Forensic Memory Analysis for Apple OS X

Andrew F. Hay

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FORENSIC MEMORY ANALYSIS FOR APPLE OS X

THESIS

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AFIT/GCO/ENG/12-17

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FORENSIC MEMORY ANALYSIS FOR APPLE OS X

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science

Andrew F. Hay, BS

June 2012

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FORENSIC MEMORY ANALYSIS FOR APPLE OS X

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Abstract

Analysis of raw memory dumps has become a critical capability in digital forensics because it gives insight into the state of a system that cannot be fully represented through traditional disk analysis. Interest in memory forensics has grown steadily in recent years, with a focus on the Microsoft Windows operating systems. However, similar capabilities for Linux and Apple OS X have lagged by comparison. The volafox open source project has begun work on structured memory analysis for OS X. The tool currently supports a limited set of kernel structures to parse hardware information, system build number, process listing, loaded kernel modules, syscall table, and socket connections. This research addresses one memory analysis deficiency on OS X by introducing a new volafox module for parsing file handles. When open files are mapped to a process, an examiner can learn which resources the process is accessing on disk. This listing is useful for determining what information may have been the target for exfiltration or modification on a compromised system. Comparing output of the developed module and the UNIX lsof (list open files) command on two version of OS X and two kernel architectures validates the methodology used to extract file handle information.
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Andrew F. Hay
# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................ iv

Acknowledgments ......................................................................................... v

List of Figures ............................................................................................... viii

List of Tables ................................................................................................. ix

I. Introduction ................................................................................................ 1
   1.1 Research Objectives and Assumptions ................................................. 3
   1.2 Methodological Approach ................................................................... 4
   1.3 Research Implications ....................................................................... 5

II. Literature Review ....................................................................................... 7
   2.1 Digital Forensics ................................................................................ 7
   2.2 Incident Response .............................................................................. 9
   2.3 Memory Forensics ............................................................................ 13
   2.4 Mac Memory Acquisition ................................................................. 18
   2.5 Structured Memory Analysis ............................................................. 21
   2.6 Summary ........................................................................................... 30

III. Methodology ............................................................................................ 31
   3.1 System Design .................................................................................. 32
   3.2 Key Kernel Structures ...................................................................... 36
   3.3 Project Volafoux ............................................................................... 44
   3.4 File Handle Module Implementation ................................................ 48
   3.5 Open Issues ..................................................................................... 64
   3.6 Summary ........................................................................................... 71

IV. Results and Analysis ................................................................................. 72
   4.1 Module Evaluation Methodology ....................................................... 72
   4.2 Results ............................................................................................... 83
   4.3 Summary ........................................................................................... 95
V. Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................................96

5.1 Research Conclusions..................................................................................96
5.2 Significance of Research ............................................................................99
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research ..................................................100
5.4 Summary.......................................................................................................102

Appendix A. Regular Builds OS X 10.4.4 – 10.7.3 ...........................................103
Appendix B. Full Structure Diagram .................................................................105
Appendix C. Python struct Library ..................................................................106
Appendix D. Full UML Diagram .......................................................................108
Appendix E. Full Test Results ..........................................................................109
Appendix F. Hardware Capture Summary .........................................................123
Appendix G. Complete Source Code: lsof.py ................................................124

Bibliography ........................................................................................................150
## List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td><code>mach_kernel</code> executable.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Volatility <code>linux_list_open_files</code> output (Cohen &amp; Collett, 2008).</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>UNIX list open files (<code>lsof</code>) command.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>C struct relationship overview.</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>Symbol table and process list.</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>Memory-mapped files (txt).</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>File descriptor table.</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>Virtual node (vnode).</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td><code>struct proc</code>.</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10</td>
<td>Abstraction crossover.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11</td>
<td>Volafox package diagram.</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12</td>
<td>UML 1 – process list and file descriptors.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 13</td>
<td>UML 2 – vnode interface and memory-mapped files.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 14</td>
<td><code>struct proc</code> template, 10.6 x86.</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 15</td>
<td>Simplified abstract class <code>Struct</code> (no error handling).</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 16</td>
<td>Concrete class <code>Devnode</code>.</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 17</td>
<td>Template generation function</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 18</td>
<td>10.7 x64 template for <code>struct ubc_info</code>.</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 19</td>
<td>Manual offset calculation for 64-bit <code>struct ubc_info</code> (annotated).</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 20</td>
<td>Template output from <code>printstructs.py</code>.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 21</td>
<td>Template testing.</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 22</td>
<td>Volafox usage statement.</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 23</td>
<td>Volafox <code>lsof</code> command branch.</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 24</td>
<td>Lsof method stub added to class volafox.</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 25</td>
<td>Volafox user output.</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 26</td>
<td>Lsof user output.</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 27</td>
<td>Volafox <code>proc_info</code> output.</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 28</td>
<td>Suiche process list output (2010).</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 29</td>
<td><code>ps</code> name keywords.</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 30</td>
<td><code>launchd</code> name keywords.</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 31</td>
<td><code>ps</code> session keywords.</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 32</td>
<td><code>class</code> Session testing modification.</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 33</td>
<td><code>struct</code> Session address.</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 34</td>
<td><code>/dev</code> directory size.</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 35</td>
<td>Volafox open files listing.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 36</td>
<td>Lsof handle duplication.</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 37</td>
<td>Simplified <code>lsof.py</code> unpacktype() function</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Tables

Table 1. volafox modules and their Volatility equivalents. .................................................. 25  
Table 2. volafox commands with associated symbols and kernel structures.......................... 29  
Table 3. UNIX lsof output fields.......................................................................................... 34  
Table 4. Open file data locations.......................................................................................... 42  
Table 5. Template interface fields....................................................................................... 53  
Table 6. Manual hex sizing................................................................................................. 59  
Table 7. Field differences versus file type........................................................................... 79  
Table 8. OS X 10.6.8 x86 test case summary...................................................................... 86  
Table 9. OS X 10.6.0 Server x64 test case summary.......................................................... 87  
Table 10. OS X 10.7.3 x86 test case summary.................................................................... 88  
Table 11. OS X 10.7.0 x64 test case summary.................................................................... 89  
Table 12. OS X 10.6.8 combined real-world results (8 samples).......................................... 91  
Table 13. OS X 10.7.x combined real-world results (2 samples).......................................... 93  
Table 14. struct.unpack format characters........................................................................ 107  
Table 15. OS X 10.6.8 x86 controlled test case results (1 sample). .................................... 109  
Table 16. OS X 10.6.0 Server x64 controlled test case results (1 sample). ......................... 110  
Table 17. OS X 10.7.3 x86 controlled test case results (1 sample). .................................... 111  
Table 18. OS X 10.7.0 x64 controlled test case results (1 sample). .................................... 112  
Table 19. OS X 10.6.8, model X6A real-world results (1 sample). ...................................... 113  
Table 20. OS X 10.6.8, model DR2 real-world results (1 sample). ...................................... 114  
Table 21. OS X 10.6.8, model VUW real-world results (1 sample). ...................................... 115  
Table 22. OS X 10.6.8, model AGU real-world results (1 sample). ...................................... 116  
Table 23. OS X 10.6.8, model U35 real-world results (1 sample). ...................................... 117  
Table 24. OS X 10.6.8, model X8A real-world results (1 sample). ...................................... 118  
Table 25. OS X 10.6.8, model DB5 real-world results (1 sample). ...................................... 119  
Table 26. OS X 10.6.8, model ATM real-world results (1 sample). ..................................... 120  
Table 27. OS X 10.7.0, model 0P2 real-world results (1 sample). ........................................ 121  
Table 28. OS X 10.7.2, model 18X real-world results (1 sample). ........................................ 122
FORENSIC MEMORY ANALYSIS FOR APPLE OS X

I. Introduction

Desktop and mobile computing platforms are central to many law enforcement and enterprise investigations due to their enormous capacity for digital evidence. Identification, individualization, association, and reconstruction of such evidence are all steps of the forensic process (Inman & Rudin, 2002). Professionals rely on both technical expertise and appropriate tools when applying these steps to digital sources. Because an examiner cannot always anticipate the platforms encountered during the course of an investigation, he or she must be prepared to deal with any of them. Tools for data acquisition and analysis are therefore required across a breadth of common endpoint devices in order to assure needed flexibility, Apple’s OS X among them.

Apple currently holds the number three position in PC manufacturing (Schonfeld, 2012), with its OS X operating system representing about 10% domestic market share (Donnini, 2012) and 6% globally (Net Applications, 2012). While this accounts for a small minority when compared with Microsoft Windows, OS X has become the operating system of preference for many individuals. As a result, it cannot be ignored as a possible target during forensic investigation.

Forensic memory analysis has become a critical capability in digital forensics because it allows insight into the state of a system that cannot be fully represented through traditional disk analysis. From an investigatory standpoint, computer memory may be the only source of data capable of revealing the use or misuse of computer at time
of seizure. Additionally, it may hold the sole evidence of malware or other compromise influencing the conclusions of the examiner. Interest in memory forensics has grown steadily in recent years, with a focus on the Microsoft Windows operating systems (Cohen & Collett, 2008). However, similar capabilities for platforms such as OS X have lagged by comparison.

Memory analysis depends on capabilities for RAM acquisition and tools for abstracting information from raw memory. Though tools exist to capture memory on OS X (Section 2.4), the sole project focusing on structured data analysis (Lee, 2011) is immature by comparison to its counterpart for Windows and Linux (Volatile Systems, 2012). This leaves primarily context-free options available to the forensic examiner, such as string searches and file carving. The challenge is to perform better than context-free memory analysis so ultimately tools can be developed to replace more invasive incident response methods for determining the state of a running system. This research addresses one component in the suite of data collected during live response: a list of file handles associated with running processes.

When open files are mapped to a process, an examiner can learn which resources the process is accessing on disk. This listing is useful in determining what information may have been the target for exfiltration or modification on a compromised system. Handles may also help identify a suspicious process when unexpected file access or modifications are observed. For example, malware masquerading as an innocuous executable while editing log files to its cover tracks. Because open files can help characterize process activity and highlight misuse of a computer during an investigation, it is desirable to recover this information from a memory capture.
1.1 Research Objectives and Assumptions

The goal of this research is to implement and document a capability for parsing file handles from raw memory captured on OS X. Two objectives are derived to support this goal. First, perform design recovery of the kernel data structures responsible for handling open files. Second, develop a flexible process for programmatically handling structures defined for different kernel architectures and operating system versions. This necessitates extensible software design resilient to changes in future versions of OS X.

Assumptions related to achieving the research goal include:

1. A method already exists for copying physical memory to file in a forensically sound manner.

2. Because analysis is always performed on a forensic duplicate of imaged memory, the tool developed is not guaranteed nor required to ensure data integrity.

3. Prior work can determine the addresses associated with key kernel symbols and perform virtual to physical address translation.

4. Direct validation of tool output is not possible and must therefore be compared with approximate data, the acquisition of which alters the state of memory.

5. Code defining the parsed kernel data structures is open source.

6. The set of architectures under consideration is limited to Intel i386 and x86_64.

7. The set of OS X operating systems under consideration is limited to 10.6.x Snow Leopard and 10.7.x Lion.

8. The set of handle types supported by the implementation is not comprehensive.

The first two assumptions leverage existing work described in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.2 respectively. Validation challenges are addressed in Section 4.1. Design assumptions and emergent research limitations are discussed throughout Chapter 3 and formally classified in Section 4.1.2.
1.2 Methodological Approach

The open source volafox project (Lee, 2011) has begun the work of analyzing raw memory dumped on OS X with modules for parsing hardware information, system build number, process listing, loaded kernel modules, syscall table, and socket connections. One omission in the existing volafox feature set is an ability to list file handles. This research presents the memory analysis methodology required to extract file handles in use by each process, and demonstrates its application through a new volafox module. The research module outputs handle information corresponding to process name, PID, file descriptor, access mode, handle type, size/offset, catalog node ID, and name. Supported handles include regular files, directories, symbolic links, character special files, memory-mapped files associated with the process executable and its current working directory.

Chapter 3 describes methodology for implementing the new file handles module. Software design requirements and constraints are listed along with a format specification for the information displayed to the user. Next, design recovery of key kernel data structures is presented. The relevant members and relationships of 36 xnu kernel structures are used to parse the required handle information. Package organization, key objects, and functions from the existing volafox source code are then described. Object-oriented design of the new file handles module is depicted using UML and a description of the data structure template development process is presented. Chapter 3 closes with a discussion of outstanding implementation issues. Results of the new module are validated against the UNIX command-line tool lsof (list open files) in Chapter 4. Versions 10.6 Snow Leopard and 10.7 Lion of the OS X operating system for both 32 and 64-bit kernels are the tested configurations.
1.3 Research Implications

Design recovery of the OS X kernel data structures related to process file handles in Section 3.2 and summarized in Appendix B is a primary implication of the research. Development of the new volafox module for parsing handle information exists in part to demonstrate this part of the methodology in a practical form. While core UNIX technologies lead to many similarities with other systems, OS X’s unique design architecture makes it distinct from other platforms. The research is novel because kernel structures parsed by the tool differ from those considered in the literature for Linux and Windows.

The research module also demonstrates a process developed for dynamically handling data structure layout in memory across multiple architecture and operating system versions. The process is broken down in three parts. Section 3.4.2 first describes how C struct templates are built to an interface specification for each OS and architecture configuration. Next, a solution is given for selecting the correct template at runtime using an abstract object initializer. Finally, Section 3.4.3 presents an external C program for generating template syntax using the kernel header files defining key structures. The process itself adds value because it simplifies program logic and readability of the resulting source code. Though unverified, the process is extensible by design and therefore may also support future versions of OS X and additional kernel structures outside the immediate research scope.

Finally, the new volafox module for listing open files is validated in Chapter 4 and found to reasonably approximate output from the UNIX `lsotf` command. After addressing outstanding constraints and deficiencies, work based on this tool could one
day replace at least one required executable from an incident response toolkit. This result directly addresses the problem statement and therefore implies a successful research outcome.
II. Literature Review

Digital evidence is integral to modern forensic investigation because of its pervasiveness in the consumer, enterprise, and government domains. Practitioners require tools to simplify the collection and analysis of such evidence across the breadth of endpoint devices encountered in the field. An investigator may employ tools from a variety of open-source, commercial, and underground sources in pursuit of needed capabilities. The work presented in this thesis evolves an existing open-source project for analyzing the memory of Apple’s OS X desktop operating system.

This chapter introduces digital forensics and the related process of incident response, with specific focus on memory analysis. Strategies for capturing memory on OS X are discussed as a component of incident response, and necessary precursor to analysis. A review of existing work for analyzing raw memory drummed on Linux serves as a baseline for higher-abstraction analytic capabilities. Finally, the volafax tool being extended for this research is presented, along with its methodology for acquiring kernel symbols and parsing key data structures.

2.1 Digital Forensics

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) describes digital evidence as “[i]nformation stored in binary form that may be introduced and relied on in court” (2008, p. 52). In order to meet the latter half of this definition, evidence must be handled in a manner
consistent with accepted forensic practice. Generally accepted standards include at minimum (NIJ, 2008):

- A process for ensuring evidence remains unchanged.
- Assuring technical expertise of personnel responsible for analysis.
- Detailed documentation of all actions affecting the evidence.

A similar definition by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) describes computer forensics as the “practice of gathering, retaining, and analyzing computer-related data for investigative purposes in a manner that maintains the integrity of the data” (2008, p. D-1). Digital forensics is therefore a process characterized by the preparation for, and execution of, the following activities (NIST, 2006):

1. **Data collection** – identifying and preserving useful data from all possible sources of digital evidence according to a standardized subprocess.

2. **Examination and analysis** – a methodical approach to correlating evidence from various sources to determine the characteristics and impact of an event.

3. **Reporting** – a procedural log and analysis summary used to demonstrate the integrity of the process overall and present its findings.

Given the wide array of platforms and environments capable of supporting digital evidence, these definitions describe *what* the digital forensic process requires rather than *how* to accomplish it.

The implementation described in Chapter 3 is specific to the evidence analysis component of the three-part process above. However, in order to understand the input for analysis, the collection of digital evidence is discussed here.
2.2 Incident Response

Motivation for applying the digital forensic process is known as an *incident*, “violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices” (NIST, 2008, p. D2). Organizations with a mission involving digital forensics need an established policy for handling such events that describes recommended practices for mitigating the effects. Performing the actions prescribed in such a policy is defined as *incident response*, an organizational standard describing how the process of digital forensics is to be applied within a specific context. An incident response almost always incorporates components of data collection and reporting as specified by the digital forensics process. Depending on mission needs of the affected systems, analysis may take place on site, be deferred, or a combination of the two. Deferred analysis may be necessary when it requires technical skills beyond that of incident responder, tools unavailable at the scene, or is expected to take more time than can be reasonably allocated.

The tool implemented in Chapter 3 could operate as a component of incident response but is more likely to be employed during deferred analysis. Data used as input to the tool is volatile and therefore its capture must be conducted as part of an incident response policy in order to make analysis possible.

2.2.1 Volatile Data.

*Volatile data* describes digital evidence of a dynamic or transient nature that is sensitive to time, system state, or power. It is contrasted with nonvolatile data such as that stored on a magnetic hard drive, smart card, or flash memory (NIJ, 2008). While sources of nonvolatile data may be collected directly as hardware or imaged during incident
response, volatile data is fragile and therefore has distinct collection and analysis needs (NIST, 2006). This section motivates the collection of volatile data during incident response as a compliment to traditional disk analysis, and provides an overview of the process. Note that system characteristics and the collection process described focus on Linux systems due to similarity with OS X.

Several arguments for seizing and analyzing volatile data exist. First, no usage snapshot is complete without a record of what the machine was doing before shutdown. This action is usually a prerequisite to imaging a system for deferred disk analysis (NIST, 2006). Valuable evidence such as running processes, network connections, and currently open files may all be irretrievably lost as soon as the target is powered off (NIST, 2008). Critical systems may also be unavailable for imaging because the downtime would adversely affect user experience or services, making traditional disk analysis infeasible. The so-called Trojan Defense is also a concern. One classic example is Aaron Caffrey’s acquittal following a defense which could have been disproven using evidence in volatile data (Leyden, 2003). Modern malware is specifically engineered to avoid the disk as a means of preventing detection. This means volatile data may be the only source of evidence available to prove its presence or absence. Dolan-Gavitt (2008a) demonstrates how a cached version of the Windows registry can be exploited without leaving any evidence on the disk.

The slow but progressive adoption of full-disk encryption offers what may be the single best argument for integrating volatile data collection into any reasonable incident response (Casey, Fellows, Geiger, & Stellatos, 2011). Data on disk may be essentially worthless to the investigator once the target is powered off if its contents become fully
encrypted. Full disk encryption became a standard feature on OS X when FileVault 2 was included with the release of 10.7 Lion. Tools for breaking FileVault 2 encryption via memory exploit are now available both open source and commercially (Kessler, 2012; Maartmann-Moe, 2012). However, none of the known attacks work after the target is turned off.

### 2.2.2 Volatile Collection Process.

Recovering volatile data from a Linux target typically involves a toolkit consisting of trusted executables needed to dump specific operating system information, exfiltrate output, and maintain integrity of evidence (Mandia, Prosise, & Pepe, 2003). On UNIX systems and their derivatives, the toolkit can be built using commands available on the platform, compiled as static binaries verified using the ldd tool on Linux (Burdach, 2004), or otool on the Mac (Webb, 2010). The volatile data of interest and some of the Linux commands associated with its collection are summarized below (Burdach, 2004; Carvey, 2009; Mandia et al., 2003):

- **date** – system date and time
- **w** – login sessions
- **ls** – directory listing including MAC times
- **netstat** – network connections and open ports with associated applications
- **ps** – process list
- **arp, route** – arp and routing cache tables
- **cat /proc/modules** – loaded kernel modules
- **lsof** – process-to-file mappings
- **cat /proc/version** – OS version
- **cat /proc/sys/kernel/name** – host name
- **cat /proc/sys/kernel/domainname** – domain name
- **cat /proc/cpuid** – hardware info
- **cat /proc/swaps** – swap partitions
- **cat /proc/partitions** – local file systems
- **cat /proc/self/mounts** – mounted file systems
• `cat /proc/uptime - uptime`
• Physical memory image (kernel-specific)
• Clipboard contents (distribution-specific)
• Command-line history (shell-specific)

The toolkit is typically delivered to the target via read-only media to protect its integrity, and its output usually stored to external media or piped over a network connection. After constructing such a toolkit, commands for collecting, naming, and storing the evidence collected are scripted for the native command-line interface. The command order should give consideration to the perishability of the data (NIST, 2006):

1. Network connections
2. Login sessions
3. Contents of memory
4. Running processes
5. Open files
6. Network configuration
7. Operating system time

Webb offers details on toolkit compilation and scripting for incident response on OS X which roughly approximates the aforementioned process (2010).

A possible alternative to this incident response methodology by Choi, Savoldi, Gubian, and Lee (2008) integrates both collection and analysis. The Linux Evidence Collection Tool (LECT) is a framework for live evidence collection aimed at server investigations. It consists of a console-based collection tool and graphical analysis environment. The tool emphasizes collection of log files and other disk-borne data for offline analysis and correlation with volatile data. Because of this hybrid approach, LECT is not well aligned with the research goals of this thesis.

The preceding exploration of volatile collection strategies for Linux serves to characterize the kinds of information that are most critical to the investigator. In the
following section, an alternative methodology is proposed to replace many of the commands mentioned with a tool for parsing this information from an image of physical memory. Use of a volatile collection toolkit as described in this section establishes a baseline against which memory forensics can be measured in terms of both analytic power and system impact.

2.3 Memory Forensics

This section describes background needed to understand the sub-field of digital forensics concerned with analyzing the contents of raw memory. Random-access memory (RAM), physical memory, or main memory are all terms used interchangeably to describe the first backing store for the operating system’s virtual memory manager (Gorman, 2004). Physical memory is of interest to the forensic examiner because it stores current and recent data being acted on by the CPU and various memory-mapped I/O. Suiche (2010) asserts that on UNIX systems the term physical memory is synonymous with /dev/mem, the character device used to abstract the hardware implementation.

A variety of hardware and software solutions exist to copy the contents of physical memory to file for offline analysis. Output of such a tool is commonly referred to as an image or memory dump. The sophistication of memory analysis varies, but by one definition represents an “attempt to use memory management structures in computers as maps to extract files and executables resident in a computer’s physical memory” (Urrea, 2006, p. 2). The more specific definition required by this research classifies structured memory analysis as the examination of kernel structures present in an image to partially characterize the state of a computer at time of capture. The two-part process of
analyzing physical memory generally involves the capture of RAM during incident response in a manner consistent with forensic principles, and subsequent examination of its contents using tools capable of parsing kernel structures or other useful patterns from the resulting file.

In its simplest form, the value of memory introspection will be familiar to any programmer who has used a debugger to analyze a core dump. Exploit developers use many of the same tools for analyzing the state of RAM during execution to craft payloads for corrupting memory in order to achieve a desired effect (Miller & Zovi, 2009). Analysts on both sides of the ethical divide observe memory in action to reverse engineer systems, applications, or malware. From a forensic standpoint, the state of a system can be most comprehensively recorded by capturing the raw contents of RAM. However, modern computers guarantee this information alone is incomplete and fragmented due to virtual memory and other architectural mechanisms. Further complicating its analysis are operating system protection schemes such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), which seek to obfuscate the location and structure of memory as a means of safeguarding information.

2.3.1 Advantages of Memory Analysis.

Despite the challenges, there are several compelling reasons to prefer structured memory analysis over the techniques for investigating volatile data described in Section 2.2.1. First, because memory contains both in-use and recently-used data, it is possible to reconstruct a limited timeline of system usage. Recently used memory segments may provide information not represented in the log files and other incident response toolkit output because, like free disk space, these segments are marked for recycling by the
operating system. Solomon, Huebner, Bem, and Szezynska assert that “[d]espite the fast
decay of user pages in free memory, it is still a worthwhile source of forensic data”
(2007, p. 71). The most recent work on Linux even suggests that it may be possible to go
about such reconstruction in a coherent and organized fashion (Case, Marziale, Neckar,
& Richard, 2010).

A second advantage of structured memory analysis is its resilience to system
tampering when compared with other strategies for reconstruction using disk analysis or
incident response toolkit output. Syscall hooking, log manipulation, and other anti-
forensic measures are common features of modern malware (Ligh, Adair, Hartstein, &
Richard, 2011; SANS Institute, 2008). These exploitation tactics can lead to missed
evidence and incorrect conclusions if the results of other analysis are not compared
against evidence in memory (Hay & Nance, 2009). Even when employing static
executables, memory analysis may be the only way to reveal running malware when
faced with a sophisticated kernel rootkit. Dolan-Gavitt (2008a) also demonstrates how
physical memory may contain the only evidence of registry tampering on Windows.

The third benefit is that physical memory may contain evidence that is never
saved to disk and would otherwise be lost. Consider that one reason for performing hard
power-off of a system prior to imaging is to preserve the temporary files that might be
overwritten in a graceful shutdown operation (NIST, 2006). This action also results in the
unfortunate loss of any files that have not been saved because they exist only in memory
at the time of shutdown. If memory is imaged during the incident response, these files are
preserved and “sections of memory can have more traditional forensic procedures applied
to them such as file carving and hashing” (Case, Cristina, Marziale, G. G. Richard, & Roussev, 2008, p. S70).

Finally, volatile data collection using a scripted response toolkit has an inherent disadvantage: changes to the system state which occur as a result of collection. Dumping information in a forensically sound manner means “[s]ome of the response tools may even substantially alter the digital environment of the original system” (Law, Chow, Kwan, & Lai, 2007, p. 137). A trusted tool must overwrite existing memory on the target system when both the executable and all its static libraries are copied from disk in order to preserve the forensic integrity of the output. Next, a series of I/O operations are needed to support the exfiltration of the output. The process is then repeated for each distinct piece of volatile data sought. This leads to a situation where “[t]he credibility of the acquired data relies solely on the reliability of the tool and the expertise of the user” (Law et al., 2009, p. 1). By contrast, capturing physical memory for deferred analysis has the potential to be much less invasive. Some techniques, such as FireWire acquisition, do not require any execution on the target system. Similarly, suspending a virtual machine allows memory capture on the guest with minimal impact.

The lack of investigator-friendly methods for analyzing memory images provides the facing argument to the use of structured memory analysis outlined in the preceding paragraphs. When deciding between an imperfect incident response toolkit and an indecipherable collection of bits, it is clear that a potentially corrupt dataset is preferable to no information at all. A dump of raw memory is only as useful as the tools available to abstract information for human analysis. Therefore the acquisition and analysis capabilities for this method are equally important.
2.3.2 Memory Forensics Process.

Analysis of raw memory is procedurally similar to many types of digital evidence, generally following the steps of capture, analysis, and reporting. Carvey (2009) provides a description of the memory forensics process, with a focus on Windows since it is the only platform where this type of analysis has matured.

The first step is to choose a method of capture based on the hardware, operating system, state of the target, and context of the investigation. Next, a delivery method is selected. Most common today is a USB device that acts as both capture toolkit and storage for the resulting memory image. The toolkit hash is documented prior to use, and appropriate physical and policy measures taken to prevent altering the contents of the device before incident response. When the tool is executed on a target, system time and hash value of the output are documented in the incident response log. Carvey (2009) argues the hash should be recorded once memory dump is complete due to changes that occur during the capture process. After memory is captured, measures must again be taken to avoid changes to the storage media. Analysis occurs only on copies of the original image file, the integrity of which can be verified using the recorded hash. This is done using a write-blocker on a forensic workstation capable of copying the storage media without changing it. Analysis then proceeds on the copy according to the needs of the investigation and the tools available. The process for parsing any results is documented in detail such that it can be reproduced, and the conclusions of the examiner are summarized in a written report. Since the reporting aspect is largely determined by organization policy or legal requirements it is not discussed further, but the details of capture and analysis for OS X and similar platforms are now presented.
2.4 Mac Memory Acquisition

This section focuses on physical memory capture for the platform under research consideration: OS X running on Intel architecture. While this thesis addresses primarily the analysis component of the memory forensics process, acquisition of RAM is a prerequisite to making such research worthwhile and is therefore discussed first.

2.4.1 FireWire, Cold-boot, and VM Extraction.

The IEEE 1394 or FireWire interface is susceptible to direct memory access (DMA) on OS X as well as Windows. Its vulnerability, the underlying PCIe bus, is shared by a variety of I/O on the Mac including ExpressCard, SD slot, and the new Intel Thunderbolt port (Graham, 2011). Using this interface to reliably capture RAM on the Mac was first demonstrated by the pyfw attack (Becher, Dornseif, & Klein, 2005). While useful, the project is not explicitly designed as a forensic tool (Hermann, 2008). Numerous forensic implementations have emerged since, including Goldfish (Gladyshev & Almansoori, 2010, 2011), and libforensic1394 (Witherden, 2010).

There are several shortcomings to DMA capture. First, the vulnerability is limited to the first 4GB of system memory (Gladyshev & Almansoori, 2010). Kubasiak and Morrissey further characterize the method as “somewhat invasive and involves tricking the system into thinking an iPod is being connected” (2009, p. 528). Finally, the attack is easily mitigated using the lock screen if user switching is disabled (Garrison, 2011).

The alternative Kubasiak and Morrissey suggest to FireWire exploitation is msramdump (2009, p. 528; McGrew, 2008). This technique calls for cold boot extraction, where the target system is forcibly shutdown and then quickly booted from external media before the contents in memory are fully wiped by momentary loss of
power. This tool builds on earlier research where the hardware DIMMS were physically cooled and removed from the target so the contents could be read externally. The risk of evidence loss appears to be high with this strategy and the authors suggest it only as a method of last resort for extracting the decryption key of a Mac using FileVault.

Another option is to copy the memory backup file maintained by the host system of an OS X virtual machine (VM) during suspension. Ligh, Adair, Hartstein and Richard list the location of such files for various virtualization products and describe how they can be used with Volatility for Windows analysis (2011). This represents perhaps the least invasive method available, however there are two caveats. First, until the release of OS X 10.7 Apple’s software license agreement only permitted virtualization of its server operating system. Second, due to tight hardware-software integration on the Mac it would be rare to encounter such an installation in the field, thereby limiting its usefulness to the forensic examiner. Possible exceptions include enterprise installations of OS X Server or VMs used for research, software development, or reverse code engineering.

2.4.2 Kernel Module Capture.

Classic methods for extracting memory from UNIX systems involved reading directly from the `/dev/mem` or `/dev/kmem` character device using `dd`. This ability has been disabled in the Linux kernel for some time and when OS X transitioned to Intel architecture it became similarly depreciated on the Mac. Singh (2006a) describes the problem and makes several suggestions for implementing a custom version of `/dev/kmem` to read from kernel memory directly. This approach was demonstrated by Suiche (2010) with an emulation of `/dev/mem` used to dump RAM on a Mac. The
presentation also describes how critical symbols retrieved from the `mach_kernel` executable can be used to build a kernel memory manager capable of virtual to physical address translation. Such translation is required to fully browse kernel address space and copy its contents. This capability did not become publically available until the release of Mac Memory Reader (Architecture Technology Corporation [ATC], 2011), a free component of the commercial Mac Marshal product. Technical limitations and design decisions lead to several details worth nothing about the tool’s output (ATC, 2011; Inoue, Adelstein, & Joyce, 2011; Leat, 2011):

- Output file format is a Mach-O, equivalent to Linux ELF (Apple Inc., 2009).
- The `-H` option prints MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512 hash to stderr.
- Using `-' for the output filename prints to stdout for command piping.
- Physical memory map used is the same format as the `showbootermemory` macro in the Apple Kernel Debug Kit.
- Only addressable pages can be copied from physical memory, excluding a small number of pages missing from the memory map.
- Memory segmentation is maintained along with offsets in the file using a header listing, the results of which can be interpreted with Apple’s `otool`.
- Memory-mapped I/O device segments and memory ports are not captured.
- Memory allocated to a virtual machine hypervisor is not captured.

There are several disadvantages to this form of acquisition. First, Mac Memory Reader requires administrator privileges to load the needed kernel module. While this may limit its use during some investigations, in many cases a cooperative administrator may be available to provide the password. Second, output from such a tool could be corrupted by the presence of memory forensic countermeasures (Haruyama & Suzuki,
2012) or advent of a rootkit explicitly designed to subvert collection. “Fortunately, unless
the subversion mechanism is very deeply embedded in the OS, a substantial amount of
overhead may be incurred to prevent acquisition, potentially revealing the presence of a
malicious agent” (Case et al., 2008, p. 2). Finally, because a kernel module must be
loaded into the memory in order to perform the capture, its use alters the target system.
The problem is addressed by the Mac Memory Reader README text (ATC, 2011):

Pieces of the MacMemoryReader executable code and data will certainly
appear within the RAM snapshot, simply because MacMemoryReader is
running in the same memory space being acquired. This is a known
"footprint" and aspect of live analysis.

While this represents a violation of the first forensic principle outlined in section 2.1, it is
likely to be no worse than the other practical methods discussed (VM analysis
notwithstanding). This method of capture also has the advantage of being self-
documenting, in that its usage is represented within the resulting output. Despite the
challenges, availability of this robust acquisition capability for the Mac encourages
additional research and emphasis on analytic capabilities for the platform.

2.5 Structured Memory Analysis

Most literature and web references to memory analysis on OS X discuss context-
free techniques such as string searches, manual hex examination, file carving and the like.
Valenzuela (2011) writes about these rudimentary methods in a blog post responding to
the release of Mac Memory Reader. Malard (2011) expands these approaches to include
session information and password extraction in a paper discussing hacking tactics for OS
X. One early effort to achieve systematic analysis of raw memory on the Mac is a tool for
automatically extracting login credentials using the FireWire exploit cited previously (Makinen, 2008). The attack iterates over all pages in memory searching for a string flag known to occur at a particular offset and then performs a keyword search for ‘username’ and ‘password’ within that page to reveal the target information. This tool is valuable for decrypting disks with FileVault enabled but is only effective against OS X 10.4 Tiger. Unfortunately, all context-free methods for memory analysis are inherently limited, imprecise, and inefficient.

2.5.1 Linux Memory Analysis.

This section offers a review of existing work concerning higher-abstraction memory analysis, presented as a timeline. Linux is chosen as a reasonable analog upon which to model research for OS X because it is the most similar platform to have received attention in the literature with regard to forensic memory analysis. However, note that Linux diverges significantly in terms of the kernel structures used to reconstruct information (Singh, 2006b).

An early paper on memory analysis for Linux proposes tools to aid embedded developers with identifying misused or wasted system memory (Movall, Nelson, & Wetzstein, 2005). While not well suited for forensic application, this work demonstrates how memory forensics follows as a natural extension of dynamic debugging. Burdach demonstrates this concept in a 2004 blog post on live forensic analysis for Linux systems. The blog notes acquisition of /proc/kcore should be favored over /dev/mem because its ELF core format allows for introspection using gbd. By comparing the addresses in Symbol.map with those from /proc/kcore, the author demonstrates how memory analysis can be used to perform rootkit detection. There is also a
description of how /proc/kcore can yield keyword searches with the UNIX strings command and regular expressions.

Moving beyond keyword searches and file carving techniques requires an understanding of operating system internals to determine how the kernel organizes information in what would otherwise be an incoherent block of data. Urrea (2006) began this work by enumerating many of the Linux structures relevant to forensic examination and shows how they might be extracted using a set of ridged Perl scripts. Burdach (2006) continued to enhance the analytic potential on the platform when he released a proof-of-concept toolkit called IDETECT to simplify introspection on memory, again using gdb. The same year FATKit framework (Petroni, Walters, Fraser, & Arbaugh, 2006) emerged as a major step forward by offering a modular approach to abstracting and visualizing forensic evidence from raw memory. Tool design is general and extensible enough that even in early releases FATKit featured modules for both Windows and Linux.

Case, Cristina, Marziale, Richard, and Roussev developed RAMPARSER to address “the lack of available memory parsing tools for Linux” (2008, p. S67). RAMPARSER can list running processes and perform introspection on specific ones to detail open files and socket information. Case, Marziale and Richard (2010) later extend RAMPARSER to make it “substantially less brittle with respect to kernel versions”. This paper frames one of the major challenges to forensic memory analysis: most tools are specific to a particular platform version and must be reworked when even minor updates to an operating system occur. The constraint is especially dire for Linux distributions, where there is a great deal of kernel fragmentation. This same challenge is also the motivation for Foriana (Petroni, Walters, Fraser, & Arbaugh, 2006), a research tool
designed to explore solutions for memory analysis when the exact target OS version is not known. The tool has support for multiple architectures and operating systems, including BSD (from which Apple’s UNIX foundation derives). Vidas (2011) suggests an open corpus for memory analysis to build support across a breadth of kernel versions.

While most of the work discussed exists primarily in the research domain, tools for Linux memory analysis are also represented commercially (Pikewerks Corporation, 2011). However, the open source forensics community has been slow to support Linux with tools built for users when compared to the capabilities available for Windows. In 2008 serious work began on this deficiency when the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) sought to develop tools specifically for Linux memory analysis. This emphasis resulted in several Linux extensions for the open source Volatility framework (Cohen & Collett, 2008). Case (2011a, b, c) writes extensively about subsequent work leading to the Linux branch available in beta from the Volatility project website. Integrated Linux support is anticipated for the 3.0 release of the project (M. Cohen, Volatility developer mailing list, March 26, 2012). In addition to the Linux commands shown in Table 1, Volatility has additional modules for analyzing network configuration, kmem cache, dmesg buffer, and auxiliary process details.

2.5.2 Volafox Project.

The first effort to provide higher-abstraction analytic capabilities for raw memory dumped on the Mac began with the open source release of volafox, a Google Code project described as a “Memory Analyzer for Mac OS X” (Lee, 2011). This text-based tool is implemented in Python 2.5 and borrows heavily from the Volatility source code. Volafox is operable on flat memory images captured from OS X 10.6-7 with 32 or 64-bit
Table 1. volafox modules and their Volatility equivalents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>volafox</th>
<th>OS X Terminal</th>
<th>Volatility (Linux branch)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>os_version</td>
<td>sw_vers</td>
<td>sw_vers</td>
<td>OS X build version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine_info</td>
<td>sysctl</td>
<td>linux_cpuinfo</td>
<td>kernel version, CPU, and memory specifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mount_info</td>
<td>mount</td>
<td>linux_mount</td>
<td>mounted filesystems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kext_info</td>
<td>kextstat</td>
<td>linux_lsmid</td>
<td>kernel extension (KEXT) list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KEXT dump</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proc_info</td>
<td>ps</td>
<td>linux_task_list_ps</td>
<td>process list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-x</td>
<td>vmmmap</td>
<td>linux_proc_maps</td>
<td>process dump</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>syscall_info</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>syscall table with hooking detection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net_info</td>
<td>netstat</td>
<td>linux_netstat</td>
<td>network socket list</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Chapter 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>volafox</th>
<th>OS X Terminal</th>
<th>Volatility (Linux branch)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

architecture. Table 1 summarizes the volafox parsing modules and offers a comparison with those available for the Linux support branch of Volatility and tools built-in to the OS X command line. Little has been written about the usage of volafox, but Shuster (2011) describes its basic functionality in his blog.

Revision 52 of volafox, the version extended in Chapter 3, does not natively support the Mac Memory Reader (MMR) output format. Leat (2011) and ATC developer Hajime Inoue contributed to experimental support for MMR which is operational in revisions 23-38 on the project website. The feature was later removed with the introduction of 64-bit addressing support due to compatibility problems. A stand-alone flatten.py utility authored by Inoue is still available to convert MMR files to a linear format, but only works for 32-bit kernel installations.

An alpha feature is also implemented in volafox to analyze network information, the output of which appears to be a simplified version of the UNIX netstat command. While difficult to ascertain the state of this module given the lack documentation, in
limited testing the feature only appears to support IPv4 TCP and UDP protocols. It is also unknown which kernel structures the module parses because this methodology is not included in the work by Suiche as with the others.

2.5.3 Symbol Table Construction.

In order to perform meaningful analysis of raw memory, an understanding of the composition and location of key kernel structures is required. Because Darwin (Apple’s open source core for OS X) is freely available, the composition of kernel structures can be determined from the header files they are defined in. Locating the structures in memory requires a mapping of identifiers and offsets, or a kernel symbol table. Suiche notes “[s]ymbols are a key element of volatile memory forensics without them an advanced analysis is impossible” (2010). The KPCR structure can be used in Windows to get the symbols directly from memory, conveniently this structure is located at a static offset (Dolan-Gavitt, 2008b). Unfortunately, the same approach cannot be used on OS X because “kernel sections are destroyed as soon as the kernel (mach_kernel) is loaded by removeKernelLinker() function” [slides] (Suiche, 2010). A solution to the equivalent problem in Linux is addressed by Volatility, which maintains a database of overlay files containing the requisite symbol tables for select distributions and kernel versions (Case, 2011a). In both Linux and OS X therefore, the “easiest way to retrieve kernel symbols is to extract them from the kernel executable of the hard-drive” (Suiche, 2010, p. 4).

Figure 1 shows key features of the mach_kernel executable file, located at the root directory of the OS X file system. Using the SYMTAB load command structure, a kernel symbol table can be constructed mapping the strings pointed to by

26
symtab_command.stroff with the static addresses stored in nlist.n_value. Such a table is valid for any installation sharing the same build version as the mach_kernel file used to derive it. This works because while the majority of physical memory is devoted to dynamic allocation for use by running processes, a portion of the layout is reserved for the kernel and its static data structures (Bovet & Cesati, 2006).
In revisions 25 and older, volafox built the symbol table directly from `mach_kernel` each the tool was executed. This was inefficient and also led to an undesirable dependency on the kernel executable. In practice, `mach_kernel` would therefore need to be copied from a target when performing memory acquisition. Leat provided a patch to the source, bringing the overlay functionality available in the Linux branch of Volatility to the volafox project (Leat, 2011; Lee, 2011). The current build (r52 at time of writing) includes an `overlay_generator.py` utility allowing symbol table generation for unsupported builds of OS X. A selection of overlay files is also being distributed with the project. However, since Apple does not publish a comprehensive list of OS X build numbers it is difficult to know whether this database is complete. A list of known builds is provided in Appendix A, but it is recommended that `mach_kernel` still be copied at time of memory acquisition to guarantee functionality.

### 2.5.4 Useful Structures.

The symbol table provides memory locations for a number of kernel structures useful in a forensic examination. The composition of these C structures (members and their types) can be determined via examination of the Darwin source code in which they are defined. Suiche (2010) describes several useful symbols and their associated structures as summarized in Table 2. This work mirrors core functionality of the volafox project so its equivalent module commands are also listed (Lee, 2011). Note the `proc` structure contains many additional members of interest to be explored in Chapter 3.
Table 2. volafox commands with associated symbols and kernel structures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>volafox Command</th>
<th>Kernel Symbol</th>
<th>Source Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>os_version</td>
<td>version</td>
<td>/xnu/osfmk/i386/lowmem_vectors.s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>struct Name</td>
<td>none (points to 100-byte string)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Definition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful Members</td>
<td>operating system, kernel version, date and username of compilation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>volafox Command</th>
<th>Kernel Symbol</th>
<th>Source Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>machine_info</td>
<td>machine_info</td>
<td>xnu/osfmk/mach/machine.h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>struct Name</td>
<td>machine_info</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Definition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful Members</td>
<td>integer_t major_version; // major kernel version</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>integer_t minor_version; // minor kernel version</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>uint64_t max_mem; // size of physical memory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>uint32_t physical_cpu; // number of CPU cores</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>int32_t logical_cpu; // number of threads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>volafox Command</th>
<th>Kernel Symbol</th>
<th>Source Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mount_info</td>
<td>mountlist</td>
<td>xnu/bsd/sys/mount_internal.h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>struct Name</td>
<td>mount</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Definition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful Members</td>
<td>TAILQ_ENTRY(mount) mnt_list; // linked-list of mounts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>struct vfsstatfs mnt vfsstat;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>struct Name</td>
<td>vfsstatsf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Definition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful Members</td>
<td>char f_fstypename; // file system type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>char f_mntonname; // directory mounted at</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>char f_mntfromname; // mounted name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>volafox Command</th>
<th>Kernel Symbol</th>
<th>Source Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kext_info</td>
<td>kmod info</td>
<td>xnu/osfmk/mach/kmod.h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>struct Name</td>
<td>kmod</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Definition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful Members</td>
<td>struct kmod_info *next; // next linked module</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>int id;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>char name[KMOD_MAX_NAME];</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>char version[KMOD_MAX_NAME];</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>int reference_count; // refs to this module</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vm_address_t address; // starting address</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vm_size_t size; // total size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>volafox Command</th>
<th>Kernel Symbol</th>
<th>Source Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>syscall_info</td>
<td>nsysent</td>
<td>xnu/bsd/sys/sysent.h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>struct Name</td>
<td>none (points to an int)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Definition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful Members</td>
<td>OS-dependent arithmetic required to find sysent based on the address of nsysent. Suiche (2010) provides details for OS X 10.5 and 10.6.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Definition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful Members</td>
<td>sy_call_t *sy_call; // implementing function</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>volafox Command</strong></td>
<td><strong>proc_info</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kernel Symbol</strong></td>
<td>kernproc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>struct Name</strong></td>
<td>proc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source Definition</strong></td>
<td>xnu/bsd/sys/proc_internal.h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful Members</strong></td>
<td>struct NAME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>proc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pid_t p_pid;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>// process identifier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pid_t ppid;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>// parent pid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>char p_comm[MAXCOMLEN+1];</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>// process name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>struct pgrp *p_pgrp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>struct Name</strong></th>
<th>pgrp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source Definition</strong></td>
<td>xnu/bsd/sys/proc_internal.h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful Members</strong></td>
<td>struct session *pg_session;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>struct Name</strong></th>
<th>session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source Definition</strong></td>
<td>xnu/bsd/sys/proc_internal.h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Useful Members</strong></td>
<td>char s_login[MAXLOGNAME];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>// process username</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The syscall table is potentially valuable for identifying hooked functions. Each system call addresses should match those stored on-file in `mach_kernel`, any discrepancies in the comparison could be evidence of tampering (Wowie, 2009). Location of the `sysent` structure in memory changes between versions of OS X, making the feature difficult to maintain. At present, the `syscall_info` command is broken in volafox for 10.7 captures due to this difficulty.

### 2.6 Summary

This chapter defined key terms and presented the processes for digital forensics, incident response, and memory analysis. Options available for capturing RAM on Intel Macs running OS X were discussed along with development and limitations of the Mac Memory Reader tool. A review of existing work in Linux memory analysis was then followed by a description of the volafox project being extended for this research. Technical details required in constructing a kernel symbol table on OS X and several useful kernel structures were also introduced.
III. Methodology

This chapter describes the implementation of a new forensic capability for parsing open file information from OS X memory captures. When open files are mapped to a process, the forensic examiner learns which resources the process is accessing on disk. This listing is useful in determining what information may have been the target for exfiltration or modification on a compromised system. File handles may also help identify a suspicious process when unexpected file access or modifications are observed. Carvey further describes how a list of open files can compliment disk analysis to “get an understanding of files you should be concerned with during an investigation” (2009, p. 132). Because open files can help characterize process activity and highlight misuse of a computer, it is highly desirable to recover this information from memory.

A number of factors influence the decision to implement the feature selected. First, an open files listing is the first to-do item on the volafox project wiki. Second, this functionality is already represented in the Linux branch for Volatility (Table 1). Third, as described in Section 2.2.2, capturing this information is a recommended practice during incident response. Listing network connections was also considered due to the high forensic value of this information. However, because volafox already includes this as an alpha module, file handles were determined to have the greater research impact.

The chapter begins with the design goals of the system. Kernel structures responsible for the target information are then discussed. Organization of the volafox source is reviewed. Next, implementation of the new volafox module is described along with modifications to the exiting project source. Finally, the outstanding issues are listed.
3.1 System Design

The developed system consists of software for extracting the open files associated with processes from a raw memory image on OS X. Implementation extends the existing volafox tool to parse a variety of kernel structures not previously described in the literature. Object-oriented design provides a solution that is flexible with respect to both kernel architecture and operating system version.

3.1.2. Target Functionality.

The desired process-to-file handle information is an approximation of output from the commands `lsof` for UNIX and OS X (Apple Inc., 2011), or the Sysinternals equivalent `handle` (Russinovich, 2011) for Windows. Common to these tools is the process associated with each handle, a type classification, and unique identifier. The Linux branch of Volatility offers a possible format for this information as shown in Figure 2. Important to note in the output are the handle types for resources other than files on-disk, such as pipes used for inter-process communication (IPC) and network sockets.

```
PID: 2095   TASK: d1970550 CPU: 0   COMMAND: "gdm-binary"
ROOT: /    CWD: /var/gdm
FD   FILE   DENTRY   INODE   TYPE  PATH
 0 d184b300 d14b9dd8 d19b90a0  CHR   /dev/null
 1 d14c4380 d14b9dd8 d19b90a0  CHR   /dev/null
 2 d0d0500 d14b9dd8 d19b90a0  CHR   /dev/null
 3 d1520500 cf410338 d07ff9a8  SOCK  socket:/[6645]
 4 cca45f00 cbdfcb30 ccc025d8  PIPE
 5 d14c4ec0 cf422228 cf74bb28  PIPE
 6 d1407540 d150d800 d150ee40  CHR   /dev/console
 7 d1bd7380 cd59cf70 cf74bd4  PIPE
 8 d14eb500 cf12add8 d0e83884  REG   /home/stevev/.xsession-errors
 9 d14ece40 cf12a888 cc0c821c  PIPE
11 d150bd80 cbdfcb30 ccc025d8  PIPE
```

Figure 2. Volatility `linux_list_open_files` output (Cohen & Collett, 2008).
A second consideration in deciding on an output format is the resource available for validating the results. Because the `lsof` (list open files) command is included with OS X, it offers a convenient and reliable source of information for comparison. Emulating the output of this tool not only simplifies such analysis, it also gives the examiner a familiar interface to interact with. For these reasons, `lsof` was selected as the model for output format. Figure 3 shows sample output for the `lsof` command and Table 3 describes the information in each column. The new volafox module for listing open files includes functionality for parsing the nine default `lsof` fields present in Figure 3 and the mode identifier integrated with the FD column.

```
$ lsof -p 109
COMMAND PID USER FD TYPE DEVICE SIZE/OFF NODE NAME
bash 109 6ad cwd DIR 14,2 578 202041 /Users/6ad
bash 109 6ad txt REG 14,2 1346544 262558 /bin/bash
bash 109 6ad txt REG 14,2 1054960 264388 /usr/lib/dyld
bash 109 6ad txt REG 14,2 213385216 466405 /private/var/db/
  dyld/dyld_shared
  _cache_x86_64
bash 109 6ad 0u CHR 16,0 0t369 611 /dev/ttys000
bash 109 6ad 1u CHR 16,0 0t369 611 /dev/ttys000
bash 109 6ad 2u CHR 16,0 0t369 611 /dev/ttys000
bash 109 6ad 255u CHR 16,0 0t369 611 /dev/ttys000
```

Figure 3. UNIX list open files (`lsof`) command.
3.1.3 Implementation Constraints.

While an ideal implementation would fully duplicate the functionality and nuances of the ls/of command, the diversity of data structures required to accomplish this makes it impractical with the development resources available for this research. A design choice is made to focus on file rather than socket or IPC handles for this research due to the forensic value of the information and because file handles logically divide the development workload. Constraints of the tool implemented are formalized in Chapter 4, but there are two key decisions that influence the implementation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. UNIX ls/of output fields.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMAND</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PID</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TYPE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEVICE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIZE/OFF</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NODE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAME</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First, the volafox open files module supports a subset of handle types, and only those subscribing to the virtual node (vnode) interface. The excluded types mean POSIX semaphores and shared memory files, kernel event queue files, pipes, and sockets are reported as part of the file descriptor table, but with DEVICE, SIZE/OFF, NODE and NAME fields unsupported. Additionally, the UNIX lsof command classifies sockets by a variety of subtypes that the volafox open files module groups together using the generic description ‘SOCKET’ in the TYPE field.

Second, the module supports a subset of the filesystems available for OS X, specifically HFS+ and DEVFS. HFS+ is the default format for the OS X boot volume and DEVFS is used to abstract certain devices, such as special character files. Among other uses, special character files describe ttys devices controlling the print streams stdin, stdout, and stderr of terminal programs. HFS+ and DEVFS account for the filesystems most commonly encountered during development and testing, but the vnode interface makes reference to at least 20 other types. One impact of this constraint is that files stored on network filesystems, FAT32, NTFS and others, do not have volafox support for lsof fields outside the vnode interface.
3.2 Key Kernel Structures

This section documents the kernel design recovery research objective specified in Section 1.1. Implementing the new volafox module for listing open files requires knowledge of 32 unique C data structures from the OS X source code, four of which are described by Suiche (2010) to list running processes. These include 26 structure (struct), three enumeration (enum), and three union definitions. Identifying the data structures containing critical information and the relationships between them is one of the primary contributions of this research because “the kernel isn’t heavily commented and its internals aren’t documented, so you learn by tracing code by hand” (Sesek, 2012). Figure 4 shows an overview of the relevant structures and associated UNIX lsof fields from Table 3. The names, source files, interesting members, and relationships between these data structures appear as series of relationship diagrams in Figures 5-8 and Appendix B.

Figure 4. C struct relationship overview.
Extracting open file information begins with the kernel symbol table, shown in Figure 5 and described in Section 2.5.3. Symbol `_kernproc` provides an address for the head of the process list, `kernel_task` (PID 0), which is unique in its use of static data structures (Singh, 2006b, p. 293). Because of this property, PID 0 does not appear in the output of UNIX commands such as `ps` or `lsof` and therefore is excluded from the file handles module implementation. The COMMAND and PID fields are members of `struct proc`, and USER is located in `struct session`. Note that `p_list` is a substructure, meaning `proc` contains it as a member rather than using a pointer to reference it.

Figure 5. Symbol table and process list.
Structure task, as pointed to by proc in Figure 5, provides the link to program text files (FD txt). Program text refers to the code and data segments of an executable, as well as linked libraries and any other memory-mapped files. This information is invaluable for identifying rouge processes, which often masquerade as legitimate executables to avoid detection (SANS Institute, 2008).

Figure 6 shows how these files are referenced. Structure _vm_map stores the header for a ring of vm_map_entry structures containing the union member object. Each memory object may reference a struct vm_object or recursively refer to another entry. Memory mapped files are backed by a vnode pager, but the pager may be located in the shadow object for external memory managers (Singh, 2006b, p. 571).

Figure 6. Memory-mapped files (txt).
The file descriptor table and current working directory are referenced from \texttt{struct filedesc} as shown in Figure 7. Member \texttt{filedesc.fd_ofiles} is a pointer to the start of a \texttt{fileproc} array. Elements of the array that contain a valid \texttt{fileglob} pointer reference a handle, those that do not are available to hold one. The index into this array represents the numerical file identifier used by the FD field of the \texttt{lsof} output. Integer \texttt{filedesc.fd_lastfile} indexes the last file in the array and provides an iteration bound. The array itself makes up the file descriptor table, used by a process to reference all open files (ASCII, word processing, logs, temp, etc.). File mode, or read/write access, is determined from the value of \texttt{fileglob.fg_flag} using the bitmap definitions in \texttt{bsd/sys/fcntl.h}. Member \texttt{fileglob.fg_offset} is the offset for FIFO and special character files as reported in the \texttt{lsof} SIZE/OFF field. The

![Diagram of file descriptor table](image.png)

Figure 7. File descriptor table.
fileglob.fg_data member is a generic pointer that may reference a variety of structures. As described in Section 3.1.3, full support is constrained to vnode types. Enumerator fileglob.fg_type holds destination type of the pointer. Any non-vnode handle can be typed using the values of enum file_type_t, but DEVICE, SIZE/OFF, NODE and NAME fields are unsupported for such handles using this research implementation.

Figure 8 shows the struct vnode referenced by proc, vnode_pager, filedesc and fileglob structures shown in Figures 5-7. The lsof NAME field is a concatenation of the device name from mount.vfsstatfs.f_mntfromname and a path of vnode.v_name strings recursively references using vnode.v_parent. Member vnode.vtype describes the file type of any supported file, and vnode.v_tag holds the associated filesystem. The number of combinations created by vnode.v_type and vnode.v_tag leads to branches at union v_un and the generic pointer v_data. NODE is stored at devnode.dn_ino for all files using the VT_DEVFS filesystem and in cnode.cat_desc.cd_cnid for VT_HFS. An encoded device identifier is found at specinfo.si_rdev for VT_DEVFS and in mount.vfsstatfs.fsid.val[0] for VT_HFS. The device identifier is decoded using macros in bsd/sys/types.h that return major and minor device numbers. Returning the correct lsof SIZE/OFF value requires knowledge of vnode.v_type. For VREG files the size is found in ubc_info.ui_size, however this structure is not valid for system vnodes that are otherwise regular (Singh, 2006b, p. 605).
Figure 8. Virtual node (vnode).
VDIR file size is calculated using the count in `cnode.cat_attr.cau_entries`, the equation:

\[(\text{entries} + 2) \times \text{AVERAGE_HFSDirentry_SIZE}\]

found in `bsd/hfs/hfs_vnops.c`, and the macro definition from `bsd/hfs/hfs.h`.

Finally, VLNK sizes are located in `filefork.cat_fork.cf_size`.

Starting with the address pointed to by `_kernproc`, this section describes the structures and relationships for retrieving information needed to emulate `lsof` output for all vnode type files stored on HFS+ or DEVFS filesystems. Table 4 summarizes the structure members needed to support the required fields.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>! DTYPE _VNODE</th>
<th>DTYPE_VNODE</th>
<th>VT_HFS</th>
<th>VT_DEVFS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMAND</td>
<td>proc.p_comm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PID</td>
<td>proc.p_pid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USER</td>
<td>session.s_login</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD &amp; mode</td>
<td>filedesc.fd_ofiles[i] + fileglob.fg_flag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYPE</td>
<td>fileglob.fg_type</td>
<td>vnode.v_type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVICE</td>
<td>mount.vfsstatfs.fsid.val[0]</td>
<td>specinfo.si_rdev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE/OFF</td>
<td>ubc_info.ui_size</td>
<td>cnode.cat_attr.cau_entries</td>
<td>filefork.cat_fork.cf_size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NODE</td>
<td>cnode.cat_desc.cd_cnid</td>
<td>devnode.dn_ino</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>mount.vfsstatfs.f_mntfromname + recurse(vnode.v_parent-&gt;v_name) + vnode.v_name</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Open file data locations.
3.2.1 OS X Abstraction Layers.

OS X is a commercial operating system integrating a collection of technologies, a subset of which are made open source by the Darwin UNIX distribution. This research is concerned with data structures defined by the Darwin kernel, known as xnu. The xnu kernel is composed of several additional abstraction layers. Mach, sometimes described as the xnu microkernel, provides critical low-level services. These are leveraged by BSD, “the primary system programming interface” (Singh, 2006b, p. 31). Among other features, the BSD layer supports a process model and virtual file system (VFS) layer. BSD hooks into Mach for numerous services, such as task operations responsible for execution and the virtual memory subsystems (Singh, 2006b, p. 33).

Much of the preceding design recovery is a consequence of manual inspection of the Darwin source code and headers, combined with prototype development in volafox to verify the purpose of various structure members. However, there are several instances where the destination of a pointer reference is of unknown or ambiguous type, complicating this analysis considerably. Figure 9 demonstrates the problem using struct proc. While three of the members shown are explicitly typed, such as pid_t p_pptr, the structure pointed to by task is unknown using the definition alone. Similar issues occur at vm_object.pager, fileglob.fg_data, vnode.v_un

```
struct proc {
    LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_list;
    pid_t    p_pid;
    void *   task;  /* corresponding task (static)*/
    struct proc * p_pptr;
    ...
};
```

Figure 9. struct proc.
and `vnode.v_data`. These generic object pointers appear at locations where an interface is needed between two or more different abstraction layers. In the example, `struct proc` is a BSD structure and `proc.task` points to a Mach structure. Figure 10 summarizes the relevant layer interfaces. Note that while `fileglob.fg_data` only branches back into the BSD layer for this implementation, support for additional file types would involve structures such as those for pipes and sockets that may exist outside the BSD abstraction layer (Singh, 2006b, p. 919).

![Figure 10. Abstraction crossover.](image)

### 3.3 Project Volafox

This section describes software design details of the volafox project needed to understand implementation of the new open file listing module. First, the relevant source files and Python classes are introduced. Next, the execution flow for the main project file is traversed to explain where the new module interfaces with the existing code.
3.3.1 Package Organization

Figure 11 shows a summary of the source files from the volafox package related to OS X memory analysis. Public classes in each file are indicated in bold. Connections represent file dependencies, which are labeled with the public function names. The new open files module, `lsaf.py`, is shown but not discussed until Section 3.4.

Figure 11. volafox package diagram.
Main program execution depends on the following source files and directory:

`addrspace.py` – houses `FileAddressSpace` class responsible for file operations on linear memory images.

`macho.py` – support for the Mac Memory Reader image format (Mach-O), the `MachAddressSpace` class is written to be the MMR format equivalent of `FileAddressSpace`. As of revision 48 of the project this functionality was disabled due to compatibility problems with 64-bit analysis.

`x86.py / ia32_pml4.py` – these files house the address space agnostic classes `IA32PagedMemoryPae` and `IA32PML4MemoryPae` respectively. They are responsible for performing virtual to physical address translations that can subsequently be converted to file offsets by either `FileAddressSpace` or `MachAddressSpace` (whichever is passed to the initializer). All requests for reading raw memory are passed through one of these two objects. PML4 is a reference to the 4th level page map used by the Intel IA-32e paging scheme (Intel Corporation, 2012), meaning the second file is the one responsible for handling 64-bit architecture images where the first is used for 32-bit.

`imageinfo.py` – the `imageInfo` class inspects a memory image file to determine the file format (MMR or linear) and kernel architecture (32 or 64-bit) required to initialize the correct address space and PAE objects already described. It also returns the OS X build version information for the image needed to select the correct overlay file. This file also has a main so it can be executed as a stand-alone utility.

**Usage:**

```
$ python imageinfo.py IMAGE.mem
```

`overlays/` – as of revision 48, `volafox.py` no longer accepts a `mach_kernel` file argument for building the symbol table. All symbols are read from files in the `overlays` directory labeled by OS version and architecture using the Python pickle library for object serialization. New overlays can be generated from the kernel executable with the `overlay_generator.py` utility.

`volafox.py` – houses the project `main()` and class `volafox` responsible for marshaling the remaining files and classes to preform analysis of OS X memory images.

**Usage:**

```
$ python volafox.py -i MEMORY_IMAGE
 [-o INFORMATION][-m KEXT ID][-x PID]
```
The volafox package also includes several stand-alone utilities:

**showbootermemorymap.py** – outputs the load commands from an MMR image in the same format as the `showbootermemorymap` kernel macro debug script and the `/dev/pmap` device.

*Usage:* $ python showbootermemorymap.py IMAGE.mmr

**flatten.py** – converts MMR image files from Mach-O into a linear equivalent which can be analyzed by volafox.py. This script is only operable on 32-bit architecture, as verified using the `imageinfo.py` utility.

*Usage:* $ python flatten.py SOURCE.mmr DEST.flat

**overlay_generator.py** – reads the symbol table from a mach_kernel executable and stores to file in the form of a serialized Python dictionary for use in the overlays directory.

*Usage:* $ python overlay_generator.py MACH_KERNEL 10.MAJOR.MINOR_ARCH.overlay [32|64]

### 3.3.2 Module Interface.

As summarized in Table 1, volafox features a number of command options for parsing information from raw memory. The code implementing these branches, around 1300 lines, is contained within the source file `volafox.py`. This monolithic software design is not particularly modular, but the implementation of the new open files functionality strives to be. This section explains where the new code interfaces with the existing project.

Since `volafox.py` is intended to be run in Python executable mode, the support code of concern begins in `main()`. This function performs the following actions:

1. Handle command line arguments and the usage statement.
2. Instantiate a new `volafox` object with path to the raw memory image file.
3. Delegate to `volafox` object for initialization of the correct address space and PAE objects, a method that also returns the architecture and OS version needed to select the correct overlay file.

4. Import a symbol table as a Python dictionary from the correct overlay stored on file as a serialized object.

5. Pass addresses for the `_IdlePDPT` and `_IdlePLM4` symbols to the `volafox` object, which uses them to initialize the page table map and thereby completes setup for virtual to physical address translation.

6. Pass address for the `_machine_info` symbol to the `volafox` object, which uses it to determine the kernel version and stores the result as an instance variable for branching based on OS (Lion versus Snow Leopard).

7. Branch based on user information requested to call the appropriate `class volafox` method. Each information method accepts a kernel symbol address and returns a string matrix of results.

8. Print results and exit.

The new module adds code to `main()` for additional argument handling and a branch for calling a new `lsot` method in `class volafox`. Method `lsot` branches on architecture to correctly read and unpack the `_kernproc` symbol and delegates all other open file analysis to the new source file `lsot.py` shown in Figure 11.

3.4 File Handle Module Implementation

This section introduces a new file handle module for `volafox` revision 52. First, the Unified Modeling Language (UML) is used to present a graphical view of how the new `lsot.py` source file is organized in Figures 12-13 and Appendix E. The solution to flexible analysis of multiple kernel architecture and OS versions follows. Next, the issue of ambiguous data types is discussed. Finally, modifications to the existing `volafox` source code are listed.
3.4.1 Object-oriented Design.

While the open files module does not require a complex inheritance hierarchy, a class diagram still offers the best visual explanation of the software’s design. UML is therefore used to provide an overview of the lsof.py source file, the complete version of which is available as a single graphic in Appendix D. Some liberty has been taken with the standard since the source integrates both object-oriented and imperative programming elements. Note that aggregate associations are modeled when a class definition includes an explicit instance variable of another class, while dependencies are used if a class constructs instances for use only within method scope.

Figure 12 shows the class elements corresponding to structures of the process list and the file descriptor table. It also specifies the abstract superclass Struct, the parent of all remaining classes in lsof.py. Figure 13 covers structures related to the vnode interface and memory-mapped files. The utilities box describes global variables and function dependencies outside the class hierarchy. The lsof.py box shows imperative functions which depend on the classes, including the public getfilelist() and printfilelist(), which serve as an interface to the remaining volafox source code.
Figure 12. UML 1 – process list and file descriptors.
Figure 13. UML 2 – vnode interface and memory-mapped files.
Though Python is not a strictly object-oriented language, its support for classes allows for a modular implementation that maps to the network of kernel structures previously discussed. Because C structs group data types, a natural solution to parsing their content uses object instances as containers for the address space they occupy and class methods for handling the unpacked data (see Appendix C. Python `struct` Library). The open files module defines classes for 18 of the structures described in Section 3.2, the remaining substructures are handled inside the class methods since they occupy the address space of the struct in which they are defined.

3.4.2 Structure Templates.

Sections 3.4.2 - 3.4.5 collectively document the research objective from Section 1.1 that requires a flexible process for programmatically handling kernel data structures defined for different kernel architectures and operating system versions. Existing volafox modules are not readily extensible and require additional logic branching for each variant in size or composition of the underlying kernel data structures. The module implemented for this research uses a dynamic runtime solution consisting of two parts.

First, the following interface is defined to describe required members of each structure for a given architecture and OS version:

```python
template = { MBR_NAME : ( MBR_TYPE, OFFSET, SIZE, FIELD, SUB_STRUCT ), ... }
```
Table 5. Template interface fields.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Python Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>template</td>
<td>dict</td>
<td>template implementing the C struct interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBR_NAME</td>
<td>str</td>
<td>dictionary key, variable name for a struct member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>template[MBR_NAME]</td>
<td>tuple</td>
<td>dictionary value, a struct member description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBR_TYPE</td>
<td>str</td>
<td>C type of the named member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFSET</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>offset in bytes for the member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>size in bytes for the member type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD</td>
<td>str</td>
<td>Isol field represented by member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB_STRUCT</td>
<td>dict</td>
<td>recursively defined substructure (optional)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 lists Python types from the C struct template interface, which itself is implemented as a dictionary. Substructures are defined as those contained within the memory allocated for a super structure. They share the same dictionary format as regular structures and their values are referenced recursively. Figure 14 shows the 32-bit Snow Leopard variant for the struct proc template.

```python
template = {
    'p_list': ( 'LIST_ENTRY(proc)', 0, 8, '' ),
    'le_next': ( 'struct proc *', 0, 4, '' ),
    'le_prev': ( 'struct proc **', 4, 4, '' ),

    'p_pid': ( 'pid_t', 8, 4, 'PID' ),
    'task': ( 'void **', 12, 4, '' ),
    'p_fd': ( 'struct filedesc *', 104, 4, '' ),
    'p_textvp': ( 'struct vnode *', 388, 4, '' ),
    'p_comm': ( 'char[]', 420, 17, 'COMMAND' ),
    'p_pgrp': ( 'struct pgrp **', 472, 4, '' )
}
```

Figure 14. struct proc template, 10.6 x86.

The second component in the template solution is a Python class initializer that dynamically selects the correct template for a given subclass at runtime based on the OS version and architecture of the memory image under analysis. Because classes in the open
files module manage fields and methods associated with a particular kernel structure, all
inherit from the abstract superclass in Figure 15.

class Struct(object):
    mem         = None
    ver         = False
    arch        = -1
    kvers       = -1

    TEMPLATES = None
    template   = None
    ssize      = -1

def __init__(self, addr):
    if self.__class__.template == None:
        self.__class__.template = self.__class__.TEMPLATES[Struct.arch] \
                                   [Struct.kvers]

        for item in self.__class__.template.values():
            if ( item[1] + item[2] ) > self.__class__.ssize:
                self.__class__.ssize = item[1] + item[2]

        self.smem = Struct.mem.read(addr, self.__class__.ssize);

Figure 15. Simplified abstract class Struct (no error handling).

The first four static variables belong to the abstract class and are shared by all
Struct subclasses. The mem variable is a reference to one of the PAE objects described
in Section 3.3.1. Verbose flag ver indicates if all file descriptors should be printed,
including those for types not fully supported by the open files module. The arch and
kvers variables report the kernel architecture and version respectively. The final three
fields are virtual static variables because their assignment is deferred to the subclasses.
The constant TEMPLATES is a nested dictionary from which the static template is
assigned the first time the initializer runs based on value of arch and kvers. The static
ssize is subsequently assigned based on the selected template and determines how many bytes the initializer reads from the address passed as an argument to provide coverage of all members specified in the structure template.

Combining the structure template interface with an abstract initializer offers a solution that greatly simplifies the program logic needed to support a selection of architectures and OS versions. The result is also highly extensible because new templates can be added without any code refactoring as long as the member names remain consistent across versions. Figure 16 shows the concrete subclass corresponding to struct devnode and demonstrates use of the structure template solution.

```python
class Devnode(Struct):
    TEMPLATES = {
        32:{
            10:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',112,4,'NODE')},
            11:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',112,4,'NODE')}
        },
        64:{
            10:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',192,8,'NODE')},
            11:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',192,8,'NODE')}
        }
    }

    def __init__(self, addr):
        super(Devnode, self).__init__(addr)

    def getnode(self):
        return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['dn_ino'], INT)
```

Figure 16. Concrete class Devnode.

### 3.4.3 Member Offsets and Type Sizing.

While the dictionary constants used to implement structure templates are easy to work with programmatically, generating their syntax is labor intensive. The open files module uses \(18 \text{ classes} \times 2 \text{ versions} \times 2 \text{ architectures} = 72\) struct templates, requiring a
great deal of error-prone coding and debugging if generated by hand. Determining size and offset values for each member in the template is also very difficult to accomplish manually due to the complexity of defined types included in the kernel structures. The solution to both of these challenges is an external C program that dissects kernel structures and automates the generation of the Python dictionary syntax needed for each template.

The offsets.c program was developed to find the size and offset of each required structure member and print the results as a structure template for use in lsof.py. Figure 17 shows a function from the program that prints a template for struct _vm_map. The variable member is a C structure defined in the program to hold the fields described in Table 5 and printmember() formats each as a key/value pair for the enclosing Python dictionary. The argument mh is a function pointer to a substructure that is printed recursively.

```c
int vm_map() {
    member m;
    int (*mh)(unsigned long int offset) = &vm_map_header;

    printf("struct_vmmmmap = ");

    m.var_name = "hdr";
    m.var_type = "struct vm_map_header";
    m.offset = offsetof(struct _vm_map, hdr);
    m.size = sizeof(struct vm_map_header);
    m.field = "";
    printmember(m, mh);

    printf("}
    return 0;
}
```

Figure 17. Template generation function.
The C language `sizeof` operator is used to find the size of any type, and the preprocessing macro `offsetof` defined in `stddef.h` can return the offset of any member for a given structure. However, most of the header files defining the structures described in Section 3.2 are not available in the include path for OS X. Sesek (2012) explains the problem and suggests a workaround in a blog post about kernel debugging:

Structs […] are merely human-friendly offsets into a region of memory. Their definition and layout can be shamelessly copied from the XNU open source headers into your kext’s project so that you can access fields in kernel private structures. As it turns out, virtually ever structure within the kernel is designed to be opaque to a kext. Apple decided to do this so that they can freely change the kernel structures, but it also makes writing a debugging tool like this a little harder. To do so you need to edit the headers so they compile in your project through a process I call “munging.”

Sesek’s method was modified to access the kernel definitions needed for `offsets.c` using the following steps applied to each required header:

1. Identify all required definitions in a given header file, cut the file content after the last statement needed to avoid irrelevant dependencies.

2. Remove any `#ifdef` macros necessary to expose the target definitions.

3. Remove any `#include` statements for kernel dependencies and replace with a local version of each header file containing a required definition.

4. Recursively apply steps 1-4 for each local header added.

5. Troubleshoot ad nauseam until the target header can be included without compilation error.

These steps must be completed for each supported version of OS X due to subtle changes within the header files. For the 10.7 version of the offsets program 27 different header files were required to define the data structures needed by the open files module. The
10.6 version uses only 17 headers because many of the required definitions are relocated to the dependent file rather than including them recursively.

Three out of 18 template functions written for `offsets.c` are known to produce incorrect member offsets for 64-bit kernel architecture. The problem is believed to be a complex definition conflict for some low-level types. Several C types are defined for userspace with standard libraries such as `stdio.h`. However, the kernel sometime uses different sizes for these same types and forced redefinition yields a compilation error. When the `offsetof` macro measures a userspace definition the result is an error for some architectures. Figure 18 shows the `offsets.c` template contradicting the value calculated manually from the structure definition in Figure 19.

```c
struct ubc_info = {'ui_size': ('off_t', 32, 8, 'SIZE/OFF')}
```

Figure 18. 10.7 x64 template for `struct ubc_info`.

```c
struct ubc_info {
    memory_object_t ui_pager;  // 8-byte pointer
    memory_object_control_t ui_control;  // 8-byte pointer
    uint32_t ui_flags;  // 4-byte int
    vnode_t ui_vnode;  // 8-byte pointer
    kauth_cred_t ui_ucred;  // 8-byte pointer
    // -----------
    off_t ui_size;  // 8-byte offset
    ...
};
```

Figure 19. Manual offset calculation for 64-bit `struct ubc_info` (annotated).
The printhex() utility written for the open files module can be used to print the address space in hex of a problematic structure for debugging. Output can be used to confirm manual sizing as shown in Table 6. The correct value of \texttt{ui\_size} in the example can be verified using output from the UNIX \texttt{lsof} command on the machine the memory was captured from to be sure the interpretation is correct. This analysis indicates \texttt{ui\_size} should have a 40-byte offset instead of 36 in the template for \texttt{struct ubc\_info}. Similar offset issues exist in the \texttt{offset.c} templates for \texttt{struct vnode\_pager} and \texttt{struct task}. Manual offset calculation and hex analysis was effective in resolving the problem for these templates as well. In all three cases, the solution is a manual adjustment made to the \texttt{TEMPLATES} constant of the equivalent structure class in \texttt{lsof.py}.

A wrapper for \texttt{offsets.c} called \texttt{printstructs.py} is written to verify the output dictionary as executable Python code and also print the structure members in a human-readable format for ease of debugging. Figure 20 shows the output of the program. The architecture argument on the command line instructs \texttt{printstructs.py} to compile \texttt{offsets.c} using \texttt{gcc \_arch} with either \texttt{i386} or \texttt{x86\_64} specified as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>\texttt{ubc_info}</th>
<th>\texttt{ui_pager}</th>
<th>\texttt{ui_control}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{hex}</td>
<td>A03F4207</td>
<td>80FFFFFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{human}</td>
<td>fffffff8007423fa0</td>
<td>fffffff80073b2bc0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>\texttt{ubc_info}</th>
<th>\texttt{ui_flags}</th>
<th>\texttt{ui_vnode}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{hex}</td>
<td>1F000000</td>
<td>00000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{human}</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>fffffff8007401000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>\texttt{ubc_info}</th>
<th>\texttt{ui_ucred}</th>
<th>\texttt{ui_size}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{hex}</td>
<td>00000000</td>
<td>00000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{human}</td>
<td>NULL</td>
<td>00EE1400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>\texttt{ubc_info}</th>
<th>\texttt{ui_size}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{hex}</td>
<td>00000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{human}</td>
<td>NULL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Manual hex sizing.
appropriate. The \texttt{-arch} flag is an Apple-only option according to the \texttt{gcc} manpage, though in limited testing the standard \texttt{-m32} and \texttt{-m64} flags also appear to work. Setting the flag allows one version of \texttt{offset.c} to produce templates for both the 32 and 64-bit installations. Dictionary output from \texttt{printstructs.py} was then pasted into the \texttt{TEMPLATES} constant of each class in \texttt{lsof.py} to complete the definition.

\textbf{3.4.4 Unions and Type Ambiguity.}

As discussed in Section 3.2.1, the union data structure and generic pointers can lead to ambiguity which must be well-handled by the open files module. One example is the \texttt{vm_object} member of \texttt{struct vm\_map\_entry}. This union may refer to a pointer for \texttt{vm\_object} or \texttt{\_vm\_map} and the address itself cannot be used to distinguish the two. The open files module deals with this situation by implementing a \textit{template test}, which unpacks the values at certain offsets and attempts to match these with the types expected for the template of a particular structure. The initializer for \texttt{class Vm\_object} demonstrates the technique in Figure 21.

\begin{verbatim}
$ ./printstructs6.py 64 -p
struct_proc = {'p_list':('LIST_ENTRY(proc)',0,16,''), 'le_next':([...]
------------------- struct proc (6x64) -------------------
LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_list   0  16
   struct proc *le_next   0  8
   struct proc **le_prev  8  8
pid_t p_pid            16  4  PID
void *task             24  8
struct filedesc *p_fd  200  8
struct vnode *p_textvp 664  8
char[] p_comm          700 17  COMMAND
struct pgrp *p_pgrp    752  8

Figure 20. Template output from printstructs.py.
\end{verbatim}
The `vm_object` object structure is characterized by two pointer members followed by a lock, which is in contrast to the lock followed by two pointers in the `_vm_map` definition. Moreover, `vm_object` appears to initialize these pointers with the address of the object itself, suggesting both should always be valid when tested. The template test provides a reliable indicator of the structure type for the pointer stored at `vm_object.vm_map_entry` and is used to branch program logic.

```python
class Vm_object(Struct):
    TEMPLATES = {...}

    def __init__(self, addr):
        super(Vm_object, self).__init__(addr)
        self.map = None

        ptr1 = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['memq'][4]['next'], INT)
        ptr2 = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['memq'][4]['prev'], INT)

        if ptr1 == 0 or ptr2 == 0 or not (Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ptr1)) or not (Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ptr2)):
            # on failure, create map instance to be called recursively
            self.map = Vm_map(addr)
```

Figure 21. Template testing.

### 3.4.5 Modifications to `volafox.py`

The implementation for listing open files is confined to the source file `ls/of.py` whenever possible in order to support modular software design. However, three noteworthy changes are required to integrate new code with the existing `volafox.py` source file. First, additional argument handling is needed to direct execution of the open files module from the command line. The modified `volafox` usage statement in Figure 22 explains the new options.
The optional –p flag emulates the UNIX lsof command option to print open files only for a specified process. Because the new module only fully supports the handle types described in Section 3.1.3, the –v flag was added to avoid output of limited value to the examiner by default. The code supporting the new options is of generic, imperative design is therefore not discussed in detail.
Figure 23 shows the second modification, a new module branch added to `main()`, note the call to `printfilelist()`, one of two public functions in `lsof.py`.

```python
elif oflag == 'lsof':
    filelist = m_volafox.lsof(symbol_list['_kernproc'], pid, vflag)
    if vflag:
        print ''
        printfilelist(filelist)
        sys.exit()
```

Figure 23. `volafox lsof command branch.`

Finally, Figure 24 shows the stub method added to `class volafox` which calls the second public function `getfilelist()`.

```python
def lsof(self, sym_addr, pid, vflag):
    if self.arch == 32:
        overlay starting at symbol _kernproc
        kernproc = self.x86_mem_pae.read(sym_addr, 4);
        proc_head = struct.unpack('I', kernproc)[0]
    else:  # 64-bit
        kernproc = self.x86_mem_pae.read(sym_addr, 8);
        proc_head = struct.unpack('Q', kernproc)[0]

    return getfilelist(self.x86_mem_pae, self.arch, self.os_version, \
                        proc_head, pid, vflag)
```

Figure 24. `lsof method stub added to class volafox.`
3.5 Open Issues

While the majority of system design goals outlined for the open files module in Section 3.1 are met by the implementation described in 3.4, there are two outstanding deficiencies not accounted for in the constraints specified. Both describe limitations of the kernel structure analysis rather than programming error. Problems reporting the correct process user and sizing the /dev directory are discussed in this section.

3.5.1 User Field Reporting.

The manpage for the UNIX lsof command describes the output of the USER field as “the user ID number or login name of the user to whom the process belongs, usually the same as reported by ps(1)”. However, output from the volafox open files module is known to incorrectly report the process login name as shown in Figures 25-26.

Figure 25. volafox user output.

```bash
$ ./volafox.py -i 10.6.8x86.vmem -o lsof -p 15
COMMAND   PID USER   FD    TYPE  DEVICE SIZE/OFF NODE [...]
distnoted 15  root   cwd   DIR   14,2  1088   2 [...]
distnoted 15  root   txt   REG   14,2  50672  268317 [...]
distnoted 15  root   txt   REG   14,2  1054960 264388 [...]
distnoted 15  root   txt   REG   14,2 213385216  466405 [...]
distnoted 15  root  0r    CHR   3,2  0t0    297 [...]
distnoted 15  root   1 PIPE  -1   -1   -1 [...]
distnoted 15  root   2 PIPE  -1   -1   -1 [...]
distnoted 15  root   3u  KQUEUE  -1   -1   -1 [...]
distnoted 15  root   56u  SOCKET -1  -1  -1 [...]
```

Figure 26. lsof user output.

```bash
# lsof -p 15
COMMAND   PID USER   FD    TYPE  DEVICE SIZE/OFF NODE [...]
distnoted 15  daemon cwd  DIR   14,2  1088   2 [...]
distnoted 15  daemon txt  REG   14,2  50672  268317 [...]
distnoted 15  daemon txt  REG   14,2  1054960 264388 [...]
distnoted 15  daemon txt  REG   14,2 213385216  466405 [...]
distnoted 15  daemon  0r   CHR   3,2  0t0    297 [...]
distnoted 15  daemon   1 PIPE 0x02fe2af8 16384 [...]
distnoted 15  daemon   2 PIPE 0x02fe2af8 16384 [...]
distnoted 15  daemon   3u  KQUEUE [...]
distnoted 15  daemon   56u  unix 0x02fdef80 0t0 [...]
```
The difference shown is not consistent across all processes of a full file listing. In many cases the expected USER value is reflected in the output, but not always.

The first test in investigating this issue is to determine whether the problem is specific to the volafox open files module implementation. Since this part of the open files methodology is taken from the proc_info command, the same erroneous output for a given process is expected from both commands. Figure 27 shows that both the lsof and proc_info commands agree on the USER ‘root’, demonstrating the problem is not isolated to the open files module.

```bash
$ ./volafox.py -i 10.6.8x86.vmem -o proc_info
list_entry_next pid ppid process name username
02f74d20 0 0 kernel_task
02f747e0 1 0 launchd 6ad
02f74540 10 1 kextd root
02f74000 11 1 notifyd root
03271d20 12 1 diskarbitrationd root
03271540 15 1 distnoted root
...
```

Figure 27. volafox proc_info output.

The second test confirms correctness of the volafox proc_info command implementation. Volafax parses the username based on Suiche’s original analysis, which states a “[p]ointer to the process group, pgrp structure, allows us to retrieve the username of the person who launched the program because this structure contains a pointer to a structure called session with the username” (2010). Figure 28, a screenshot from his conference slides, shows the username nfi for the launchd process. Here nfi (short for Netherlands Forensic Institute) is a local user and therefore cannot be the correct username for the launchd process. As Singh explains, “user-level startup is initiated when the kernel executes /sbin/launchd as the first user process”
The launchd process is therefore always associated with the username root since the kernel is responsible for executing it. This demonstrates the problem is also not specific to the volafox implementation of Suiche’s methodology.
The third test determines whether the discrepancy could be the result of a semantic difference between the user/username fields from the Suiche analysis and the lsof manpage. The manpage’s “login name of the user to whom the process belongs” could contradict Suiche’s definition of a user as “the person who launched the program.” The ps command offers a variety of keywords associated with users and names that can help. Figure 29 shows the ps output for PID 15, the same example previously shown.

```
# ps -p 15 -o ucomm,pid,logname,ruser,user
UCOMM   PID    LOGIN   RUSER   USER
distnoted 15   daemon   daemon   daemon
```

Figure 29. ps name keywords.

This result rules out the possibility that Suiche was discussing a different, but nevertheless related and valid username. Figure 30 is the same output for launchd, showing the username nfi for PID 1 must also be incorrect for all user keywords.

```
# ps -p 1 -o ucomm,pid,logname,ruser,user
UCOMM   PID    LOGIN   RUSER   USER
launchd 1      root    root    root
```

Figure 30. launchd name keywords.

In a fourth test, output of the ps command is used to analyze the structures involved with username output. The ps manpage states the keyword logname reports the “login name of user who started the session” and sess is the “session ID.” Both keywords are likely related to the session structure Suiche pulls the username from. Figure 31 shows the output of both for the ongoing example.
The hex output for field “session ID” is equivalent to 50161136 in decimal, so the value appears to be a pointer rather than an integer as one might expect from the ps definition. The simple modification in Figure 32 to the class Session initializer allows volafox to print this address for comparison as shown in the output Figure 33.

```python
class Session(Struct):

    TEMPLATES = {...}

    def __init__(self, addr):
        super(Session, self).__init__(addr)
        print "Session Address: %x" %addr
...
```

Figure 32. class Session testing modification.

$ python volafox.py -i 10.6.8x86.vmem -o lsof -p 15
Session address: 2fd65f0
COMMAND   PID USER   FD   TYPE DEVICE SIZE/OFF NODE NAME
distnoted  15 root  cwd  DIR  14,2  1088  2 /dev/null
...

Figure 33. struct session address.

Because the ps keyword sess and volafox both report the same address for struct session, there is evidence to suggest the session.s_login[MAXLOGNAME] member interrogated by volafox is correct for the keyword logname. The discrepancy therefore does not appear to be a fault in the source analysis by Suiche.
The final test in this investigation determines if the intermittent discrepancy can be explained by changes to the structure linked-lists during memory capture. Hay and Nance (2009) discuss problems associated with inconsistent memory snapshots resulting from state changes during capture. The goal is to show that the pgrp and session structures that are returned for these failure cases are in fact correct for the process, and not in some momentary transitional state recorded in the image. To accomplish this, volafox is modified to print the values of additional struct members not required for the open files module implementation. The results of these experiments have shown:

1. In all cases observed, \texttt{proc.p_pid == proc.p_pgpid}, meaning the process group identifier can be used as a reference to a process. Note that as verified in \texttt{ps}, the keyword \texttt{gid \neq pgid}. The process group identifier references a specific process within a group, it does not identify the group itself.

2. For all failure cases \texttt{proc.p_pgrpid == pgrp.pgid == session.s_id}. Since all three structures store a correct identifier referencing the source process, a reference error does not appear to be at fault.

3. The \texttt{session.s_leader} member is a proc structure pointer described in the comments as “Session leader. (static)”. In all failure cases, this points back the source process so there is no reference error apparent from either direction.

4. The \texttt{proc.si_uid} member is the only example in any of the three structures discussed that is typed \texttt{uid_t} (user identifier). However, it does not correctly identify the process UID output of \texttt{ps}. Therefore, supplying the UID rather than username does not appear to be a valid alternative.

Despite the previous analysis, neither the source nor the solution to the username field-reporting error is identified. There is also no known method to determine when the session structure returns the correct value. The bug derives from prior work that is not the direct focus of the research and therefore is not explored further.
### 3.5.2 Sizing the `/dev` Directory.

A second problem identified during development is an inability to correctly report the SIZE/OFF field for certain directories. The `/dev` directory is typed `DTYPE_VNODE` in `fileglob.fg_type` and `VDIR` in `vnode.v_type`. However, it has a tag of `VT_DEVFS` from `vnode.v_tag` rather than the `VT_HFS` seen for most other directories. Figure 34 shows an example of `/dev` as reported by the UNIX `lsof` command.

![Command output](image)

Figure 34. `/dev` directory size.

Note that $4495 \mod 34 \neq 0$, and therefore sizing by the entry count as described in Section 3.2 is not valid for this directory. Table 4 gives three alternate locations for the size applicable to other file types, but none were found to be effective in this case. Fortunately, due to the unique combination of tag and type for `/dev`, the failure is possible to detect. Since the location of the size is unknown, the volafox open files module prints `-1` for the size of `/dev` to indicate the field is unsupported.
3.6 Summary

Section 3.1 of this chapter introduces the goals for a new volafox module to list open files from a raw memory dump. Section 3.2 covers design recovery of the kernel structures responsible for the process file descriptor table and memory-mapped files. Section 3.3 reviews technical details for the existing volafox source code. Section 3.4 describes the open files module implementation, including the new source file lsof.py and external programs offsets.c and printstructs.py. Finally, Section 3.5 offers an analysis of open issues related to the implementation.

Significant effort is put forth to ensure a well-engineered solution which adheres to fundamental software design principles. The result is a modular, object-oriented implementation with a minimal interface to the existing volafox source. For comparison, the analogous volafox output for the information printed by the UNIX lsof command in

\[
\text{COMMAND} \quad \text{PID} \quad \text{USER} \quad \text{FD} \quad \text{TYPE} \quad \text{DEVICE} \quad \text{SIZE/OFF} \quad \text{NODE} \quad \text{NAME}
\]
bash  109  6ad  cwd  DIR  14,2  578 202041 /Users/6ad
bash  109  6ad  txt  REG  14,2  1346544 262558 /bin/bash
bash  109  6ad  txt  REG  14,2  1054960 264388 /usr/lib/dyld
bash  109  6ad  txt  REG  14,2  213385216 466405 /private/var/db/dyld/dyld_shared_cache_x86_64
bash  109  6ad   0u  CHR  16,0   0t400  611 /dev/ttys000
bash  109  6ad   1u  CHR  16,0   0t400  611 /dev/ttys000
bash  109  6ad   2u  CHR  16,0   0t400  611 /dev/ttys000
bash  109  6ad  255u  CHR  16,0   0t400  611 /dev/ttys000

Figure 35. volafox open files listing.
IV. Results and Analysis

This chapter tests the effectiveness of the volafox module implemented for listing open files from an OS X memory capture. As discussed in Section 3.1.2, one reason for selecting the UNIX \texttt{lsof} (list open files) command as the output format model for the volafox handles module is the relative ease with which it can be validated. When executed with administrator privileges on a test system, output provided by \texttt{lsof} acts as a baseline against which analysis on memory captured from the same system can be measured.

The following sections define a successful research outcome and describe the tools, processes, and definitions used to analyze the implementation. A suite of software test cases consisting of two OS X versions running both 32 and 64-bit kernel architecture is used to validate the tool. Finally, physical memory captured on a variety of Mac models is used to exercise the tool on real-world data.

4.1 Module Evaluation Methodology

A successful implementation of the volafox open files module must accurately report all file handles, adjusted for stated constraints and known deficiencies. However, because the module represents novel research, no tool exists to validate the output using only the image of physical memory. Therefore, validation must compare data that \textit{approximates} the state of open files when the collection occurred. The UNIX \texttt{lsof} command offers a source of data for comparison when output is redirected to a file just before suspending a VM or executing the Mac Memory Reader capture tool.
Given the difficulty of direct validation, success must be redefined in terms of the degree to which the volafox output matches that of the UNIX `lsof` command. The complex nature of a modern operating system like OS X guarantees changes to the system state between the time when the `lsof` command is run and the memory dump occurs (Hay & Nance, 2009). Some allowance is necessary to account for changes during this interval. A successful implementation therefore becomes one that can be validated against the UNIX `lsof` command, adjusted for stated constraints, known deficiencies, and accuracy of the validation method.

By this definition, limitations of the program that are also shared by `lsof` are not an indication of correctness. For example, while the HFS+ filesystem supports 16-bit Unicode file names, `lsof “only outputs printable [...] 8 bit characters” per its manpage. Therefore, the lack of Unicode support within the volafox open files module is not considered a shortcoming of the implementation for the purpose of this research analysis.

4.1.1 Test Configuration and Design.

The following sections provide a step-by-step description of the processes used to configure, collect, and compare the results discussed in Section 4.2 and employ the research tools `capture.py` and `validate.py` developed for analysis.

4.1.1.1 Controlled Test Configuration.

This section describes the process for configuring OS X virtual machines used to validate the research implementation. Output of the process is a virtual machine prepared for the data collection process. The resulting configuration is intended to minimize operating system activity during the time between when the validation data is gathered.
and the memory image is created. This is done so that analysis may focus on differences caused by the implementation, rather than those resulting from temporal changes that occur during normal operating conditions. Graphical navigation paths begin with references to items in the OS X menu bar.

1. Install guest using the VMware Fusion Virtual Machine Assistant with default settings for the OS X version being configured. Wizard will select minimum RAM configuration for that version. Note: Apple specifies 2 GB of RAM in the system requirements for 10.6 Server, however VMware selects 1 GB which installed and tested without issue during this research.

2. Install guest updates (10.6.8 and 10.7.3 test cases only):  ➔ Software Update

3. Disable optional virtual hardware and host interaction in VMware Fusion.
   a. Do not install the VMware Tools daemon.
   b. Virtual Machine ➔ Settings ➔ USB & Bluetooth ➔ unchecked all
   c. Virtual Machine ➔ Settings ➔ Sound Card ➔ Sound Card: OFF
   d. Virtual Machine ➔ Settings ➔ CD/DVD ➔ Enable CD/DVD Drive: OFF
   e. Virtual Machine ➔ Settings ➔ Display ➔ Accelerate 3D Graphics: OFF
   f. Virtual Machine ➔ Settings ➔ Sharing ➔ Shared Folders: OFF

4. Disable networking.
   a. Guest:  ➔ System Preferences ➔ Network: remove all interfaces
   b. VMware Fusion: Virtual Machine ➔ Settings ➔ Network Adaptor ➔ Enable Network Adaptor: OFF

5. Remove OS X startup items in the guest.
   a. Select and delete any items in the following directories:

```
~/.Library/LaunchAgents
/Library/LaunchAgents
/Library/LaunchDaemons
/Library/StartupItems
```

   b.  ➔ System Preferences ➔ Users & Groups ➔ Login Items: remove all
6. Disable other daemons in the guest.
   a. Apple → System Preferences → Software Update → Check for updates: uncheck
   b. Apple → System Preferences → Date & Time → Set date and time automatically: uncheck
   c. Apple → System Preferences → Desktop & Screen Saver → Start screen saver: never
   d. Apple → System Preferences → Energy Saver → Computer sleep: never; Display sleep: never; uncheck all other options
   e. Spotlight indexing, Terminal.app:
      # mdutil -a -i off
   f. Server administrative daemon (10.6 Server test case only), Terminal.app:
      # cd /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/
      # launchctl unload -w com.apple.servermgrd.plist

4.1.1.2 Controlled Data Collection.

This section describes the process for collecting validation data and an image of physical memory from virtual machines configured to test the tool. The process outputs a text file containing the handles reported by the lsof command, and an image of physical memory saved by VMware Fusion when the virtual machine is suspended (Section 2.4.1). All steps reference actions in the guest OS unless stated otherwise.

1. Launch Terminal.app from /Applications/Utilities. Perform an execution of lsof with administrator privileges prior to data collection. The lsof manpage indicates certain data structures may be cached so this ensures minimum filesystem interaction when the command is run for data collection.

2. Let the system stabilize with no user interaction for approximately 5 minutes.

3. Collect validation data, from Terminal.app:
   # lsof > ~/lsof.out
4. Once command-prompt reappears, user immediately navigates to and clicks the suspend button in the upper-left-hand corner of the virtual machine window.

5. Host: copy suspended memory image, from Terminal.app:

   $ cp PATH/TEST_CASE.vmwarevm/*.vmem ~/Desktop

6. Resume virtual machine and recover the lsod.out validation data file. Because networking and sharing are disabled, USB support is enabled in the guest so the file can be copied to the host via external media.

   **4.1.1.3 Real-word Data Collection.**

   This section describes the process used to collect real-world data from Mac computers. The process outputs a text file containing the handles reported by the lsod command, and an image of physical memory originally created by the Mac Memory Reader tool, which is then converted using the volafox utility described in Section 3.3.1.

   1. Create a collection toolkit using a forensic workstation. First format external USB media as HFS+ in the OS X Disk Utility application. Next, copy the script capture.py (Section 4.2.4) and a directory containing Mac Memory Reader kernel extension along with its dependencies to the root of the formatted device.

   2. Plug toolkit into the Mac targeted for collection.

   3. Double-click the USB device; this should appear on the desktop once mounted. Within the resulting window, double-click the icon named capture (the OS X Finder dies not by default show any file extension).

   4. A Terminal window will launch and prompt the user for an administrator password. Enter the password and follow the remaining instructions. The script will report the total time elapsed during collection when execution has finished. A new, uniquely named directory is created on the USB toolkit containing both the image of physical memory and the output from lsod for comparison.

   5. Drag the USB toolkit shown on the desktop to the trash to dismount, then unplug the device.

   6. Prior to analysis, the Mac Memory Reader image must first be converted to a linear format compatible with volafox. On a forensic workstation, execute the following from the volafox source code directory:

   $ python flatten.py SOURCE.mmr DEST.flat
**4.1.1.4 Results Comparison.**

The tool `validate.py` is developed to compare output of the `lsof` command with the volafox open files listing using Python’s extensive library of list and string operations. The result is a custom `diff` program used to build the tables throughout this chapter and its related appendices. This section describes both the process for using the tool, and also the tool’s processes for performing comparison. Two input files are required for the results comparison process. First, the baseline file referred to here as `lsof.out` contains an approximate list of open files from the time the memory was collected. Second, a linear memory image referred to here as `image.mem` which can be analyzed by volafox. Output of the process depends on the source data. For controlled test cases, applicable results are analyzed from the tables in Section 4.2.3 and used to validate the tool. Results for real-world test cases are summarized in the tables of Section 4.2.4. However, these are not considered part of the validation methodology.

1. Obtain a list of open files from `image.mem` using volafox, and redirect output to file. Include `-v` switch to print all handles including those with partial support.

   ```
   $ python volafox -i image.mem -vo lsof > vlfx.out
   ```

2. Input files `vlfx.out` and `lsof.out` are both needed to run `validate.py`. The script compares input using a difference taxonomy (Section 4.1.2). The `-s` switch is used when analyzing 10.7 test cases (E1). Execute the following:

   ```
   $ python validate.py [-s] lsof.out vlfx.out
   ```

   The `validate.py` script automates the following sequence of steps:

   a. Read both files from disk, discard the header line, and store the remaining lines in a 2D array split on whitespace. The resulting matrices use a row for each handle and a column for each `lsof` field described in Table 3.

   b. Adjust the list of processes in the `lsof` matrix for E1 and E3 and the list of handles in the `lsof` matrix for E4.
c. Adjust the process list in the volafox matrix for E2 and E3.

d. Align the list of processes in both matrices and report any differences as F2.

e. Detect differences in the ls/of COMMAND and USER fields (columns 0 and 2 of the matrix), report as F1 and D1 respectively.

f. Align the list of handles (matrix rows) and report any differences as F3.

g. Detect differences in the optional file-mode descriptor from the ls/of FD field (column 3) and report any differences as F4.

h. Detect differences in the ls/of TYPE field (column 4) and report differences as F5. Do not consider socket (C1) or symbolic link (E5) handles.

i. Detect differences in the ls/of DEVICE field (column 5) and report differences as F6. Do not consider FIFO (E6), non-vnode (C2), or non-HFS+/DEVFS (C3) handles.

j. Detect differences in the ls/of SIZE/OFF field (column 6) and report differences as F7. Do not consider non-vnode (C2) or non-HFS+/DEVFS (C3) handles, nor those corresponding to the /dev directory (D2) or the ttys file used by ls/of (E7).

k. Detect differences in the ls/of NODE field (column 7) and report differences as F8. Do not consider non-vnode (C2) or non-HFS+/DEVFS (C3) handles.

l. Detect differences in the ls/of NAME field (column 8) and report differences as F8. Do not consider non-vnode (C2) handles.

3. Print the count of processes or handles affected by the constraints (C1-3), deficiencies (D1,2), explained differences (E1-7), and failures (F1-9) described in Section 4.1.2 to STDOUT. These text results are transcribed into the detailed test case results (Tables 15-28) located in Appendix E.

4. Ranges of real-world test case results are summarized in Tables 12 and 13 for auxiliary research analysis. However, these results are not considered part of the implementation validation methodology described in the following steps.

5. Controlled test cases results are examined with the goal of identifying previously unidentified implementation problems. The majority of constraints, deficiencies, and explained differences are not considered in this analysis as the failures alone describe possible unknown faults in the tool developed. A summary of these results is found in Tables 8-11. Note that the username reporting deficiency (D1) is listed only to emphasize the number of handles affected since it is already classified as a known bug.
6. Each failure reported for the controlled test cases is analyzed manually to determine if it is likely to represent a validation accuracy fault, or an unknown implementation problem. This judgment is based on knowledge of OS X internals and the consistency of the failure across test cases.

7. The difference taxonomy described in Section 4.1.2 is developed through the iterative application of this process. Reclassify failures as deficiencies, constraints or explained differences when possible and repeat.

4.1.2 Analysis Taxonomy.

This section identifies differences between the lsof command and output from the volafox open files module as reported by validate.py. Relationships between classifications are discussed in Section 4.1.2.4. Order listed does not correspond to the order in which the validation script determines differences; see Section 4.1.1.4 for the execution sequence. Table 7 compares various file types and the output fields to summarize which combinations are affected by the differences classified in the following sections. The table is also useful for visualizing the scope of the implementation with regard to file type and impact of the known deficiencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Type</th>
<th>COMMAND</th>
<th>PID</th>
<th>USER</th>
<th>FD+ mode</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DEVICE</th>
<th>SIZE/ OFF</th>
<th>NODE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cwd</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>txt</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REG</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIR</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHR</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINK</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFO</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNODE (other)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSXSHM</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSXSEM</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KQUEUE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIPE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSEVENT</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCKET</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Field differences versus file type.
4.1.2.1 Constraints.

Constraints are defined as differences in output that occur due to system design decisions. As described in Section 3.1.3, the volafox open files module has several limitations with regard to handle type and filesystem tag.

C1. The lsof subtype for socket handles cannot be determined. A value of DTYPE_SOCKET for the member filglob.fg_type indicates a socket handle. The lsof command reports a number of subtypes for these handles including: systm, unix, IPv4, IPv6, rte, key, ndrv, and possibly others that were not observed in testing. Sockets are assigned the generic type SOCKET in the volafox open files output.

C2. Only handles subscribing to the virtual node (vnode) interface are fully supported. A value of DTYPE_VNODE for the member fileglob.fg_type indicates the vnode interface is in use for a particular handle. Full support indicates meaningful output is reported for all nine lsof command fields. Non-vnode handles show the value ‘-1’ for DEVICE, SIZE/OFF, NODE, and NAME to indicate these fields are unsupported in the volafox open files output.

C3. Only vnodes tagged HFS+ or DEVFS are fully supported. A value of VT_HFS or VT_DEVFS for the member vnode.v_tag indicates a supported filesystem. The lsof command fields DEVICE, SIZE/OFF, and NODE are defined outside struct vnode and therefore unsupported for other filesystems. Unsupported fields are indicated in the volafox open files output with an appropriate value from ECODE, a global dictionary defined for lsof.py.

4.1.2.2 Deficiencies.

Deficiencies are defined as differences in output that occur due to known bugs. As described in Section 3.5, the volafox open files module has two open issues.

D1. The lsof USER field is not correctly reported for all processes in a full file listing. This problem is not consistent across all processes and the volafox open files module is not capable of detecting its occurrence.

D2. Size of the /dev directory cannot be determined. Handles with vnode.v_type of VDIR and vnode.v_tag of VT_DEVFS such as /dev show the value ‘-1’ in the SIZE/OFF field.
4.1.2.3 Explanations.

Explanations are those in output that occur due to reproducible idiosyncrasies of the tools used for capture or validation. They are distinct from failures because the explanations are not speculative, and the differences can be detected using automation. Explanations E4, E5, and E6 are believed to be bugs in the OS X version of the `lsof` program. However, because `lsof` is defined as the authoritative standard for measurement, its bugs are classified as explained differences rather than deficiencies.

E1. The UNIX `lsof` command output always includes the `lsof` command and its associated handles, whereas a memory dump does not. For 10.7 only, the dependent process `sudo` is present in addition to `lsof`.

E2. Memory captured using the Mac Memory Reader tool (see Section 2.4.2) includes evidence of the process `MacMemoryReader` and its dependency `image`, whereas output from the `lsof` command does not.

E3. Data collected using `capture.py` (4.4.3) does not share the process `sh` because `MacMemoryReader` and `lsof` are executed in different subprocesses.

E4. OS X duplicates some handles in a full listing using `lsof`. Duplication occurs at least once per listing. Figure 36 demonstrates the problem.

```
$ sudo lsof COMMAND PID USER FD TYPE DEVICE SIZE/OFF NODE NAME
... 
mds 29 root cwd DIR 14,2 1088 2 / 
mds 29 root twd DIR 14,2 1088 2 / 
... 
```

Figure 36. `lsof` handle duplication.

In all observed cases, the file descriptor ‘twd’ (a composite of `cwd` and `txt`) identifies the duplicate, while all other fields remain the same.

E5. OS X reports the type of symbolic links as ‘0012’ instead of ‘LINK’ in the `lsof` `TYPE` field. The keyword ‘LINK’ is specified in the manpage and therefore the `volafox` open files module reports symbolic links using that label. The bug has only been observed in the 10.7 version of OS X.
E6. OS X does not report the `ls/of` DEVICE field for FIFO type files. The manpage does not discuss the omission and the volafox open files module can determine the major and minor device number for FIFO special files.

E7. Execution of the `ls/of` command causes the offset of its terminal file (`ttys`) to grow. For cases where a `ttys` file is the same used by the `ls/of` command, any offset difference is classified as E7 rather than F6.

4.1.2.4 Failures.

Failures are defined as differences in output not already accounted for by constraints, deficiencies, or explanations that occur due to asynchronous data collection or implementation artifact. It is important to note that the fault causing failure is undefined by default. Analysis in Section 4.2 indicates that in most cases failure is a consequence of validation accuracy rather than an error in the volafox open files module implementation.


Username mismatch is classified as D1 and therefore not listed as a failure. It is reported in the results after adjustment for F2. Reporting failures F2 and F3 also aligns the process and handle lists of each file respectively for the remaining failure tests. This
means, for example, that F1 does not report command name mismatches that occur due to a missing process because F2 already accounts for it.

4.2 Results

This section describes the experimental setup used to validate the volafox open files module, summarizes output from the experiments, and provides analysis of the results. Experimental data is partitioned in two sets: controlled test cases collected in the lab and real-world collections from physical Mac hardware. Only the controlled test cases are directly considered in the validation of the tool, but the real-world data is maintained due to a number of ancillary conclusions that can be derived from it.

4.2.1 Parameters.

Parameters specify the experimental configurations used to validate the tool.

4.2.1.1 Common Collection Parameters.

- Development/analysis platform: iMac (27-inch Mid 2011), 10.7.x, 8 GB RAM
- Volafax base version: r52, research build (with open files support): 1.0
- OS X version (with UNIX 
  ls
  of built-in)
- RAM installed

4.2.1.2 Controlled Test Case Parameters.

- VMware Fusion version: 4.1.0
- Memory capture format: *.vmem (VMware frozen memory file, linear format)
- Darwin kernel architecture

4.2.1.3 Real-world Collection Parameters.

- Darwin kernel architecture: i386
- Mac Memory Reader version: 3.0.0
- capture.py build: 1.1
- Mac hardware (model specification)
4.2.2 Factors.

Factors specify the subset of parameters discretely varied across experiments.

4.2.2.1 Virtual Machine Configurations.

1. OS X version: 10.6.8
   Darwin kernel architecture: i386
   RAM installed: 1 GB

2. OS X version: 10.6.0 Server
   Darwin kernel architecture: x86_64
   RAM installed: 1 GB
   Note: by default, 10.6 Snow Leopard installs a 32-bit kernel for the client version. OS X Server was therefore used instead to achieve this configuration.

3. OS X version: 10.7.3
   Darwin kernel architecture: i386
   RAM installed: 2 GB

4. OS X version: 10.7.0
   Darwin kernel architecture: x86_64
   RAM installed: 2 GB

4.2.2.2 Real-world Machine Configurations.

1. OS X version: 10.6.8
   RAM installed: 3 GB
   Mac Model: MacBook Pro (15-inch Core 2 Duo), S/N code: X6A

2. OS X version: 10.6.8
   RAM installed: 2 GB
   Mac Model: MacBook Air (13-inch, Late 2010), S/N code: DR2

3. OS X version: 10.6.8
   RAM installed: 3 GB
   Mac Model: iMac (20-inch Late 2006), S/N code: VUW

4. OS X version: 10.6.8
   RAM installed: 4 GB
   Mac Model: MacBook Pro (15-inch, Mid 2010), S/N code: AGU

5. OS X version: 10.6.8
   RAM installed: 2 GB
   Mac Model: Mac mini (Early 2006), S/N code: U35
6. OS X version: 10.6.8  
   RAM installed: 1 GB  
   Mac Model: iMac (24-inch Mid 2007), S/N code: X8A

7. OS X version: 10.6.8  
   RAM installed: 4 GB  
   Mac Model: iMac (27-inch, Mid 2010), S/N code: DB5

8. OS X version: 10.6.8  
   RAM installed: 4 GB  
   Mac Model: MacBook Pro (13-inch, Mid 2010), S/N code: ATM

9. OS X version: 10.7.0  
   RAM installed: 4 GB  
   Mac Model: MacBook (13-inch Early 2008), S/N code: 0P2

10. OS X version: 10.7.2  
    RAM installed: 2 GB  
    Mac Model: MacBook Air, S/N code: 18X

4.2.3 Controlled Test Cases.

Because this research involves implementation of a novel tool, direct validation of the results is inherently problematic. An approximation using output from `lsof` therefore demonstrates the capabilities of the system developed. The validation method used amounts to a suite of software test cases that either pass or fail. Resulting failures are then addressed individually, or reclassified in the difference taxonomy before the suite is rerun. Where an explanation is provided for a failure, the discussion must be viewed as speculative because all concrete differences identified have been integrated with the taxonomy described in Section 4.1.2. Furthermore, the difficulty in defining, acquiring, and replicating clean memory captures means no statistical rigor can be applied to the validation. The majority of firm numbers from test results are therefore located in Appendix E to avoid the inference that results were achieved through performance analysis.
As stated in Section 3.1, one design goal for the system implemented is to provide coverage for a breadth of operating system versions and kernel architectures. These test cases are intended to demonstrate that coverage by representing both i386 and x86_64 Intel architectures over the span of minor OS X versions (10.6.0-8 and 10.7.0-3) within the current and previous releases of the operating system. All tests are performed on guest installations of OS X running as a virtual machine. This setup offers the linear file format volafox requires in analyzing 64-bit kernel memory, the contents of which are written to disk when the VM is suspended. Section 4.1.1.1 describes steps taken to minimize operating system interference with the state of open files during collection.

Table 8 shows a summary of the results provided in Appendix E (Table 15) for the first controlled test case. After accounting for the constraints, deficiencies, and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diff</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Δ Count</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>COMMAND</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>PID</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>USER</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15% of usernames misreported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>FD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4</td>
<td>mode</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td>TYPE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6</td>
<td>DEVICE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7</td>
<td>SIZE/OFF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>process: Terminal file: /dev/ptmx lsof: 0t421 volafox: 0t452 diff: +31 bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F8</td>
<td>NODE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>process: notifyd file: /usr/share/zoneinfo/America/New_York lsof: 266103 volafox: 266579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>process: notifyd file: /usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC lsof: 226396 volafox: 266606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9</td>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
explained differences listed in Section 4.1.2 (not shown), this table indicates how similar the volafox open files output is to the lsof approximation.

Table 8 indicates the username deficiency (D1) affects a substantial number of processes reported. The file size failure (F7) is for the pseudo-tty device opened by process Terminal. The Terminal application is in the process hierarchy for lsof, which as explained in E7 is known to modify some ttys device offsets during execution. The node identification failures (F8) are both files related to time zone opened by the notifyd process. It is unclear why the notification server would make changes to these files during lsof execution, however the behavior has been observed in all controlled test cases.

Table 9 shows a summary for the second controlled test case (Appendix E, Table 16). The offset and node identification failures (F7, F8) are the same process/file combinations described for the 10.6.8 x86 results.

Table 9. OS X 10.6.0 Server x64 test case summary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diff</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Δ Count</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>COMMAND</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>PID</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>USER</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17% of usernames misreported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>FD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4</td>
<td>mode</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td>TYPE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6</td>
<td>DEVICE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7</td>
<td>SIZE/OFF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>process: Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>file: /dev/ptmx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lsof: 0t343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volafox: 0t360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>diff: +17 bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F8</td>
<td>NODE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>process: notifyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>file: /usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lsof: 92583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volafox: 92789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9</td>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10. OS X 10.7.3 x86 test case summary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diff</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Δ Count</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>COMMAND</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>PID</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>process: launchdadd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volafox: 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>USER</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>38 % of usernames misreported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>FD</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>process: launchd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volafox: 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>type: SOCKET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>process: launchd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volafox: 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>type: SOCKET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>process: launchd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volafox: 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>type: PIPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4</td>
<td>mode</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td>TYPE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6</td>
<td>DEVICE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7</td>
<td>SIZE/OFF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>process: Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>file: /dev/ptmx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lsof: 01446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volafox: 01508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>diff: +62 bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F8</td>
<td>NODE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>process: notifyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>file: /usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lsof: 86138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volafox: 86347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9</td>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 shows a summary for the third controlled test case (Appendix E, Table 17). The extra process in the volafox output (F2) is a daemon with the highest PID in the process list. It therefore appears to have been launched after executing lsof. Additional file descriptors in the volafox output (F3) belong to launchd. Because the launchd process manages all other daemons (Singh, 2006b, p. 38), it is very active and therefore volatile. For both 10.7.x test cases the lsof and launchd processes appear to be confounded. The offset and node identification failures (F7, F8) are the same process/file combinations previously described.
Table 11 shows a summary for the last controlled test case (Appendix E, Table 18). Offset and node identification failures (F7, F8), extra process (F2), and the extra launchd handles (F3) are the same previously discussed. The extra WindowServer file descriptor appears to be a malformed vnode. All members within the structure are invalid, and the file name is made up of non-ASCII characters. This case does call into question the methodology described in Section 3.2 for determining valid descriptors in
the file table. Since the occurrence appears to be isolated, it is particularly difficult to debug this potential implementation failure. One possible explanation is that the handle may be an initialized but as-yet-unused vnode in the file descriptor table. The current tool has no ability to detect this condition, though the template test method described in Section 3.4.4 could possibly be used if a reliable test case could be determined for the failure. Luckily, the error output is well-handled and therefore a human analyst should be able to make this determination with ease even if the tool cannot.

Results from the four controlled test cases yield several important conclusions. First, the volafox open files module is functional for kernels utilizing both Intel i386 and x86_64 architectures. Second, the tool provides coverage for OS X 10.6.x Snow Leopard and 10.7.x Lion operating systems. Third, as described in Section 3.5.1, the username deficiency (D1) results suggest that this field cannot be trusted in the volafox output. Finally, the low number of unexplained failures suggests the implementation is successful under the definition in Section 4.1.

4.2.4 Real-world Data Analysis.

In addition to the controlled test cases described in Section 4.2.2, the volafox open files module was also tested against a set of memory collected from physical machines. The script capture.py was developed to automate the collection of memory using the Mac Memory Reader tool described in Section 2.4.2 and a variety of incident response data from Section 2.2.2 for comparison. These real-world collections are invaluable for program debugging and revealing edge cases in the open files implementation but are not well suited for validation for several reasons. First, because failures cannot be replicated it is difficult to determine if a fault is caused by implementation bug or validation
accuracy. Second, the collection time required by Mac Memory Reader (see Appendix F) assures that output from `lsof` is always stale when compared to a dump of physical memory. Finally, the real-world data available does not cover the breadth of OS versions and kernel architectures.

Appendix F summarizes the collections acquired for analysis. As discussed in Section 2.5.2, revision 52 of the volafox project on which the open files implementation is based does support the Mac Memory Reader output format directly. As a result, only i386 captures can be analyzed with the volafox tool and only after conversion to linear format using the `flatten.py` utility. The ten qualifying captures are listed in Section 4.2.2 and the full open files results for each is available in Appendix E.

Table 12. OS X 10.6.8 combined real-world results (8 samples).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diff</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity or % Per Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>SOCKET handles cannot be subtyped</td>
<td>15-22% of handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Non-vnode handles are not fully supported</td>
<td>27-40% of handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Non-HFS+/DEVFS vnodes are not fully supported</td>
<td>0-4% of handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>Δ USER field</td>
<td>16-51% of usernames misreported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>/dev directory cannot be sized</td>
<td>0 handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td><code>lsof</code> process is not shared</td>
<td>1 process removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>MacMemoryReader and image processes are not shared</td>
<td>2 processes removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td><code>sh</code> process is not shared</td>
<td>1 process removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>Duplicate handles labeled FD: ‘twd’</td>
<td>2-5 handles removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>LINK handles are mislabeled</td>
<td>0 handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>FIFO handles do not report device identifier</td>
<td>0-2 handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
<td><code>lsof ttys</code> file size is not shared</td>
<td>10 handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>Δ COMMAND field</td>
<td>0 commands differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>Δ PID field</td>
<td>0-6% of processes removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>Δ FD field</td>
<td>4-22% of handles removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4</td>
<td>Δ MODE field</td>
<td>0-2 modes differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td>Δ TYPE field</td>
<td>0-2 types differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6</td>
<td>Δ DEVICE field</td>
<td>0-2 device identifiers differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7</td>
<td>Δ SIZE/OFF field</td>
<td>0-10% of sizes/offsets differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F8</td>
<td>Δ NODE field</td>
<td>0-8% of node identifiers differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9</td>
<td>Δ NAME field</td>
<td>0-3% of names identifiers differ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12 shows a combined summary of the real-world results for 32-bit samples running OS X 10.6 Snow Leopard (Appendix E, Tables 19-26). Because the hardware and software configurations vary greatly between collections, the data points represent different sample populations that cannot be aggregated to produce valid mean or standard deviation. Instead, the range of each constraint, deficiency, explained difference, and failure is reported to offer a general impression of how commonly these differences occur. A few noteworthy conclusions emerge from this analysis.

1. With up to 6% of processes (F2) and 22% of handles (F3) thrown out for comparison during alignment, lsof does not approximate the real-world data very closely. This observation supports the earlier statement that such data makes a poor choice for tool validation.

2. The set of non-vnode handles (sockets, pipes, semaphores, etc.) make up a significant portion of the lsof results (C2). This observation highlights one opportunity for future work.

3. Unsupported file systems (C3) in the real-world data were cross-referenced with the mount information also collected by the capture.py script to determine which types should be considered for future support. The results included one instance each of: msdos (FAT32 external hard drive), cddafs (responsible for reading audio CDs), and ntfs (Apple Bootcamp installation of Windows).

4. As concluded previously, high occurrence of the username reporting bug (D1) makes the results of the USER field unreliable. This impacts not only the open files module in volafox, but also affects the process listing module as explained in Section 3.5.1.

5. Explained differences (E1-E7) and the /dev sizing deficiency (D2) do not affect a large number of processes and handles. However, they are enumerated in detail because each occurrence is an important data cleaning consideration during validation of the tool.

6. For a given handle the size/offset (F7) and node identifier (F8) information can be particularly volatile, with up to 10 and 8 percent change observed respectively. This mirrors the failure behavior observed across test cases in Section 4.2.3.
7. Upon inspection of the failures by hand, high volatility of the name field (F9) was often linked to two applications: Spotlight and the Microsoft suite. Spotlight is Apple’s indexed search technology and automatically begins processing external media when mounted. Because the `capture.py` script is delivered on external media, the act of collection increases indexing activity. Spotlight should therefore be an important consideration during incident response because of this observed impact to the state of open files.

Unlike Snow Leopard, Lion installs a 64-bit kernel for the client OS by default. A 32-bit Lion kernel is only present on older models that received an upgrade installation of Lion from 32-bit Snow Leopard. This results in fewer qualifying samples available for analysis.

Table 13 summarizes the remaining real-world results, both taken from installations of 32-bit 10.7 Lion (Appendix E, Tables 27-28). The samples are from machines running different minor version of the OS and therefore are grouped only for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diff</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity or % Per Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>SOCKET handles cannot be subtyped</td>
<td>22% of handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Non-vnode handles are not fully supported</td>
<td>35,36% of handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Non-HFS+/DEVFS vnodes are not fully supported</td>
<td>1 handle affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>Δ USER field</td>
<td>40,54% of usernames misreported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>/dev directory cannot be sized</td>
<td>1 handle affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>lsod process is not shared</td>
<td>1 process removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>MacMemoryReader and image processes are not shared</td>
<td>0*,2 processes removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>sh process is not shared</td>
<td>0*,1 process removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>Duplicate handles labeled FD: ‘twd’</td>
<td>5 handles removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>LINK handles are mislabeled</td>
<td>3 handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>FIFO handles do not report device identifier</td>
<td>0 handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
<td>lsodttys file size is not shared</td>
<td>0*,13 handles affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>Δ COMMAND field</td>
<td>0 commands differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>Δ PID field</td>
<td>4,10% of processes removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>Δ FD field</td>
<td>11,14% of handles removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4</td>
<td>Δ MODE field</td>
<td>0,2 modes differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td>Δ TYPE field</td>
<td>0,2 types differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6</td>
<td>Δ DEVICE field</td>
<td>0,1 device identifiers differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7</td>
<td>Δ SIZE/OFF field</td>
<td>1% of sizes/offsets differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F8</td>
<td>Δ NODE field</td>
<td>0,1% of node identifiers differ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9</td>
<td>Δ NAME field</td>
<td>0,1% of names differ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
convenience. Ranges are replaced with series for values that vary since there are only two samples. The general conclusions listed from the 10.6 analysis remain unchanged, but there are a few interesting highlights. First, the 10.7 results include the unsupported filesystem (C3) mtmfs used to implement the Mobile Time Machine feature unique to Lion (Siracusa, 2011). Second, the E2, E3, and E7 results include an asterisk because one of the samples experienced an interesting collection failure. The capture.py script and all its associated processes (Python, sh, MacMemoryReader, image, etc.) are all conspicuously absent from the volafox output for the 18X model sample (see Section 4.2.2 for model codes).

The real-world data identifies a number of implementation problems that may not have been encountered otherwise. In addition to the truncated process list for 18X, the U35 model sample causes a previous version of the open files module to enter an infinite loop due to a self-referencing process in the linked list. These two cases led to a host of new exception handling code being added to the open files module. Originally for debugging purposes, the new warnings reveal an abundance of broken pointers present throughout the real-world samples. Model X8A for example generated over 1200 warnings alone, though this was an extreme case.

Since the invalid pointer warnings were not observed in the controlled test cases, two explanations are postulated. First, the flatten.py image conversion utility may not be trustworthy, or there exists a bug in the Mac Memory Reader capture tool itself. Second, changes to the layout of memory made during capture may result in instability of the linked data structures reflected in the volafox analysis. Given the number of process
and handle changes observed from memory capture to `lsif` execution in the real-world results, the second explanation is more likely. One recommendation to mitigate this problem is to assure memory capture proceeds as rapidly as possible. As indicated in Appendix F, one factor affecting speed is the type of external media used for capture. The results show a 16 Mb/s average increase in capture speed when using an external hard drive over flash storage.

4.3 Summary

Section 4.1 of this chapter introduces the evaluation technique used to validate the results of the volafox open files module by comparison with approximate output from the UNIX `lsif` command. Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 describe the methods used to test the tool and acquire results. Section 4.2 begins with an overview of the experimental parameters and factors used to test the implementation. Section 4.2.3 offers an analysis of controlled test cases used to validate the tool across the breadth of designed operating system and kernel architecture capabilities. Section 4.2.4 closes with an analysis of results from a set of real-world data collections.

This chapter systematically approaches validation of the volafox open files module using a suite of controlled software test cases. The number of failures present after cleaning the data of enumerated constraints, deficiencies, and explained differences is small enough to permit individual analysis of the faults. Most failures can be circumstantially attributed to the precision of the validation method, with one implementation fault outstanding. Because bugs are an expected element of any complex software system, the results of this analysis are deemed an acceptable research outcome.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter reviews the overall conclusions provided by the new volafox open files implementation and compares research results with stated objectives. Academic and practical contributions of the work are emphasized. Recommendations for future research topics related to forensic memory analysis on OS X are also provided. Finally, the future of the open source volafox project extended by the implementation is discussed.

5.1 Research Conclusions

This section summarizes research results and the key conclusions derived in Chapter 4. The original research goal and supporting objectives from Section 1.1 are restated first with a response offered for each.

5.1.1 Research Goal.

Implement and document a capability for parsing file handles from raw memory captured on OS X.

Success – the volafox open files module implementation documented in Section 3.4 can list handles associated with regular files, directories, symbolic links, FIFO, and character special files. Memory-mapped files for the process executable are also parsed along with the current working directory. Test results are favorable on raw memory from suspended instances of OS X running in VMware (Section 4.2.3) and memory captured on physical hardware using the Mac Memory Reader tool (Section 4.2.4).
5.1.2 Supporting Objectives.

*Perform design recovery of the data structures responsible for handling open files.*

**Success** – the research implementation effectively leverages the data structures and references described in Section 3.2 to find and parse file handle information. Class structure of the open files source file `ls/of.py` is organized to closely resemble that of the design recovery used to build the module (Appendix B, D).

*Develop a flexible process for programmatically handling structures defined for different kernel architectures and operating system versions. This necessitates extensible software design resilient to changes in future versions of OS X.*

**Success** – the data structure template process described in Sections 3.4.2 – 3.4.3 effectively parses data and pointer members for 18 different classes written for the volafox open files module. Implementation of the process tested favorably against two architectures (i386, x86_64) and two major versions of OS X (10.6 Snow Leopard, 10.7 Lion) in Section 4.2.3. While the template process was found to be flexible across both tested versions of OS X, future extensibility relies on consistent naming of key structure members (Section 3.4.2). Because the development process requires kernel headers defining key structures, extensibility is also dependent on the open source availability of the kernel code.
5.1.3 Additional Research Conclusions.

Testing the implementation also produced several additional conclusions not directly related to the research goal and its supporting objectives. First, the open files module does not reliably output the correct user of a running process, as verified across all controlled and real-world test cases (Section 4.2). No fault could be identified in the implementation, nor any problem with the kernel structure analysis described in prior work (Section 3.5.1). The deficiency is formally listed in Section 4.1.2.2 and represented in the results. Because the login username is only indirectly related to the file handles through the process, this open issue does not affect the overall research outcome.

Second, due to the time required for memory capture on physical hardware, memory analysis tools are difficult to validate on real-world data (Section 4.2.4). Controlled tests using virtual machine memory images should therefore be used in development.

Third, the OS X indexed search technology, Spotlight, changes numerous handles in response to the mounting of external media (Section 4.2.4). This observation should be considered during incident response and subsequent analysis if the memory capture toolkit is delivered via mounted filesystem.

Finally, memory captured on physical hardware suffers from a high number of invalid pointer references, occasionally resulting in malformed linked-lists (Section 4.2.4). Robust exception handling should be implemented to address this problem in a memory analysis tool. Collection must proceed quickly to minimize state changes during memory copy and avoid possible loss of evidence. External hard disk is preferable to flash media due to faster collection speeds (Appendix F).
5.2 Significance of Research

This research makes three primary contributions to the field of forensic memory analysis on OS X.

*Design recovery of kernel structures related to open files.* While the Darwin kernel foundation of OS X is open source, it is not well documented. Structured memory analysis requires knowledge of kernel organization that must be traced by hand from the source code. The description of data structures and their relationships in this document will be of use to anybody seeking to implement or extend extraction of OS X file handles from raw memory.

*Dynamic data structure templates.* The repeatable, general-purpose process developed to build structure templates for a range of architecture and operating system configurations can be applied to existing and future volafox modules. It may also prove extensible to future versions of OS X. The method implemented to dynamically select the correct template for a given memory image greatly simplifies the programming logic needed to support multiple configurations.

*Volafox open files module implementation.* Because the research code was designed around a minimal interface to the existing project source, the new module can be patched against the latest development revision with little or no refactoring. The full source code for the new module is available in Appendix G. With follow on efforts to address outstanding constraints and deficiencies, this module could be a component in a comprehensive tool targeted at technical users and forensic analysts.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research

The problem outlined in Chapter 1 emphasizes use of forensic memory analysis to replace more invasive incident response methods. Section 2.2.2 lists seven pieces of information that National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) specifies should be captured during the volatile collection process. Including this research, volafox now has modules to support four of the seven items. For maximum impact, future OS X memory analysis research efforts should consider the remainder: login sessions, network configuration, and operating system time.

Constraints and deficiencies of the research implementation for listing open files, Sections 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.2 respectively, enumerate the work remaining for this specific module. Support for the following features is recommended in particular:

1. **Identifying process ownership** – the inability to consistently determine the user associated with a particular process reduces the credibility of the volafox output and also its usefulness. A process normally expected to run in userland takes on new significance when observed executing as root for example. The bug is pervasive as it affects both the open files and running process modules in volafox so addressing the user problem is a priority.

2. **Support for socket handles** – sockets make up a significant portion of the unsupported handle types. They are of high investigative value and can help identify remote activity on a target or highlight exfiltration of data. Because the capabilities of the volafox network information module are currently limited (Section 2.5.2), the next priority in handle support should include the socket subtypes (Section 4.1.2.1).

3. **Additional filesystem support** – real-world test results identified four filesystems currently unsupported by the open files module: msdos, ntfs, cddafs and mtmfs. The msdos filesystem (usually FAT32) is a common choice for external media that must be interoperable with OS X and Windows. Though ntfs is mounted read-only by OS X, mounts may be present if a Mac is partitioned via Bootcamp to support dual-boot with Windows. Though not observed in testing, two additional network filesystems are also worth considering. The proprietary Apple Filing Protocol (AFP) is the default for OS X filesharing and Common Internet File System (CIFS) is used for shares mounted over Samba.
One final suggestion for future research is to consider the performance analysis of memory capture speed, the interval required to image a target, as it relates to data structure corruption. This research assumes the occurrence of invalid pointers and broken linked data structures (looping references, incomplete listings) is correlated with the time required to image physical memory. Exploring this relationship further might offer important insights with regard to the development of efficient tools and processes for copying physical memory for forensic analysis.

5.3.1 Future of the Volafox Project.

The volafox project currently suffers from a lack of contributing members needed to build a robust forensics capability that can be relied upon by technical users. This thesis represents the second academic work to extend volafox (Leat, 2011), but to move beyond the research domain a larger community is required to develop and validate the tool. An agenda for the upcoming Forensics and Incident Response Summit (SANS Institute, 2012) indicates OS X memory analysis may soon be added to the Volatility framework. Volatility is an established project in the field and the de facto standard for open source forensic memory analysis. Due to the community support and visibility, it is recommended that existing work from volafox be integrated with the future OS X branch of Volatility. Because volafox borrows extensively from the Volatility source, the transition should not require major refactoring.
5.4 Summary

Section 5.1 restates the original research goal and its supporting objectives before comparing both to the conclusions provided in Chapter 4. Testing shows the implementation successfully responds to the research goal and the development process offers a practical demonstration of the derived objectives. Section 5.2 describes the three significant research contributions: design recovery of kernel structures related to open files, a process for generating and selecting dynamic data structure templates, and the volafox open files module itself. Section 5.3 offers recommendations for future research related to OS X forensic memory analysis and the future of the volafox project.
# Appendix A. Regular Builds OS X 10.4.4 – 10.7.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OS X</th>
<th>Build</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Darwin</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>10.4.4</td>
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<td>10.7</td>
<td>11A511,a</td>
<td>Jul 2011</td>
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<td>Retail Mac App Store release;</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Retail USB drive release</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.7.2</td>
<td>11C74</td>
<td>Oct 2011</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td><a href="http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4767">http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4767</a></td>
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<tr>
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<td>10D50</td>
<td>Feb 2012</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>Releases b and d have been observed, symbol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tables appear to be interchangeable;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td><a href="http://support.apple.com/kb/HT5048">http://support.apple.com/kb/HT5048</a></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. This information largely summarized from Wikipedia release histories for 10.4-10.7, and the Apple knowledgebase article “Finding your Mac OS X version and build information” (http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633).
2. There are also numerous hardware-specific builds in addition to those listed, some of which are available in the Apple knowledgebase article “Mac OS X versions (builds) for computers” (http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1159).
3. Build numbers in bold are those encountered in the course of this research, and therefore ones for which volafox could be patched to support using the data collected.
Appendix B. Full Structure Diagram
Appendix C. Python struct Library

Figure 37 demonstrates the Python standard library function `struct.unpack` as utilized by the open files module `unpacktype()` wrapper. The function is used to convert C structures represented as binary data to a tuple of equivalent Python types. From the documentation http://docs.python.org/library/struct.html:

```
struct.unpack(fmt, string)¶
Unpack the string (presumably packed by `pack(fmt, ...)`) according to the given format. The result is a tuple even if it contains exactly one item. The string must contain exactly the amount of data required by the format (len(string) must equal calcsize(fmt)).
```

Within the context of this research `string` is a variable read from file using either `IA32PagedMemoryPae` or `IA32PML4MemoryPae`, whichever object class volafox is using an instance of. Return value of `len(string)` is the number of bytes. The `fmt` string literal consists of format characters representing primitive C types from Table 14,

```
STR = 0 # string: char (8-bit) * size
INT = 1 # int: 32 or 64-bit
SHT = 3 # short: 16-bit
```

```
def unpacktype(binstr, member, mtype):
    offset = member[1]
    size   = member[2]
    fmt    = ''

    if mtype == STR:
        fmt = str(size) + 's'
    elif mtype == INT:
        fmt = 'I' if size == 4 else 'Q'
    elif mtype == SHT:
        fmt = 'H'

    return struct.unpack(f'{fmt}', binstr[offset:size+offset])[0]
```

Figure 37. Simplified lsof.py unpacktype() function.
any of which can be preceded by an integral to specify a repeat count (e.g. `4h` → `hhhh`). Because pointers are not an available type, the format `I` or `Q` is used to represent a 32 or 64-bit pointer respectively.

The `struct.unpack` function performs endian conversion as needed, but it is not capable of handling the nuances of byte and type alignment for members within a struct. Padding must therefore be explicitly defined in the format string, but bytes marked `x` are not included as items in the output tuple. For the format `2I392xI52sI` output would consist of the following sequence of types: int, int, int, string, and int.

**Table 14.** `struct.unpack` format characters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Format</th>
<th>C Type</th>
<th>Python Type</th>
<th>Standard Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>pad byte</td>
<td>no value</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>char</td>
<td>string of length 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>signed char</td>
<td>integer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>unsigned char</td>
<td>integer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>_Bool</td>
<td>bool</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>short</td>
<td>integer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>unsigned short</td>
<td>integer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>integer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>unsigned int</td>
<td>integer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l</td>
<td>long</td>
<td>integer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>unsigned long</td>
<td>integer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q</td>
<td>long long</td>
<td>integer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>unsigned long long</td>
<td>integer</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>float</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>s</td>
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<td>string</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>char[]</td>
<td>string</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The constant `TEMPLATES` is an abstract static variable whose definition is deferred to the subclasses. The static variable `template` is chosen from `TEMPLATES` at runtime by `_init_()` based on the value of `arch` and `kvers`.

```plaintext
<< abstract >>
Struct
+mem : IA32*MemoryPae
+verp : bool
+addr : int
+kvers : int
-TEMPLATES : dict
-template : dict
-ssize : int
-smem : str {binary}
+init_(addr : int)
+validaddr(addr : int) : bool
```

```plaintext
Session
-TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getuser() : str
```

```plaintext
Pgpp
-TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getuser() : str
```

```plaintext
Fileglob
-TEMPLATES : dict
+FILE_TYPE : list
-MODE : list
-type : int
+init_(addr : int)
+getmode(fd : int) : str
+gettype() : str
+getoff() : int
+getdata() : int {pointer}
```

```plaintext
Fileproc
-TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getglob() : int {pointer}
```

```plaintext
Filedesc
-TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getw() : int {pointer}
```

```plaintext
Proc
+self_ptr : int {pointer}
-TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getnext() : int {pointer}
+gettxt() : list
+pid : int
+init_(int)
+nex[ (int) : Proc
+valid() : bool
+setpid() : bool
+getfd() : int {pointer}
+getdir() : int {pointer}
+getuser() : str
+getcmd() : str
```

```plaintext
Vm_map_entry
+TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+gettxt() : int {pointer}
```

```plaintext
Vm_map
+TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+gettxt() : list
```

```plaintext
Task
+TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+gettxt() : list
```

```plaintext
Vm_object
+TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+gettxt() : list
```

```plaintext
Vnode
+TEMPLATES : dict
-VNODE_TYPE : list
-VNODE_TAG : list
+init_(addr : int)
+getoff() : int
+getoff(fileglob_offset : int) : str
+getparent() : int {pointer}
```

```plaintext
Vnode_pager
+TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getoff() : int
```

```plaintext
Ubcinfo
+TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getoff() : int
+getuser() : str
```

```plaintext
Specinfo
+TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getoff() : int
+getdev() : str
```

```plaintext
Filefork
+TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getoff() : int
```

```plaintext
Devnode
+TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getnode() : int
```

```plaintext
Mount
+TEMPLATES : dict
+init_(addr : int)
+getmount() : str
```
**Appendix E. Full Test Results**

Table 15. OS X 10.6.8 x86 controlled test case results (1 sample).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Test</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total XRef</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>TYPE: socket</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>handle</td>
<td>F3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>TYPE: not(vnode)</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>handle</td>
<td>F3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>TYPE: vnode(other)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>handle</td>
<td>F3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>Δ USER</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>process</td>
<td>F2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>NAME: /dev</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>handle</td>
<td>F3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>COMMAND: lsof,sudo</td>
<td>1 removed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td></td>
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Table 16. OS X 10.6.0 Server x64 controlled test case results (1 sample).

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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total XRef</th>
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Table 17. OS X 10.7.3 x86 controlled test case results (1 sample).

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<tr>
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Table 18. OS X 10.7.0 x64 controlled test case results (1 sample).

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<th>Unit</th>
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Table 19. OS X 10.6.8, model X6A real-world results (1 sample).

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<th>Unit</th>
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Table 20. OS X 10.6.8, model DR2 real-world results (1 sample).

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114
Table 21. OS X 10.6.8, model VUW real-world results (1 sample).

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Table 22. OS X 10.6.8, model AGU real-world results (1 sample).

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Table 23. OS X 10.6.8, model U35 real-world results (1 sample).

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Table 24. OS X 10.6.8, model X8A real-world results (1 sample).

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Table 25. OS X 10.6.8, model DB5 real-world results (1 sample).

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<th>Unit</th>
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Table 26. OS X 10.6.8, model ATM real-world results (1 sample).

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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total XRef</th>
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Table 27. OS X 10.7.0, model 0P2 real-world results (1 sample).

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Table 28. OS X 10.7.2, model 18X real-world results (1 sample).

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122
## Appendix F. Hardware Capture Summary

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**MIN:** 00:38  1  8.8  
**MAX:** 12:47  8  35.6  

| AVG(flash): | 11.5 |
| AVG(HDD):   | 27.4 |
Appendix G. Complete Source Code: lsof.py

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python

'''
Author: student researcher, osxmem@gmail.com
Last Edit: 31 Mar 2012
Description: Research implementation of file handle support for volafox.

Dependent: x86.py defines read and is_valid_address functions for the
IA32PagedMemoryPae object passed in the first argument of getfilelist,
though it is not an import dependency.

Constraints:
1. NODE field will only be returned for files opened on HFS+ or DEVFS filesystems
2. Supported filetypes: VNODE
3. Supported subtypes: REG, DIR, CHR, LINK, FIFO
4. No unicode support for filenames (8-bit characters only)

Deficiencies:
1. USER field is not reported correctly for many processes (mismatch with lsof and all
   user-related keywords of ps on the OSX command line)
3. Files on DEVFS with vnode type of DIR cannot be sized (e.g /dev)

Notes:
1. All struct classes MUST have at least one element in their template dictionaries
   (even if not fully implemented during development) or there will be serious
   performance issues as the size is sorted out.
'''

import sys
import struct
import inspect

from sys import stderr

# error codes which may be printed in the program output
ECODE = {
    'unsupported': -1,
    'command': -2,
    'pid': -3,
    'fd': -4,
    'type': -5,
    'device': -6,
    'size': -7,
    'node': -8,
    'name': -9
}
```

#%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% UTILITIES #%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

124
# convert dev_t (also first member in struct fsid_t) encoding to major/minor device IDs

def dev_decode(dev_t):

    # interpreted from the major(x) and minor(x) macros in bsd/sys/types.h
    maj = (dev_t >> 24) & 255
    min = dev_t & 16777215
    return "%%d,%%d" % (maj, min)

# print hex representation of a binary string in 8-byte chunks, four to a line

def printhex(binstr):

    hexstr = binstr.encode(\"hex\")
    l = len(hexstr)
    i = 0
    while i < l:
        if i+32 < l:
            line = hexstr[i:i+32]
        else:
            line = hexstr[i:]
        out = \"\"
        j = 0
        for k in xrange(len(line)):
            out += line[k]
            if j == 7:
                out += \',\'
                j = 0
            else:
                j += 1
        print out
        i += 32

# print a string matrix as a formatted table of columns

def columnprint(headerlist, contentlist, mszlist=[]):

    num_columns = len(headerlist)
    size_list = []

    # start sizing by length of column titles
    for title in headerlist:
        size_list.append(len(title))

    # resize based on content
    for i in xrange(num_columns):
        for line in contentlist:
            if len(line) != len(headerlist):
                stderr.write("ERROR length of header list does not match content.\n")
                return -1
            if len(line[i]) > size_list[i]:
                size_list[i] = len(line[i])

    # check sizing against optional max size list
if len(mszlist) > 0:
    if len(mszlist) != len(headerlist):
        stderr.write("ERROR length of header list does not match max size list.\n")
        return -1
    for i in xrange(num_columns):
        if mszlist[i] < size_list[i] and mszlist[i] > 0:  # -1/0 for unrestricted sz
            if mszlist[i] < len(headerlist[i]):
                stderr.write("WARNING max size list and column header length mismatch.\n")
                size_list[i] = mszlist[i]

        # prepend header to content list
        contentlist = [headerlist] + contentlist

    # build comprehensive, justified, printstring
    printblock = ""
    for line in contentlist:
        printline = ""
        for i in xrange(num_columns):
            if i == 0:
                printline += line[i][:size_list[i]].ljust(size_list[i])
            elif i == (num_columns - 1):
                printline += " " + line[i][:size_list[i]]
            else:
                printline += line[i][:size_list[i]].rjust(size_list[i]+1)
        printblock += printline + '\n'
    sys.stdout.write('%s' %printblock)

# mtype (enum)
STR = 0  # string: char (8-bit) * size
INT = 1  # int: 32 or 64-bit
SHT = 3  # short: 16-bit

# return unpacked member from a struct given its memory and a member template
def unpacktype(binstr, member, mtype):
    offset = member[1]
    size = member[2]
    fmt = ''

    if mtype == STR:
        fmt = str(size) + 's'
    elif mtype == INT:
        fmt = 'I' if size == 4 else 'Q'
    elif mtype == SHT:
        fmt = 'H'
    else:
        calling_fxn = sys._getframe(1)
        stderr.write("ERROR %s.%s tried to unpack the unknown type %d.\n" %
(callingclass(calling_fxn), calling_fxn.f_code.co_name, mtype))
return None

if struct.calcsize(fmt) != len(binstr[offset:size+offset]):
    calling_fxn = sys._getframe(1)
    stderr.write("ERROR %s.%s tried to unpack '%s' (fmt size: %d) from %d bytes.\n" % (callingclass(calling_fxn), calling_fxn.f_code.co_name, fmt, struct.calcsize(fmt), len(binstr[offset:size+offset])))

    return None

    return struct.unpack(fmt, binstr[offset:size+offset])[0]

# return the enclosing class when called inside a function (error reporting)
def callingclass(calling_fxn):
    try:
        classname = calling_fxn.f_locals['self'].__class__.__name__
    except KeyError:
        classname = "<unknown>"
    return classname

# parent from which all structures derive, an abstract class
class Struct(object):
    # static variables (common to all structure subclasses)
    mem = None
    verb = False
    arch = -1
    kvers = -1

    # abstract static variables (subclass-specific)
    TEMPLATES = None
    template = None
    ssize = -1

    # argument checking
    def validaddr(self, addr):
        if addr == 0:
            calling_fxn = sys._getframe(1)
            stderr.write("WARNING %s.%s was passed a NULL address.\n" % (callingclass(calling_fxn), calling_fxn.f_code.co_name))
            return False

        elif not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(addr)):
            calling_fxn = sys._getframe(1)
            stderr.write("WARNING %s.%s was passed the invalid address %.8x.\n" % (callingclass(calling_fxn), calling_fxn.f_code.co_name, addr))
            return False

        return True

    def __init__(self, addr):
        self.smem = None

        if self.__class__.__template == None:
# configure template based on architecture and kernel version
if Struct.arch in self.__class__.TEMPLATES:
    if Struct.kvers in self.__class__.TEMPLATES[Struct.arch]:
        self.__class__.template = self.__class__.TEMPLATES[Struct.arch][Struct.kvers]
    else:
        stderr.write("ERROR %s has no template for x%d Darwin %d.x.\n" % (self.__class__.__name__, Struct.arch, Struct.kvers))
        sys.exit()
else:
    stderr.write("ERROR %s does not support %s architecture.\n" % (self.__class__.__name__, str(Struct.arch)))
    sys.exit()

# set size of the structure by iterating over template
for item in self.__class__.template.values():
    if (item[1] + item[2]) > self.__class__.ssize:
        self.__class__.ssize = item[1] + item[2]

if self.validaddr(addr):
    self.smem = Struct.mem.read(addr, self.__class__.ssize);
else:
    stderr.write("ERROR instance of %s failed to construct with address %.8x.\n" % (self.__class__.__name__, addr))

# Cnode --> Filefork
class Filefork(Struct):
    TEMPLATES = {
        32:{
            10:{'ff_data':('struct
cat_fork',16,96,'','[cf_size':('off_t',16,8,'SIZE/OFF(LINK)'))}
        },
        64:
            10:{'ff_data':('struct
cat_fork',32,96,'','[cf_size':('off_t',32,8,'SIZE/OFF(LINK)'))}
        }
    }

    def __init__(self, addr):
        super(Filefork, self).__init__(addr)

    def getoff(self):
        return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['ff_data'][4]['cf_size'], INT)

# Vnode --> Cnode
class Cnode(Struct):
class Devnode(Struct):

    def __init__(self, addr):
        super(Cnode, self).__init__(addr)

    def getnode(self):
        return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['c_desc'][4]['cd_cid'], INT)

    def getentries(self):  # used to calculate size for DIR files
        return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['c_attr'][4]['ca_union2'], INT)

    def getoff(self):  # returns the size for LINK files
        datafork_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['c_datafork'], INT)
        datafork = Filefork(datafork_ptr)
        return datafork.getoff()

# Vnode --> Devnode
class Devnode(Struct):

    TEMPLATES = {
        32:{
            10:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',112,4,'NODE(CHR)')},
            11:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',112,4,'NODE(CHR)')}
        },
        64:{
            10:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',192,8,'NODE(CHR)')},
            11:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',192,8,'NODE(CHR)')}
        }
    }
def __init__(self, addr):
    super(Devnode, self).__init__(addr)

def getnode(self):
    return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['dn_ino'], INT)

# Vnode -- Specinfo

class Specinfo(Struct):

    TEMPLATES = {
        32:
            10:{'si_rdev':'dev_t', 12, 4, '->DEVICE(CHR)'},
            11:{'si_rdev':'dev_t', 12, 4, '->DEVICE(CHR)'}
        },
        64:
            10:{'si_rdev':'dev_t', 24, 4, '->DEVICE(CHR)'},
            11:{'si_rdev':'dev_t', 24, 4, '->DEVICE(CHR)'}
    }

    def __init__(self, addr):
        super(Specinfo, self).__init__(addr)

    def getdev(self):
        dev_t = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['si_rdev'], INT)
        return dev_decode(dev_t)

# Vnode -- Ubcinfo

class Ubcinfo(Struct):

    TEMPLATES = {
        32:
            10:{'ui_size':'off_t', 20, 8, 'SIZE/OFF(REG)'},
            11:{'ui_size':'off_t', 20, 8, 'SIZE/OFF(REG)'}
        },
        64:{ # NOTE: 10.6/7x64 offset for ui_size edited manually 32 --> 40
            10:{'ui_size':'off_t', 40, 8, 'SIZE/OFF(REG)'},
            11:{'ui_size':'off_t', 40, 8, 'SIZE/OFF(REG)'}
        }
    }

    def __init__(self, addr):
        super(Ubcinfo, self).__init__(addr)

    def getoff(self):
        return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['ui_size'], INT)

# Vnode -- Mount

class Mount(Struct):

    TEMPLATES = {
        32:
    }

10: {'mnt_vfsstat': 'struct
    vfsstatfs', 76, 2152, '', ['f_fsid': ('fsid_t', 132, 8), 'val[0]': ('int32_t', 132, 4, -
>DEVICE'), 'val[1]': ('int32_t', 136, 4, '')]}, 'f_mntonname': ('char[]', 168, 1024, -
->NAME')}

11: {'mnt_vfsstat': 'struct
    vfsstatfs', 76, 2152, '', ['f_fsid': ('fsid_t', 132, 8), 'val[0]': ('int32_t', 132, 4, -
>DEVICE'), 'val[1]': ('int32_t', 136, 4, '')]}, 'f_mntonname': ('char[]', 168, 1024, -
->NAME')

64:

10: {'mnt_vfsstat': 'struct
    vfsstatfs', 136, 2164, '', ['f_fsid': ('fsid_t', 196, 8), 'val[0]': ('int32_t', 196, 4, -
>DEVICE'), 'val[1]': ('int32_t', 200, 4, '')]}, 'f_mntonname': ('char[]', 232, 1024, -
->NAME')

11: {'mnt_vfsstat': 'struct
    vfsstatfs', 132, 2164, '', ['f_fsid': ('fsid_t', 192, 8), 'val[0]': ('int32_t', 192, 4, -
>DEVICE'), 'val[1]': ('int32_t', 196, 4, '')]}, 'f_mntonname': ('char[]', 228, 1024, -
->NAME')

1

def __init__(self, addr):
    super(Mount, self).__init__(addr)

1
def getmount(self):
    return unpacktype(self.smemp, Mount.template['mnt_vfsstat'][4]['f_mntonname'],
    STR).split('x00', 1)[0].strip('x00')

1
def getdev(self):
    dev_t = unpacktype(self.smemp,
    Mount.template['mnt_vfsstat'][4]['f_fsid'][4]['val[0]'], INT)
    return dev_decode(dev_t)

# Proc --> Vnode (exe)
# Fileesc --> Vnode (cwd)
# Fileglob --> Vnode
# Vnode --> Vnode (parent)
class Vnode(Struct):

    TEMPLATES = {

32:

10: {'v_type': ('uint16_t', 68, 2, 'TYPE(vnode)'), 'v_tag': ('uint16_t', 70, 2, 'vfs-
type'), 'v_un': ('union', 76, 4, -ubc_info/specinfo'), 'v_name': ('const char *
*116, 4, 'NAME'), 'v_parent': ('vnode_t', 120, 4, -
vnode(parent)'), 'v_mount': ('mount_t', 136, 4, -mount'), 'v_data': ('void *', 140, 4, -
cnode/devnode')}

11: {'v_type': ('uint16_t', 64, 2, 'TYPE(vnode)'), 'v_tag': ('uint16_t', 66, 2, 'vfs-
type'), 'v_un': ('union', 72, 4, -ubc_info/specinfo'), 'v_name': ('const char *
*112, 4, 'NAME'), 'v_parent': ('vnode_t', 116, 4, -
vnode(parent)'), 'v_mount': ('mount_t', 132, 4, -mount'), 'v_data': ('void *', 136, 4, -
cnode/devnode')}

32:

64:
10: {'v_type': ('uint16_t', 112, 2, 'TYPE(vnode)'), 'v_tag': ('uint16_t', 114, 2, 'vfs-type'), 'v_un': ('union', 120, 8, '- > ubc_info/specinfo'), 'v_name': ('const char *', 184, 8, 'NAME'), 'v_parent': ('vnode_t', 192, 8, '- > vnode(parent)'), 'v_mount': ('mount_t', 224, 8, '- > mount'), 'v_data': ('void *', 232, 8, '- > cnode/devnode')

11: {'v_type': ('uint16_t', 104, 2, 'TYPE(vnode)'), 'v_tag': ('uint16_t', 106, 2, 'vfs-type'), 'v_un': ('union', 112, 8, '- > ubc_info/specinfo'), 'v_name': ('const char *', 176, 8, 'NAME'), 'v_parent': ('vnode_t', 184, 8, '- > vnode(parent)'), 'v_mount': ('mount_t', 216, 8, '- > mount'), 'v_data': ('void *', 224, 8, '- > cnode/devnode')

# NOTE 1: type LINK below is called just "LNK" in the source but lsof uses "LINK"
# NOTE 2: 10.7 version of lsof appears to be broken for LINK types, it outputs the
# undocumented type "0012" instead
# NOTE 3: these static lists defined in bsd/sys/vnode.h but modified for printing
VNODE_TYPE = ['NON', 'REG', 'DIR', 'BLK', 'CHR', 'LINK', 'SOCK', 'FIFO', 'BAD', 'STR', 'CPLX']

def __init__(self, addr):
    super(Vnode, self).__init__(addr)
    self.vtype = None
    self.tag = None
    self.xnode = None  # cnode, devnode
    self.mount = None

def getnode(self):
    if self.xnode == None:
        x_node_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_data'], INT)
        if self.tag == None:
            self.tag = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_tag'], SHT)
        if self.tag == 16:  # VT_HFS
            self.xnode = Cnode(x_node_ptr)
        elif self.tag == 18:  # VT_DEVFS
            self.xnode = Devnode(x_node_ptr)
        else:
            if self.tag < len(Vnode.VNODE_TAG):
                s_tag = Vnode.VNODE_TAG[self.tag]
            else:
                s_tag = str(self.tag)
            stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getnode(): unsupported FS tag %s, returning %d.\n" % (s_tag, ECODE['node']))
return ECODE['node']

return self.xnode.getnode()

def getname(self):
    name_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_name'], INT)
    if name_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(name_ptr)):
        return None

    # NOTE: this may be trouble for the 255 UTF-16 filename characters HFS+ allows
    name_addr = Struct.mem.read(name_ptr, 255)
    name = struct.unpack('255s', name_addr)[0]
    return name.split('\x00', 1)[0].strip('\x00')

def getparent(self):
    parent_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_parent'], INT)
    if parent_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(parent_ptr)):
        return None
    return parent_ptr

def getdev(self):
    if self.tag == None:
        self.tag = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_tag'], SHT)
    if self.tag == 18:
        # CHR
        vu_specinfo = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_un'], INT)
        # this pointer is invalid for /dev (special case DIR using VT_DEVFS)
        if not(vu_specinfo == 0) and Struct.mem.is_valid_address(vu_specinfo):
            specinfo = Specinfo(vu_specinfo)
            return specinfo.getdev()
    # default return for REG/DIR/LINK
    if self.mount == None:
        mount_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_mount'], INT)
        if mount_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(mount_ptr)):
            stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getdev(): v_mount pointer invalid, returning %d. W\n %ECODE['device']")
            return ECODE['device']
        self.mount = Mount(mount_ptr)
        return self.mount.getdev()

    # default return for REG/DIR/LINK
    if self.mount == None:
        mount_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_mount'], INT)
        if mount_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(mount_ptr)):
            stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getdev(): v_mount pointer invalid, returning %d. W\n %ECODE['device']")
            return ECODE['device']
        self.mount = Mount(mount_ptr)
        return self.mount.getdev()

def getpath(self):
    path = ""
    mntonname = ""
    parent = self
if self.tag == None:
    self.tag = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_tag'], SHT)

if self.mount == None:
    mount_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_mount'], INT)
    if mount_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(mount_ptr)):
        stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getpath(): v_mount pointer invalid, returning %d.\n" %ECODE['name'])
        mntonname = str(ECODE['name'])
        else:
            self.mount = Mount(mount_ptr)

    if self.mount != None:
        mntonname = self.mount.getmount()

while True:
    parent_ptr = parent.getparent()
    if parent_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(parent_ptr)):
        break
    name = parent.getname()
    if name == None:
        break

    path = name + "/" + path
    parent = Vnode(parent_ptr)

    if len(path) < 2:  # file is root
        return mntonname

    if len(mntonname) == 1:  # mount is root, delete trailing slash
        return mntonname + path[:-1]

    return mntonname + "/" + path[:-1]  # mount + path, delete trailing slash

def gettype(self):
    if self.vtype == None:
        self.vtype = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_type'], SHT)

    if self.vtype < len(Vnode.VNODE_TYPE):
        return Vnode.VNODE_TYPE[self.vtype]

    return -1  # check for this in the Vnode_pager validation

def getoff(self, fileglob_offset):
    if self.vtype == None:
        self.vtype = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_type'], SHT)
if self.tag == None:
    self.tag = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_tag'], SHT)

# NOTE: UBC information not valid for vnodes marked as VSYSTEM
if self.vtype == 1:  # REG
    ubcinfo_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_un'], INT)
    if ubcinfo_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ubcinfo_ptr)):
        stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getoff(): v_un pointer invalid, returning
%(d.\n %(ECODE['size']))")
        return ECODE['size']

    ubcinfo = Ubcinfo(ubcinfo_ptr)
    return ubcinfo.getoff()

elif self.tag == 16:  # VT_HFS
    if self.xnode == None:
        x_node_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_data'], INT)
        self.xnode = Cnode(x_node_ptr)

    if self.vtype == 2:  # DIR
        entries = self.xnode.getentries()
        return (entries + 2) * 34  # AVERAGE_HFSDIRENTRY_SIZE: bsd/hfs/hfs.h

    elif self.vtype == 5:  # LINK
        return self.xnode.getoff()

    elif self.vtype == 7:  # FIFO
        return "0t%i" %fileglob_offset

elif self.tag == 18:  # VT_DEVFS
    if self.vtype == 4:  # CHR
        return "0t%i" %fileglob_offset

    elif self.vtype == 2:  # /dev
        return "-1"  # not returning ECODE because this deficiency known

if self.tag < len(Vnode.VNODE_TAG):
    s_tag = Vnode.VNODE_TAG[self.tag]
else:
    s_tag = str(self.tag)

if self.vtype < len(Vnode.VNODE_TYPE):
    s_type = Vnode.VNODE_TYPE[self.vtype]
else:
    s_type = str(self.vtype)

stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getoff(): unsupported type %s, tag %s. Returning
%(d.\n %s_type, s_tag, ECODE['size'])")
return ECODE['size']

# Fileproc --> Fileglob
class Fileglob(Struct):
TEMPLATES = {
    32:
    10:{'fg_flag':('int32_t',16,4,'MODE'),'fg_type':('file_type_t',20,4,'FTYPE'),'fg_off
set':('off_t',40,8,'SIZE/OFF'),'fg_data':('caddr_t',48,4,'->vnode')},
    11:{'fg_flag':('int32_t',16,4,'MODE'),'fg_type':('file_type_t',20,4,'FTYPE'),'fg_offset':(
'off_t',40,8,'SIZE/OFF'),'fg_data':('caddr_t',48,4,'->vnode')}},
    64:
    10:{'fg_flag':('int32_t',32,4,'MODE'),'fg_type':('file_type_t',36,4,'FTYPE'),'fg_off
set':('off_t',64,8,'SIZE/OFF'),'fg_data':('caddr_t',72,8,'->vnode')},
    11:{'fg_flag':('int32_t',32,4,'MODE'),'fg_type':('file_type_t',36,4,'FTYPE'),'fg_offset':(
'off_t',64,8,'SIZE/OFF'),'fg_data':('caddr_t',72,8,'->vnode')}},

    32:
    10:{'fg_flag':('int32_t',32,4,'MODE'),'fg_type':('file_type_t',36,4,'FTYPE'),'fg_off
set':('off_t',64,8,'SIZE/OFF'),'fg_data':('caddr_t',72,8,'->vnode')}},

    # global defined in bsd/sys/file_internal.h but modified to match lsof output
    FILE_TYPE = ["-1", "VNODE", "SOCKET", "PSXSHM", "PSXSEM", "KQUEUE", "PIPE",
    "FSEVENT"]
    MODE = [" ", "r ", "w ", "u "]

def __init__(self, addr):
    super(Fileglob, self).__init__(addr)
    self.ftype = None

def getmode(self, fd):
    self.ftype = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fg_type'], INT)
    filemode = " 
    
    # NOTE: in limited lsof testing types known to include file mode reporting are:
    #       VNODE, SOCKET, PSXSHM, PSXSEM, and KQUEUE. Others do not append any
    # character to the FD identifier.
    if self.ftype in xrange(1,6):
        flag = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fg_flag'], INT)
        filemode = Fileglob.MODE[flag & 3]
    
    return str(fd)+filemode

def gettype(self):
    if self.ftype == None:
        self.ftype = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fg_type'], INT)
    
    if self.ftype < 0 or self.ftype > ( len(Fileglob.FILE_TYPE) -1 ):
        stderr.write("WARNING Fileglob.gettype(): unknown file type %d, excluding
this result.\n%self.ftype)
        return -1  # check for this in the getfilelistbyproc()
return Fileglob.FILE_TYPE[self.ftype]

def getoff(self):
    return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fg_offset'], INT)

def getdata(self):
    data_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fg_data'], INT)

    if self.validaddr(data_ptr):
        return data_ptr
    return None

# Filedesc --> Fileproc
class Fileproc(Struct):

    TEMPLATES = {
            32:{
            10:{'f_fglob':('struct fileglob *',8,4,'->fileglob')},
            11:{'f_fglob':('struct fileglob *',8,4,'->fileglob')}},
            64:{
            10:{'f_fglob':('struct fileglob *',8,8,'->fileglob')},
            11:{'f_fglob':('struct fileglob *',8,8,'->fileglob')}}
    }

    def __init__(self, addr):
        super(Fileproc, self).__init__(addr)

def getfglob(self):
    fileglob_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['f_fglob'], INT)

    if self.validaddr(fileglob_ptr):
        return fileglob_ptr
    return None

# Proc --> Filedesc
class Filedesc(Struct):

    TEMPLATES = {
            32:{
            10:{'fd_ofiles':('struct fileproc **',0,4,'->fileproc[]'),
                'fd_cdir':('struct vnode *',8,4,'->CWD'),
                'fd_lastfile':('int',20,4,'->fileproc[LAST_INDEX]')},
            11:{'fd_ofiles':('struct fileproc **',0,4,'->fileproc[]'),
                'fd_cdir':('struct vnode *',8,4,'->CWD'),
                'fd_lastfile':('int',20,4,'->fileproc[LAST_INDEX]')},
            64:{
            10:{'fd_ofiles':('struct fileproc **',0,8,'->fileproc[]'),
                'fd_cdir':('struct vnode *',16,8,'->CWD'),
                'fd_lastfile':('int',36,4,'->fileproc[LAST_INDEX]')}}
    }
138

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def __init__(self, addr):
    super(Filedesc, self).__init__(addr)

def getcwd(self):
    cwd_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fd_cdir'], INT)
    if self.validaddr(cwd_ptr):
        return cwd_ptr
    return None

def getfglobs(self):
    # sometimes the fd is valid, but this array address is not (e.g. kernel_task)
    ofiles_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, Filedesc.template['fd_ofiles'], INT)
    if ofiles_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ofiles_ptr)):
        return None

    # construct a list of addresses from the fd_ofiles array
    fd_lastfile = unpacktype(self.smem, Filedesc.template['fd_lastfile'], INT)
    ptr_size = 4 if (Struct.arch == 32) else 8
    fmt = 'I' if (Struct.arch == 32) else 'Q'
    fglobs = {}
    for i in xrange(fd_lastfile+1):

        # **fd_ofiles is an array of pointers, read address at index i
        fileproc_ptr = Struct.mem.read(ofiles_ptr+(i*ptr_size), ptr_size)
        fileproc_addr = struct.unpack(fmt, fileproc_ptr)[0]

        # not every index points to a valid file
        if fileproc_addr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(fileproc_addr)):
            continue

        fileproc = Fileproc(fileproc_addr)
        fileglob_ptr = fileproc.getfglob()

        if fileglob_ptr != None:
            fglobs[i] = fileglob_ptr

    return fglobs

# Vm_object --> Vnode_pager
class Vnode_pager(Struct):
    TEMPLATES = {
        32:{
            10:{'vnode_handle':('struct vnode *',16,4,'->txt')},
            11:{'vnode_handle':('struct vnode *',16,4,'->txt')}
        }
    }
```

138
def __init__(self, addr):
    super(Vnode_pager, self).__init__(addr)

def gettxt(self):
    txt_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['vnode_handle'], INT)
    # self may not actually be a vnode pager (there are other valid types), need to
    # run several tests without generating warnings to be sure.
    if txt_ptr == 0 or not (Struct.mem.is_valid_address(txt_ptr)):
        return None
    # this pointer test ensures the target memory matches the vnode template
    vnode = Vnode(txt_ptr)
    if vnode.gettype() == -1 or vnode.getname() == None:
        return None
    # return the pointer rather than vnode because duplicates will occur as a
    # result of recursive calls in Vm_object
    return txt_ptr

# Vm_map_entry --> Vm_object
class Vm_object(Struct):
    TEMPLATES = {
        32:{
        10:{'memq':('queue_head_t',0,8,''),'next':('struct queue_entry *',4,4,'type test(vm_object)'), 'prev':('struct queue_entry *',0,4,'type
        test(vm_object)'), 'shadow':('struct vm_object *',52,4,'-vm_object(recurse)'), 'pager':('memory_object_t',64,4,'-pager')}
        11:{'memq':('queue_head_t',0,8,''),'next':('struct queue_entry *',4,4,'type test(vm_object)'), 'prev':('struct queue_entry *',0,4,'type
        test(vm_object)'), 'shadow':('struct vm_object *',52,4,'-vm_object(recurse)'), 'pager':('memory_object_t',64,4,'-pager')}
        }
    64:{
        10:{'memq':('queue_head_t',0,16,''),'next':('struct queue_entry *',8,8,'type test(vm_object)'), 'prev':('struct queue_entry *',0,8,'type
        test(vm_object)'), 'shadow':('struct vm_object *',72,8,'-vm_object(recurse)'), 'pager':('memory_object_t',88,8,'-pager')}
        11:{'memq':('queue_head_t',0,16,''),'next':('struct queue_entry *',8,8,'type test(vm_object)'), 'prev':('struct queue_entry *',0,8,'type
        test(vm_object)'), 'shadow':('struct vm_object *',72,8,'-vm_object(recurse)'), 'pager':('memory_object_t',88,8,'-pager')}
    }
    def __init__(self, addr):
        super(Vm_object, self).__init__(addr)
        self.map = None

        # this test determines whether self matches the struct vm_object template, or
        # the
        # vm_map template.
        ptr1 = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['memq'][4]['next'], INT)
        ptr2 = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['memq'][4]['prev'], INT)
        if ptr1 == 0 or ptr2 == 0 or
           not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ptr1)) or
           not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ptr2)):

            # on failure, create map instance to be called recursively
            self.map = Vm_map(addr)

    def gettxt(self):

        # recurse on vm_map type
        if self.map != None:
            return self.map.gettxt()

        pager_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['pager'], INT)

        # objects for memory-mapped files keep the pager in the shadow object rather
        # than the original, this test determines which self is.
        if pager_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(pager_ptr)):

            shadow_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['shadow'], INT)
            if shadow_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(shadow_ptr)):

                # make recursive call on shadow object
                shadow = Vm_object(shadow_ptr)
                return shadow.gettxt()

        # the default case here wraps the return in a list for compatibility with the
        # recursive map case.
        pager = Vnode_pager(pager_ptr)
        return [ pager.gettxt() ]  # NOTE: this may return [ None ] without error

    # Vm_map_entry --> Vm_map_entry
    # Vm_map  --> Vm_map_entry
    class Vm_map_entry(Struct):

        TEMPLATES = {
            32:{
                10:{'links':('struct vm_map_links',0,24,''),
                    'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *',0,4,''),
                    'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',4,4,'->vm_map_entry')},
                'object':('union vm_map_object',24,4,'->vm_object')
            }
        }


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    817         }, 11:{'links':('struct vm_map_links',0,24,''), 'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *
    818          ',0,4,''), 'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',4,4,'->vm_map_entry')}, 'object':('union
    819          vm_map_object',36,4,'->vm_object')}

    820        },
    821        64:{
    822        10:{'links':('struct vm_map_links',0,32,''), 'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *
    823               ',0,8,''), 'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',8,8,'->vm_map_entry')}, 'object':('union
    824               vm_map_object',32,8,'->vm_object')

    825        }, 11:{'links':('struct vm_map_links',0,32,''), 'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *
    826               ',0,8,''), 'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',8,8,'->vm_map_entry')}, 'object':('union
    827               vm_map_object',56,8,'->vm_object')

    828    }

    829
    830    def __init__(self, addr):
    831        super(Vm_map_entry, self).__init__(addr)

    832    def getnext(self):
    833        return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['links'][4]['next'], INT)

    834    def gettext(self):
    835        vmobject_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['object'], INT)

    836        # some entries lack an object, check manually to prevent error
    837        if vmobject_ptr == 0 or not (Struct.mem.is_valid_address(vmobject_ptr)):
    838            return [] # Vm_map expects an empty list, never None

    839        vm_object = Vm_object(vmobject_ptr)
    840        return vm_object.gettxt()

    841    # Vm_object --> Vm_map
    842    # Task --> Vm_map
    843    class Vm_map(Struct):
    844        TEMPLATES = {
    845        32:{
    846        10:{'hdr':('struct vm_map_header',12,32,''), 'links':('struct
    847            vm_map_links',12,24,''), 'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *
    848            ',12,4,''), 'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',16,4,'->vm_map_entry')}, 'nentries':('int',36,4,'no. nodes')}

    849        }, 11:{'hdr':('struct vm_map_header',12,44,''), 'links':('struct
    850            vm_map_links',12,24,''), 'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *
    851            ',12,4,''), 'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',16,4,'->vm_map_entry')}, 'nentries':('int',36,4,'no. nodes')}

    852        },
    853        64:{
    854        10:{'hdr':('struct vm_map_header',16,40,''), 'links':('struct
    855            vm_map_links',16,32,''), 'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *
    856            ',16,8,''), 'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',24,8,'->vm_map_entry')}, 'nentries':('int',48,4,'no. nodes')}

    857        }, 11:{'hdr':('struct vm_map_header',16,56,''), 'links':('struct
    858            vm_map_links',16,32,''), 'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *
    859            ',16,8,''), 'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',24,8,'->vm_map_entry')}, 'nentries':('int',48,4,'no. nodes')}

    860    }
```
def __init__(self, addr):
    super(Vm_map, self).__init__(addr)

def gettext(self):
    vmmapentry_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem,
        self.template['hdr'][4]['links'][4]['next'], INT)
    nentries = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['hdr'][4]['nentries'], INT)
    ret_ptrs = []

    # iterate over map entries in the linked-list and collect any backing vnode
    # pointers
    for i in xrange(nentries):
        if self.validaddr(vmmapentry_ptr):
            vm_map_entry = Vm_map_entry(vmmapentry_ptr)
            txt_ptrs = vm_map_entry.gettxt()

            for txt_ptr in txt_ptrs:
                if self.validaddr(txt_ptr) != None and not (txt_ptr not in ret_ptrs):
                    ret_ptrs.append(txt_ptr)

    vmmapentry_ptr = vm_map_entry.getnext()

    # unique list of verified vnode pointers
    return ret_ptrs

# Proc --> Task
class Task(Struct):

    TEMPLATES = {
        32:{
            10:{'map':('vm_map_t',24,4,'->vm_map')},
            11:{'map':('vm_map_t',20,4,'->vm_map')}
        },
        64:{
            10:{'map':('vm_map_t',40,8,'->vm_map')}, # NOTE: 10.6x64 offset for vm_map
                edited manually 36 --> 40
            , 11:{'map':('vm_map_t',32,8,'->vm_map')}, # NOTE: 10.7x64 offset for vm_map
                edited manually 28 --> 32
        }
    }

    def __init__(self, addr):
        super(Task, self).__init__(addr)

    def gettext(self):
        vmmap_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['map'], INT)

        if self.validaddr(vmmap_ptr):
            
    142
vm_map = Vm_map(vmmmap_ptr)
return vm_map.gettxt()

return None

# Pgrp --> Session
class Session(Struct):

TEMPLATES = {
    32:{
        10:{'s_login':('char[]',28,255,'USER')},
        11:{'s_login':('char[]',28,255,'USER')}},
    64:{
        10:{'s_login':('char[]',48,255,'USER')},
        11:{'s_login':('char[]',48,255,'USER')}}
}

def __init__(self, addr):
    super(Session, self).__init__(addr)

def getuser(self):
    return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['s_login'], STR).split(\x00, 1)[0].strip(\x00)

# Proc --> Pgrp
class Pgrp(Struct):

TEMPLATES = {
    32:{
        10:{'pg_session':('struct session *',12,4,'->session')},
        11:{'pg_session':('struct session *',12,4,'->session')}},
    64:{
        10:{'pg_session':('struct session *',24,8,'->session')},
        11:{'pg_session':('struct session *',24,8,'->session')}}
}

def __init__(self, addr):
    super(Pgrp, self).__init__(addr)

    # skipped the full validator here because pg_session is the only pointer/target
def getuser(self):
        session_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['pg_session'], INT)

        if self.validaddr(session_ptr):
            session = Session(session_ptr)
            return session.getuser()

        return None
# _kernproc -- > Proc

class Proc(Struct):

    TEMPLATES = {
        32: {
            10: {'p_list': ('LIST_ENTRY(proc)', 0, 8, ''), 'le_next': ('struct proc *', 0, 4, ''), 'le_prev': ('struct proc **', 4, 4, '-')
                },
            11: {'p_list': ('LIST_ENTRY(proc)', 0, 8, ''), 'le_next': ('struct proc *', 0, 4, ''), 'le_prev': ('struct proc **', 4, 4, '-')
                }
        },
        64: {
            10: {'p_list': ('LIST_ENTRY(proc)', 0, 16, ''), 'le_next': ('struct proc *', 0, 8, ''), 'le_prev': ('struct proc **', 8, 8, '-')
                },
            11: {'p_list': ('LIST_ENTRY(proc)', 0, 16, ''), 'le_next': ('struct proc *', 0, 8, ''), 'le_prev': ('struct proc **', 8, 8, '-')
                }
        }
    }

def __init__(self, addr):
    super(Proc, self).__init__(addr)

    if Proc.head == None:
        Proc.head = addr

    self.self_ptr = addr
    getfilelist()  # store this for cycle detection by

    self.filedesc_ptr = None
    self.exe_ptr = None
    self.pgrp_ptr = None
    self.pid = -1

    def next(self):
        nxt_proc = unpacktype(self.smem, Proc.template['p_list'][4]['le_prev'], INT)
if nxt_proc == Proc.head:
    stderr.write("ERROR %s.%s encountered a circular list.\n" % (self.__class__.__name__, sys._getframe().f_code.co_name))
    return None

elif nxt_proc != 0 and Struct.mem.is_valid_address(nxt_proc):
    return Proc(nxt_proc)

return None

# this method has evolved to check ALL requisite proc structure pointers

def valid(self):

    # check *p_fd
    filedesc_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['p_fd'], INT)
    if filedesc_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(filedesc_ptr)):
        return False

    # check *p_textvp
    exe_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['p_textvp'], INT)
    if exe_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(exe_ptr)):
        return False

    # check *p_pgrp
    pgrp_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['p_pgrp'], INT)
    if pgrp_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(pgrp_ptr)):
        return False

    self.filedesc_ptr = filedesc_ptr
    self.exe_ptr = exe_ptr
    self.pgrp_ptr = pgrp_ptr
    return True

def setpid(self, pid):
    self.pid = unpacktype(self.smem, Proc.template['p_pid'], INT)

    while self.pid != pid:
        nxt_proc = unpacktype(self.smem, Proc.template['p_list'][4]['le_prev'], INT)

        if nxt_proc == Proc.head:
            stderr.write("ERROR %s.%s encountered a circular list.\n" % (self.__class__.__name__, sys._getframe().f_code.co_name))
            return False

        elif nxt_proc != 0 and Struct.mem.is_valid_address(nxt_proc):
            self.smem = Struct.mem.read(nxt_proc, Proc.ssize);
            self.pid = unpacktype(self.smem, Proc.template['p_pid'], INT)

        else:
            return False

        filedesc_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['p_fd'], INT)
if filedesc_ptr == 0:
    print "\nPID: %d (%s) has no open files." % (pid, self.getcmd())
    sys.exit()
if not (Struct.mem.is_valid_address(filedesc_ptr)):
    print "\nPID: %d (%s) has an invalid file descriptor." % (pid, self.getcmd())
    sys.exit()
if not self.valid():
    print "\nPID: %d appears in the in process list, but is not compatible with lsof." % pid
    sys.exit()

return True

def getfd(self):
    return self.filedesc_ptr

def getpid(self):
    if self.pid < 0:
        return unpacktype(self.smem, Proc.template['p_pid'], INT)
    return self.pid

def getcmd(self):
    return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['p_comm'], STR).split('\x00', 1)[0].replace(' ', '\\x20').strip('\x00')

def getuser(self):
    pgrp = Pgrp(self.pgrp_ptr)
    return pgrp.getuser()

def gettext(self):
    task_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['task'], INT)
    task = Task(task_ptr)
    txt_ptrs = task.gettxt()

    if not (self.exe_ptr in txt_ptrs):
        txt_ptrs.append(self.exe_ptr)

    return txt_ptrs

# given a validated proc structure, return a list of open files
def getfilelistbyproc(proc):
    filedesc = Filedesc(proc.getfd())
    fglobs = filedesc.getfglobs()
    filelist = []

    if fglobs == None:
        return []
cwd = Vnode(filedesc.getcwd())
if cwd:
    filelist.append( (proc.getcmd(), proc.getpid(), proc.getuser(), "cwd ",
                     cwd.gettype(), cwd.getdev(), cwd.getoff(-1), cwd.getnode(), cwd.getpath())
                     )

txt_ptrs = proc.gettxt()
for txt_ptr in txt_ptrs:
    txt = Vnode(txt_ptr)
    filelist.append( (proc.getcmd(), proc.getpid(), proc.getuser(), "txt ",
                     txt.gettype(), txt.getdev(), txt.getoff(-1), txt.getnode(), txt.getpath())
                     )

# iterate over fileglob structures, note: items() is unsorted by default
for fd, fglob in sorted(fglobs.items()):
    # this has been observed as an invalid pointer even when fileproc is not
    if fglob == 0 or not Struct.mem.is_valid_address(fglob):
        continue

    fileglob = Fileglob(fglob)
    # full support for VNODE (1) only, otherwise, just print ftype for verbose
    ftype = fileglob.gettype()
    # exclude file if type cannot be resolved
    if ftype == -1:
        continue

    if ftype != 'VNODE':
        if Struct.verb:
            filelist.append( (proc.getcmd(), proc.getpid(), proc.getuser(),
                             fileglob.getmode(fd), ftype, -1, -1, -1, -1)
                             )
            continue

    vnode_ptr = fileglob.getdata()
    if vnode_ptr == None:
        continue

    vnode = Vnode(vnode_ptr)
    filelist.append( (proc.getcmd(), proc.getpid(), proc.getuser(),
                     fileglob.getmode(fd), vnode.gettype(), vnode.getdev(),
                     vnode.getoff(fileglob.getoff()), vnode.getnode(), vnode.getpath())
                     )

    return filelist

# build list of processes with open files, and return the aggregate listing
def getfilelist(mem, arch, kvers, proc_head, pid, vflag):


Struct.mem = mem
Struct.arch = arch
Struct.kvers = kvers
Struct.verb = bool(vflag)

proc = Proc(proc_head)
if pid > -1:
    if proc.setpid(pid): # returns True on success
        return getfilelistbyproc(proc)
    print "\tPID: %d not found in process list." %pid
    sys.exit()

ptr_list = [] # this list catches cycles in the linked list (known to occur)
proclist = []
while proc:
    if proc.self_ptr in ptr_list: # test for cycle
        stderr.write("ERROR getfilelist(): proc linked-list cycles, results may be incomplete.\n")
        break
    ptr_list.append(proc.self_ptr)
    if proc.valid():
        proclist.append(proc)
        proc = proc.next()

fullfilelisting = []
for proc in proclist:
    fullfilelisting += getfilelistbyproc(proc)

return fullfilelisting

# given the output of getfilelist(), build a string matrix as input to columnprint()
def printfilelist(filelist):
    headerlist = ["COMMAND", "PID", "USER", " FD ", "TYPE", "DEVICE", "SIZE/OFF", "NODE", "NAME"]
    contentlist = []

    for file in filelist:
        line = ["%s" %file[0]]
        line.append("%d" %file[1])
        line.append("%s" %file[2])
        line.append("%s" %file[3])
        line.append("%s" %file[4])
        line.append("%s" %file[5])
        line.append("%s" %file[6])
        line.append("%d" %file[7])
        line.append("%s" %file[8])
        contentlist.append(line)

    #columnprint(headerlist, contentlist)
# use optional max size list here to match default lsof output, otherwise specify
# lsof +c 0 on the command line to print full name of commands
mszlist = [9, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1]
columnprint(headerlist, contentlist, mszlist)
Bibliography


151


154


**4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE**

Forensic Memory Analysis for Apple OS X

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**14. ABSTRACT**

Analysis of raw memory dumps has become a critical capability in digital forensics because it gives insight into the state of a system that cannot be fully represented through traditional disk analysis. Interest in memory forensics has grown steadily in recent years, with a focus on the Microsoft Windows operating systems. However, similar capabilities for Linux and Apple OS X have lagged by comparison. The volafox open source project has begun work on structured memory analysis for OS X. The tool currently supports a limited set of kernel structures to parse hardware information, system build number, process listing, loaded kernel modules, syscall table, and socket connections. This research addresses one memory analysis deficiency on OS X by introducing a new volafox module for parsing file handles. When open files are mapped to a process, an examiner can learn which resources the process is accessing on disk. This listing is useful for determining what information may have been the target for exfiltration or modification on a compromised system. Comparing output of the developed module and the UNIX lsof (list open files) command on two version of OS X and two kernel architectures validates the methodology used to extract file handle information.

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**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

digital forensics; memory analysis; apple os x; volafox; file handles