level.

Research Objectives

There are two main objectives of this research. The first objective is to verify and build on Cordell's (2017) logistical regression model for estimating the probability that a contract will experience an ECP. The second objective is to develop a multiple regression model to output the percentage increase in cost due to ECPs over the baseline estimate.

Research Questions

1. What factors affect the probability of experiencing an ECP?
2. What factors contribute to the magnitude of total ECP growth on a contract?

Methodology

The identification of data and methodology for this study are straightforward. We identified a large database of contracts stored on the Cost Assessment Data Enterprise's (CADE) website. This data contains information on over 7000 unique contracts and their respective modifications. Additionally, the data has many specific contract details, such as award date, service, phase, and modification descriptions that serve may useful in understanding ECPs.

To analyze this data, we use two regression-based models. Specifically, we use logistic regression to understand what factors affect the probability of experiencing an ECP. The results of the logistic regression return a probability of experiencing an ECP for a given contract. We then use this output to feed into a linear regression model. We use multiple linear regression to understand what factors affect the magnitude of total ECP growth. The output of this model is in the form of percent growth in the baseline cost of a contract due to expected ECPs. Both regression models utilize mixed stepwise fitting to determine the input variables. Additionally, both regression models are validated using a holdout validation. Each model is created and then validated on separate data points.

Cordell (2017) recommended reclassifying some modifications rather than using the standard/strictest definition of an ECP. He noticed that many outliers in ECP growth are occasions in which the Government would have prior knowledge and desire to spend money. If the Government has prior knowledge of a follow-on

effort, this confounds the relationship study of ECPs. To create this modified database, we created a stratified random sampling from the CADE database; reading each contract modification and applying the additional restriction/reclassification appropriately. This modified and sampled database is the data used for all analysis.

Summary

This research investigates the impact of changing requirements on a contract and is broken into five chapters. Chapter I is the introduction, briefly giving an overview on each chapter and purpose. Chapter II is the literature review, reviewing and synthesizing on previous literature. This allows us to start where others have left off and use their recommendations to aid in our approach. Chapter II also identifies the current method of estimating ECP withhold and the gaps in research associated with it. Chapter III dives into the methodology of this research. It lays out the near step-by-step process we used to obtain and sample contracts. Additionally, it addresses the statistical approach used in developing and testing the regression models. Chapter IV is the journal article submitted for publication. It contains a cursory introduction, review, methodology and then all of the results from creating and validating the regression models. Additionally, we compare and contrast the regression model vs the alternative withhold methods. Lastly, Chapter V is the conclusion and discussion section. Here we summarize the findings, discuss how the findings are relevant to the acquisition community, and suggest future research topics.

II. Literature Review

In this chapter we conduct a review of previous studies relating to ECPs. Understanding cost growth, the over-arching discipline, is required in order to understand what factors may predict ECPs as well as why ECPs are even a concern at all. For that reason, we also reference much in the cost growth field to build a foundation for ECPs. The first section defines the Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) and the standard process the acquisition community uses to manage them. Then we further explain the history of cost growth, touching on the past and current state of acquisitions. We review the specific research that predicts ECPs/cost growth, hoping to use their foundation to aid in our study. Lastly, we display the lack of statistical studies specifically for ECP and springboard into the proposed analysis in this thesis.

Engineering Change Proposals Defined

First, we need to start with a clear understanding of what ECPs are and how they are implemented. The Defense Acquisition Guide (DAG) defines an ECP as

> "the documentation by which a proposed engineering change is submitted to the responsible authority recommending that a change to an original item of equipment be considered, and the design or engineering change be incorporated into the article to modify, add to, delete, or supersede original parts." (Defense Acquisition University, 2017)

To expand and clarify the above, lets break down the different elements the word ECP. Engineering: This is the type of change performed/requested. They are usually technical in nature and include performance specifications and details. Contracting and Administrative changes are other types of changes listed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)(DC, 2017). Today, we are only concerned about the technical changes. Change: this is the action being performed/requested. You cannot change a contract that does not exist. Changes are signed by the contracting officer, directing the contractor to make a change to the established contract. The Changes Clause may authorize the contracting officer to make this modification order with or without the contractor's consent.

Proposal: A proposal is often provided by the contractor given to the Government for review. A proposal can be requested by the Government or given without solicitation to the Government by the contractor. Since change management falls within the systems engineering disciple and is not DoD specific, there may be multiple other synonymous definitions to replace what we define as an ECP. The other common names include, Engineering Change, Engineering Change Order, Engineering Change Request, Engineering Change Notice. For the purposes of this research, we will use the phrase Engineering Change Proposal as the encompassing system of requirements change.

ECPs are then further classified into multiple buckets. For our purposes, we will identify the two most broad classifications: Class I and Class II. Class I ECPs initiate changes that require Government approval before being implemented. Class I ECPS tend to be larger in cost and complexity or of greater impact to the contract. These changes can result from a number of reasons. For example, they can arise from problems with the baseline requirement, safety, interfaces, operating/servicing capability, preset adjustments, human interface including skill level, or training. Class I changes can be made to a contract in any phase of the acquisition lifecycle whether the product is fielding or still in development. Class I ECPs are also used to change contractual provisions that do not directly impact the configuration baseline; for example, changes affecting cost, warranties, deliveries, or data requirements. As with nearly everything, there is an official procedure to obtain program office approval and officially modify the contract. This process is usually handled through a formal Configuration Control Board (CCB), chaired by the Government Program Manager (PM) or delegated representative.

Class II changes correct minor conflicts, typos, and other minor changes that basically correct the documentation to reflect the current configuration. Class II applies only if the overall configuration is not changed. Class II ECPs are usually handled by the in-plant Government representative or PM. Class II ECPs normally require only government concurrence to ensure the change is properly classified and documented (Defense Acquisition University, 2017).

The process of incorporating an ECP is simplified as follows. The contractor provides the Government with a proposal to change the technical details of the contract - changes in price are included in this proposal. This proposal may or may not have been requested by the Government, it does not matter. The Government reviews and collectively agrees or disagrees to the proposal's information. The Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO) then modifies the current contract by adding a new description of work. The contractor then proceeds to fulfill the contract (now changed). There are many steps that happened during these processes, this is a simplification. Now that there is an understanding of what ECPs are, we need to understand the broader acquisition role that they fall in: cost growth.

Past and current state of cost growth

Arena et al. (2006) analyzed historical cost growth within Air Force major weapon systems. This study is part of a broader multi-study effort examining cost risk analysis requested by the U.S. Air Force. In the broader study, they are examining methods of assessing cost risk and biases introduced into the estimating process. Arena et al.'s stated goal is to provide an empirical way to evaluate cost risk.

Their primary source of data for assessing cost growth are Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs). They

state that SARs provide data in the form of annual reports that summarize the current program status of major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). Arena et al., selected SAR data from 68 major programs, spanning from 1968 to 2003. They found these programs had nearly a 46% cost growth before the end of Milestone II. Additionally, those programs experienced another 16% growth by Milestone III. The median cost growth factor is nearly 1.25, meaning the median cost growth is 25% above the Milestone II estimate. Arena, et al. state that

"Our analysis also shows that, by and large, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military

departments have underestimated the cost of buying new weapon systems. (Arena et al., xi)

Their results find very few factors with any significant correlation with cost growth. Arena et al. found that schedule and commodity may have an impact. Programs with longer duration had greater cost growth. Also, Electronics programs tended to have lower cost growth. Although they did notice some differences in the mean total cost growth among the military departments, the differences are not statistically significant. Lastly, newer programs appear to have lower cost growth, however they do not conclude that acquisition policies had any influence. From this study, we use commodity, schedule and service as potential predictors. Additionally, we will create a variable to potentially account for the major acquisition policy reforms that occurred during our data.

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is the principal staff element of the Secretary of Defense in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal, and program evaluation responsibilities. Annually, OSD releases *Performance of the Defense Acquisition System.* Their recent report discusses many cost growth concepts. They found the median total cost growth of programs is 49% with the median annual growth at over 1% (OSD, 2016). They discussed in detail that the median cost growth is the appropriate metric to report. OSD found that there are a few very large outliers skewing results. In fact, they claim cost growth on major programs generally is at or improving compared to historical levels, but extreme outliers remain a problem. Outliers negatively influence the overall perceptions about the defense acquisition system. Understanding why a program may exhibit such a large percentage cost growth requires an individual examination of each individual case. For example, the C-130J originally was envisioned as a non-developmental aircraft acquisition with a negligible developmental effort planned. Several years into the program, a decision was made to install the Global Air Traffic Management system, causing the total development funding growth to climb upward of 3,000 percent. This is an example of a major change in the program rather than poor execution although still classified as a change in requirements.

ECPs Place in Cost Growth

The concept of a few substantial cost growth outliers is supported by GAO (2015) in their ECP research. The GAO report focuses on analyzing MDAP programs and their systems engineering processes. The study concluded that high level requirements did not frequently change. High level requirements refer to Key Performance Parameters (KPP). In fact, only 5 of 78 programs (2009-2013) reported changes to key performance parameters. However, changing high level requirements can be a potential indicator for outliers for extreme cost growth despite the fact that changing requirements does not require a change in cost (GAO, 2015). Collectively, we start to see the similarities between cost growth and ECPs. Additionally, it appears that there are large outliers in both fields.

An NRO Cost Group (2005) study was one of the first to focus on engineering changes and their impact on the final total cost of a program. This study shed light on the issues surrounding how much should be included in an estimate to best compensate for requirements changes. The NRO Cost Group analyzed 21 space related programs that ranged from 4 million dollars to 4 billion dollars. The research showed that of the expected cost growth contained in the program, approximately 20%-30% would be for new technical scope. Bolten et al. (2008) support the NRO research. Bolten et al. assessed SAR inputs for 35 major programs that were considered greater than 90% complete. They aggregated the justifications provided for cost growth by each program. The study is not specifically assessing the impacts of changing requirements; however, they find that changing requirements contributes to cost growth. They show that between 10% - 18% of a program's cost is attributable to requirements changing (Bolten et al., 2008). This percent is relatively close to the fixed amount used by current practitioners (10%).

Neither of these reports attempt to discover factors that cause cost growth or lead to changing requirements. Instead, they describe the major sources/reasons of cost growth. Rather than mistakes or errors in procurement or execution, Bolten et al. conclude that "total (development plus procurement) cost growth is dominated by decisions, which account for more than two-thirds of the growth" (Bolten et al., 2008, pg. xvi). Changing requirements is classified as a decision by the Government. The other major source of cost growth is a change in quantity. Changing the quantity of a contract accounts for nearly 41% of cost growth on procurement contracts (Bolten et al., 2008). In order to create more flexibility in our regression model, we decide to create a variable to help account for known changes quantity. While changes in quantity are by the strictest definition an ECP since it is a technical change to the requirements, we recorded it as a separate variable to potentially explain additional cost variance.

The GAO (2011) released a 12-page report with details regarding Nunn-McCurdy breaches since 1997. Since 1997 there have been 74 unique program breaches. Of the 74, 34 state changing requirement as a factor

related to their breach (GAO, 2011). This percent is higher percent than found by Bolten et al. and the NRO cost group. We believe this to be since the GAO report did not randomly sample 74 programs, rather they assessed 74 "failing" programs. With this information, we hypothesize that programs experiencing cost growth/requirements changes tend to experience even more cost growth/requirements changes. Again, this idea of outliers emerges. The GAO report provides additional insight of the 74 programs. Forty-one programs state a change in quantity, further validating that we need to account for quantity changes in our regression models.

Following this same trend, Harmon and Arnold (2013) state that 11 of 16 development programs that had positive year over year cost growth, added unplanned capability. Programs that have modified requirements will continue to modify requirements. They state a strong correlation between programs that have requirements changes and those that have cost growth. Increasing the capabilities of a program beyond the established contract adds cost and potential risk to mature weapon systems already in production. This report also performed an assessment of contract type, which is discussed in the next section.

Causes of ECPs

Program Level

On the program level, Christensen and Templin (2000) tested whether the median Management Reserve (MR) percent on fixed-price contracts was greater than the MR on cost reimbursable contracts. They conclude that fixed-price contracts have a lower MR. While MR is not identical to ECP withhold, MR is the contractor's expectations of riskiness. As previously stated in the literature review, whenever a program starts to have trouble, it tends to continue having trouble. We expect programs with more perceived riskiness to have a higher probability of needing an ECP. For these reasons, we will include Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contracts as a potential variable in our regression model.

Since we know that cost growth and ECPs are related, factors predicting cost growth may help predict ECPs. Trudelle, White, Ritschel, Koshnick, Lucas (2017) found several variables to be predictive factors for determining if a program will experience only a limited cost and schedule growth. They found that Electronic System Programs, Projected Milestone II to Initial Operational Capability (IOC) duration of less than 58 months, and extra-large programs to be statically significant. All three of these variables are already documented in this literature review: commodity, schedule and project size. The Trudelle article supports Arena et al.'s (2006) report that electronic programs and shorter schedules experience less cost growth.

In contrast, Trudelle et al. found that programs that are fixed wing aircraft, longer that 28 months between Milestone I and Milestone II, started after 1985, and spending at least $272M (FY17) of RDT&E

funding to be predictive that programs are likely to experience more cost growth and schedule slippage. From this research, they conclude that schedule length is related to program cost and schedule growth. Since a program is the summation of contracts, perhaps schedule is related to whether or not a contract will experience the same delays and overruns. This leads us into the contract level factors of predicting ECPs.

Contract Level

Davis and Anton (2016) analyzed cost growth for individual contracts on an annual basis. They assessed growth in contract cost using summary Earned Value (EV) data on 1,123 major contracts from FY1981-2015 for 239 major defense acquisition programs. These included the combined results from 9,680 Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) reports and 8,790 early production reports (Davis and Anton, 2016). They concluded that there are three statistically significant factors in modeling cost growth for development contracts. The first is the DoD budget. An increase in the 5-year average DoD budget, leads to an increase in average annual cost growth. The second is the acquisition related policy era. They found that cost growth is greatly reduced during the Better Buying Power era (post 2012) and was increasing leading into 1985. The third and final factor is the amount of growth in the current year above the previous year. If programs spent more than their average in any year, they tend to spend less than average the following year. Davis and Anton concluded that the 31-year average annual cost growth is ~7%.

Harmon and Arnold (2013) performed an assessment on contracts types, attempting to understand the impact of overall contract price. They determined that for a series of production contracts in which the system design is mature and stable, the best choice of contract type is FFP. The FFP contract provides the most incentive for the contractor to invest in cost-reducing innovations, as the contractor can keep more of the value of the cost savings in comparison to any other contract type. Harmon and Arnold's assessment aligns with the conclusions of Christensen and Templin (2000). Both studies conclude that contract type, FFP specifically, influence the execution of a contract.

Current Practice for Managing ECP

There are three major cost estimating guides in use today: The Air Force Cost Analysis Handbook (AFCAH), GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, and U.S. Air Force - Cost Risk and Uncertainty Analysis Handbook (AFCRUH). Each provide overlapping material and views in order to best estimate cost and risk. None of the guides provide a definite empirical starting location for estimating ECP withhold. They each recommend consulting a subject matter expert. The AFCAH provides an additional statement that an analogy program should be used to develop the ECP withhold: "...during the early stages of a

program, cost analysts generally estimate ECOs for the development and production phases as a percentage of total development and production program cost, respectively. The factors are based on experience from analogous programs." (AFCAH, 2007) Collectively, all three fail to provide a good standard or empirical starting location for estimating ECP withhold.

Ten percent rule of thumb

A relatively common rule of thumb among the acquisition community is that estimates may vary by ten percent. This is seen in several separate fields and disciplines. The starting location for estimating MR is 5% - 10% (PMI, 2017). The level of accuracy of cost realism for cost estimating is plus or minus 10% (PMI, 2017). The amount over cost for an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) breach is 10 percent (Department of Defense, 2015). For development cost estimates, a 10 percent cost is added above the total estimate (Valentine, 2017) and lastly, the Automated Cost Estimating Integrated Tools (ACEIT) software package ranges an ECP estimate between 6-10 percent.

Deep diving into the two factors relating to ECPs, ACEIT and Valentine. The ACEIT factors were developed by internally in the 1980s and are currently maintained by Tecolote Research, Incorporated. These factors were derived from assessing previous (historic) contracts and isolating the amount of cost caused by requirement changes. ACEIT uses at least two factors - one for the development phase and another for the production phase. Their survey resulted in a range of potential ECP production phase factors from 1.2 to 17.2 percent. The average percent (6%) is recommended as the factor for production contracts. ACEIT developed the recommended factor for development contracts by examining 6 programs and their total system development cost. ACEIT recommends using 10% as the development phase factor with a range of 6 to 25 percent. Additionally, ACEIT suggests using analogous contracts to modify the ECP factors.

Valentine (2017) stated that the current practice in for developing ECP withhold is to use a static factor multiplied by the total estimated cost. The current factor for development contracts is to use 10% and for production contracts is 6%. These percentages match the ACEIT recommendations exactly. However, Valentine (S. Valentine, personal communication, multiple dates, 2009-2017) found that the current ECP withhold factor is outdated. For development contracts, Valentine found that the factor should be over 20%. He also found that the distribution of percent growth may follow an exponential distribution. This type of distribution may lead to extreme over/under funding contracts if a static average is used.

Valentine's preliminary findings led to research performed by Cordell (2017). Cordell took an exploratory approach in assessing the best method to estimate ECP withhold. He used logistic regression to determine a contract's probability of having an ECP and then linear regression to determine the magnitude of that all ECPs on the contract. He found that the logistic regression model is valid and accurate with 81% accuracy.

Also, linear regression model to predict the magnitude of ECPs is too volatile and noisy. He referred to several potential errors in classification that may confound results. The data is too general in the classification of ECPs. This led Cordell to suggest additional study into the exact causes for and amount of ECPs without classifying them into the larger generalized classification. This would reduce the size of the dataset but allow for much more precise and accurate modeling. This recommendation is where we pick up our research.

Summary

With cost growth being a fundamental aspect of acquisitions, it is no surprise that there are numerous articles relating to cost growth. We uncovered the definition as well as the historical results of cost growth within Air Force Acquisitions; describing several potential causes as well. With the knowledge of prior research, specifically building on Cordell's logistic and linear models, we are able to identify our starting point and strategy moving forward to our methodology. As identified earlier, there are several potential predictors we use in our regression model. We integrate schedule, baseline cost, contract type, and commodity into the models. It is clear that limited research exists in understanding factors that are highly correlated with cost growth, and even less when focusing on individual contracts. By reviewing the literature, we now know that there is this need in the community and we can fill it. In the next chapter, Methodology, we use the foundation gained here to build upon.

III. Methodology

In this chapter, we discuss the step-by-step process to create our regression models. First are the database details and procedures used to modify and remove errors from the dataset. This step is intensive as the original data needed heavy modification and editing as it contained numerous errors. Next, we discuss the procedures to conduct our research, including defining our response variable for both the logistic regression and the linear regression model. Then we discuss the regression techniques we use and experiment-wise error rate we accept. Afterwards, we outline the tests and procedures we must conduct to ensure our predictive models are stable and applicable to the data analyzed. From there we discuss the validation of our model and the updating of the validation pool to create the final models.

Data

The data was extracted on 11 April 2017 from the Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE) website, and comprises of basic contracts and their modifications. The data contains 7,343 unique basic contracts consisting of 147,562 contract modifications. The original database includes 23 columns/variables, containing information specific to each modification. All missing, omitted and not applicable values are recorded as blank cells.

This database Excel file is influenced by several different organizations. The database information is collected from Electronic Document Access (EDA). EDA is an online resource in which Government contacting agencies upload scanned copies of the actual contractual documents (EDA, 2017). These actual contracts are the documents used to create the database Excel file. The Excel file itself is accessed through the Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE) website. Technomics Inc. is the contracted entity maintaining and updating the data transfer from EDA to CADE. The purpose of this database is purely informational. Technomics claims that the database is a non-biased collection of contracts from EDA; this cannot be verified. The update schedule of Technomics is performed quarterly.

All dollar amounts are converted to Base Year (BY) 2016 dollars to account for the effects of inflation. The Total Manufacturing Producer Price Index as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is used for the conversions. Because we do not have the "color of money" for every CLIN or contract, we cannot escalate prices with the respect to OSD Price Indices. This leaves us using a more commercial inflation technique. Total Manufacturing Producer Inflation is more representative than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the context of military procurement. All analysis used either JMP13 Pro by the SAS Corporation or RStudio (1.0.143). Table 1 shows the specific packages used in R.

For both the OLS model and the logistic model, a mixed stepwise procedure is used to arrive at the final

models. A level of significance is set to 0.01 to determine initial predictive ability of an explanatory variable. This means that a variable's p-value must be below .01 to enter the model, and above .01 to leave the model. The stepwise procedure ends with a selected model with all variables being significant at .01 alpha. From there, we then run diagnostics and validation.

Database Modifications

We performed over twenty (20) different filters and removals to obtain a "clean" database. In removing errors from the database, any contract with an error was removed along with all of its modifications. This technique was used because leaving in error filled contracts could bias the results. Several new columns are needed to accurately filter the database. We created new columns based on schedule, cost, contract type and count of ECPs.

The cleaned version reduced the number of unique contracts down to approx. 6,000 and the total rows down to approx. 100,000. The exact figures are shown in Table 2. Since the CADE database is growing in usage, a major desire of this research is to leave a lasting tool/table behind to identify errors that exist. To accomplish this, an error table was created. Table 3 summarizes and displays the type of error with the number of contracts that have this error. This summary does not identify the exact contract with the error, just a summary of errors. The general methods of database modification and filter are as follows:

Table 1: R Packages

Package	Title	Maintainer	Version	URL
pROC	Display and Analyze ROC Curves	Xavier Robin <robin@lindinglab.org>	1.10.0	
knitr	A General-Purpose Package for Dynamic Report Generation in R	Yihui Xie <xie@yihui.name>	1.17	
kableExtra	Construct Complex Table with 'kable' and Pipe Syntax	Hao Zhu <haozhu233@gmail.com>	0.5.2	http://haozhu233.github.io/kableExtra/,
scales	Scale Functions for Visualization	Hadley Wickham <hadley@rstudio.com>	0.5.0	
car	Companion to Applied Regression	John Fox <jfox@mcmaster.ca>	2.1-5	https://r-forge.r-project.org/projects/car/,
lubridate	Make Dealing with Dates a Little Easier	Vitalie Spinu <spinuvit@gmail.com>	1.6.0	
tidyverse	Easily Install and Load 'Tidyverse' Packages	Hadley Wickham <hadley@rstudio.com>	1.1.1	http://tidyverse.org,
lmtest	Testing Linear Regression Models	Achim Zeileis <Achim.Zeileis@R-project.org>	0.9-35	
stats	The R Stats Package	R Core Team <R-core@r-project.org>	3.4.2	
readxl	Read Excel Files	Jennifer Bryan <jenny@rstudio.com>	1.0.0	http://readxl.tidyverse.org,

Missing Data

Removing contracts with missing data is a multiple step process. We first removed any contracts that were missing award dates, end dates or contract type along with a dollar value. This step allows us to assess initial schedule as an independent variable and bring each contract dollar value to a single base year. Missing values in variables such as service, were not eliminated unless all contract entries were also missing that variable. If only one (1) modification of a contract was missing service, this was considered an entry type error. The missing value was assumed to take the same value as every other entry within that specific contract.

Schedule Errors

Any contract that was ongoing was removed. We classified ongoing as any contract that had a Period of Performance (PoP) that extended past the date of starting analysis (11 April 2017). Additionally, there are date errors with award dates. Many modifications are listed as starting before the start date of the basic contract. This is an error and as such, we removed the entire contract.

Dollar Value Error

Several contracts listed as having negative total cost. We considered this an error. Along similar logic, any contract with a missing dollar or a negative dollar value on the basic contract is considered an error since the Government cannot require a contractor to perform an action for free or for payment.

Final Database to be Sampled

Table 2: Final Database - Population

Category	25th Percentile	50th Percentile	75th Percentile	Mean	Stdev
Baseline Cost	$45,485	$394,277	$2,813,981	$25,435,452	$274,055,487
Basic Cost	$43,640	$354,143	$2,436,080	$15,973,967	$185,569,402
Final Schedule	271	451	755	615	559
Initial Schedule	201	363	548	420	315
# of ECPs	0	0	0	1	5
Total Cost	$46,711	$430,968	$3,487,682	$33,694,318	$315,432,494

Table 3 shows the reasons we removed contracts. It lists the procedures in order of being accomplished. This table only references unique contracts. Since we started with 7343 unique contracts, that is the first row. The last row displays the total number of contracts after removing errors.

Limitations

There are many limitations to all research. Presented are our three primary limitations. One error that may still bias the population is an error with the award date of a modification. There are occurrences in which a modification date occurs after an ended PoP. Within the dataset there are many occurrences of adding scope to an ended contract and also deobligating money from an ended contract. These are shown in Table 4. There is no sure method of removing additional errors associated with award dates occurring after the end date without manually reading each modification. Because of all the other contracts removed and the errors eliminated, we do not feel that this will bias or alter the use of either the logistic or linear regression models. Table 4 should be compared to Table 2 for an assessment of this assumption.

Table 3: Filter History of Removing Errors

Inclusion.Criteria	Contracts.Added	Cumlative.Removed	Contracts.Remaining
CADE Database	7343		7343
Missing Date with Dollar Value		12	7331
Missing Contract Type with Dollar Value		615	6728
Service Missing		638	6705
Commodity Missing		638	6705
Contract Type Missing		639	6704
Mod Date Missing		639	6704
TY Dollar Missing		641	6702
PoP End Date Missing		954	6389
No End Date on Basic		1137	6206
No Basic		1145	6198
No Start Date on Basic		1145	6198
Ongoing Contract		1215	6128
PoP Date Error (0)		1219	6124
Mod Date Error (0)		1219	6124
No Money on Basic		1224	6119
No Money on Baseline		1229	6114
Negative Contract Value		1308	6035
Missing Baseline Cost		1310	6033
NA as Modification Type		1340	6003
Schedule Error		1409	5934
ECP Date Before Basic		1412	5931
Modification Date Before Basic		1416	5927
Final Total		1416	5927

The second limitation is the color of money assumption in the comparison section. When comparing projects, we assumed that money can be transferred between contracts and that all money is current (not expired). This allows for over-funded contracts to help under-funded contracts. In reality this is only possible when the color of money is the same. Transferring funds is limited by the color of money and the restrictions of using different money (time and purpose). We maintain that the comparison is fair/even for all models and thus valid.

Table 4: Unremoved Potential Errors

Category	25th Percentile	50th Percentile	75th Percentile	Mean	Stdev
Baseline Cost	$436,405	$2,009,429	$26,403,626	$63,219,098	$198,168,457
Basic Cost	$356,061	$1,618,468	$18,140,428	$38,157,190	$104,589,590
Final Schedule	276	543	1032	773	696
Initial Schedule	170	350	537	411	354
# of ECPs	1	2	6.75	6	11
Total Cost	$533,294	$3,905,482	$36,169,597	$91,222,672	$335,245,343

The last major limitation is the collection of data. There are 5927 unique contracts and over 130 unique programs within the database, however we cannot be certain if there was bias in the collection. There may be reasons that these contracts were requested to be the database. Additionally, one (1) program represents a large number of contracts: F18 Super Hornet. This program represents nearly 40% of all contracts in the database. The F18 program was used by Technomics as a demonstration of the database's capability. The database, full of F18 contracts, was then pitched to various services. Currently the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) manages the Technomics contract for the Air Force. Table 5 shows the breakout of median ECP percent growth per contract and the median percent of contracts that have ECPs within each phase.

Because Chapter IV is a copy of the submitted journal article and to account for the F18 collection bias, we perform a two-tailed two-sample t-test in this section. This t-test is to determine if the F18 program is different from the rest of the database. Specifically, it tests if the ECP percent of all F18 contracts (2481) is equal to that of non-F18 contracts (3446). The t-score is -4.21 resulting in a p-value of 2.672e-05. These results suggest that there is a very strong possibility that the F18 is different from the remaining dataset. Since the F18 data is such a large representation of our population and potentially very different, we added a variable to account for if the program is F18 Super Hornet. This variable is a binary dummy variable. It will be a 1 if the contract it from and F18 contract else a 0. We run stepwise just the same.

Table 5: F18 Compared to Other Programs

F18	Phase	Median.per	Median.ECPper	Contracts
No	Development	75%	20.6%	612
No	O&S	33.3%	32.6%	1680
No	Production	88.9%	11.1%	1013
Yes	Development	33.7%	71.5%	95
Yes	O&S	8.7%	37.3%	1058
Yes	Production	3.54%	18.5%	1329

Stratifying Methods

Stratification is the process of dividing members of the population into homogeneous subgroups before sampling. The strata should be mutually exclusive: every element in the population must be assigned to only one stratum. The strata should also be collectively exhaustive: no population element can be excluded. This often improves the representation of the sample by reducing sampling error. Table 7 in Chapter IV shows all strata/bins and their definition while Table 8 in Chapter IV shows the breakout and percentages of the population with respect to the strata. Based on the literature review, we used four strata for this database; Phase, Schedule, Size, and Contract Type. Due to the size of the database, we are not able to sample every

contract. Using these four strata allowed us to stratify the population while also limiting the number bins. To choose the number of bins, we continued adding bins until the binned sample accounted for at least 80% of the population. Stratifying at least 80% of the population ensures we do not unintentionally bias our sample. In the end, we have eight (8) unique bins that we then used to sample the population. This is best shown in Table 9 in Chapter IV.

Each stratum contained one "IF" statement to separate the contracts; making a possible of 16 combinations/strata. Phase is divided into Development phase vs Other. Schedule is divided into contracts that have an initial schedule longer than 365 days. Size separates contracts by their baseline cost. Contracts that have a baseline cost greater than $5,000,000 vs contracts that have a baseline cost less than $5,000,000. Contract Type splits contracts by those with greater than 90% FFP. In the results section, we compare the sample vs the population using a Chi-square test of independence.

Lastly, to ensure we have an accurate representation of the population, we perform a t-test on the sample vs population. This is a Paired T-test comparing the percentages of the population strata to that of the sample strata. The desired result is that respective p-value is above alpha (.05). This helps determine that the sample is or is not different from the population. It is important to have the sample equivalent because of it allows us to assume that conclusions drawn from the sample apply to the entire population. The breakout of this test is shown in Table 10 in Chapter IV.

Model Diagnostic

As a general rule, we want p-values from any diagnostic to be above alpha. This is because most diagnostic tests assume that everything is acceptable (null hypothesis). The diagnostic attempts to "prove" (alternative hypothesis) that the assumption is wrong. For our tests, we use .05 as the alpha. What follows are the diagnostics we use:

Shapiro-Wilk's Test

In order for our multiple regression models to be valid, we must test several assumptions made with linear regression. First, we use the Shapiro-Wilk's test for the assumption of normality. The Shapiro-Wilks test is performed on the residuals from the linear model. It tests whether the residuals are a normal distribution or not. This is our weakest test as a linear regression model can still be valid even if the assumption of normality is incorrect. If normality is not present, we must make a distinction between the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and Least Squares Estimation (LSE). The null hypothesis for the Shapiro-Wilks test is that the residuals from our model are normally distributed; the alternative hypothesis is that they are not. We test this at a threshold of .05. If the p-value for the test is larger than .05, then we satisfy the assumption

of normality for our model (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter & Li, 2005). To help ensure we pass this test, we take the natural log of the ECP percent. Taking the natural log of a variable is more common when there is a skewed distribution as shown in Figure 1 in Chapter IV. Because the dependent variable is in natural log form, the end result of the OLS model is the predicted median (vs mean) percent of ECP withhold.

Studentized Residuals

Studentized residuals are analyzed to detect any potential outliers in the data. Studentized residuals are the residuals from regression standardized by the standard deviation of the residuals. This normalizes the results, allowing for easier assessment. For our research, any data is considered to be a potential outlier if the studentized residual is greater than three standard deviations from the mean. To measure this, we will simply count the number of points beyond three standard deviations. More than the expected number may suggest there is an issue with the data.

Cook's Distance

Cook's Distance is used to detect overly influential data points within the dataset that are possibly skewing the results. Cook's Distance is commonly used in multiple regression analysis to interpret each data point's influence on the regression results. An overly-influential data point can potentially bias the inclusion of independent variables in a regression model, due to the fact that we over-fit the regression output to include that one instance. When utilizing Cook's Distance, we are alerted to any possible points which need to be analyzed more closely by a score above .5 or any significantly different/separate points. If the Cook's Distance is higher than .5, we look into the exact cause to determine why.

Variance Inflation Factors

Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) scores show the relationship between independent variables. The VIF score measures how much multicollinearity is present. In the background, VIF scores show how well one independent variable predicts another independent variable. High multicollineaity results in unstable coefficients and interpretations; we want the VIF scores to be lower rather than higher. In our model selection process, we use a score of 5 as the cutoff point for main effects and 10 for interaction variables. Interaction effects are allowed to have a higher VIF score because the main effect variable is in the model. By default, JMP centers interaction variables, this decreases the respective VIF score. No other remediation is automatically performed.

Constant Variance Test

The Breusch-Pagan (B-P) test is used to statistically prove whether a model exhibits constant variance or

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not. In order for our model to be valid, the variance from the errors in the model must not be dependent on the independent variables. This test is used to determine whether heteroscedasticity is present in the model, which identifies the variance in the model created as being non-constant. In order to pass the assumption of constant variance we use a p-value of .05. If the p-value for the test is larger than .05, then we satisfy the assumption of constant variance for our model

Validation

Prior to any model building, the study's database is partitioned into two components: the modeling data set and the validation data set. For the logistic model, due to the sample size (approximately 550 contracts), 50% of the contracts are set aside for model validation. For the OLS model, 20% of the contracts that experienced an ECP are set aside for validation since the sample is greatly reduced due to now modeling just those contracts with an ECP. None of the contracts in the validation set were used to create the respective statistical models.

The Confusion Matrix is used to assess validity of the developed logistic regression model. [Note: a confusion matrix assesses the number of true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives, respectively.] A cutoff criterion of 0.5 is set as the prediction threshold to separate a contract into "Yes ECP" vs "No ECP". The validity of the OLS model is assessed in multiple criteria: Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE), Median Absolute Percent Error (MdAPE), and Pearson's Correlation Coefficient. MAPE is calculated as mean of each absolute value of Predicted minus Actual then divided by Actual with respect to the ECP percent growth. MdAPE is simply the median value of the same percent error.

Comparison

To finalize the presented results, we compare four different methods for budgeting ECP withhold. The four methods are 1) regression models in this paper, 2) Having no ECP withhold for any contract, 3) Assuming the more traditional amounts of 6% for development and 10% for procurement contracts, and 4) Using the mean of all contracts as a flat budget percent. This comparison is key for a "real" assessment of the quality of each method. We are comparing the only known methods, trying to determine differences and potential impacts of using that method.

To compare the four (4) methods, we use several metrics. We compare and assess the percent of contracts overfunded and underfunded. Comparing the percent of contracts funded correctly puts all contracts on an even field - disregarding the dollar value of a contract. This helps show how well the methods perform across all dollar values. Next, we compare the deviation in terms of dollars rather than percent. This is the sum of

dollars that each method overfunds and underfunds; as well as the sum of all deviations in dollars. Comparing dollars weights bigger contracts more than smaller contracts. Lastly, we rank each metric 1-4 for best to worst. A 1 represents the best method in that metric while a 4 represents the worst method in that metric. This allows an average assessment to be made, potentially giving insight into the rank of each method overall.

Chapter IV is the journal article submitted for publication. It contains a cursory introduction, review, methodology and then all of the results from creating and validating the regression models. Additionally, we compare and contrast the regression model vs the alternative withhold methods. The tables and figures are at the end of the Chapter. This allows for the publisher to place the tables as spacing allows. Note that there are bracketed place holders for where we desire the referenced tables/figure.

IV. Journal - Likelihood and Cost Impact of Engineering Change Requirements for DoD Contracts

Introduction and Background

History suggests that, by and large, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military departments have underestimated the cost of buying new weapon systems. Arena et al. (2006) analyzed major DoD programs and discovered these experienced nearly 46% cost growth before the end of Milestone B and another 16% growth by Milestone C. This cost growth trend continued with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. As of the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) the JSF per-unit estimate has grown 57% from its initial October 2001 estimated value.

To combat and possibly militate against cost growth, Congress enacted the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, often called WSARA. The act created a Pentagon office - Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) - to analyze the cost of new programs. One particular factor related to cost growth are technical changes. These Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) can occur for many reasons. An ECP is a scope change to a contract, usually technical in nature. They can be initiated by the Government, the contractor, or even feedback from the users.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 63 percent of major defense programs had requirement changes after system development began (GAO, 2008). Additionally, those programs with requirement changes encountered, on average, cost growth of 72 percent, while costs grew by only 11 percent among those programs that did not change requirements. The fundamental purpose of an ECP is to change the requirements of a contract (ECP, 2017). To build in flexibility, the acquisition practice is to estimate a dollar value to hold in reserve after the contract is awarded. This amount has several names, for the purpose of this article, we call it ECP withhold since it is the amount of money the Government withholds for ECPs.

There are three major cost estimating guides in use today: The Air Force Cost Analysis Handbook (AFCAH), The GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, and The U.S. Air Force - Cost Risk and Uncertainty Analysis Handbook (AFCRUH). Each provide overlapping material and views in order to best estimate cost and risk, however, none of the guides provide an empirical-based method for estimating ECP withhold. Yet despite this, common rules-of-thumb are being used for ECP withhold.

A relatively common one among the acquisition community is that estimates may vary by 10%. This is seen in several separate fields and disciplines. The starting amount for estimating management reserve is 5% - 10% (Program Management Institute, 2017). The amount over cost for an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) breach is 10 percent (DoD, 2015). Currently, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center allots the

following percentages. For development cost estimates, a 10 percent cost is added above the total estimate, while for procurement estimates that percentage lowers to 6% (S. Valentine, personal communication, multiple dates, 2015-2017). Lastly, the Automated Cost Estimating Integrated Tools (ACEIT) software package ranges this estimate between 6-10 percent.

The purpose of this article is to present empirically-based models via historical data that can be used to estimate not only the likelihood of a contract experiencing an ECP but to also determine the amount of ECP withhold as a percentage of the total contract cost. In addition, the study compares these models to the rule-of-thumb that a straight percentage is applied to all contracts for ECP withhold, which has the tacit assumption that all contracts experience an ECP. The analysis presented in this paper is at the contract level and not a program level.

Database and Methodology

As described by them, CAPE's mission is to provide independent program analyses and insights as requested by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and Congress. Additionally, CAPE reviews programs that may be, or already are, struggling in the acquisition process. To facilitate their mission, CAPE initiated the development of Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE), the Department's initiative to identify and integrate data from disparate databases and systems for better decision-making, management of, and oversight of the Department's acquisition portfolio.

As of 11 April 2017, CADE hosted a contract level database consisting of 7,343 unique contracts with details extracted from Electronic Document Access (EDA). EDA is a web-based system that provides for storage and retrieval of not only DoD contracts but also contract modifications (EDA, 2017). It is from this database that provides the starting point from which to build the study's database. This database in turn forms the basis from which to develop empirical regression models to not only predict the likelihood of a contract of having an ECP but to also predict the additional percent increase.

Both the large number of available contracts and the requisite time to manually check contract details necessitated using a stratified sampling plan. Initial stratification included four main criteria consisting of the following contract elements: Phase, Schedule, Size, and Type. Phase is divided into Development versus Other (Production/Operations and Support). Schedule is divided into contracts that have an initial schedule longer than one year or those equal to or less than a year. Size separates contracts that have a baseline cost greater than 5M ($5,000,000) versus contracts that have a baseline cost less than or equal to 5M. Contract Type splits contracts by those with greater than 90% Fixed Firm Price (FFP). An additional stratum takes into consideration very large contracts, specifically those exceeding 400M. This was due to the preliminary

findings from Cordell (2017). [Note: all dollar amounts are in Base Year (BY) 2016 dollars.]

This 2^4 arrangement presents sixteen possible strata from which to sample in addition to the one accounting for very large ECP contracts. As shown in the Results section these seventeen total strata ultimately collapse to seven for sample collection purposes from the population. Sample percentages are statistically matched to that of the population percentages to ensure these bins correspond accordingly and are checked via a Paired T-test. In addition, another Paired T-test is conducted to show that the sample matches that of that of the population with respect to percentile distributions of type of contract, branch of service, and commodity. These inferential tests are conducted at a level of significance of 0.05.

Once the stratification plan is finalized, errant contracts are filtered out prior to populating the study's database. These errors may include, for example, missing contract dates, missing contract amounts, or even a negative contract award since a contract cannot possess a negative value. Other errors may also include modifications being incorrectly classified as a cost modification despite adding scope, which is an ECP by definition. In the next section, we list the main errors detected in building the modeling database and the number affected by each exclusion criteria. As mentioned previously, all dollar amounts are converted to BY 2016 dollars to account for the effects of inflation. The Total Manufacturing Producer Price Index as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics was used for the conversions. All analysis in this article used JMP12 Pro, Excel or R.

The models presented in this article predict two response variables. The first is a binary (dichotomous) variable for the logistic regression model. If a contract has any technical ECPs, the response is a 1. If the contract has no technical ECPs, the response is a 0. The second is a continuous variable for the ordinary least squares (OLS) model. This variable is the natural logarithm of the percent cost growth strictly relating to changing requirements. The percent ECP growth is the sum of all modifications that are listed as a change in requirements, divided by the contract's baseline cost. The end result of the OLS model is the predicted median percent of ECP withhold.

With respect to possible explanatory variables either associated with the likelihood of an ECP occurring or the median percent of ECP withhold, we turn to previous research to include cited references therein. Trudelle et al. (2017), Bolten et al. (2008), and Arena et al. (2006) document several potential variables to be predictive factors for determining if a program will experience cost growth. Lastly, Harmon and Arnold (2013) performed an assessment on contracts types, attempting to understand the impact of overall contract price. They determined that for a series of production contracts in which the system design is mature and stable, the best choice of contract type is FFP. This finding played a key role in determining one of the strata in the sampling plan.

Prior to any model building, the study's database is partitioned into two components: the modeling data

set and the validation data set. For the logistic model, due to the large sample size, approximately 50% of the contracts are set aside for model validation. For the OLS model, approximately 20% of the contracts that experienced an ECP are set aside for validation since the sample is greatly reduced due to now modeling just those contracts with an ECP. None of the contracts in the validation set were used to create the respective statistical models.

Before validating the OLS model, the customary residual assumptions of normality and constant variance are tested by utilizing the Shapiro-Wilk test and the Breusch-Pagan test, respectively. Both are conducted at the 0.05 level of significance. Additionally, multicollinearity, outliers, and influential data points are investigated in order to prevent model bias. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) highlight the linear relationship between independent variables and a VIF score higher than 5 suggests multicollinearity. Regarding outliers, any studentized residual greater than three standard deviations is categorized as an outlier and a possible source of concern. Lastly, Cook's Distance detects overly influential data points possibly skewing the results. Any value greater than 0.5 is investigated closely.

To assess validity of the developed logistic regression model, the Confusion Matrix is used. This matrix assesses the number of true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives, respectively. A cutoff criterion of 0.5 is set as the prediction threshold to separate a contract into "ECP likely" vs "ECP not likely". The validity of the OLS model is assessed in multiple criteria: Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE), Median Absolute Percent Error (MdAPE), coefficient of determination (R2) and adjusted R2. Each absolute percent error is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between a Predicted response minus the Actual response divided by the Actual response.

For either the OLS model or the logistic model, a mixed stepwise procedure is adopted to arrive at the models presented in the next section. A level of significance is set to 0.01 to determine initial predictive ability of an explanatory variable. From there, the preliminary selected variables are then investigated to determine their practical effect on the respective model. If a particular explanatory variable is determined to have less than a 1% relative effect on a particular model's response, then that variable is excluded from being in the final model that is presented for practitioners' use. This is done to minimize a variable being statistically significant but have little practical effect.

To finalize the presented results, four different methods and their recommended ECP withholds are compared descriptively. The first method utilizes the application of the presented regression models in this article. The second method involves having no ECP withhold (essentially assuming no additional costs for a contract). The third adopts the percent found anecdotally in the literature: 6% for development and 10% for procurement contracts. The last method simply uses a flat average. This average is the average percent ECP growth for all contracts with no discrimination between phase and applied indiscriminately to all contracts.

Model Analysis

From an initial population of 7,343 contracts housed within the CADE database on April 11, 2017, 1,416 were excluded due to missing or erroneous data, resulting in an effective population size of 5,927 or approximately 81% of the total starting number. Table 6 highlights the main reasons that attributed to approximately 84% of the exclusions. Of the 1,416 contracts removed prior to creating a stratified random sample for the study's analysis, missing contract type associated with a contractual amount was the dominant exclusionary reason, accounting for approximately 43% of the 1,416 contracts removed for consideration. The next highest was missing an end date to a modification to an initial contract. That reason accounted for 313 contracts or approximately 22% of the excluded contracts.

[Insert Table 6]

With respect to the initial strata or bin characteristics as discussed in the previous section, Tables 2 and 3 show the population and sample percentages, respectively, while Table 9 highlights the final seven strata selected. The Paired T-test comparing the percentages of the population strata to that of the sample strata results in a p-value of 0.96, which concludes in failing to the reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, at a 0.05 level of significance, the Paired T-test strongly suggests that the modeling database appears statistically equivalent to the population.

[Insert Tables 7 - 9]

Regarding acquisition phase, branch of service, and commodity type, Table 10 lists the percentages by both population and sample. Conducting another Paired T-test comparing the percentages of the population strata to that of the sample strata results in a p-value of 0.99, which again supports the preceding results that the modeling database appears statistically equivalent to the population. One other noticeable conclusion from Table 10 highlights a high number of Navy or aircraft contracts in the population.

Delving further, a large percent of the population contracts stem from the F/A-18E/F (Super Hornet) program only. Approximately 42% of all the contracts originated from the F/A-18E/F with the second highest being approximately 4% for the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) program. However, in terms of total cost (sum of all contracts for a given program), the F-22 (Raptor) leads all programs and account for approximately 7.6% of the total population contract cost, while the F/A-18E/F accounts for approximately 5.9% of the total amount. In total, the population database contains 132 unique programs, while the random sample contains 68 unique programs. Appendix A lists all the programs considered in the sample database.

[Insert Table 10]

Table 11 lists the possible explanatory variables considered in the analysis to predict the likelihood of a

contract experiencing an ECP as well as the expected median percentage increase. As noted earlier, given the large number of F/A-18E/F contracts in the population, a dichotomous predictor variable, labeled F18, has been added to statistically test if that program overly influences the modeling database either with the likelihood of a contract experiencing an ECP or the expected median percentage increase.

[Insert Table 11]

Logistic Model

Out of the 541 contracts in the sample database, 271 were randomly set aside for the validation set. The remaining 270 were used as the modeling set for the logistic model. Customarily a 20/80 ratio is used, however, due to the relatively large size of the sample database, a 50/50 split was more preferred to allow for greater generalization testing.

Prior to commencing any analysis, a histogram reflecting the baseline cost for all 541 contracts highlighted 8 contracts (approximately 1.5% of the sample database) that noticeably appeared as outliers, whereas the remaining 533 contracts (which were equal to or less 164M in FY 16 dollars) had a relatively smooth lognormal distribution (p-value of approximately 0.04 for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit statistic, which is reasonable given the large sample size). The smallest baseline cost of these 8 outliers was 260M, while the largest was 2.6B. Given the sparsity and ten-fold difference between the lowest and largest baseline contract cost of these eight, we chose at this point to remove from consideration these 8 contracts, which in turns removes from consideration the explanatory variable of Contract Size Extra Large (programs exceeding 400M) and limits the paper's inferential results to contracts 160M or less.

With this change in mind, the model building set reduced to 265 and the validation set lowered to 267. Table 12 highlights two possible models for predicting the likelihood of a contract experiencing an ECP as selected by stepwise regression. The explanatory variable Ln (Baseline cost) [the natural logarithm of a contract's baseline cost] and the explanatory variables Contract Size Large and Contract Size Small are complementary in nature given both small and large contracts are included in the entire gambit of baseline contract costs. Therefore, stepwise only flagged one model at a time as being significant, but we chose both going forward into validation to determine which of the two might be ultimately better in predicting the likelihood of an ECP. No other explanatory variable proved statistically significant given the cost of the contract was already in the model, including the F18 variable. The overall takeaway is that the cost of the contract appears to be the overwhelmingly dominant factor in determining the likelihood of an ECP.

[Insert Table 12]

With respect to how well both models predict a contract experiencing an ECP, Table 13 displays the confusion matrix for the model building and validation datasets. Overall both models reflect a high predictive

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ability for detecting contracts that do not experience an ECP, however, both reflect quite poorly at predicting ECPs, with Model 1 displaying some ability to predict the true likelihood of an ECP. Model 2 (as evident from Table 12) reflects that a breakpoint potentially occurs somewhere in the lower cost spectrum for contracts equal to or less than 100K have a lower chance of incurring an ECP compared to contracts greater than 5M. In fact, of the 533 contracts in the sample database whose baseline cost is less than or equal to 100K (171 in total), only one contract had an ECP. We use this information later in terms of overall model application.

[Insert Table 13]

OLS Model

The linear (OLS) model is designed to predict the amount of cost growth solely attributable to ECPs. This response is in the form of the natural logarithm of the percentile increase. To revert to the actual expected percentage, one would take the natural exponent of the predicted value, which results in the expected median percentile increase due to incurring an ECP. As mentioned in the previous section, contracts that had a net negative ECP growth are not considered. This occurs whenever a contract de-scopes effort and cannot be used to obtain an accurate ECP withhold before contract award.

Of the 541 contracts in the original sample database, 99 experienced a contract increase due to an ECP. Of these 99, 20 were initially randomly set aside for the validation set, while the remaining 79 were used to develop the OLS model. After accounting for the 8 contracts excluded due to a very large baseline contract cost (exceeding 164M), these numbers changed to 71 for the modeling dataset with 20 remaining in the validation set, respectively.

Given the highly skewed pattern of ECP percentage increase, basic contract cost, baseline contract cost, and the schedule (in days) of the contract, all of these variables were transformed via the natural logarithm function. As an example of this, see Figure 1, which displays the typical skewed right pattern of the basic contract cost in addition to its distribution after the transformation.

[Insert Figure 1]

Table 14 highlights the preliminary model for predicting the expected natural log percentage increase in contract cost due to an ECP. The model presents with an R2 of 0.37 and an adjusted R2 of 0.35, respectively. No other explanatory variable proved statistically significant after accounting for the cost of the basic contract along with the number of CLINs truncated at 5 (that is 5 or more CLINs are grouped into the 5 CLIN group). In no iteration did the F18 variable prove statistically significant, similar to the findings of the logistic model. The candidate model in Table 14 passed all model diagnostics with no issues with multicollinearity (largest VIF score of 1.13), outliers (largest studentized residual value of 2.5), influential data points (largest Cook's D value of 0.13), normality (Shapiro-Wilk test p-value of 0.47), and constant variance (Breusch-Pagan test

p-value of 0.50).

[Insert Table 14]

With respect to the MAPE and MdAPE of the OLS model for both the modeling and validation datasets, these values are 86% and 35% and 130% and 36%, respectively. The higher MAPEs in comparison to the lower MdAPEs reflects moderate outliers in both datasets, while the relative comparable MdAPEs are a better measure of the model's consistency and generalization. Table 15 highlights the final empirical model after updating with the validation dataset and used in conjunction with the results of the previously presented logistic models. Equation (1) represents the user model in mathematical form, taking into consideration back-transformation. Note: a user would only use Equation (1) for any contract whose baseline cost exceeds 100K but is less than or equal to 164M (both in BY 16 dollars). Otherwise, the expected median percentage would be zero given a very, very low chance of lower cost contracts (equal to or less than 100K) incurring an ECP.

[Insert Table 15]

$$\text{Expected ECP percentage} = e^{3.32 - .30 Ln(BasicCost) - .33(CLINsonBasicTruncatedat5)} \quad (1)$$

Table 16 compares using Equation (1) to three other ECP withhold methods. The first using no ECP withhold. The second referenced in the literature as to using 6% for development and 10% for procurement contracts. The last and third method uses a simple flat average applied indiscriminately regardless of phase. The average of the 533 contracts in the sample database is approximately 5.9%. This is the value used for the flat average method. Based on the average ranking of best (1) to worst (4), Equation (1) appears to be the best method of the four presented with an average rank of 1.8. All methods used the true final cost of a contract to determine the percentages and amounts. Final cost equaled total baseline cost in addition to any ECP amounts documented.

[Insert Table 16]

Discussion and Conclusion

To the best of our knowledge, no peer-reviewed source could be found that documents the amount of ECP withhold that should be set aside for DoD contracts. Only anecdotal amounts were present in the literature. The aim of this paper served dual purposes: one, as a published reference point in the archival forum; and two, derive an empirically-based method for determining percent ECP withhold.

Based on the analysis presented, several points became evident. One, not every contract incurs an ECP, however, ECPs do occur and not budgeting accordingly results in a serious shortfall as shown in Table 16. Two, both the likelihood of an ECP as well as additional amount incurred appears to be statistically independent

of acquisition phase, branch of service, commodity, contract type, or any other factor except for the basic contract amount and the number of CLINs (Contract Line Item Numbers). Both of these variables equally affected the contract percentage increase due to an ECP. Lastly, the logistic regression approach proved a poor predictor of determining the likelihood of a DoD contract incurring an ECP. However, it did provide invaluable insight that lower cost contracts appeared statistically less likely to incur an ECP. Preliminary analysis suggests that this breakpoint might be around 100K, however, future research is encouraged to further delve into this lower boundary.

As with any research, limitations do exist for the results in this paper. Quality statistical analysis depends on quality data. Therefore, any errors within CAPE's database pulled from EDA will pass down to the sample database that formed the conclusions stated in this paper. Additionally, the encouraged use of Equation (1) requires a portfolio managed approach to contracts in an organization. That is, an agency or manager overseeing a multitude of contracts is able to move ECP withhold amounts from contract to contract as needed. For if so, then the OLS model as shown in Table 16 shows an almost balanced approach. Lastly, using (1) for contracts exceeding 164M in BY 16 dollars would be model extrapolation, and we caution against such use.

The field of changing requirements and their impact at the contract level is full of opportunity. One major recommendation we provide is to use or add a different source of data. Adding data from the Selected Acquisition Reports might provide details on program elements that might increase the chance of all contracts within that program experiencing an ECP. Another source of information is EVM reports. Not only could the EVM metric provide a snapshot of contract health, but also research has shown that sentiment analysis of EVM/Status Reports of programs might provide insightful information and prediction capability (Freeman, 2013).

Lastly, we suggest simultaneous analysis at the contract and the program level. From our experience, many programs will let a new contract rather than adding requirements on an existing contract. This practice, while valid and legal, may skew the analysis if performed solely at the contract level. That is, a program might experience cost growth by adding new contracts, while existing contracts show no increased cost. Overall, a broader and holistic view is needed to accurately assess the impact of changing requirements for the final cost of a DoD program and elements that affect its bottom-line.

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Appendix: Department of Defense programs used in the modeling database

F/A-18E/F (Super Hornet)
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System)
LVSR (Logistics Vehicle System)
C-5 (Galaxy)
MTVR (Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement)
B-52 CONECT (B-52 Stratofortress Combat Network Communications Technology)
SH-60/HH-60H/MH-60 (Seahawk)
AHLTA (Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application)
V-22 (Osprey)
F-15 RMP (F-15 Radar Modernization Program (RMP))
B-2 (Spirit)
GCSS-MC (Global Combat Support Systems - Marine Corps)
BGM-109 (Tomahawk Block IV)
UH-60L/UH-60M/HH-60M (Black Hawk)
MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle)
MIM-104F (PAC-3) Patriot Missile upgrade
MIM-104A/B/C/D (Patriot Missile)
F/A-18A-D (Hornet)
P-8A (Poseidon)
H-1 (H-1 Upgrades)
AGM-84/SLAM E (Harpoon Missile)
AGM-154C (Joint Standoff Weapon)
JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition)
JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile)
AIM-9 (Sidewinder Missile)
F-35 (Lightning II)
Essentris (Documentation and electronic medical record system)
MQ-9 (Reaper, unmanned aerial vehicle)
GBU-53/B (Small Diameter Bomb II)
GBU-24 (Paveway III, laser-guided missile)
AGM-158 (Joint Air-to Surface Standoff Missile)
LAIRCM (Large Aircraft Infrared Counter-Measure system)
SLAM ER (Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response, cruise missile)
F-22 (Raptor)
GBU-12 (Paveway II)
AIM-120 (Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM))
CHCS (Composite Health Care System)
GBU-39 (Small Diameter Bomb)
DCGS-N (Distributed Common Ground Station-Navy)
AGM-88 HARM (HARM (High-speed Antiradiation Missile))
RIM-66 (SM-2 BLK IVA, Missile Program)
E-3A (Sentry)
BQM-34 (Firebee, target drone)
C-40 (Clipper)
ADM-160 MALD (Miniature Air-Launched Decoy)
MHS (Military Health System)
AV-8B (Harrier II)
F-16 (Fighting Falcon)
CH-47 (Chinook)
CH-53E (Sea Stallion)
Standard Missile Program (Shipborne guided missiles)
ASIP (Advanced Special Improvement Models, radio program)

WCMD (Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser system)
AGM-65 (Maverick, air-to-ground tactical missile)
EA-18G (Growler)
CBU-97 (SFW, Sensor Fuzed Weapon)
C-130 (Hercules)
JLTV (Joint Light Tactical Vehicle)
B-2 DMS (B-2 DMS Modernization)
AEHF (Advanced Extremely High Frequency communication satellites)
AWS (Affordable Weapon System, cruise missile program)
ASLS (Aircraft Structural Life Surveillance program)
MGM-140 (ATACMS, Army Tactical Missile system)
AH-64 (Apache)
F-136 Engine
E-2D (Advanced Hawkeye)
GQM-163 (Coyote, supersonic sea skimming target)
MQ-4C (Triton, unmanned aircraft system)

Table 6: Primary Exclusion Reasons. Percentages rounded to two decimal places.

Criteria	Number	Percent
No contract type associated with the dollar value given	603	43
Missing end date of a modification to an initial contract	313	22
Missing end date to the initial contract	183	13
Contract summed (initial plus any modifications) to a negative dollar value	79	6

Table 7: Initial population stratum characteristics. Strata pairs 1/2, 3/4, 5/6, and 7/8 are complementary events. All dollars presented in base year 2016 values. Baseline contract cost equals initial contract cost plus all priced options.

Population Stratum Elements (Name)	Characteristic Present
1 (DEV)	Development contracts
2 (Non-DEV)	Production or Operations and Support contracts
3 (Short)	Initial contract duration equal to or less than a year
4 (Long)	Initial contract duration longer than a year
5 (Small)	Baseline contract cost equal to or less than $5,000,000
6 (Large)	Baseline contract cost exceeds $5,000,000 but less than $400,000,000
7 (FFP)	Total percent of initial contract type and modification contract types greater than 90% Fixed Firm Price (FFP)
8 (Non-FFP)	Total percent of initial contract type and modification contract types is equal to or less than 90% Fixed Firm Price (FFP)
Special	Baseline contract cost equals or exceeds $400,000,000

Table 8: Population breakdown of the 5,927 contracts and associated percentages. Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Note: the 0* denotes a percentage less than 1.

Bin Number	Contract Phase	Contract Length	Contract Cost	Contract Type	Number	Population %
1	Non-DEV	Short	Small	FFP	1360	23
2	Non-DEV	Short	Small	Non-FFP	1147	19
3	Non-DEV	Long	Small	FFP	966	16
4	Non-DEV	Long	Small	Non-FFP	767	13
5	Non-DEV	Long	Large	FFP	367	6
6	DEV	Short	Small	Non-FFP	264	4
7	Non-DEV	Long	Large	Non-FFP	227	4
8	Non-DEV	Short	Large	FFP	174	3
9	DEV	Long	Large	Non-FFP	153	2
10	Non-DEV	Short	Large	Non-FFP	135	2
11	DEV	Long	Small	Non-FFP	99	2
12	DEV	Short	Small	FFP	82	1
13	DEV	Long	Small	FFP	52	1
14	DEV	Short	Large	Non-FFP	50	1
15	DEV	Long	Large	FFP	25	0*
16	DEV	Short	Large	FFP	7	0*
17	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	52	1

Table 9: Consolidated strata for study sample along with population and matching sample characteristics. Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

Stratum Number	Bin Grouping from Table 3	Population Number	Population % (Out of 5927)	Sample Number	Sample % (Out of 541)	Paired Percentile Difference
1	1	1360	22.9	118	21.8	1.1
2	2	1147	19.4	101	18.7	0.7
3	3	966	16.3	92	17.0	-0.7
4	5,7,8, and 10	903	15.2	84	15.5	-0.3
5	4	767	12.9	71	13.1	-0.2
6	6,9,11-16	732	12.4	70	12.9	-0.5
7	17	52	0.9	5	0.9	0.0

Table 10: Population and sample characteristics by acquisition phase, service, and commodity type. Commodity Other group consists of contracts for unmanned aerial vehicles, decoys, engines, guns, lasers, non-lethal systems, radar, ships, space, or targets/drones, AIS stands for Automated Information Systems contracts, while MO stands for Munitions and Ordnance contracts. Percentages rounded to the nearest tenths.

Variable	Subcategory	Population/Sample Number	Population/Sample Percentage
Acquisition Phase	Operations and Support	2822 / 252	47.6 / 46.6
	Production	2364 / 218	39.9 / 40.3
	Development	741 / 71	12.5 / 13.1
Service	Navy	3286 / 300	55.4 / 55.5
	Air Force	1375 / 133	23.2 / 24.6
	Marine Corps	726 / 63	12.2 / 11.6
	Department of Defense	329 / 21	5.6 / 3.9
	Army	211 / 24	3.6 / 4.4
Commodity Type	Aircraft	3856 / 358	65.1 / 66.2
	Missiles	565 / 62	9.5 / 11.5
	Ground Vehicle	483 / 43	8.2 / 8.0
	AIS	453 / 30	7.6 / 5.5
	M&O	235 / 20	4.0 / 3.7
	Electronics	221 / 17	3.7 / 3.1
	Other	114 / 11	1.9 / 2.0

Table 11: Explanatory variables considered in the development of the logistic regression model to predict the likelihood of a contract having an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) and the expected median percentage increase caused by the ECP.

Variable Name	Description of Subcategories
Phase	Acquisition phase of the contract: Operations and Support, Production, or Development.
Service	Branch in the Government that let the contract: Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, or Department of Defense (Joint).
Commodity Type	Majority of product on contract. For example, Aircraft, Missile, Ground Vehicle, AIS (Automated Information System), Munitions, Ordnance, Electronics, etc. A total of 17 types were considered.
Contract Type	Funding outlay as defined in Federal Acquisition Report (FAR) Part 16 Procurement. For example, Fixed-Price Contracts, Cost-Reimbursement Contracts, or Incentive Contracts. A total of 9 types were considered.
Mod Category	Assigned classification of the contract modification (technical, baseline, or schedule for example). A total of 8 categories were considered.
Baseline cost	Cost in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 dollars of the initial contract plus priced options.
Basic Cost	Cost in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 dollars of the initial contract.
Schedule	Length of the contract in terms of days.
Contract Year Start / End	Date the initial contract started or ended. Investigated years 2010, 2011, and 2012 to determine if the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 or Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives launched in 2010 had an effect on a contract.
F18	This dichotomous variable assumes a value of 1 if the contract is a part of the F/A-18E/F program.
Few CLINs (Contract Line Item Number)	This dichotomous variable assumes a value of 1 if the number of Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs) equaled 5 or less. This number was chosen since it represented the 90th percentile of CLINs in the database. Only 10 percent of contracts have more than 5 CLINs on their basic contract.
CLINs on Basic Truncated at 5	This continuous variable assumes the value equal to the number of Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs) if the number of CLINs equaled 5 or less, else it assumes the value of 5.
CLINs on Basic	This continuous variable assumes the value equal to the number of Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs) regardless of the number.
Option Price	This continuous variable is the value of all priced options divided by the Basic cost of the contract.
IDIQ (Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity)	This dichotomous variable assumes a value of 1 if the contract is from an IDIQ, else 0.
FMS (Foreign Military Sales) Related	This dichotomous variable assumes a value of 1 if there is an FMS requirement on the Basic contract.
Program Past ECPs	This dichotomous variable assumes a value of 1 if the encompassing program had an ECP on any contract before the award date of the current contract. Else the value is 0.
Contract Size	A total of 4 dichotomous variables. Each variable assumes the value of 1 if the Baseline cost of the contract falls into the defined dollar value size. Small, medium, large, and extra large are the defined sizes. Small: Less than or equal to 100,000. Medium: Greater than 100,000 and less than or equal to 5,000,000. Large: Greater than 5,000,000 and less than or equal to 400,000,000. Extra Large: Greater than 400,000,000. [Note: this last group was later removed from consideration.] All costs are in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 dollars.

Table 12: Candidate models for predicting the likelihood of a contract experiencing an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP). All values rounded to two significant digits.

Model Number	Variable	Estimate	P-value
1	Intercept	-8.41	< 0.0001
	Ln (Baseline cost): Natural logarithm of the contract baseline cost	0.5	< 0.0001
2	Intercept	-1.52	< 0.0001
	Contract Size Large	1.44	1E-4
	Contract Size Small	-2.96	0.0041

Table 13: Confusion matrices for the two logistic regression candidate models for predicting the likelihood of a contract experiencing an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP). Parenthetical percentages reflect the accuracy rate of the chosen metric. Information is reflective of both the modeling dataset (Model; 265 contracts) and validation set (Test; 268 contracts). Percentages rounded to two decimal places.

Model Number	True Positives	True Negatives	False Positives	False Negatives
1 Model	13 (28%)	208 (95%)	10 (5%)	34 (72%)
1 Test	13 (28%)	199 (90%)	23 (10%)	33 (72%)
2 Model	0 (0%)	218 (100%)	0 (0%)	47 (100%)
2 Test	0 (0%)	222 (100%)	0 (0%)	46 (100%)

Table 14: Candidate linear model for predicting the natural logarithm of the expected percentage contract increase due to experiencing an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP). Numbers truncated to two decimal places.

Variable	Estimate	T-ratio	P-value
Intercept	3.34	2.42	1.84E-2
Ln (Basic Cost)	-0.30	-3.13	0.0025
CLINs on Basic Truncated at 5	-0.41	-4.14	< 0.0001

Table 15: Final linear model for predicting the natural logarithm of the expected percentage contract increase due to experiencing an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP). Numbers truncated to two decimal places.

Variable	Estimate	T-ratio	P-value
Intercept	3.32	2.93	0.0043
Ln (Basic Cost)	-0.30	-3.87	0.0002
CLINs on Basic Truncated at 5	-0.33	-3.76	0.0003

Table 16: Comparison of the method presented in this paper (Equation 1) to having no ECP withhold, engaging the apparent current practice of 6 percent ECP withhold for development contracts and 10 percent ECP withhold for non-development contracts, and applying a straight average ECP percent to all contracts (5.9 for the sample database). All dollar amounts rounded to the nearest dollar (BY 16).

| Model Method	Underfund Percent	Overfund Percent	Underfund (Dollars)	Overfund (Dollars)	Portfolio Total	Overall Rank
Equation (1)	0.0938	0.589	(178M)	197M	19M	1
No Withhold	0.174	0	(262M)	0M	(262M)	3
Current Practice	0.0957	0.893	(169M)	284M	116M	3
Flat Average	0.113	0.887	(175M)	217M	42M	2
	Rank	Rank	Rank	Rank	Rank	Average Rank
Equation (1)	1	2	3	2	1	1.8
No Withhold	4	1	4	1	4	2.8
Current Practice	2	4	1	4	3	2.8
Flat Average	3	3	2	3	2	2.6

Figure 1: Upper graph displays typical presentation of either basic contract cost, baseline contract cost, ECP percentage increase, or contract length. Lower graph shows the same data but after transforming using the natural logarithm. Illustrative graphs are just for basic contract cost.

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, we summarize our entire research endeavor by discussing the relevant findings, irrelevant findings, our limitations, and how future researchers can build upon what we have done. Through this we are able to draw an end to what we have accomplished and simultaneously provide a stepping off point for others to further our efforts. The findings contained within this research have the potential to impact future cost analysts and program managers when faced with allocating resources and effort with respect to an individual contract. To the best of our knowledge, no peer-reviewed source could be found that documents the amount of ECP withhold that should be set aside for DoD contracts. Only anecdotal amounts were present in the literature. The aim of this paper served dual purposes: one, as a published reference point in the archival forum; and two, derive an empirically-based method for determining percent ECP withhold.

Based on the analysis presented, several points became evident. One, not every contract incurs an ECP, however, ECPs do occur and not budgeting accordingly results in a serious shortfall as shown in Table 16. Two, both the likelihood of an ECP as well as additional amount incurred appears to be statistically independent of acquisition phase, branch of service, commodity, contract type, or any other factor except for the basic contract amount and the number of CLINs (Contract Line Item Numbers). Both of these variables equally affected the contract percentage increase due to an ECP. Lastly, the logistic regression approach proved a poor predictor of determining the likelihood of a DoD contract incurring an ECP. However, it did provide invaluable insight that lower cost contracts appeared statistically less likely to incur an ECP. Preliminary analysis suggests that this breakpoint might be around 100K, however, future research is encouraged to further delve into this lower boundary.

As with any research, limitations do exist for the results in this paper. Quality statistical analysis depends on quality data. Therefore, any errors within CAPE's database pulled from EDA will pass down to the sample database that formed the conclusions stated in this paper. Additionally, the encouraged use of Equation (1) requires a portfolio managed approach to contracts in an organization. That is, an agency or manager overseeing a multitude of contracts is able to move ECP withhold amounts from contract to contract as needed. For if so, then the OLS model as shown in Table 11 shows an almost balanced approach. Lastly, using (1) for contracts exceeding 164M in BY 16 dollars would be model extrapolation, and we caution against such use. Table Table 17, not shown in the journal article, is the same results as Table , however separated by phase as well. This delivers a more detailed picture of if the equation works in all phases. The results are similar to the overall assessment; this equation does a good job of estimating withhold and contract phase is not a valid predictor.

Table 17: Comparison of the all 4 withhold methods with respect to contract phase.

Compare	Model	Practice	Model	Practice	Model	Practice
Underfund Percent	20.0%	24.3%	6.4%	7.5%	9.5%	7.1%
Overfund Percent	77.1%	74.3%	58.3%	92.5%	53.6%	90.5%
Underfund Dollars	$-67.38	$-66.98	$-15.32	$-11.37	$-95.51	$-90.36
Overfund Dollars	$74.02	$112.90	$70.19	$103.02	$52.78	$68.47
Total Abs Deviation Dollars	$141.40	$179.88	$85.50	$114.39	$148.29	$158.83
Total Portfolio	$6.63	$45.92	$54.87	$91.65	$-42.73	$-21.89

Future Research

The field of changing requirements and their impact at the contract level is full of opportunity. One major recommendation we provide is to use or add a different source of data. Adding data from Selected Acquisition Reports will provide details on program elements that might increase the chance of all contracts within that program experiencing an ECP. Another source of information is EVM reports. Not only could the EVM metric provide a snapshot of contract health, but also research has shown that sentiment analysis of EVM/Status Reports of programs might provide insightful information and prediction capability (Freeman, 2013).

Next, we suggest assessing the impact of ECPs to future cost and schedule. Since the results section (Chapter IV) is the submittal as a journal article, we place our preliminary research into the impact to schedule here. To assess the impact of an ECP to schedule, we used all ~6000 datapoints. We did this to allow for a big picture assessment since schedule was not the focus of this research. The purpose is to determine in a broad stroke if there is any impact. Table 18 shows the likelihood of a contract adding additional schedule. In this case, if an ECP added schedule on that specific modification, we assume that is the new baseline and assessed if the contract will then add even more schedule. This corrects for the fact that for additional technical scope, additional schedule may be needed. Table 19 shows the amount of schedule added as a percent of the basic schedule. This shows that the median contract with an ECP added an additional 18% schedule. This is significantly different from contracts that did not have an ECP. Without further analysis we cannot determine the cause of the additional schedule.

Table 18: Comparing likelihood of adding additional schedule for ECP contracts vs nonECP contracts

Contracts that	Added Schedule	Did Not Add Schedule
Had an ECP	62%	38%
Had No ECP	23%	77%

Table 19: Comparison of the all 4 withhold methods with respect amount of schedule added.

Contracts that	25th Percentile	Median	75th Percentile	Count
Had an ECP	0%	18%	27%	1,435
Had No ECP	0%	0%	15%	4,492

Lastly, we suggest simultaneous analysis at the contract and the program level. From our experience, many programs will let a new contract rather than adding requirements on an existing contract. This practice, while valid and legal, may skew the analysis if performed solely at the contract level. That is, a program might experience cost growth by adding new contracts, while existing contracts show no increased cost. Overall, a broader and holistic view is needed to accurately assess the impact of changing requirements for the final cost of a DoD program and elements that affect its bottom-line. Next we suggest a continuous application of contract management That is, rather than setting/managing the budget only at contract award, creating a model that can continuously provide ECP estimates. Providing a model that is continuously used will provide much more benefit to the using community.

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14. ABSTRACT
The fundamental purpose of an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) is to change the requirements of a contract. To build in flexibility, the acquisition practice is to estimate a dollar value to hold in reserve after the contract is awarded. There appears to be no empirical-based method for estimating this ECP withhold in the literature. Using the Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE) database, 533 contracts were randomly selected to build two regression models: one to predict the likelihood of a contract experiencing an ECP, and the other to determine the expected median percent increase in baseline contract cost if an ECP was likely. Results suggest that this two-step approach works well over a managed portfolio of contracts in contrast to three investigated rules-of-thumb. Significant drivers are the basic contract cost and the number of contract line items.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
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