Date of Award
12-23-2011
Document Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
First Advisor
Rusty O. Baldwin, PhD.
Abstract
Unintentional electromagnetic emissions are used to recognize or verify the identity of a unique integrated circuit (IC) based on fabrication process-induced variations in a manner analogous to biometric human identification. The effectiveness of the technique is demonstrated through an extensive empirical study, with results presented indicating correct device identification success rates of greater than 99:5%, and average verification equal error rates (EERs) of less than 0:05% for 40 near-identical devices. The proposed approach is suitable for security applications involving commodity commercial ICs, with substantial cost and scalability advantages over existing approaches. A systematic leakage mapping methodology is also proposed to comprehensively assess the information leakage of arbitrary block cipher implementations, and to quantitatively bound an arbitrary implementation's resistance to the general class of differential side channel analysis techniques. The framework is demonstrated using the well-known Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance leakage models, and approach's effectiveness is demonstrated through the empirical assessment of two typical unprotected implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard. The assessment results are empirically validated against correlation-based differential power and electromagnetic analysis attacks.
AFIT Designator
AFIT-DEE-ENG-11-06
DTIC Accession Number
ADA550584
Recommended Citation
Cobb, William E., "Exploitation of Unintentional Information Leakage from Integrated Circuits" (2011). Theses and Dissertations. 1094.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1094